{"blocks":[{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Nearly two years after the alleged events, Lucile H. Craig's attorneys want to delay Diego Sarabia's motion to dismiss\u2014while defending a complaint that invokes a childhood sexual-abuse statute despite identifying Craig as a 20-year-old adult.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"Justice Delayed, Justice Denied","caption":"Justice Delayed, Justice Denied","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"748","text":"","type":"image"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"There is a remarkable irony unfolding in the New York Supreme Court.","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Lucile H. Craig (Lucy Craig), the plaintiff in the sprawling Cornell University litigation, has spent considerable effort demanding accountability, answers, and justice.\n\nBut now that one of the defendants has dared to ask the court whether the claims against him are legally sustainable, Craig's attorneys have discovered an entirely new appreciation for patience.\n\nSixty more days of patience, to be precise.\n\nOn November 5, 2026, attorney Jeremy A. Hellman filed NYSCEF Document No. 99, asking the court to postpone defendant Diego Sarabia's motion return date from November 16, 2026, until at least January 15, 2027.\n\nWhy?\n\nNot because Sarabia concealed evidence.\n\nNot because some extraordinary new development fundamentally changed the lawsuit.\n\nNot because of a documented emergency.\n\nInstead, Craig's attorneys say they need more time to address complex issues and would prefer to coordinate their opposition with motions that other defendants might eventually file.\n\nTranslation: Sarabia has challenged the lawsuit against him, but Craig's attorneys would find it more convenient to answer him later.\n\nAnd convenience, apparently, should outweigh a defendant's interest in obtaining a timely determination of the claims hanging over his head.\n\nThe request becomes particularly difficult to defend when considered alongside the legal problems identified in Sarabia's October 23 memorandum.\n\nThose problems include the ordinary one-year statute of limitations, the failure to distinguish adequately between individual defendants, and the plaintiff's invocation of a statutory provision concerning sexual offenses against children\u2014even though Craig's own pleaded age was twenty.\n\nTogether, the two filings present an uncomfortable picture of a plaintiff who waited almost two years to commence litigation and now seeks to postpone an individual defendant's effort to challenge it.\n\nJustice delayed is justice denied.\n\nAnd justice is not the exclusive property of the person who files the lawsuit.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"1. Nearly Two Years to Sue. Now Another Two Months to Respond?","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"The relevant chronology is straightforward.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":"440","html":"\n
\n \n\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n
DATEEVENT
October 19\u201320, 2024Alleged underlying events
October 20, 2025\n Approximate expiration of the ordinary one-year\n limitations period for intentional torts arising\n from those events, absent an applicable exception\n or toll\n
September 16, 2026Craig commences the civil action
October 23, 2026Sarabia files his motion to dismiss
November 16, 2026Scheduled motion return date
January 15, 2027\n New return date requested by Craig's counsel\n
\n
\n","media_id":"","text":"","type":"html"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Craig had almost twenty-three months between the alleged events and the commencement of her civil action.\n\nThat does not automatically make every claim untimely. Different causes of action may carry different limitations periods, and New York law provides important exceptions for certain sexual offenses.\n\nBut timing is central to Sarabia's defense.\n\nUnder CPLR \u00a7 215(3), ordinary civil assault and battery claims are generally subject to a one-year limitations period.\n\nSarabia argues that the specifically pleaded conduct attributed to him does not qualify for the longer limitations period Craig invokes.\n\nThat is a question the court must answer.\n\nWhat makes the current request objectionable is the sequence: Craig chose when to commence her lawsuit, Sarabia promptly challenged its legal sufficiency, and now Craig's lawyers want additional time before that challenge proceeds.\n\nThe passage of nearly two years before filing was not Sarabia's choice. Why should he now shoulder another delay for the convenience of the party who sued him?\n\nThe statute of limitations did not materialize overnight.\n\nIts requirements existed before the complaint was drafted, before the defendants were named, and before the plaintiff's attorneys decided which statutory theories to invoke.\n\nIf those theories are legally sound, Craig's lawyers should explain why.\n\nIf they are not, additional waiting will not make them so.