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DECISION/ORDER + JUDGMENT (Motion #1)
NYSCEF document #37 | Filed: 2026-09-23 | Filed by: Court User Filed: Received: | Docket status: Processed Confirmation Notice | Case: Jane Doe v. Cornell Univeristy (Tompkins County) | Source: NYSCEF
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At a Motion Term of the Supreme
Court of the State of NewYork, held
in and for the Sixth
Judicial
District,
by Microsoft
Teamson the 21st day
of August, 2026.
PRESENT: HON.MARKG. MASLER
Justice
Presiding.
STATEOFNEWYORK
SUPREMECOURT
COUNTYOFTOMPKINS
In the Matter of the Application
of
JOHNDOE,
DECISION, ORDER,
Petitioner,
ANDJUDGMENT
v
Index No. EF2026-0292
CORNELLUNIVERSITY,
Respondent.
APPEARANCES:
BUSHELL, SOVAK,KANE& SASHLLP
By:
Alan E. Sash, Esq.
Attorneys
for
Petitioner
Via NYSCEF
SALANDLAWPC
By:
Jeremy Saland,
Esq.
Attorneys
for
Petitioner
274 Madison Avenue,
Suite
1401
NewYork, NY10016
Via USPS
CORNELLUNIVERSITY OFFICEOFGENERALCOUNSEL
By:
AdamG. Pence, Esq.
Attorneys
for Respondent
Via NYSCEF
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MARKG. MASLER,J. S. C.
Jane Roe filed
a complaint
with Cornell
University
alleging
that
she was the victim
of a
sexual
assault
involving
multiple
fraternity
membersthat
occurred
during
a party
she attended
at
the Chi Phi fraternity
house between October 19 and October 20, 2024.
Petitioner
was a student
at Cornell
University,
a member of Chi Phi fraternity,
a resident
of the
fraternity
house, and
present
at the party
during
the time of the alleged
assault.
OnNovember 22, 2024,
Cornell
issued a formal
complaint
charging
seven fraternity
members, including
petitioner,
with
violating
its
Title
IX policy
(known as Policy
6.4).
In the formal
complaint,
petitioner
was "accused of
violating
Cornell
University's
Policy
6.4 prohibition
against
Sexual
Exploitation
[and]
Sexual
Assault"
(NY St Cts Elec
Filing
[NYSCEF] Doc No. 19 at R-01046).1
The formal
complaint
also
advised
that
Cornell
"may hold the Respondents accountable
for
violations
of Policy
6.4 and
other
policies
that
are not referenced
in the Formal Complaint
but are learned about from
evidence,
testimony,
or admissions during
the investigation
and adjudication
process"
(NYSCEF
Doc No. 19 at R-01044, R-01050, R-01056).
An evidentiary
hearing
that
lasted
12 days was held before
a three-member
hearing
panel.
Petitioner
actively
participated
in the hearing.
He was represented
by counsel, who cross-
examined numerous witnesses,
and testified
in his own behalf.
The hearing
panel
issued a
decision
dated August
18, 2025 that,
in relevant
part,
found that
petitioner
was not responsible
for Sexual Assault
or Sexual Exploitation,
but that he was responsible
for Attempted
Sexual
1 Cornell
revised
the formal complaint
in January
and March 2025, however the
accusations
against
petitioner
were not materially
altered
(see NYSCEFDoc No. 19 at R-01050
- R-01053; R-01056 - R-01059).
In the copy of the
initial
formal
complaint
filed
with the
petition,
complainant's
name, the summary of alleged
misconduct,
and the namesof others
accused of violations
arising
from the incident
were redacted
(see NYSCEFDoc No. 4).
The
record,
which
is sealed pursuant
to an order on stipulation,
contains
unredacted
copies of the
formal
complaint
and its
revisions
(see NYSCEFDoc No. 19 at R-01044 - R-01059).
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Exploitation.
Petitioner
filed
an administrative
appeal
raising
several
issues,
including:
(1)
the
contention
that
the hearing
was compromised because panel member Savannah Bao was
distracted
during
the hearing,
including
a 45-minute
period when she was participating
by
videoconference
while
driving
a car during
the testimony
of a witness
to petitioner's
conduct
during
the
incident;
(2) the objection
that he had been found responsible
for
a violation
that he
had not been charged with;
and (3)
the contention
that
the finding
he was responsible
for
Attempted
Sexual Exploitation
was clearly
erroneous.
A three-member
appeal panel
issued a
decision
dated January 14, 2026 denying the appeal
in
its
entirety.
