# Lucy Craig Wants Another 60 Days. The Court Should Say No.

JUSTICE DELAYED IS JUSTICE DENIED:

Nearly two years after the alleged events, Lucile H. Craig's attorneys want to delay Diego Sarabia's motion to dismiss—while defending a complaint that invokes a childhood sexual-abuse statute despite identifying Craig as a 20-year-old adult. Justice Delayed, Justice Denied There is a remarkable irony unfolding in the New York Supreme Court. Lucile H.
Nearly two years after the alleged events, Lucile H. Craig's attorneys want to delay Diego Sarabia's motion to dismiss—while defending a complaint that invokes a childhood sexual-abuse statute despite identifying Craig as a 20-year-old adult.

[Justice Delayed, Justice Denied](https://lucycraig.blog/media/748)


## There is a remarkable irony unfolding in the New York Supreme Court.

Lucile H. Craig (Lucy Craig), the plaintiff in the sprawling Cornell University litigation, has spent considerable effort demanding accountability, answers, and justice.

But now that one of the defendants has dared to ask the court whether the claims against him are legally sustainable, Craig's attorneys have discovered an entirely new appreciation for patience.

Sixty more days of patience, to be precise.

On November 5, 2026, attorney Jeremy A. Hellman filed NYSCEF Document No. 99, asking the court to postpone defendant Diego Sarabia's motion return date from November 16, 2026, until at least January 15, 2027.

Why?

Not because Sarabia concealed evidence.

Not because some extraordinary new development fundamentally changed the lawsuit.

Not because of a documented emergency.

Instead, Craig's attorneys say they need more time to address complex issues and would prefer to coordinate their opposition with motions that other defendants might eventually file.

Translation: Sarabia has challenged the lawsuit against him, but Craig's attorneys would find it more convenient to answer him later.

And convenience, apparently, should outweigh a defendant's interest in obtaining a timely determination of the claims hanging over his head.

The request becomes particularly difficult to defend when considered alongside the legal problems identified in Sarabia's October 23 memorandum.

Those problems include the ordinary one-year statute of limitations, the failure to distinguish adequately between individual defendants, and the plaintiff's invocation of a statutory provision concerning sexual offenses against children—even though Craig's own pleaded age was twenty.

Together, the two filings present an uncomfortable picture of a plaintiff who waited almost two years to commence litigation and now seeks to postpone an individual defendant's effort to challenge it.

Justice delayed is justice denied.

And justice is not the exclusive property of the person who files the lawsuit.


## 1. Nearly Two Years to Sue. Now Another Two Months to Respond?

The relevant chronology is straightforward.

Craig had almost twenty-three months between the alleged events and the commencement of her civil action.

That does not automatically make every claim untimely. Different causes of action may carry different limitations periods, and New York law provides important exceptions for certain sexual offenses.

But timing is central to Sarabia's defense.

Under CPLR § 215(3), ordinary civil assault and battery claims are generally subject to a one-year limitations period.

Sarabia argues that the specifically pleaded conduct attributed to him does not qualify for the longer limitations period Craig invokes.

That is a question the court must answer.

What makes the current request objectionable is the sequence: Craig chose when to commence her lawsuit, Sarabia promptly challenged its legal sufficiency, and now Craig's lawyers want additional time before that challenge proceeds.

The passage of nearly two years before filing was not Sarabia's choice. Why should he now shoulder another delay for the convenience of the party who sued him?

The statute of limitations did not materialize overnight.

Its requirements existed before the complaint was drafted, before the defendants were named, and before the plaintiff's attorneys decided which statutory theories to invoke.

If those theories are legally sound, Craig's lawyers should explain why.

If they are not, additional waiting will not make them so.


## 2. Seven Defendants Are Seven Individuals, Not One Collective Villain

Perhaps the most revealing part of Hellman's November 5 affirmation appears in paragraph 7.

He acknowledges that the legal issues involving individual defendants may vary, but suggests that having motions returnable around the same time would simplify matters and potentially allow plaintiff's counsel to prepare a single opposition.

How convenient.

For the attorneys.

But this is a courtroom, not an administrative exercise designed to minimize the number of documents that plaintiff's counsel must draft.

Diego Sarabia is not Matthew Ingalls. He is not Winston Lee. He is not Johnathan Newell. He is not Gillio Lopes.

Each is a separate defendant.