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"2. Seven Defendants Are Seven Individuals, Not One Collective Villain","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Perhaps the most revealing part of Hellman's November 5 affirmation appears in paragraph 7.\n\nHe acknowledges that the legal issues involving individual defendants may vary, but suggests that having motions returnable around the same time would simplify matters and potentially allow plaintiff's counsel to prepare a single opposition.\n\nHow convenient.\n\nFor the attorneys.\n\nBut this is a courtroom, not an administrative exercise designed to minimize the number of documents that plaintiff's counsel must draft.\n\nDiego Sarabia is not Matthew Ingalls. He is not Winston Lee. He is not Johnathan Newell. He is not Gillio Lopes.\n\nEach is a separate defendant.\n\nEach is entitled to have the claims against him evaluated according to the particular conduct and legal theories attributable to him.\n\nAnd each has the right to challenge those claims independently.\n\nSarabia's October 23 memorandum makes this distinction central to his defense.\n\nAccording to his attorneys, Craig's complaint approaches 600 paragraphs and repeatedly characterizes the seven student defendants collectively as perpetrators of sexual assault and rape.\n\nYet the defense identifies only two specifically described actions attributed to Sarabia:\n\nAllegedly grabbing Craig's face and kissing her without consent.\n\nParticipating with others in placing ketamine on her body and snorting it.\n\nSarabia categorically denies the allegations.\n\nHis attorneys argue that the complaint does not specifically allege he penetrated Craig, participated in the other alleged sexual encounters, or was present for most of the events involving other defendants.\n\nThat is not a minor distinction.\n\nIt is the difference between individual liability and an attempt to substitute a collective narrative for particularized allegations.\n\nNew York law can recognize liability involving multiple participants where the necessary facts and legal elements are established. But merely naming several people in the same complaint does not make every person responsible for every alleged act.\n\nA plaintiff cannot convert seven distinct individuals into one interchangeable defendant simply by repeating the most serious accusation against the group.\n\nIf Craig believes Sarabia is legally responsible for conduct committed by others, her attorneys must identify and support the applicable legal theory.\n\nIf she alleges wrongdoing by Sarabia individually, the sufficiency and timeliness of those claims must be evaluated individually.\n\nThe court should not be persuaded that Sarabia must wait for Cornell University, a sorority, a fraternity, or other students to file their own motions before his challenge can be addressed.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"3. The Statute of Limitations Is Not a Technicality to Be Wished Away","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Sarabia's motion seeks dismissal under CPLR \u00a7 3211(a)(5) and \u00a7 3211(a)(7).\n\nThe first concerns, among other things, claims barred by limitations periods.\n\nThe second concerns whether a legally cognizable claim has been sufficiently stated.\n\nThe defense argues that the complaint fails on both grounds.\n\nFor the intentional tort claims, Sarabia invokes the ordinary one-year limitations period under CPLR \u00a7 215(3).\n\nCraig's complaint, according to his memorandum, relies in part on CPLR \u00a7 213-c, which establishes a twenty-year period for certain civil claims resulting from specified serious sexual offenses.\n\nThat statute is significant.\n\nIt exists to permit civil claims arising from particular enumerated offenses and can reach parties whose intentional or negligent conduct is alleged to have resulted in qualifying conduct.\n\nBut it is not an automatic twenty-year extension for every allegedly offensive physical act described within a larger sexual-assault lawsuit.\n\nSarabia argues that the acts specifically attributed to him do not themselves satisfy the qualifying statutory requirements and that the complaint fails to establish a legally sufficient basis connecting him to covered conduct.\n\nWhether he is correct remains for the court to decide.\n\nStill, the question deserves a direct response.\n\nCalling someone a rapist repeatedly does not substitute for pleading facts that establish the applicable legal elements.\n\nNor does surrounding a comparatively narrow set of allegations against one defendant with hundreds of paragraphs concerning other people automatically cure a limitations problem.\n\nThe judiciary exists to examine these distinctions.\n\nThat examination should not be postponed merely because the plaintiff's attorneys would prefer to prepare their responses to multiple defendants together.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"4. An Adult Plaintiff Invoking a Childhood Sexual-Abuse Statute: The Problem Craig's Lawyers Need to Explain","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Now we arrive at perhaps the most troubling statutory issue identified in Sarabia's memorandum.