Petitioner
commencedthis
proceeding on March 30, 2026 seeking judgment
annulling
the decision
finding
him responsible
for Attempted
Sexual Exploitation,
vacating
all
penalties
imposed against
him, and expunging
all
references
to the underlying
charges from his academic record.2
In this
proceeding,
petitioner
does not contend that
the decision
of the hearing
panel was not supported
by substantial
evidence.
Rather,
he argues only
that
Cornell
failed
to follow
relevant
law and its ownpolicy
by finding
him responsible
for
a violation
that he was not charged with.3
2 The petition
seeks declaratory
judgment;
however,
petitioner
did not
file
and serve a
summons as required
to commencea hybrid CPLRarticle
78 proceeding and action
for
a
declaratory
judgment
(see Matter of Nicholas v Martuscello,
245 AD3d1055, 1058 [3d Dept
2026]).
In any event,
"[a]
trial
court maydecline
to entertain
an action
for
declaratory
judgment
where other adequate remedies are available,
such as a CPLRarticle
78 proceeding
to challenge
an administrative
determination"
(Matter
of Gable Transp.,
Inc.
v State
of NewYork, 29 AD3d
1125, 1127 [3d Dept 2006]).
The request
for
a declaratory
judgment
has not been considered
because it was not properly
made and is duplicative
and unnecessary in light
of the remedy
available
through the CPLRarticle
78 proceeding
(see
id.).
3 The petition
also
alleges
that
the hearing was compromised by the inattention
of panel
member Bao during
testimony
petitioner
contends
was critical
to his defense
(see NYSCEFDoc
No.
1, petition,
¶¶ 38, 40-42,
44);
however, petitioner
does not rely
on these allegations
as a basis
for
challenging
the administrative
determination.
In this
regard,
it bears emphasizing
that no
request
for
relief
made in the petition
was based on allegations
regarding
Bao's conduct during
the hearing
(see petition
¶¶ 46-74),
nor was any argument seeking
affirmative
relief
based on
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Petitioner
was found responsible
for Attempted
Sexual Exploitation,
a charge
that was
not expressly
mentioned
in the formal
complaint
or any other pre-hearing
notice
that was
provided
to petitioner.
As relevant
here,
Sexual Exploitation
is defined
as "intentionally
engaging in
. . . [o]bserving
another person when that person is nude or engaged in sexual
activity
without
the knowledge and consent of the person observed" (NYSCEFDoc No. 31,
Policy
6.4 procedures,
§ 3.6).
Attempting
to Commit Prohibited
Conduct
is separately
defined
as occurring
when, "with
the intent
to commit such conduct,
[a] person engages in conduct
directly
tending
toward completion
of the prohibited
conduct"
(Policy
6.4 procedures
§ 3.2).
Petitioner
argues that
Sexual Exploitation
and Attempted
Sexual Exploitation
are distinct
offenses
because they
are separately
defined
in Policy
6.4, and argues
that
"Cornell
cannot
simply add on lesser
included
offenses
after
the hearing
is concluded" (NYSCEFDoc No. 36,
petitioner's
memin reply,
at 5).
Cornell
argues that
the elements
of prohibited
conduct,
such as
Sexual Exploitation,
and attempted
prohibited
conduct are the same, noting
that
the
analysis
of
whether a person engaged in attempted
prohibited
conduct is necessarily
based on the elements
of the underlying
specific
violation
charged.
It
further
contends
that
the notice
provided
to
petitioner
was sufficient
to apprise him of the facts
on which the charges were based and to
Bao's conduct made in petitioner's
reply memorandum of law or at oral
argument.
Thus,
it
appears
that
the
allegations
made in the petition
regarding
Bao's conduct merely provide
context
by identifying
all
issues
that were raised
and decided in petitioner's
administrative
appeal of the
decision
of the hearing
panel.
Were this
issue
to be considered
on the merits,
there
is no basis
for
finding
that
the
chair
of the hearing
panel abused her discretion
in denying petitioner's
request
to declare
a mishearing based on Bao's conduct during
the hearing
(see Policy
6.4
procedures
§ 26.10.1).
The time
that Bao observed the hearing
from her car amounted to only
45 minutes out of a 12-day hearing,
and covered only
15 pages of the
1,732-page
transcript.
Bao stated
she observed the testimony
that was given while
she was in her car, and she also
observed the ensuing
cross-examination
of the witness
by petitioner's
attorney,
which
immediately
followed
and recapped much of the direct
testimony.
Finally,
the decision
of the
three-member hearing
panel was unanimous.
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permit
him to present
a defense.