Each is entitled to have the claims against him evaluated according to the particular conduct and legal theories attributable to him.

And each has the right to challenge those claims independently.

Sarabia's October 23 memorandum makes this distinction central to his defense.

According to his attorneys, Craig's complaint approaches 600 paragraphs and repeatedly characterizes the seven student defendants collectively as perpetrators of sexual assault and rape.

Yet the defense identifies only two specifically described actions attributed to Sarabia:

Allegedly grabbing Craig's face and kissing her without consent.

Participating with others in placing ketamine on her body and snorting it.

Sarabia categorically denies the allegations.

His attorneys argue that the complaint does not specifically allege he penetrated Craig, participated in the other alleged sexual encounters, or was present for most of the events involving other defendants.

That is not a minor distinction.

It is the difference between individual liability and an attempt to substitute a collective narrative for particularized allegations.

New York law can recognize liability involving multiple participants where the necessary facts and legal elements are established. But merely naming several people in the same complaint does not make every person responsible for every alleged act.

A plaintiff cannot convert seven distinct individuals into one interchangeable defendant simply by repeating the most serious accusation against the group.

If Craig believes Sarabia is legally responsible for conduct committed by others, her attorneys must identify and support the applicable legal theory.

If she alleges wrongdoing by Sarabia individually, the sufficiency and timeliness of those claims must be evaluated individually.

The court should not be persuaded that Sarabia must wait for Cornell University, a sorority, a fraternity, or other students to file their own motions before his challenge can be addressed.


## 3. The Statute of Limitations Is Not a Technicality to Be Wished Away

Sarabia's motion seeks dismissal under CPLR § 3211(a)(5) and § 3211(a)(7).

The first concerns, among other things, claims barred by limitations periods.

The second concerns whether a legally cognizable claim has been sufficiently stated.

The defense argues that the complaint fails on both grounds.

For the intentional tort claims, Sarabia invokes the ordinary one-year limitations period under CPLR § 215(3).

Craig's complaint, according to his memorandum, relies in part on CPLR § 213-c, which establishes a twenty-year period for certain civil claims resulting from specified serious sexual offenses.

That statute is significant.

It exists to permit civil claims arising from particular enumerated offenses and can reach parties whose intentional or negligent conduct is alleged to have resulted in qualifying conduct.

But it is not an automatic twenty-year extension for every allegedly offensive physical act described within a larger sexual-assault lawsuit.

Sarabia argues that the acts specifically attributed to him do not themselves satisfy the qualifying statutory requirements and that the complaint fails to establish a legally sufficient basis connecting him to covered conduct.

Whether he is correct remains for the court to decide.

Still, the question deserves a direct response.

Calling someone a rapist repeatedly does not substitute for pleading facts that establish the applicable legal elements.

Nor does surrounding a comparatively narrow set of allegations against one defendant with hundreds of paragraphs concerning other people automatically cure a limitations problem.

The judiciary exists to examine these distinctions.

That examination should not be postponed merely because the plaintiff's attorneys would prefer to prepare their responses to multiple defendants together.


## 4. An Adult Plaintiff Invoking a Childhood Sexual-Abuse Statute: The Problem Craig's Lawyers Need to Explain

Now we arrive at perhaps the most troubling statutory issue identified in Sarabia's memorandum.

According to the defense, Craig's complaint invokes CPLR § 208(b) in paragraphs 516 and 522 as a basis for protecting certain claims against a statute-of-limitations defense.

There is one enormous problem with that argument.

CPLR § 208(b) expressly concerns specified sexual offenses committed against a person who was under eighteen years of age.

Craig's own complaint, as described in Sarabia's memorandum, states that she was twenty years old at the time of the alleged events.

Twenty.

An adult under New York law.

The provision extends special civil protections to people who suffered specified sexual offenses as minors. It does not become applicable to alleged conduct occurring when a plaintiff was twenty simply because the underlying accusations are serious.

This is not obscure legal terminology.

It is a fundamental statutory eligibility requirement.

And the mismatch raises questions that deserve an answer from Craig's lawyers.

Why was a provision expressly addressing offenses committed against children included in claims arising from events involving a twenty-year-old plaintiff?

What legal rationale supports its application?

And if no such rationale exists, why should the individual defendants bear the burden of litigating against a statutory theory that appears incompatible with the plaintiff's own pleaded age?

