{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"DigitalDocument","altText":"MEMORANDUM OF LAW Memorandum of Law in support of Respondents' Verified Answer and in opposition to the Verified Petit ... show more","alternateName":"NYSCEF-case-20f2fbf9d925-000021.pdf","caption":"NYSCEF document #21 | Filed: 2026-10-22 | Filed by: VIGARS, KAITLIN NORA Filed:  Received: | Docket status: Processed Confirmation Notice | Case: Lopes v. Hochul (Cornell 7 Lopes Against Special Prosecutor Assignment Tish James) Albany | Source: NYSCEF","contentUrl":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/595/raw","datePublished":"2026-10-22T21:41:51+00:00","description":"NYSCEF document #21 | Filed: 2026-10-22 | Filed by: VIGARS, KAITLIN NORA Filed:  Received: | Docket status: Processed Confirmation Notice | Case: Lopes v. Hochul (Cornell 7 Lopes Against Special Prosecutor Assignment Tish James) Albany | Source: NYSCEF","encodingFormat":"application/pdf","identifier":"595","isAccessibleForFree":true,"machineReadable":{"json":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/595/index.json","markdown":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/595/index.md"},"name":"MEMORANDUM OF LAW Memorandum of Law in support of Respondents' Verified Answer and in opposition to the Verified Petit ... show more","ocrStatus":"ready","ocrText":"--- Page 1 ---\nSUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK \nCOUNTY OF ALBANY \n \nIn the Matter of the Application of \nGILLIO LOPES, \nPetitioner, \n \nFor a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 \nof the Civil Practice Law and Rules \n \n-against- \n \nKATHLEEN (\u201cKATHY\u201d) M. HOCHUL, in her official \ncapacity as Governor of the State of New York, and \nLETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney \nGeneral of the State of New York, \n \nRespondents. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIndex No. 911974-26 \n \nOctober 29, 2026 \n \nFarrell, J. \n \n  \n \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF \nRESPONDENTS\u2019 ANSWER AND IN \nOPPOSITION TO THE VERIFIED PETITION \n \n \nLETITIA JAMES \nAttorney General of the State of New York \nAttorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, \nGovernor of the State of New York, and \nLetitia James, Attorney General of the \nState of New York \nThe Capitol \nAlbany, New York 12224 \n \nKaitlin Vigars \nAssistant Attorney General,  \n of Counsel \nTelephone: (518) 776-2036 \nFax: (518) 915-7738 (Not for service of papers) \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n1 of 52\n\n--- Page 2 ---\ni \n \nTable of Contents \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 1 \nSTANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 3 \nARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5 \nI. \nPETITIONER\u2019S CLAIMS ARE NOT JUSTICIABLE. ............................. 5 \nA. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims raise a political question. .................................. 6 \n1. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims invade the province of the \nexecutive branch. ................................................................ 8 \n2. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims invade the province of the \nlegislative branch. ............................................................. 11 \nB. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims are not ripe. .................................................... 12 \nC. \nPetitioner lacks standing. .............................................................. 14 \n1. \nPetitioner did not suffer any injury-in-fact. ...................... 16 \n2. \nAny injury-in-fact is not within the relevant zone of \ninterests. ............................................................................ 19 \nII. \nPETITIONER\u2019S CLAIMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT .............................. 20 \nA. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims are procedurally improper. ............................. 20 \nB. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie. ............................................. 22 \n1. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie against \nexecutive action. ............................................................... 23 \n2. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie because \nPetitioner has no clear legal right to relief. ....................... 26 \nC. \nThe writ of prohibition should not be issued as a matter of \ndiscretion. ...................................................................................... 28 \n1. \nIssuance of a writ of prohibition is not warranted. ........... 28 \n2. \nDisqualification is not warranted. ..................................... 31 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n2 of 52\n\n--- Page 3 ---\nii \n \nD. \nThe Governor\u2019s actions are not subject to judicial review as \narbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. ....................... 35 \nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 36 \n \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n3 of 52\n\n--- Page 4 ---\niii \n \nTable of Authorities \n \nPage(s) \nCases \nAbelove v. Cuomo, \n57 Misc. 3d 668 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2017) ...................................................................4, 25 \nAllard v. Allard, \n145 A.D.3d 1254 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) ...........................................................................................14 \nAmerican Ins. Assn. v. Chu, \n64 N.Y.2d 379 (1985) ................................................................................................................6 \nAntonetty v. Cuomo, \n131 Misc. 2d 1041 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1986) .....................................................................10 \nArgyle Farm & Props., LLC v. Watershed Agric. Council of the N.Y. City Watersheds, \nInc., \n135 A.D.3d 1262 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) ...........................................................................................17 \nCampaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, \n8 N.Y.3d 14 (2006) ..................................................................................................................12 \nCenter for Independence of the Disabled v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., \n184 A.D.3d 197 (1st Dep\u2019t 2020) ..............................................................................................7 \nChurch of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, \n67 