{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"DigitalDocument","altText":"161704_2026_Jane_Doe_v_Cornell_University_Inc_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_50","alternateName":"161704_2026_Jane_Doe_v_Cornell_University_Inc_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_50.pdf","caption":"","contentUrl":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/217/raw","datePublished":"2026-10-10T17:31:39+00:00","description":"","encodingFormat":"application/pdf","identifier":"217","isAccessibleForFree":true,"machineReadable":{"json":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/217/index.json","markdown":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/217/index.md"},"name":"161704_2026_Jane_Doe_v_Cornell_University_Inc_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_50","ocrStatus":"ready","ocrText":"--- Page 1 ---\n1 \n \nSTATE OF NEW YORK \n \nSUPREME COURT  \nCOUNTY OF NEW YORK \n \nJANE DOE,  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPlaintiff, \n \n-against-  \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIndex No. 161704/2026 \n \nCORNELL UNIVERSITY, INC., CHI PHI CHAPTER \nHOUSE ASSOCIATION, CHI PHI FRATERNITY, INC., \nCHI PHI EDUCATIONAL TRUST, ALPHA BETA HOUSE \nCORPORATION OF DELTA DELTA DELTA, DELTA \nDELTA DELTA SORORITY, ZAREEN ENTERPRISE LLC \nd/b/a MOONIES BAR & NIGHTCLUB, MATTHEW \nINGALLS, JOHNATHAN NEWELL, WINSTON LEE, \nGILLIO LOPES, DIEGO SARABIA, SCOTT NORRIS, \nSCOTT KRETZSCHMAR, JOHN DOE (FACULTY), \nJOHN DOE (ALUMNI), JOHN DOES (EXECUTIVE \nBOARD), and ORAZIO PETITO, \n \n \n \n \n \nDefendants. \n \n_________________________________________________ \n \n \n \n \n \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW  \nIN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT DIEGO SARABIA\u2019S  \nORDER TO SHOW CAUSE \n \n \n \n \nJames C. Knox, Esq., \nAlishah Bhimani, Esq. \nHACKER MURPHY LLP \nAttorneys for Defendant  \nDiego Sarabia \n22 Corporate Woods Blvd, Suite 404 \nAlbany, New York 12211 \n(518) 274-5820 \njknox@hackermurphy.com \nabhimani@hackermurphy.com \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n1 of 10\n\n--- Page 2 ---\n2 \n \n  \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n \nDefendant Diego Sarabia respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of his \nOrder to Show Cause seeking narrowly tailored restrictions on extrajudicial statements by the \nparties and their counsel, together with interim relief pending the return date. \nThis action concerns allegations of sexual assault and related claims arising from events \nPlaintiff alleges occurred during the night of October 19, 2024, and the morning of October 20, \n2024, while she was an undergraduate student at Cornell University. Plaintiff seeks damages from \ncorporate, institutional, and individual Defendants and has demanded a jury trial. \nSince this action began, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has repeatedly addressed the merits through \nwidely disseminated media statements. The accompanying attorney affirmation identifies some of \nthe many public statements by Plaintiff\u2019s attorney concerning Plaintiff\u2019s alleged incapacity to \nconsent, an alleged cover-up by Cornell University and others, the credibility and motives of \nDefendants, the asserted destruction of evidence, the purported significance of evidence referenced \nin the Complaint, and the possibility that additional persons participated in the alleged assault. \nThese statements present disputed allegations and interpretations of evidence to the public before \ndiscovery and trial. \nThe resulting danger is not abstract. The Court has already found that information \nappearing in filed documents was used by online observers to threaten and dox a nonparty\u2019s family \nafter an incorrect address was associated with a Defendant. In its October 9, 2026 Decision and \nOrder, the Court characterized the conduct as dangerous internet vigilantism and warned that \nmalicious threats and possible physical harm were approaching a point at which they could impede \nthe legal process. Further, the risk of improper influence upon the prospective juror pool in this \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n2 of 10\n\n--- Page 3 ---\n3 \n \ncase is undeniable given the media\u2019s desire for commentary which Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has been \nworking daily to satisfy. \nThe requested Order does not restrain the press, close the courtroom, or prevent access to \njudicial records that remain public. It regulates only participating parties, their attorneys, and their \nlegal representatives; employs a substantial-likelihood-of-material-prejudice standard; identifies \nspecific categories of sensitive information; and preserves communications necessary to litigate, \ninvestigate, report unlawful conduct, and comply with legal or institutional obligations. \nThat focused relief is warranted. Courts may regulate litigants and counsel to protect \njudicial proceedings, but restrictions affecting speech must be precise and no broader than \nnecessary. The proposed Order satisfies both principles. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \nPlaintiff commenced this action against Cornell University, fraternity and sorority entities, \na nightclub, and numerous individuals, including Defendant Diego Sarabia. The case remains in \nits early stages, and certain parties have not yet even appeared in this action. \nAs set forth in the accompanying supporting affirmation, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has undertaken \nnumerous television and media appearances concerning the action. Among other things, counsel \nhas publicly asserted that Plaintiff was incapable of consent, that Defendant Cornell University \nand the Defendant fraternity engaged in a cover-up, that Defendants deleted or disposed of \nevidence, that particular material constitutes decisive proof of wrongdoing and liability, and that \nunidentified additional persons may have participated in the alleged assault. The statements also \naddress the character, credibility, reputation, and motives of multiple Defendants. \nThe accompanying affirmation further explains that Plaintiff\u2019s publicity campaign was \napparently coordinated with media representatives before the action was even filed, and it remains \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n3 of 10\n\n--- Page 4 ---\n4 \n \nongoing. Defendant seeks relief now because additional public advocacy concerning disputed \nfacts, expected testimony, and potential evidence risks compounding the prejudice, before the \nparties have completed discovery or the Court has adjudicated the merits. \nThe proposed Order would prohibit public communications that the speaker knows or \nreasonably should know will be publicly disseminated and that present a substantial likelihood of \nmaterially prejudicing this action. It would also restrict the dissemination of nonpublic personal \nidentifying information, unfiled discovery material, certain statements about parties and witnesses, \nprejudicial descriptions of nonpublic evidence, and communications encouraging threats, \nharassment, intimidation, doxing, or improper extrajudicial contact. \nThe proposal contains express exceptions for statements made in open court or properly \nfiled papers; communications necessary to investigate, prosecute, defend, or resolve the action; \ndisclosures required by law or other specified obligations; limited responses to prejudicial \npublicity; and good-faith reports of threats or unlawful conduct. The restrictions would remain in \neffect only through trial or further order of the Court. \nLEGAL STANDARD \nCPLR 2214(d) permits a court, in a proper case, to grant an order to show cause in place \nof a notice of motion and to prescribe the time and manner of service.  \nCPLR 6313(a) authorizes temporary relief before a hearing when the movant shows that \nimmediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result unless the adverse party is restrained.  \nWhen temporary relief is granted, the hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction must \nbe set for the earliest possible time. \nNew York courts of record possess inherent authority to regulate and control the conduct \nof litigants and counsel appearing before them. See Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 454 \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n4 of 10\n\n--- Page 5 ---\n5 \n \n(1985). Because inherent authority carries a risk of arbitrary use, it must be exercised with restraint \nand in response to the circumstances of the particular case. See id. \nA restriction on speech must be framed in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the \npermissible and specifically identified objective. See Adams v. Tersillo, 245 A.D.2d 446, 447 (2d \nDept. 1997). A prior restraint carries a heavy presumption against constitutional validity, and the \nparty seeking it bears a correspondingly heavy burden of justification. Karantinidis v Karantinidis, \n186 A.D.3d 1502, 1504 (2d Dept. 2020). The order therefore must be tailored as precisely as \npossible to the case\u2019s demonstrated needs. See id. \nAttorney speech presents distinct concerns when counsel\u2019s public statements threaten the \nintegrity of an adjudicative proceeding. A restriction directed to participating attorneys is \nappropriately limited when it applies only to public speech presenting a substantial likelihood of \nmaterial prejudice, operates without regard to viewpoint, and postpones the restricted commentary \nonly while the proceeding remains pending. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 \n(1991). \nARGUMENT \nA.  