Perhaps the provision was included as an alternative argument.

Perhaps it was a drafting error.

Perhaps Craig's attorneys intend to advance some explanation not yet evident from the documents examined.

But whatever the explanation, the responsibility for establishing the statute's applicability belongs to the party invoking it.

The court should require that explanation, not allow the statutory problem to disappear into a sprawling collective narrative.


## 5. The Reputational Harm of Invoking Child Sexual Abuse Law Against an Adult's Defendants

There is another dimension to this issue, one that deserves public scrutiny independently of whether the court dismisses any particular cause of action.

The reputational consequences.

Allegations of sexual misconduct are exceptionally serious.

They can affect employment, education, personal relationships, professional opportunities, and a defendant's standing in the community.

Even where allegations are denied and never established, the public consequences can be substantial.

Now introduce a statute associated with sexual abuse committed against children.

The reputational implications become potentially more damaging.

There is an obvious difference between an accusation involving adult participants and an accusation involving the sexual abuse of a minor.

That distinction matters legally, morally, and publicly.

To be clear, citing CPLR § 208(b) does not itself expressly allege that Sarabia assaulted a child. It does not convert Craig into a minor, and the citation alone does not establish actionable defamation.

But the possibility of public misunderstanding is real.

In a case already characterized by sweeping and highly inflammatory accusations, invoking a special statutory framework for childhood sexual abuse risks confusing the nature of the alleged conduct and the protections being claimed.

Sarabia should not have to contend with implications beyond even the specific wrongdoing Craig alleges against him.

His defense is entitled to be evaluated against the actual allegations.

Not allegations against other defendants.

Not the most inflammatory characterization available.

And not a statutory framework addressing childhood victimization if the plaintiff's own pleaded age makes that framework inapplicable.

There is an important legal distinction here: New York generally recognizes an absolute privilege for pertinent statements in judicial proceedings. That means an apparently erroneous statutory argument is not, by itself, a viable defamation claim.

But litigation privilege is not a guarantee of sound legal reasoning.

Nor does it insulate an argument from public criticism.

The fact that an attorney may invoke a statutory provision in a pleading does not mean the argument is legally persuasive, factually appropriate, or free from troubling reputational implications.

A legally protected court filing can still be criticized as misleading, excessive, or unsupported.

And where the consequence of imprecise legal characterization may be lasting reputational damage to an identifiable defendant, precision should be demanded.


## 6. The 'Clean Hands' Argument: Accusations as a Reason to Delay Examining Accusations

Hellman's affirmation supplies another remarkable argument.

In paragraph 8, he suggests Sarabia does not approach the matter with entirely clean hands, referring to the alleged unwanted kissing and ketamine-related conduct.

That is quite a proposition.

The allegations that Sarabia is asking the court to evaluate are effectively invoked as a reason his request for prompt judicial consideration deserves less sympathy.

Consider the circular reasoning.

Craig accuses Sarabia of wrongdoing.

Sarabia moves to dismiss the claims, arguing that they are untimely or legally insufficient.

Craig's attorney then points to those very accusations to suggest that Sarabia does not deserve accelerated consideration of the motion.

Since when does an unproven allegation diminish a defendant's entitlement to ordinary procedural fairness?

The court is not being asked to decide whether Sarabia is a morally admirable person.

It is being asked to determine whether the legal claims against him can proceed.

A motion to dismiss ordinarily assumes properly pleaded factual allegations to be true for purposes of evaluating their legal sufficiency. It does not constitute a trial, and it does not establish that the alleged events happened.

That distinction should be elementary.

A defendant may have a complete limitations defense even when the alleged underlying conduct is offensive.

A plaintiff may have suffered a genuine injury yet asserted a cause of action that is legally insufficient against a particular defendant.

The law recognizes both possibilities.

The seriousness of an accusation does not excuse the plaintiff from demonstrating a legally sustainable claim.

Nor should it become a reason to postpone examination of that claim.


## 7. 'Common Courtesy' Is Not a Legal Defense to a Motion to Dismiss

Hellman's November 5 filing also invokes the notion of common legal courtesy.

The suggestion is that Sarabia's attorneys should accommodate the requested delay rather than insist upon the existing motion schedule.

But Sarabia's attorneys are under no general obligation to consent to a sixty-day adjournment merely because opposing counsel requests one.