N.Y.2d 510 (1986) ..............................................................................................................13 \nCitizens for St. Patrick\u2019s v. City of Watervliet City Council, \n126 A.D.3d 1159 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) ...........................................................................................15 \nDoe v. Axelrod, \n71 N.Y.2d 484 (1988) ..............................................................................................................26 \nEaton v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., \n56 N.Y.2d 340 ..........................................................................................................................21 \nFederation of Mental Health Ctrs. v. DeBuomo, \n275 A.D.2d 557 (3d Dep\u2019t 2000) .............................................................................................13 \nGaynor v. Rockefeller, \n21 A.D.2d 92 (1st Dep\u2019t 1964), aff\u2019d 15 N.Y.2d 120 (1965) ..................................................35 \nGrand S. Point, LLC v. Bassett, \n230 A.D.3d 49 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) ...............................................................................................12 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n4 of 52\n\n--- Page 5 ---\niv \n \nHollandale Apts. & Health Club v. Bonesteel, \n173 A.D.3d 55 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) ...............................................................................................13 \nIn re Grand Jury Investigation, \n696 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................14 \nIn re Grand Jury Proceedings, \n700 F.Supp. 626 (Dist. P.R. 1988) ...........................................................................................13 \nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, \n781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986).....................................................................................................13 \nJane Doe v. Cornell University, et al., \nIndex No. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) ..........................................................................1 \nJiggetts v. Grinker, \n75 N.Y.2d 411 (1990) ..............................................................................................................11 \nJones v. Beame, \n45 N.Y.2d 402 (1978) ................................................................................................................5 \nLa Rocca v. Lane, \n37 N.Y.2d 575 (1975) ........................................................................................................28, 31 \nLancaster Dev., Inc. v. McDonald, \n112 A.D.3d 1260 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) ...........................................................................................20 \nMatter of 292 Bedford, LLC v. New York, \n249 A.D.3d 874 (2d Dep\u2019t 2026) .............................................................................................17 \nMatter of 61 Crown St., LLC v. New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic \nPreserv., \n207 A.D.3d 837 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) .............................................................................................14 \nMatter of Acevedo v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehs., \n132 A.D.3d 112 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016), aff\u2019d 29 N.Y.3d 202 (2017) ...............................................14 \nMatter of Acevedo v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehs., \n29 N.Y.3d 202 (2017) ................................................................................................................5 \nMatter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Superme Ct. v. Doe, \n50 N.Y.2d 14 (1980) ............................................................................................................3, 11 \nMatter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct., \n50 N.Y.2d at 18\u201319 ..................................................................................................................24 \nMatter of Alessi v. Pataki, \n21 A.D.3d 1141 (3d Dep\u2019t 2005) ...............................................................................................4 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n5 of 52\n\n--- Page 6 ---\nv \n \nMatter of Allen B. v. Sproat, \n23 N.Y.3d 364 (2014) ..............................................................................................................22 \nMatter of Amorosi v. South Colonie Ind. Cent. Sch. Dist., \n9 N.Y.3d 367 (2007) ................................................................................................................21 \nMatter of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Aubertine, \n119 A.D.3d 1202 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014) ...........................................................................................18 \nMatter of Assoc. for a Better Long Island, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, \n23 N.Y.3d 1 (2014) ..................................................................................................................15 \nMatter of Bd. of Supervisors of Montgomery Cnty. v. Aulisi, \n62 A.D.2d 644 (3d Dep\u2019t 1978) ...............................................................................................32 \nMatter of BLDG 44 Devs. LLC v. State of New York, \n___ A.D.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 02898 (3d Dep\u2019t May 7, 2026).......................................7 \nMatter of Boyd v. Pataki, \n52 A.D.3d 1128 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) .............................................................................................35 \nMatter of Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU Sch. of Law v. New York State Bd. of \nElections, \n159 A.D.3d 1299 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) .......................................................................................5, 16 \nMatter of Brown v. New York State DOCCS Exec. Clemency Bur., \n239 A.D.3d 1216 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................35 \nMatter of Buenos Hill, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Planning Bd., \n240 A.D.3d 990 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) .............................................................................................14 \nMatter of Canning v. Revoir, \n220 A.D.3d 16 