The Court Has Authority to Protect This Proceeding from Prejudicial Outside \nInfluence. \n \nThe Court\u2019s inherent authority extends to controlling the conduct of both litigants and \ncounsel appearing before it. See Gabrelian, at 454. That authority may be exercised to protect the \norderly, fair, and efficient resolution of litigation, provided the Court acts with restraint and tailors \nits intervention to the circumstances presented. See id. \nThe circumstances here warrant intervention. Plaintiff has demanded a jury trial. Yet before \ndiscovery and adjudication, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has publicly advanced disputed conclusions \nconcerning consent, culpability, witness credibility, destruction of evidence, institutional \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n5 of 10\n\n--- Page 6 ---\n6 \n \nmisconduct, and the alleged participation of additional unidentified persons. Those subjects go to \nthe heart of the claims and defenses that a jury may ultimately be asked to decide. \nDue process requires an impartial jury free from outside influence, and trial courts may \ntake affirmative measures to prevent prejudicial publicity from compromising that right. See Neb. \nPress Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). Lawyers\u2019 statements carry particular weight \nbecause the public may perceive counsel as having special access to discovery, client \ncommunications, and other case information. See United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 836-838 \n(1995). \nThe risk has already manifested in threats and doxing arising from information associated \nwith this action. The Court\u2019s sealing and redaction directives addressed the immediate exposure \nof purported addresses, but the supporting affirmation describes continuing public statements \nconcerning disputed facts and potential evidence. A focused order, governing litigation \nparticipants, is therefore necessary to preserve the adjudicative process while the action proceeds. \nB.  The Proposed Restrictions on Attorneys Track the Constitutionally Permissible \nMaterial-Prejudice Standard. \n \nThe proposed Order does not impose a blanket prohibition on attorney speech. It restricts \nonly statements that counsel knows or reasonably should know will be publicly disseminated and \nthat present a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the adjudication. \nThat is a recognized and limited standard for regulating attorneys participating in particular \nlitigation. A restriction confined to attorney speech substantially likely to have a materially \nprejudicial effect advances the substantial interest in protecting adjudicative proceedings while \nleaving counsel free to speak on matters falling outside that defined risk. See Gentile at 1075-76. \nThe proposed Order also preserves neutral procedural information and communications \nnecessary to litigate the case. It permits statements made in court or in properly filed papers, \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n6 of 10\n\n--- Page 7 ---\n7 \n \nnecessary litigation communications, disclosures required by law or court order, limited responses \nto prejudicial publicity, and reports of threats or unlawful conduct. \nThose exceptions matter. An order barring counsel from discussing any matter related to a \ncase is constitutionally impermissible when unsupported by findings of a serious threat, when less \nrestrictive measures have not been considered, or when the order reaches innocuous information. \nSee National Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman, 116 A.D.2d 287, 293 (2d Dept. 1986). Likewise, a \nblanket restriction covering anything that has or may have something to do with a case is not \nnarrowly tailored. See United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1993). \nThe proposed Order avoids those defects. It does not bar every discussion of the action. It \ntargets materially prejudicial public advocacy, nonpublic discovery, personal identifying \ninformation, prejudicial descriptions of expected testimony and evidence, and communications \nencouraging harassment or intimidation. Its exceptions preserve legitimate case-related \ncommunications, and its duration is limited to trial or further order. \nC.  The Relief Is Directed to Specific, Demonstrated Risks Rather Than General \nCriticism or Disparagement. \n \nNew York appellate authority rejects broad orders prohibiting a party from making \nderogatory statements to any person when the identified harm can be prevented through a narrower \nrestriction. Adams v. Tersillo, 245 A.D.2d 446, 447 (2d Dept. 1997). A prohibition against \ndiscussing, demeaning, or disparaging another party before all third parties is similarly overbroad \nwhen the demonstrated injury concerns communications to a specific audience. See Karantinidis \nv Karantinidis, 186 A.D.3d 1502, 1504 (2d Dept. 2020). \nHere, the proposed Order does not impose such a generalized nondisparagement \nrequirement. It does not prohibit criticism merely because it is unfavorable. Instead, it applies a \nmaterial-prejudice threshold and identifies concrete categories tied to the dangers presented here: \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n7 of 10\n\n--- Page 8 ---\n8 \n \nprivate identifying information, nonpublic discovery, prejudicial assertions concerning witnesses \nand expected testimony, prejudicial disclosure of nonpublic evidence, and communications \nfacilitating threats, harassment, intimidation, doxing, or