\n\nAccording to the defense, Craig's complaint invokes CPLR \u00a7 208(b) in paragraphs 516 and 522 as a basis for protecting certain claims against a statute-of-limitations defense.\n\nThere is one enormous problem with that argument.\n\nCPLR \u00a7 208(b) expressly concerns specified sexual offenses committed against a person who was under eighteen years of age.\n\nCraig's own complaint, as described in Sarabia's memorandum, states that she was twenty years old at the time of the alleged events.\n\nTwenty.\n\nAn adult under New York law.\n\nThe provision extends special civil protections to people who suffered specified sexual offenses as minors. It does not become applicable to alleged conduct occurring when a plaintiff was twenty simply because the underlying accusations are serious.\n\nThis is not obscure legal terminology.\n\nIt is a fundamental statutory eligibility requirement.\n\nAnd the mismatch raises questions that deserve an answer from Craig's lawyers.\n\nWhy was a provision expressly addressing offenses committed against children included in claims arising from events involving a twenty-year-old plaintiff?\n\nWhat legal rationale supports its application?\n\nAnd if no such rationale exists, why should the individual defendants bear the burden of litigating against a statutory theory that appears incompatible with the plaintiff's own pleaded age?\n\nPerhaps the provision was included as an alternative argument.\n\nPerhaps it was a drafting error.\n\nPerhaps Craig's attorneys intend to advance some explanation not yet evident from the documents examined.\n\nBut whatever the explanation, the responsibility for establishing the statute's applicability belongs to the party invoking it.\n\nThe court should require that explanation, not allow the statutory problem to disappear into a sprawling collective narrative.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"5. The Reputational Harm of Invoking Child Sexual Abuse Law Against an Adult's Defendants","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"There is another dimension to this issue, one that deserves public scrutiny independently of whether the court dismisses any particular cause of action.\n\nThe reputational consequences.\n\nAllegations of sexual misconduct are exceptionally serious.\n\nThey can affect employment, education, personal relationships, professional opportunities, and a defendant's standing in the community.\n\nEven where allegations are denied and never established, the public consequences can be substantial.\n\nNow introduce a statute associated with sexual abuse committed against children.\n\nThe reputational implications become potentially more damaging.\n\nThere is an obvious difference between an accusation involving adult participants and an accusation involving the sexual abuse of a minor.\n\nThat distinction matters legally, morally, and publicly.\n\nTo be clear, citing CPLR \u00a7 208(b) does not itself expressly allege that Sarabia assaulted a child. It does not convert Craig into a minor, and the citation alone does not establish actionable defamation.\n\nBut the possibility of public misunderstanding is real.\n\nIn a case already characterized by sweeping and highly inflammatory accusations, invoking a special statutory framework for childhood sexual abuse risks confusing the nature of the alleged conduct and the protections being claimed.\n\nSarabia should not have to contend with implications beyond even the specific wrongdoing Craig alleges against him.\n\nHis defense is entitled to be evaluated against the actual allegations.\n\nNot allegations against other defendants.\n\nNot the most inflammatory characterization available.\n\nAnd not a statutory framework addressing childhood victimization if the plaintiff's own pleaded age makes that framework inapplicable.\n\nThere is an important legal distinction here: New York generally recognizes an absolute privilege for pertinent statements in judicial proceedings. That means an apparently erroneous statutory argument is not, by itself, a viable defamation claim.\n\nBut litigation privilege is not a guarantee of sound legal reasoning.\n\nNor does it insulate an argument from public criticism.\n\nThe fact that an attorney may invoke a statutory provision in a pleading does not mean the argument is legally persuasive, factually appropriate, or free from troubling reputational implications.\n\nA legally protected court filing can still be criticized as misleading, excessive, or unsupported.\n\nAnd where the consequence of imprecise legal characterization may be lasting reputational damage to an identifiable defendant, precision should be demanded.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"6. The 'Clean Hands' Argument: Accusations as a Reason to Delay Examining Accusations","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Hellman's affirmation supplies another remarkable argument.