According to the affirmation, plaintiff's counsel proposed the extension on October 27, followed up on October 29, and received an express refusal on October 30.

That refusal does not establish misconduct.

It establishes disagreement.

Under 22 NYCRR § 202.8(e), a party can seek an adjournment without the other party's consent, and the court has authority to decide the request.

The rule limits routine stipulated adjournments without additional court permission; it does not give a party an automatic entitlement to sixty days simply for asking.

Courtesy is not a tolling provision.

It is not a substitute for showing why a particular extension is necessary.

And it is not a requirement that a defendant voluntarily prolong litigation against himself.

If the plaintiff needs additional time for a specific and compelling reason, counsel can explain that reason to the court.

What does not follow is that the defendant's refusal to consent should somehow be portrayed as objectionable conduct.

Sarabia has a legitimate interest in having a pending threshold motion heard.

That interest does not evaporate because the plaintiff believes the lawsuit is important.


## 8. Cornell, Tri Delta, and the Other Defendants Have Their Own Legal Problems

Hellman's filing lists several defendants who have received extensions of time to respond to the complaint, including Scott Kretzschmar, Delta Delta Delta, Scott Norris, Gillio Lopes, and Cornell University.

The theory appears to be that these defendants might file motions raising issues that could be addressed alongside Sarabia's.

That is possible.

But possibility is not necessity.

Cornell University's potential institutional obligations are different from those of a student.

A fraternity house corporation's possible liability is different from an individual student's alleged personal misconduct.

A sorority's potential duties are different from those of a nightclub.

And Sarabia's alleged acts are not necessarily identical to those attributed to other defendants.

Indeed, this is the very reason the lawsuit's collective framing warrants careful scrutiny.

Different defendants may have different defenses and different statutory issues.

That is not an inconvenience the justice system should eliminate by forcing everyone onto the plaintiff's preferred schedule. It is an essential feature of individualized adjudication.

Plaintiff's counsel may prefer to draft one affirmation rather than several.

But there is no automatic right to a coordinated schedule merely because that approach would reduce the burden on counsel.

Courts possess case-management tools to address overlapping legal issues without treating every defendant as procedurally inseparable from every other defendant.

If later motions raise substantially similar grounds, they can be managed appropriately.

Sarabia's existing motion should not become a hostage to anticipated filings from defendants who have not yet made them.


## 9. A Long Complaint Does Not Automatically Require a Long Delay

Craig's attorneys emphasize the complexity of the case and the extensive complaint.

Complex litigation can justify additional time, and courts must ensure that both parties have a fair opportunity to present their arguments.

That principle is not disputed.

What is disputed is the adequacy of the explanation offered for this particular sixty-day request.

Hellman's affirmation does not identify a specific new evidentiary development that must be investigated before responding to Sarabia.

Nor does it describe a concrete obstacle making a response within the existing schedule impossible.

Instead, the requested length of the adjournment is substantially justified by expected motions from other defendants and the hope of preparing coordinated opposition papers.

There is an obvious weakness in that reasoning.

The plaintiff chose the structure of her complaint.

The plaintiff chose which causes of action to assert.

The plaintiff chose to name the individual and institutional defendants together.

And the plaintiff's attorneys chose the statutory provisions upon which the complaint relies.

They cannot reasonably present all of those litigation choices as entirely unexpected complications once an individual defendant files a motion testing their legal sufficiency.

A complaint approaching 600 paragraphs may be complicated. But complicated is not synonymous with legally sufficient.

Neither is length a reason to avoid addressing a defendant's particularized challenge.


## 10. The Defendant's Reputation Does Not Get a Sixty-Day Holiday

The consequences of continued litigation are not distributed equally.

For the plaintiff's attorneys, an extension may mean more time to prepare opposition papers.

For Sarabia, it means the pending claims and allegations remain unresolved for a longer period.

That does not make every requested adjournment improper.

Nor does a pending dismissal motion automatically entitle the defendant to an immediate ruling.

But the defendant's interests must be part of the calculation.

This case involves allegations capable of profoundly affecting an individual's reputation and future.

It also involves a memorandum arguing that the plaintiff has used collective allegations exceeding the particularized conduct attributed to Sarabia, and relied upon at least one statute whose age requirement appears facially incompatible with her own pleaded facts.

Those issues are not trivial.

They deserve judicial examination.

And they should not be minimized simply because the plaintiff's attorneys would find a later return date more convenient.