improper contact. \nNor does the proposed Order rely solely on the professional-conduct rules to bind the \nparties themselves. An attorney-conduct rule does not, by its own force, authorize a gag order \nagainst a represented party. See Doe v. Zeder, 5 Misc. 3d 574, 579 (Onondaga Cty. Sup. Ct. 2004). \nThe requested restrictions on parties instead rest on the Court\u2019s inherent authority to regulate \nlitigants appearing before it and are confined to conduct threatening the fairness and safety of this \nproceeding. See Gabrelian, at 454. \nThe distinction is important, as here the Court is not being asked to suppress a party\u2019s \nviewpoint or prevent access to public proceedings. It is instead being asked to prevent litigation \nparticipants from using public communications to disseminate nonpublic information, influence \nprospective jurors concerning disputed merits, or facilitate threats and extrajudicial pressure while \nthe case is pending. \nD.  Less Restrictive Measures Do Not Adequately Address the Present and \nContinuing Harm. \n \nBefore imposing a restriction on case-related speech, a court should consider whether less \nrestrictive alternatives can adequately protect the proceeding. See National Broadcasting Co., at \n293. Potential alternatives may include searching voir dire, jury instructions, postponement, \nsequestration, or a change of venue. See id. \nThose trial-stage measures do not fully address the present circumstances. This action is in \nits infancy, some parties have not appeared, and the publicity is ongoing. The harm includes not \nonly possible juror prejudice, but also the public dissemination of nonpublic personal information \nand the danger of threats, doxing, intimidation, and extrajudicial contact. Voir dire and jury \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n8 of 10\n\n--- Page 9 ---\n9 \n \ninstructions cannot retract information already distributed online or prevent current harassment \nbefore a jury is selected. \nThe Court has already employed a narrower remedial measure by sealing specified \ndocuments and directing the filing of redacted versions. That relief addressed documents filed with \nthe Court, but it does not govern subsequent extrajudicial statements by litigation participants. The \nproposed Order complements that limited protection by regulating only specified public \ncommunications and preserving legitimate litigation activity. \nE.  Interim Relief Is Necessary Pending the Return Date. \nCPLR \u00a7 6313(a) permits temporary restraint before a hearing when immediate and \nirreparable injury will otherwise result. The existing pattern of repeated media appearances, the \nearly posture of the action, and the absence of any apparent end to the publicity establish a present \nrisk of additional statements before the application can be heard. \nThe Court has already found that publicity surrounding filed information led to dangerous \ninternet vigilantism and created a risk that malicious threats and possible physical harm could \nimpede the legal process. Once private information is further disseminated, harassment is \nencouraged, or prospective jurors are exposed to counsel\u2019s characterizations of disputed evidence, \nlater corrective measures may not eliminate the resulting harm. \nThe interim relief sought is correspondingly limited. It would apply only pending the \nhearing and determination of this application and only to the restrictions expressly imposed by the \nCourt when signing the Order to Show Cause. That temporary protection preserves the status quo \nand prevents the identified risks from escalating before all parties can be heard. \n \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n9 of 10\n\n--- Page 10 ---\n10 \n \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, Defendant Diego Sarabia respectfully requests that the Court \nsign the proposed Order to Show Cause, impose the requested interim restrictions pending the \nreturn date, and, after hearing the parties, enter an Order: \n(1)  Directing the parties, their attorneys, and their legal representatives to refrain from \npublic communications that they know or reasonably should know present a substantial \nlikelihood of materially prejudicing this action; \n(2)  Prohibiting the public dissemination of the specified personal identifying \ninformation, nonpublic discovery, prejudicial statements concerning parties, witnesses, expected \ntestimony or nonpublic evidence, and communications facilitating threats, harassment, \nintimidation, doxing, or improper extrajudicial contact; \n(3)  Preserving the exceptions stated in the proposed Order for court proceedings, filed \npapers, necessary litigation communications, legally required disclosures, appropriately limited \nresponses to prejudicial publicity, and good-faith reports of threats or unlawful conduct; and \n(4)  Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. \nDated: October 9, 2026 \nAlbany, New York \n \n \n \nBy:__________________________ \nBy:__________________________ \n \nAlishah Bhimani  \n \n \n \n \n \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \nOffice & P.O. Address \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJames C. Knox \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \nOffice & P.O. Address \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n10 of 10","text":"--- Page 1 ---\n1 \n \nSTATE OF NEW YORK \n \nSUPREME COURT  \nCOUNTY OF NEW YORK \n \nJANE DOE,  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nPlaintiff, \n \n-against-  \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIndex No. 161704/2026 \n \nCORNELL UNIVERSITY, INC., CHI PHI CHAPTER \nHOUSE ASSOCIATION, CHI PHI FRATERNITY, INC., \nCHI PHI EDUCATIONAL TRUST, ALPHA BETA HOUSE \nCORPORATION OF DELTA DELTA DELTA, DELTA \nDELTA DELTA SORORITY, ZAREEN ENTERPRISE LLC \nd/b/a MOONIES BAR & NIGHTCLUB, MATTHEW \nINGALLS, JOHNATHAN NEWELL, WINSTON LEE, \nGILLIO LOPES, DIEGO SARABIA, SCOTT NORRIS, \nSCOTT KRETZSCHMAR, JOHN DOE (FACULTY), \nJOHN DOE (ALUMNI), JOHN DOES (EXECUTIVE \nBOARD), and ORAZIO PETITO, \n \n \n \n \n \nDefendants. \n \n_________________________________________________ \n \n \n \n \n \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW  \nIN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT DIEGO SARABIA\u2019S  \nORDER TO SHOW CAUSE \n \n \n \n \nJames C. Knox, Esq., \nAlishah Bhimani, Esq. \nHACKER MURPHY LLP \nAttorneys for Defendant  \nDiego Sarabia \n22 Corporate Woods Blvd, Suite 404 \nAlbany, New York 12211 \n(518) 274-5820 \njknox@hackermurphy.com \nabhimani@hackermurphy.com \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n1 of 10\n\n--- Page 2 ---\n2 \n \n  \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n \nDefendant Diego Sarabia respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of his \nOrder to Show Cause seeking narrowly tailored restrictions on extrajudicial statements by the \nparties and their counsel, together with interim relief pending the return date. \nThis action concerns allegations of sexual assault and related claims arising from events \nPlaintiff alleges occurred during the night of October 19, 2024, and the morning of October 20, \n2024, while she was an undergraduate student at Cornell University. Plaintiff seeks damages from \ncorporate, institutional, and individual Defendants and has demanded a jury trial. \nSince this action began, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has repeatedly addressed the merits through \nwidely disseminated media statements. The accompanying attorney affirmation identifies some of \nthe many public statements by Plaintiff\u2019s attorney concerning Plaintiff\u2019s alleged incapacity to \nconsent, an alleged cover-up by Cornell University and others, the credibility and motives of \nDefendants, the asserted destruction of evidence, the purported significance of evidence referenced \nin the Complaint, and the possibility that additional persons participated in the alleged assault. \nThese statements present disputed allegations and interpretations of evidence to the public before \ndiscovery and trial. \nThe resulting danger is not abstract. The Court has already found that information \nappearing in filed documents was used by online observers to threaten and dox a nonparty\u2019s family \nafter an incorrect address was associated with a Defendant. In its October 9, 2026 Decision and \nOrder, the Court characterized the conduct as dangerous internet vigilantism and warned that \nmalicious threats and possible physical harm were approaching a point at which they could impede \nthe legal process. Further, the risk of improper influence upon the prospective juror pool in this \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n2 of 10\n\n--- Page 3 ---\n3 \n \ncase is undeniable given the media\u2019s desire for commentary which Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has been \nworking daily to satisfy. \nThe requested Order does not restrain the press, close the courtroom, or prevent access to \njudicial records that remain public. It regulates only participating parties, their attorneys, and their \nlegal representatives; employs a substantial-likelihood-of-material-prejudice standard; identifies \nspecific categories of sensitive information; and preserves communications necessary to litigate, \ninvestigate, report unlawful conduct, and comply with legal or institutional obligations. \nThat focused relief is warranted. Courts may regulate litigants and counsel to protect \njudicial proceedings, but restrictions affecting speech must be precise and no broader than \nnecessary. The proposed Order satisfies both principles. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \nPlaintiff commenced this action against Cornell University, fraternity and sorority entities, \na nightclub, and numerous individuals, including Defendant Diego Sarabia. The case remains in \nits early stages, and certain parties have not yet even appeared in this action. \nAs set forth in the accompanying supporting affirmation, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has undertaken \nnumerous television and media appearances concerning the action. Among other things, counsel \nhas publicly asserted that Plaintiff was incapable of consent, that Defendant Cornell University \nand the Defendant fraternity engaged in a cover-up, that Defendants deleted or disposed of \nevidence, that particular material constitutes decisive proof of wrongdoing and liability, and that \nunidentified additional persons may have participated in the alleged assault. The statements also \naddress the character, credibility, reputation, and motives of multiple Defendants. \nThe accompanying affirmation further explains that Plaintiff\u2019s publicity campaign was \napparently coordinated with media representatives before the action was even filed, and it remains \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n3 of 10\n\n--- Page 4 ---\n4 \n \nongoing. Defendant seeks relief now because additional public advocacy concerning disputed \nfacts, expected testimony, and potential evidence risks compounding the prejudice, before the \nparties have completed discovery or the Court has adjudicated the merits. \nThe proposed Order would prohibit public communications that the speaker knows or \nreasonably should know will be publicly disseminated and that present a substantial likelihood of \nmaterially prejudicing this action. It would also restrict the dissemination of nonpublic personal \nidentifying information, unfiled discovery material, certain statements about parties and witnesses, \nprejudicial descriptions of nonpublic evidence, and communications encouraging threats, \nharassment, intimidation, doxing, or improper extrajudicial contact. \nThe proposal contains express exceptions for statements made in open court or properly \nfiled papers; communications necessary to investigate, prosecute, defend, or resolve the action; \ndisclosures required by law or other specified obligations; limited responses to prejudicial \npublicity; and good-faith reports of threats or unlawful conduct. The restrictions would remain in \neffect only through trial or further order of the Court. \nLEGAL STANDARD \nCPLR 2214(d) permits a court, in a proper case, to grant an order to show cause in place \nof a notice of motion and to prescribe the time and manner of service.  \nCPLR 6313(a) authorizes temporary relief before a hearing when the movant shows that \nimmediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result unless the adverse party is restrained.  \nWhen temporary relief is granted, the hearing on the application for a preliminary injunction must \nbe set for the earliest possible time. \nNew York courts of record possess inherent authority to regulate and control the conduct \nof litigants and counsel appearing before them. See Gabrelian v. Gabrelian, 108 A.D.2d 445, 454 \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n4 of 10\n\n--- Page 5 ---\n5 \n \n(1985). Because inherent authority carries a risk of arbitrary use, it must be exercised with restraint \nand in response to the circumstances of the particular case. See id. \nA restriction on speech must be framed in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the \npermissible and specifically identified objective. See Adams v. Tersillo, 245 A.D.2d 446, 447 (2d \nDept. 1997). A prior restraint carries a heavy presumption against constitutional validity, and the \nparty seeking it bears a correspondingly heavy burden of justification. Karantinidis v Karantinidis, \n186 A.D.3d 1502, 1504 (2d Dept. 2020). The order therefore must be tailored as precisely as \npossible to the case\u2019s demonstrated needs. See id. \nAttorney speech presents distinct concerns when counsel\u2019s public statements threaten the \nintegrity of an adjudicative proceeding. A restriction directed to participating attorneys is \nappropriately limited when it applies only to public speech presenting a substantial likelihood of \nmaterial prejudice, operates without regard to viewpoint, and postpones the restricted commentary \nonly while the proceeding remains pending. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 \n(1991). \nARGUMENT \nA.  The Court Has Authority to Protect This Proceeding from Prejudicial Outside \nInfluence. \n \nThe Court\u2019s inherent authority extends to controlling the conduct of both litigants and \ncounsel appearing before it. See Gabrelian, at 454. That authority may be exercised to protect the \norderly, fair, and efficient resolution of litigation, provided the Court acts with restraint and tailors \nits intervention to the circumstances presented. See id. \nThe circumstances here warrant intervention. Plaintiff has demanded a jury trial. Yet before \ndiscovery and adjudication, Plaintiff\u2019s counsel has publicly advanced disputed conclusions \nconcerning consent, culpability, witness credibility, destruction of evidence, institutional \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n5 of 10\n\n--- Page 6 ---\n6 \n \nmisconduct, and the alleged participation of additional unidentified persons. Those subjects go to \nthe heart of the claims and defenses that a jury may ultimately be asked to decide. \nDue