\n\nIn paragraph 8, he suggests Sarabia does not approach the matter with entirely clean hands, referring to the alleged unwanted kissing and ketamine-related conduct.\n\nThat is quite a proposition.\n\nThe allegations that Sarabia is asking the court to evaluate are effectively invoked as a reason his request for prompt judicial consideration deserves less sympathy.\n\nConsider the circular reasoning.\n\nCraig accuses Sarabia of wrongdoing.\n\nSarabia moves to dismiss the claims, arguing that they are untimely or legally insufficient.\n\nCraig's attorney then points to those very accusations to suggest that Sarabia does not deserve accelerated consideration of the motion.\n\nSince when does an unproven allegation diminish a defendant's entitlement to ordinary procedural fairness?\n\nThe court is not being asked to decide whether Sarabia is a morally admirable person.\n\nIt is being asked to determine whether the legal claims against him can proceed.\n\nA motion to dismiss ordinarily assumes properly pleaded factual allegations to be true for purposes of evaluating their legal sufficiency. It does not constitute a trial, and it does not establish that the alleged events happened.\n\nThat distinction should be elementary.\n\nA defendant may have a complete limitations defense even when the alleged underlying conduct is offensive.\n\nA plaintiff may have suffered a genuine injury yet asserted a cause of action that is legally insufficient against a particular defendant.\n\nThe law recognizes both possibilities.\n\nThe seriousness of an accusation does not excuse the plaintiff from demonstrating a legally sustainable claim.\n\nNor should it become a reason to postpone examination of that claim.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"7. 'Common Courtesy' Is Not a Legal Defense to a Motion to Dismiss","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Hellman's November 5 filing also invokes the notion of common legal courtesy.\n\nThe suggestion is that Sarabia's attorneys should accommodate the requested delay rather than insist upon the existing motion schedule.\n\nBut Sarabia's attorneys are under no general obligation to consent to a sixty-day adjournment merely because opposing counsel requests one.\n\nAccording to the affirmation, plaintiff's counsel proposed the extension on October 27, followed up on October 29, and received an express refusal on October 30.\n\nThat refusal does not establish misconduct.\n\nIt establishes disagreement.\n\nUnder 22 NYCRR \u00a7 202.8(e), a party can seek an adjournment without the other party's consent, and the court has authority to decide the request.\n\nThe rule limits routine stipulated adjournments without additional court permission; it does not give a party an automatic entitlement to sixty days simply for asking.\n\nCourtesy is not a tolling provision.\n\nIt is not a substitute for showing why a particular extension is necessary.\n\nAnd it is not a requirement that a defendant voluntarily prolong litigation against himself.\n\nIf the plaintiff needs additional time for a specific and compelling reason, counsel can explain that reason to the court.\n\nWhat does not follow is that the defendant's refusal to consent should somehow be portrayed as objectionable conduct.\n\nSarabia has a legitimate interest in having a pending threshold motion heard.\n\nThat interest does not evaporate because the plaintiff believes the lawsuit is important.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"8. Cornell, Tri Delta, and the Other Defendants Have Their Own Legal Problems","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Hellman's filing lists several defendants who have received extensions of time to respond to the complaint, including Scott Kretzschmar, Delta Delta Delta, Scott Norris, Gillio Lopes, and Cornell University.\n\nThe theory appears to be that these defendants might file motions raising issues that could be addressed alongside Sarabia's.\n\nThat is possible.\n\nBut possibility is not necessity.\n\nCornell University's potential institutional obligations are different from those of a student.\n\nA fraternity house corporation's possible liability is different from an individual student's alleged personal misconduct.\n\nA sorority's potential duties are different from those of a nightclub.\n\nAnd Sarabia's alleged acts are not necessarily identical to those attributed to other defendants.\n\nIndeed, this is the very reason the lawsuit's collective framing warrants careful scrutiny.\n\nDifferent defendants may have different defenses and different statutory issues.\n\nThat is not an inconvenience the justice system should eliminate by forcing everyone onto the plaintiff's preferred schedule. It is an essential feature of individualized adjudication.\n\nPlaintiff's counsel may prefer to draft one affirmation rather than several.\n\nBut there is no automatic right to a coordinated schedule merely because that approach would reduce the burden on counsel.\n\nCourts possess case-management tools to address overlapping legal issues without treating every defendant as procedurally inseparable from every other defendant.