Finally,
it
also
argues that
petitioner
was informed from the
beginning of the process
that he could be held accountable
for
violations
not referred
to in the
formal
complaint,
but that maybe later
identified
during
the
investigation
and adjudication
process.
It
is thus necessary
to consider
the extent of notice
required
to be provided
to students
accused of violating
Policy
6.4.
Education Law article
129-B, commonly known as the Enough
is Enough Law, was enacted
in 2015 to "require
all
colleges
and universities
in the State of New
York to implement uniform
prevention
and response
policies
and procedures
relating
to sexual
assault,
domestic violence,
dating
violence,
and stalking"
(Matter
of Jacobson v Blaise,
157
AD3d1072, 1074 [3d Dept 2018]
[internal
quotation
marks, ellipsis,
and citation
omitted]).
As
relevant
here,
the law provides
standards
for
the minimum process
to be afforded
a student
accused of "sexual
assault,
domestic violence,
dating
violence,
stalking,
or sexual
activity
that
may otherwise
violate
the
institution's
code of conduct"
(Education
Law § 6444 [5]
[b],
[c]
[emphasis
added]).
These requirements
include
being provided with
(1) "notice
. . . describing
the date,
time,
location
and factual
allegations
concerning
the
violation,
a reference
to the
specific
code of conduct provisions
alleged
to have been violated,
and possible
sanctions"
(Education
Law § 6444 [5]
[b]
[i]);
and (2) written
or electronic
notice
"of the
specific
rule,
rules
or laws alleged
to have been violated
and in what manner" (Education
Law § 6444 [5]
[c]
[vii]).4
By its
terms, Education Law § 6444 (5)
specifies
the notice
required
to be provided
only
when a student
is accused,
as relevant
here,
of sexual
assault
or sexual
activity
that may
otherwise
violate
the
institution's
code of conduct.
Respondent satisfied
this
requirement
by
4 A list
of possible
sanctions
is provided
within
Policy
6.4
(see Policy
6.4 procedures
§
26.13).
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providing
petitioner
written
notice
in the formal
complaint
that he was accused of Sexual
Assault.
The formal
complaint
also
referred
to Policy
6.4's
prohibition
against
Sexual
Exploitation,
an offense
which
is not included
in those specifically
enumerated in Education Law
§ 6444 (5).
For purposes of the Enough is Enough Law, "sexual
activity"
is defined
as having
"the same meaning as 'sexual
act'
and 'sexual
contact'
as provided
in 18 USC2246 (2) and 18
USC2246 (3)"
(Education
Law § 6439 [10]).
In turn,
"sexual
act"
and "sexual
contact"
are
defined
as a number of acts
that
require
physical
contact
(see
18 USC2246 [2],
[3]).
The
offense
of Sexual Exploitation
does not
fall
within
the statutory
definition
of sexual
activity
because the elements
thereof
do not include
any of the activities
listed
in
18 USC2246 (2) and
(3)
that
require
physical
contact,
and thus does not
fall
within
the scope of "sexual
activity
that
mayotherwise
violate
the
institution's
code of conduct."
Accordingly,
neither
Education Law §
6444 (5)
(b)
(i)
nor § 6444 (5)
(c)
(vii)
require
that
petitioner
have been provided with notice
that
he could be found responsible
for Sexual Exploitation
or Attempted
Sexual Exploitation.
Policy
6.4 does not expressly
require
that an accused student be notified
of the specific
code of conduct provisions,
or rule
or law,
alleged
to have been violated.
Rather,
it requires
that
an accused student be provided with notice
of the "alleged
prohibited
conduct and its
date,
time,
and location,
to the extent known,"
and the
"factual
allegations
pertaining
to the prohibited
conduct"
(Policy
6.4 procedures
§ 18).
It
further
provides
that when a case is referred
for
a
hearing,
the notice
of hearing
must apprise an accused student of "the
charges
at issue"
(Policy
6.4 procedures
§ 26.4).
The formal
complaint
identified
the complainant,
provided
the
dates
and location
of the
incident,
set forth
a summary of alleged
misconduct
consisting
of approximately
two pages that
identified
the other students
accused of violations
arising
from the
incident,
advised
petitioner
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that he was accused of violating
the prohibitions
against
Sexual Assault
and Sexual Exploitation,
and set forth
the specific
facts
applicable
to the charges made against
petitioner
(NYSCEFDoc
No. 19 at R-01044 - R-01059).