The reputational burden of an unresolved accusation is real, even when the ultimate merits remain undecided.

That is precisely why litigation should proceed fairly and without unnecessary delay.


## 11. The Court Should Reject the Requested Sixty-Day Adjournment

No one is suggesting that a plaintiff should be denied a meaningful opportunity to respond to a dismissal motion.

And no one can properly conclude from these two filings alone that every claim against Sarabia must necessarily fail.

But the November 5 affirmation does not present a persuasive justification for postponing the motion's return date by the full period requested.

The interests of judicial efficiency must be balanced against the interests of the individual defendant.

Here, Sarabia has filed a substantial motion identifying specific statutory and pleading defects.

The plaintiff has known the underlying facts since the events she alleges occurred.

Her counsel drafted the complaint.

And the issues raised by Sarabia—including the ordinary one-year limitations period, the distinction between individualized and collective allegations, and the apparently inapplicable childhood sexual-abuse provision—are readily identifiable from the pleadings and motion papers.

The court should preserve the November 16 return date unless Craig can demonstrate a specific need for a limited additional period that cannot fairly be accommodated within the existing schedule.

Even if a shorter extension is warranted, the desire to consolidate anticipated opposition papers should not, standing alone, justify deferring Sarabia's motion until January 15.

The court's role is not to punish the plaintiff for filing a complicated lawsuit.

It is not to punish the defendant for refusing an extension.

It is to apply the law evenhandedly.

And evenhanded treatment means recognizing that the interests of both sides matter.


## Final Word: Justice Is Not Reserved for the Accuser

The most striking feature of Craig's adjournment request is not that her attorneys want additional time.

Lawyers ask for extensions every day.

It is the reasoning advanced for requiring a defendant to wait.

Sarabia has asked the court to examine the allegations against him individually.

His counsel argues that certain claims are untimely, that important allegations are pleaded collectively rather than specifically, and that Craig's reliance on CPLR § 208(b) is incompatible with her admitted adult age at the time of the alleged events.

Those arguments may succeed or fail.

But their resolution should not depend upon whether the plaintiff's lawyers would prefer to respond to Cornell University, a sorority, a nightclub, and other individual defendants simultaneously.

And there is something especially troubling about invoking the seriousness of sexual-misconduct allegations to justify delaying the legal scrutiny of those very allegations.

An accusation is not a conviction.

A collective allegation is not proof of individual liability.

A statutory citation is not a substitute for satisfying the statute.

And common courtesy is not an entitlement to sixty days of additional litigation.

The plaintiff was twenty years old, according to her own complaint.

The childhood sexual-abuse limitations provision expressly addresses offenses committed against persons under eighteen.

If Craig's attorneys have a legal explanation for invoking that provision, the court should hear it.

If they do not, it should not be treated as a valid basis for preserving claims.

Likewise, if the specific allegations against Sarabia establish timely, legally sufficient causes of action, those claims should proceed.

If they do not, they should be dismissed.

That is how the legal system is supposed to operate.

Not by guilt through association.

Not by emotional appeals.

Not by stretching statutes beyond their written requirements.

And certainly not by treating one defendant's future as an administrative inconvenience.

Lucile H. Craig chose to bring this lawsuit. Diego Sarabia is entitled to challenge it.

The court should allow that challenge to move forward without the full requested delay.

Because justice delayed is justice denied.

And the defendant deserves justice, too.

**Evidence note:** Court: Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County
Case: Jane Doe v. Cornell University, Inc., et al.
Index No.: 161704/2026

NYSCEF Document No. 90: Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss by Defendant Diego Sarabia, filed October 23, 2026.

NYSCEF Document No. 99: Affirmation in Support of Request for Adjournment, Jeremy A. Hellman, filed November 5, 2026.

CPLR § 215(3): Ordinary one-year limitations period for assault and battery.

CPLR § 213-c: Twenty-year limitations period for civil claims resulting from specified sexual offenses.

CPLR § 208(b): Special limitations provision concerning specified offenses committed against persons under eighteen.

CPLR § 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7): Grounds for dismissal based on, among other things, limitations defenses and failure to state a cause of action.

22 NYCRR § 202.8(e): Motion adjournment procedures.

[Lucy Craig's Adjournment Motion](https://lucycraig.blog/media/747)

[Sarabia Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss](https://lucycraig.blog/media/618)