\n\nIf later motions raise substantially similar grounds, they can be managed appropriately.\n\nSarabia's existing motion should not become a hostage to anticipated filings from defendants who have not yet made them.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"9. A Long Complaint Does Not Automatically Require a Long Delay","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Craig's attorneys emphasize the complexity of the case and the extensive complaint.\n\nComplex litigation can justify additional time, and courts must ensure that both parties have a fair opportunity to present their arguments.\n\nThat principle is not disputed.\n\nWhat is disputed is the adequacy of the explanation offered for this particular sixty-day request.\n\nHellman's affirmation does not identify a specific new evidentiary development that must be investigated before responding to Sarabia.\n\nNor does it describe a concrete obstacle making a response within the existing schedule impossible.\n\nInstead, the requested length of the adjournment is substantially justified by expected motions from other defendants and the hope of preparing coordinated opposition papers.\n\nThere is an obvious weakness in that reasoning.\n\nThe plaintiff chose the structure of her complaint.\n\nThe plaintiff chose which causes of action to assert.\n\nThe plaintiff chose to name the individual and institutional defendants together.\n\nAnd the plaintiff's attorneys chose the statutory provisions upon which the complaint relies.\n\nThey cannot reasonably present all of those litigation choices as entirely unexpected complications once an individual defendant files a motion testing their legal sufficiency.\n\nA complaint approaching 600 paragraphs may be complicated. But complicated is not synonymous with legally sufficient.\n\nNeither is length a reason to avoid addressing a defendant's particularized challenge.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"10. The Defendant's Reputation Does Not Get a Sixty-Day Holiday","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"The consequences of continued litigation are not distributed equally.\n\nFor the plaintiff's attorneys, an extension may mean more time to prepare opposition papers.\n\nFor Sarabia, it means the pending claims and allegations remain unresolved for a longer period.\n\nThat does not make every requested adjournment improper.\n\nNor does a pending dismissal motion automatically entitle the defendant to an immediate ruling.\n\nBut the defendant's interests must be part of the calculation.\n\nThis case involves allegations capable of profoundly affecting an individual's reputation and future.\n\nIt also involves a memorandum arguing that the plaintiff has used collective allegations exceeding the particularized conduct attributed to Sarabia, and relied upon at least one statute whose age requirement appears facially incompatible with her own pleaded facts.\n\nThose issues are not trivial.\n\nThey deserve judicial examination.\n\nAnd they should not be minimized simply because the plaintiff's attorneys would find a later return date more convenient.\n\nThe reputational burden of an unresolved accusation is real, even when the ultimate merits remain undecided.\n\nThat is precisely why litigation should proceed fairly and without unnecessary delay.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"11. The Court Should Reject the Requested Sixty-Day Adjournment","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"No one is suggesting that a plaintiff should be denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to a dismissal motion.\n\nAnd no one can properly conclude from these two filings alone that every claim against Sarabia must necessarily fail.\n\nBut the November 5 affirmation does not present a persuasive justification for postponing the motion's return date by the full period requested.\n\nThe interests of judicial efficiency must be balanced against the interests of the individual defendant.\n\nHere, Sarabia has filed a substantial motion identifying specific statutory and pleading defects.\n\nThe plaintiff has known the underlying facts since the events she alleges occurred.\n\nHer counsel drafted the complaint.\n\nAnd the issues raised by Sarabia\u2014including the ordinary one-year limitations period, the distinction between individualized and collective allegations, and the apparently inapplicable childhood sexual-abuse provision\u2014are readily identifiable from the pleadings and motion papers.\n\nThe court should preserve the November 16 return date unless Craig can demonstrate a specific need for a limited additional period that cannot fairly be accommodated within the existing schedule.\n\nEven if a shorter extension is warranted, the desire to consolidate anticipated opposition papers should not, standing alone, justify deferring Sarabia's motion until January 15.\n\nThe court's role is not to punish the plaintiff for filing a complicated lawsuit.\n\nIt is not to punish the defendant for refusing an extension.\n\nIt is to apply the law evenhandedly.