process requires an impartial jury free from outside influence, and trial courts may \ntake affirmative measures to prevent prejudicial publicity from compromising that right. See Neb. \nPress Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554 (1976). Lawyers\u2019 statements carry particular weight \nbecause the public may perceive counsel as having special access to discovery, client \ncommunications, and other case information. See United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 836-838 \n(1995). \nThe risk has already manifested in threats and doxing arising from information associated \nwith this action. The Court\u2019s sealing and redaction directives addressed the immediate exposure \nof purported addresses, but the supporting affirmation describes continuing public statements \nconcerning disputed facts and potential evidence. A focused order, governing litigation \nparticipants, is therefore necessary to preserve the adjudicative process while the action proceeds. \nB.  The Proposed Restrictions on Attorneys Track the Constitutionally Permissible \nMaterial-Prejudice Standard. \n \nThe proposed Order does not impose a blanket prohibition on attorney speech. It restricts \nonly statements that counsel knows or reasonably should know will be publicly disseminated and \nthat present a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the adjudication. \nThat is a recognized and limited standard for regulating attorneys participating in particular \nlitigation. A restriction confined to attorney speech substantially likely to have a materially \nprejudicial effect advances the substantial interest in protecting adjudicative proceedings while \nleaving counsel free to speak on matters falling outside that defined risk. See Gentile at 1075-76. \nThe proposed Order also preserves neutral procedural information and communications \nnecessary to litigate the case. It permits statements made in court or in properly filed papers, \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n6 of 10\n\n--- Page 7 ---\n7 \n \nnecessary litigation communications, disclosures required by law or court order, limited responses \nto prejudicial publicity, and reports of threats or unlawful conduct. \nThose exceptions matter. An order barring counsel from discussing any matter related to a \ncase is constitutionally impermissible when unsupported by findings of a serious threat, when less \nrestrictive measures have not been considered, or when the order reaches innocuous information. \nSee National Broadcasting Co. v. Cooperman, 116 A.D.2d 287, 293 (2d Dept. 1986). Likewise, a \nblanket restriction covering anything that has or may have something to do with a case is not \nnarrowly tailored. See United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1993). \nThe proposed Order avoids those defects. It does not bar every discussion of the action. It \ntargets materially prejudicial public advocacy, nonpublic discovery, personal identifying \ninformation, prejudicial descriptions of expected testimony and evidence, and communications \nencouraging harassment or intimidation. Its exceptions preserve legitimate case-related \ncommunications, and its duration is limited to trial or further order. \nC.  The Relief Is Directed to Specific, Demonstrated Risks Rather Than General \nCriticism or Disparagement. \n \nNew York appellate authority rejects broad orders prohibiting a party from making \nderogatory statements to any person when the identified harm can be prevented through a narrower \nrestriction. Adams v. Tersillo, 245 A.D.2d 446, 447 (2d Dept. 1997). A prohibition against \ndiscussing, demeaning, or disparaging another party before all third parties is similarly overbroad \nwhen the demonstrated injury concerns communications to a specific audience. See Karantinidis \nv Karantinidis, 186 A.D.3d 1502, 1504 (2d Dept. 2020). \nHere, the proposed Order does not impose such a generalized nondisparagement \nrequirement. It does not prohibit criticism merely because it is unfavorable. Instead, it applies a \nmaterial-prejudice threshold and identifies concrete categories tied to the dangers presented here: \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n7 of 10\n\n--- Page 8 ---\n8 \n \nprivate identifying information, nonpublic discovery, prejudicial assertions concerning witnesses \nand expected testimony, prejudicial disclosure of nonpublic evidence, and communications \nfacilitating threats, harassment, intimidation, doxing, or improper contact. \nNor does the proposed Order rely solely on the professional-conduct rules to bind the \nparties themselves. An attorney-conduct rule does not, by its own force, authorize a gag order \nagainst a represented party. See Doe v. Zeder, 5 Misc. 3d 574, 579 (Onondaga Cty. Sup. Ct. 2004). \nThe requested restrictions on parties instead rest on the Court\u2019s inherent authority to regulate \nlitigants appearing before it and are confined to conduct threatening the fairness and safety of this \nproceeding. See Gabrelian, at 454. \nThe distinction is important, as here the Court is not being asked to suppress a party\u2019s \nviewpoint or prevent access to public proceedings. It is instead being asked to prevent litigation \nparticipants from using public communications to disseminate nonpublic information, influence \nprospective jurors concerning disputed merits, or facilitate threats and extrajudicial pressure while \nthe case is pending. \nD.  