Accordingly,
the formal
complaint
provided
petitioner
with
notice
adequate
to comply with Policy
6.4 and to satisfy
due process
(see Matter
of Jacobson v
Blaise,
157 AD3dat 1075; NewYork State Education Department, Complying
with Education
Law Article
129-B at 26 [The notice
provided
"should
be specific
enough to allow
a reasonable
person to present
a defense,
pursuant
to institutional
policy,
but need not be so long and detailed
that
it negatively
impacts
the student conduct process"]).5
Petitioner's
argument that
finding
him responsible
for Attempted
Sexual Exploitation
is
arbitrary
and capricious
because the formal
complaint
did not specifically
provide
notice
that he
was accused of violating
that
section
of Policy
6.4
is also unavailing
for the following
additional
reasons.
First,
petitioner
was advised
that he could be held accountable
for
violations
not
referred
to in the formal
complaint
that maybe identified
during
the
investigation
and
adjudication
process.
The Department of Education has specifically
noted that:
"Nothing
in the paragraph [Education
Law § 6444 (5)
(b)]
prohibits
an institution
from holding
students
accountable
for
violations
that
are not referenced
in the
initial
charge
letter
but are learned
about from evidence,
testimony,
or admission
at a hearing
or during
the
investigatory
process,
consistent
with
institution
policies
and due process, where applicable"
(New York State Education Department,
Complying
with Education Law Article
129-B at 26).
Second, as noted by Cornell,
Attempted
Sexual Exploitation
adds no elements
to Sexual
Exploitation.
Accordingly,
the formal
complaint
provided
petitioner
with notice
of alleged
facts
5 TheNewYork State Education Department guidance document entitled
"Complying
with Education Law Article
129-B,"
which was cited
by the Appellate
Division,
Third
Department,
in Matter of Jacobson v Blaise
(157 AD3dat 1074), maybe found at
https://www.nysed.gov/sites/default/files/article-129-b-guidance.pdf
(last
accessed September
23, 2026).
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relevant
to his conduct to support
the charge
for Attempted
Sexual Exploitation.
The elements
of Attempted
Sexual Exploitation
- the
intent
to commit Sexual Exploitation
and affirmative
acts
tending
toward
its completion - were necessarily
at issue
in the evidentiary
hearing,
and
petitioner
had the opportunity
to present
relevant
evidence,
arguments,
and defenses.
Since
the
elements
of prohibited
conduct include
the elements
of attempted
prohibited
conduct the analysis
of whether a person attempted
prohibited
conduct
is necessarily
based on the elements
of the
underlying
specific
violation
charged.
This
is the sameanalysis
employed
in considering
lesser
included
charges
for
criminal
defendants,
a concept
that
petitioner
alluded
to in arguments that
compare the attempt
charge
to a "lesser
included
offense"
(petitioner's
memin reply
at 5,
9).
In
the criminal
context,
a lesser
included
offense
is defined
as follows:
"When it
is impossible
to commit a particular
crime without
concomitantly
committing,
by the same conduct,
another
offense
of lesser
grade or degree,
the
latter
is, with respect
to the former,
a 'lesser
included
offense.'
In any case in
which
it
is legally
possible
to attempt
to commit a crime,
an attempt
to commit
such crime constitutes
a lesser
included
offense
with
respect
thereto"
(CPL 1.20
[37]
[emphasis
added]).
Thus,
the hearing
panel's
decision
finding
petitioner
responsible
for Attempted
Sexual
Exploitation
is analogous to the imposition
against
a criminal
defendant
of a charge
for
the
lesser
included
offense
of attempting
to commit the crime with which
the defendant
was indicted.
If a
criminal
defendant,
whose liberty
interests
are at stake, maybe convicted
of a lesser
included
offense
with which he or she was not specifically
indicted
- including
an attempt
to commit the
greater
count - then the finding
that
petitioner
was responsible
for Attempted
Sexual
Exploitation
cannot be considered
to have been arbitrary
and capricious.
Based on the foregoing,
the petition
is dismissed.
This
decision
constitutes
the order and judgment
of the court.
The filing
of this
decision,
order,
and judgment,
or the
transmittal
of copies
hereof,
by the court
shall
not constitute
notice
of
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entry
(see
e.g. CPLR2221 [d]
[3];
5513).
The prevailing
party
shall
serve notice
of entry hereof
as required
by CPLR2220 (b) and Uniform
Rules for
Trial
Courts
(22 NYCRR)§ 202.5-b
(h)
(2).
Dated:
September 23, 2026
Cortland,
NewYork
64/--
a
D
2
.23
ENTER
HON.MARKG. MASLER
Supreme Court Justice
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The following
documents filed
with
the Clerk of the County of Tompkins via the New
York State
Courts
Electronic
Filing
System were considered
herein
(see CPLR2219 [a]):
Document Numbers 1-8;
10; 14-36.
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