\n\nAnd evenhanded treatment means recognizing that the interests of both sides matter.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Final Word: Justice Is Not Reserved for the Accuser","type":"heading"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"The most striking feature of Craig's adjournment request is not that her attorneys want additional time.\n\nLawyers ask for extensions every day.\n\nIt is the reasoning advanced for requiring a defendant to wait.\n\nSarabia has asked the court to examine the allegations against him individually.\n\nHis counsel argues that certain claims are untimely, that important allegations are pleaded collectively rather than specifically, and that Craig's reliance on CPLR \u00a7 208(b) is incompatible with her admitted adult age at the time of the alleged events.\n\nThose arguments may succeed or fail.\n\nBut their resolution should not depend upon whether the plaintiff's lawyers would prefer to respond to Cornell University, a sorority, a nightclub, and other individual defendants simultaneously.\n\nAnd there is something especially troubling about invoking the seriousness of sexual-misconduct allegations to justify delaying the legal scrutiny of those very allegations.\n\nAn accusation is not a conviction.\n\nA collective allegation is not proof of individual liability.\n\nA statutory citation is not a substitute for satisfying the statute.\n\nAnd common courtesy is not an entitlement to sixty days of additional litigation.\n\nThe plaintiff was twenty years old, according to her own complaint.\n\nThe childhood sexual-abuse limitations provision expressly addresses offenses committed against persons under eighteen.\n\nIf Craig's attorneys have a legal explanation for invoking that provision, the court should hear it.\n\nIf they do not, it should not be treated as a valid basis for preserving claims.\n\nLikewise, if the specific allegations against Sarabia establish timely, legally sufficient causes of action, those claims should proceed.\n\nIf they do not, they should be dismissed.\n\nThat is how the legal system is supposed to operate.\n\nNot by guilt through association.\n\nNot by emotional appeals.\n\nNot by stretching statutes beyond their written requirements.\n\nAnd certainly not by treating one defendant's future as an administrative inconvenience.\n\nLucile H. Craig chose to bring this lawsuit. Diego Sarabia is entitled to challenge it.\n\nThe court should allow that challenge to move forward without the full requested delay.\n\nBecause justice delayed is justice denied.\n\nAnd the defendant deserves justice, too.","type":"paragraph"},{"alt":"","caption":"","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"","text":"Court: Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County\nCase: Jane Doe v. Cornell University, Inc., et al.\nIndex No.: 161704/2026\n\nNYSCEF Document No. 90: Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Diego Sarabia, filed October 23, 2026.\n\nNYSCEF Document No. 99: Affirmation in Support of Request for Adjournment, Jeremy A. Hellman, filed November 5, 2026.\n\nCPLR \u00a7 215(3): Ordinary one-year limitations period for assault and battery.\n\nCPLR \u00a7 213-c: Twenty-year limitations period for civil claims resulting from specified sexual offenses.\n\nCPLR \u00a7 208(b): Special limitations provision concerning specified offenses committed against persons under eighteen.\n\nCPLR \u00a7 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7): Grounds for dismissal based on, among other things, limitations defenses and failure to state a cause of action.\n\n22 NYCRR \u00a7 202.8(e): Motion adjournment procedures.","type":"evidence"},{"alt":"","caption":"Lucy Craig's Adjournment Motion","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"747","text":"","type":"pdf"},{"alt":"","caption":"Sarabia Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss","height":420,"html":"","media_id":"618","text":"","type":"pdf"}],"canonical":"https://lucycraig.blog/article/lucy-craig-wants-another-60-days-the-court-should-say-no","description":"Nearly two years after the alleged events, Lucile H. Craig's attorneys want to delay Diego Sarabia's motion to dismiss\u2014while defending a complaint that...","keywords":["sarabia","craig's","defendants","attorneys","motion","claims","complaint","plaintiff","defendant","limitations","sarabia's","statutory"],"markdown":"https://lucycraig.blog/article/lucy-craig-wants-another-60-days-the-court-should-say-no.md","published_at":"2026-11-05T16:11:16+00:00","section":"Legal Commentary","subtitle":"JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED:","summary":"Nearly two years after the alleged events, Lucile H. Craig's attorneys want to delay Diego Sarabia's motion to dismiss\u2014while defending a complaint that invokes a childhood sexual-abuse statute despite identifying Craig as a 20-year-old adult. Justice Delayed, Justice Denied There is a remarkable irony unfolding in the New York Supreme Court. Lucile H.","title":"Lucy Craig Wants Another 60 Days. The Court Should Say No.","updated_at":"2026-11-05T16:11:56+00:00"}