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...............................................................................................27 \nMatter of Carey (Fischer), \n68 A.D.2d 220 (4th Dep\u2019t 1979) ............................................................................................4, 9 \nMatter of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. State Of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Commission, \n242 A.D.3d 33 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...............................................................................................22 \nMatter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cnty. of Erie, \n43 A.D.3d 1341 (4th Dep\u2019t 2007) ............................................................................................10 \nMatter of Clegg v. Rounds, \n222 A.D.3d 112 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) .............................................................................................28 \nMatter of Cnty. of Orange v. City of New York, \n232 A.D.3d 785 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................17 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n6 of 52\n\n--- Page 7 ---\nvi \n \nMatter of Cnty. of Suffolk v. Kennedy, \n211 A.D.3d 937 (2d Dep\u2019t 2022) .............................................................................................23 \nMatter of Columbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 (Czajka), \n118 A.D.3d 1081 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014) ...........................................................................................29 \nMatter of Curry v. New York State Educ. Dep\u2019t, \n13 A.D.3d 1327 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) .............................................................................................15 \nMatter of Czajka v. Koweek, \n188 A.D.3d 1540 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) ...........................................................................................32 \nMatter of Doe v. Cuomo, \n71 A.D.3d 889 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) ...............................................................................................24 \nMatter of Dondi, \n40 N.Y.2d at 19\u201320 ..................................................................................................................11 \nMatter of Dondi v. Jones, \n40 N.Y.2d 8 (1976) ..............................................................................................................4, 24 \nMatter of Donnaruma v. Carter, \n41 Misc. 3d 195 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013) .......................................................................20 \nMatter of Figgins v. Hendricks, \n28 A.D.3d 1178 (4th Dep\u2019t 2006) ............................................................................................23 \nMatter of Flynn v. DiTullio, \n228 A.D.3d 1323 (4th Dep\u2019t 2024) ..........................................................................................34 \nMatter of Gonzalez v. Northeast Parent & Child Soc\u2019y, \n___ N.Y.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 01443 (Mar. 17, 2026) ...................................................7 \nMatter of Grigger v. Goord, \n27 A.D.3d 803 (3d Dep\u2019t 2006) ...............................................................................................15 \nMatter of Gronbach v. New York State Educ. Dep\u2019t, \n221 A.D.3d 1385 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...........................................................................................16 \nMatter of Hassan v. Magistrates\u2019 Ct. of City of N.Y., \n20 Misc. 2d 509 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1959) .........................................................................9 \nMatter of HCI Distrib., Inc. v. New York State Police, Troop B Commander, \n110 A.D.3d 1297 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) ...........................................................................................28 \nMatter of Henry v. Fandrich, \n159 A.D.3d 1409 (4th Dep\u2019t 2018) ..........................................................................................28 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n7 of 52\n\n--- Page 8 ---\nvii \n \nMatter of Holtzman v. Goldman, \n71 N.Y.2d 564 (1988) ..............................................................................................................26 \nMatter of Hoovler v. Vazquez-Doles, \n237 A.D.3d 936 (2d Dep\u2019t 2025) .............................................................................................26 \nMatter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, \n164 A.D.2d 518 (3d Dep\u2019t 1990) .............................................................................................13 \nMatter of Johnson, \n91 N.Y.2d at 223\u201324 ..................................................................................................................8 \nMatter of Johnson Elec. Constr. Corp. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Transp., \n124 A.D.3d 1199 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) .............................................................................................3 \nMatter of Johnson v. Pataki, \n91 N.Y.2d 214 (1997) ................................................................................ 1, 3-4, 11, 19, 24, 35 \nMatter of Lawrence Teachers\u2019s Assn., NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO v. New York State \nPub. Empl. Relations Bd., \n152 A.D.3d 171 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .............................................................................................21 \nMatter of Lawyers for Children v. New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., \n___ N.Y.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 03218 (May 21, 2026) ..................................................19 \nMatter of League of Women Voters of N.Y. State v. New York State Bd. of Elections, \n206 A.D.3d 1227 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...........................................................................................24 \nMatter of LeGrand v. Goord, \n272 A.D.2d 650 (3d Dep\u2019t 2000) .............................................................................................13 \nMatter of Long Is. Pure Water, Ltd. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Health, \n209 A.D.3d 1128 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...........................................................................................15 \nMatter of Lorie C., \n49 N.Y.2d 161 (1980) ..............................................................................................................11 \nMatter of Madison Sq. Garden Ent. Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth., \n221 A.D.3d 536 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) ............................................................................................28 \nMatter of Maluf v. Vance, \n116 A.D.3d 542 (1st Dep\u2019t 2014) ............................................................................................30 \nMatter of McGinley, \n51 N.Y.2d at 123\u201325 ................................................................................................................25 \nMatter of McGinley v. Hynes, \n51 N.Y.2d 116 (1980) ..............................................................................................................24 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n8 of 52\n\n--- Page 9 ---\nviii \n \nMatter of Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Daniels, \n33 N.Y.3d 44 (2019) ................................................................................................................16 \nMatter of Mohr v. Greenan, \n10 Misc. 3d 610 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cnty. 2005) ............................................................................12 \nMatter of Montano v. Cnty. Legislature of Cnty. of Suffolk, \n70 A.D.3d 203 (2d Dep\u2019t 2009) .................................................................................................8 \nMatter of Morabito v. Martens, \n149 A.D.3d 1316 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .............................................................................................6 \nMatter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, \n59 N.Y.2d 143 (1983) ..............................................................................................................23 \nMatter of Mulhern v. Touro Coll., \n226 A.D.3d 788 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................22 \nMatter of Mulroy, \n58 A.D.2d at 214 ................................................................................................................11, 23 \nMatter of Mulroy v. Carey, \n58 A.D.2d 213\u201314 (4th Dep\u2019t 1977) ..........................................................................................4 \nMatter of New York Blue Line Council, Inc. v. Adirondack Park Agency, \n86 A.D.3d 756 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) ...........................................................................................6, 13 \nMatter of New York State Bd. of Regents v. State Univ. of N.Y., \n178 A.D.3d 11 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) ...............................................................................................18 \nMatter of New York State Health Facilities Assn., Inc. v. Sheehan, \n100 A.D.3d 1086 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) ...........................................................................................23 \nMatter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, \nAFSCME, AFL-CIO, \n64 N.Y.2d at 239\u201340 ..................................................................................................................8 \nMatter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, \nAFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cuomo, \n64 N.Y.2d 233 (1984) ................................................................................................................7 \nMatter of Park Manor Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., LLC v. Shah, \n129 A.D.3d 1276 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) ...........................................................................................20 \nMatter of Park v. Town of New Windsor Zoning Bd. of Appeals, \n137 A.D.3d 924 (2d Dep\u2019t 2016) .............................................................................................17 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n9 of 52\n\n--- Page 10 ---\nix \n \nMatter of Parkland Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Health, \n261 A.D.2d 770 (3d Dep\u2019t 1999) .............................................................................................16 \nMatter of Paychex, Inc. v. Dep\u2019t of Taxation & Fin., \n251 A.D.3d 1369 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) ...........................................................................................14 \nMatter of People v. Trump Org., Inc., \n205 A.D.3d 625 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) ............................................................................................27 \nMatter of Percinthe v. Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, \n227 A.D.3d 1347 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................5 \nMatter of Peterec-Tolino v. Schick, \n236 A.D.3d 1130 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................28 \nMatter of Pryor v. Greenberg, \n247 A.D.2d 711 (3d Dep\u2019t 1998) .............................................................................................29 \nMatter of Raheem v. New York State Bd. of Parole, \n66 A.D.3d 1270 (3d Dep\u2019t 2009) .............................................................................................28 \nMatter of Raiser & Kenniff, P.C. v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t, \n149 A.D.3d 1084 (2d Dep\u2019t 2017) ...........................................................................................23 \nMatter of Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. v. Vecchio, \n27 N.Y.2d 92 (2016) ..................................................................................................................5 \nMatter of Rice, \n31 Misc. 3d 838 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2011)....................................................................4, 32 \nMatter of Rodriguez v. Hobbs, \n220 A.D.3d 1145 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...........................................................................................29 \nMatter of Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, \n206 A.D.3d. 1332 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ..........................................................................................16 \nMatter of Schmitt v. Skovira, \n53 A.D.3d 918 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) ...............................................................................................29 \nMatter of Schulz v. Cuomo, \n133 A.D.3d 945 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) .........................................................................................5, 18 \nMatter of Schulz v. Silver, \n212 A.D.2d 293 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................12 \nMatter of Schulz v. State of New York, \n216 A.D.3d 21 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) .................................................................................................7 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n10 of 52\n\n--- Page 11 ---\nx \n \nMatter of Schumer v. Holtzman, \n60 N.Y.2d 46 (1983) ......................................................................................... 