Less Restrictive Measures Do Not Adequately Address the Present and \nContinuing Harm. \n \nBefore imposing a restriction on case-related speech, a court should consider whether less \nrestrictive alternatives can adequately protect the proceeding. See National Broadcasting Co., at \n293. Potential alternatives may include searching voir dire, jury instructions, postponement, \nsequestration, or a change of venue. See id. \nThose trial-stage measures do not fully address the present circumstances. This action is in \nits infancy, some parties have not appeared, and the publicity is ongoing. The harm includes not \nonly possible juror prejudice, but also the public dissemination of nonpublic personal information \nand the danger of threats, doxing, intimidation, and extrajudicial contact. Voir dire and jury \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n8 of 10\n\n--- Page 9 ---\n9 \n \ninstructions cannot retract information already distributed online or prevent current harassment \nbefore a jury is selected. \nThe Court has already employed a narrower remedial measure by sealing specified \ndocuments and directing the filing of redacted versions. That relief addressed documents filed with \nthe Court, but it does not govern subsequent extrajudicial statements by litigation participants. The \nproposed Order complements that limited protection by regulating only specified public \ncommunications and preserving legitimate litigation activity. \nE.  Interim Relief Is Necessary Pending the Return Date. \nCPLR \u00a7 6313(a) permits temporary restraint before a hearing when immediate and \nirreparable injury will otherwise result. The existing pattern of repeated media appearances, the \nearly posture of the action, and the absence of any apparent end to the publicity establish a present \nrisk of additional statements before the application can be heard. \nThe Court has already found that publicity surrounding filed information led to dangerous \ninternet vigilantism and created a risk that malicious threats and possible physical harm could \nimpede the legal process. Once private information is further disseminated, harassment is \nencouraged, or prospective jurors are exposed to counsel\u2019s characterizations of disputed evidence, \nlater corrective measures may not eliminate the resulting harm. \nThe interim relief sought is correspondingly limited. It would apply only pending the \nhearing and determination of this application and only to the restrictions expressly imposed by the \nCourt when signing the Order to Show Cause. That temporary protection preserves the status quo \nand prevents the identified risks from escalating before all parties can be heard. \n \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n9 of 10\n\n--- Page 10 ---\n10 \n \nCONCLUSION \nFor the foregoing reasons, Defendant Diego Sarabia respectfully requests that the Court \nsign the proposed Order to Show Cause, impose the requested interim restrictions pending the \nreturn date, and, after hearing the parties, enter an Order: \n(1)  Directing the parties, their attorneys, and their legal representatives to refrain from \npublic communications that they know or reasonably should know present a substantial \nlikelihood of materially prejudicing this action; \n(2)  Prohibiting the public dissemination of the specified personal identifying \ninformation, nonpublic discovery, prejudicial statements concerning parties, witnesses, expected \ntestimony or nonpublic evidence, and communications facilitating threats, harassment, \nintimidation, doxing, or improper extrajudicial contact; \n(3)  Preserving the exceptions stated in the proposed Order for court proceedings, filed \npapers, necessary litigation communications, legally required disclosures, appropriately limited \nresponses to prejudicial publicity, and good-faith reports of threats or unlawful conduct; and \n(4)  Granting such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. \nDated: October 9, 2026 \nAlbany, New York \n \n \n \nBy:__________________________ \nBy:__________________________ \n \nAlishah Bhimani  \n \n \n \n \n \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \nOffice & P.O. Address \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nJames C. Knox \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \nOffice & P.O. Address \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/09/2026 07:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 50\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/09/2026\n10 of 10","thumbnailUrl":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/217/thumb.webp","transcriptStatus":"not_applicable","transcriptText":"","url":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/217"}