10, 25-26, 29-31 \nMatter of Schwabler v. DiNapoli, \n194 A.D.3d 1235 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) ...........................................................................................22 \nMatter of Seneca Lake Guardian v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conserv., \n229 A.D.3d 987 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................18 \nMatter of Sgueglia v. Kelly, \n45 Misc. 3d 335 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2014) .............................................................................8 \nMatter of Smith v. Gribetz, \n211 A.D.2d 605 (2d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................23 \nMatter of Snyder v. Farrell, \n242 A.D.3d 1480 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................29 \nMatter of Soares v. Herrick, \n20 N.Y.3d 139 (2012) ........................................................................................................28, 32 \nMatter of Staten Is. Branch of the Natl. Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. \nState of N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & Thirteenth Jud. Dists., \n144 A.D.3d 412 (1st Dep\u2019t 2016) ............................................................................................10 \nMatter of Stevens v. New York State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., \n40 N.Y.3d 505 (2003) ..............................................................................................................15 \nMatter of Suffolk Cnty. Legislature v. Mullen, \n211 A.D.2d 736 (2d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................25 \nMatter of Town of Brunswick v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, \n152 A.D.3d 1106 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .............................................................................................6 \nMatter of Town of Huntington v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, \n82 N.Y.2d 783 (1993) ..............................................................................................................26 \nMatter of Town of Riverhead v. Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning & Policy Commn, \n71 A.D.3d 679 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) ...............................................................................................13 \nMatter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, \n39 N.Y. 3d 201 (2023) .............................................................................................................21 \nMatter of Tripodi v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, \n251 A.D.3d 1708 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026) ..........................................................................................12 \nMatter of Trump v. Engoron, \n222 A.D.3d 505 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) ............................................................................................29 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n11 of 52\n\n--- Page 12 ---\nxi \n \nMatter of Trump v. Merchan, \n230 A.D.3d 413 (1st Dep\u2019t 2024) ............................................................................................28 \nMatter of Urban Justice Ctr. v. Pataki, \n38 A.D.3d 20 (1st Dep\u2019t 2006) ..................................................................................................8 \nMatter of Vasquez v. Fischer, \n127 A.D.3d 1441 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) .............................................................................................5 \nMatter of Wal-Mart Stores v. Campbell, \n238 A.D.2d 831 (3d Dep\u2019t 1997) .............................................................................................14 \nMatter of Whitfield v. New York State Off. of Professional Med. Conduct, \n237 A.D.3d 1393 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................15 \nMatter of Working Families Party v. Fisher, \n23 N.Y.3d 539 (2014) ..............................................................................................................31 \nMaybee v. State of New York, \n4 N.Y.3d 415 (2005) ................................................................................................................35 \nMontano v. City of Watervliet, \n47 A.D.3d 1106 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) ...............................................................................................6 \nMorgenthau v. Crane, \n113 A.D.2d 20 (1st Dep\u2019t 1985) ..............................................................................................33 \nMulroy v. Carey, \n43 N.Y.2d 819 (1977) ..............................................................................................................20 \nNew York State Ass\u2019n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, \n2 N.Y.3d 207 (2004) ................................................................................................................18 \nNew York State Police Investigators Assn., Local 4 IUPA, AFL-CIO v. State of New York, \n71 Misc. 3d 1007 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2021) .....................................................................23 \nNitkewich v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y., \n40 N.Y.3d 349 (2023) ..............................................................................................................22 \nPeople ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Extraordinary Special & Trial Term of \nSupreme Court, \n220 N.Y. 487 (1917) ..................................................................................................................8 \nPeople v. Abelove, \n179 A.D.3d 39 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) .........................................................................................11, 20 \nPeople v. Adams, \n20 N.Y.3d 608 (2013) ..............................................................................................................31 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n12 of 52\n\n--- Page 13 ---\nxii \n \nPeople v. Barba, \n60 Misc. 3d 1074 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 2018) .....................................................................33 \nPeople v. Bunge Corp., \n25 N.Y.2d 91 (1969) ................................................................................................................10 \nPeople v. Callara, \n44 N.Y.3d 623 (2025) ..............................................................................................................32 \nPeople v. Douglas, \n226 A.D.3d 1162 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) ...........................................................................................34 \nPeople v. Drago, \n207 A.D.3d 559 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) .............................................................................................35 \nPeople v. Goldston, \n126 A.D.3d 1175 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) ...........................................................................................34 \nPeople v. Hodgins, \n202 A.D.3d 1377 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...........................................................................................31 \nPeople v. Jenkins, \n186 A.D.3d 31 (1st Dep\u2019t 2020) ..............................................................................................35 \nPeople v. Lancaster, \n69 N.Y.2d 20 (1986) ................................................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Leahy, \n72 N.Y.2d 510 (1988) ...................................................................................................... 8-9, 23 \nPeople v. Mero, \n221 A.D.3d 1242 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...........................................................................................33 \nPeople v. Miller, \n110 A.D.3d 1150 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) ...........................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Mitchell, \n82 N.Y.2d 509 (1993) ..............................................................................................................34 \nPeople v. National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc., \n223 A.D.3d 84 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) ..............................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Pelchat, \n62 N.Y.2d 97 (1984) ................................................................................................................34 \nPeople v. Pottorff, \n145 A.D.3d 1095 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) ...........................................................................................33 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n13 of 52\n\n--- Page 14 ---\nxiii \n \nPeople v. Rivera, \n206 A.D.3d 1356 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...........................................................................................28 \nPeople v. Ronk, \n159 A.D.3d 1129 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) ...........................................................................................33 \nPeople v. Santorelli, \n95 N.Y.2d 412 (2000) ..............................................................................................................18 \nPeople v. Shinkle, \n51 N.Y.2d 417 (1980) ..............................................................................................................31 \nPeople v. Sloley, \n179 A.D.3d 1308 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) ...........................................................................................31 \nPeople v. Tatro, \n53 A.D.3d 781 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) ...............................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Thompson, \n22 N.Y.3d 803 (2014) ..............................................................................................................34 \nPeople v. Viviani, \n36 N.Y.3d 564 (2021) ........................................................................................................19, 32 \nPeople v. Walton, \n214 A.D.2d 805 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Zakrzewski, \n249 A.D.2d 1314 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...........................................................................................33 \nPirro v. Angiolillo, \n89 N.Y.2d 351 (1996) ..............................................................................................................26 \nPolice Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v. New York State Div. of State \nPolice, \n40 A.D.3d 1350 (3d Dep\u2019t 2007) ...............................................................................................6 \nRapp v. Carey, \n44 N.Y.2d 157 (1978) ..............................................................................................................24 \nRoberts v. Health & Hosps. Corp., \n87 A.D.3d 311 (1st Dep\u2019t 2011) ................................................................................................6 \nRush v. Mordue, \n68 N.Y.2d 348 (1986) ........................................................................................................27, 30 \nSaranac Land & Timber Co., \n220 N.Y. ...................................................................................................................................35 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n14 of 52\n\n--- Page 15 ---\nxiv \n \nSaxton v. Carey, \n44 N.Y.2d 545 (1978) ................................................................................................................4 \nSoares v. Carter, \n25 N.Y.3d 1011 (2015) ........................................................................................................9, 26 \nSoc\u2019y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, \n77 N.Y.2d 761 (1991) .................................................................................................. 14-15, 19 \nState of New York v. Wolowitz, \n96 A.D.2d 47 (2d Dep\u2019t 1983) ...........................................................................................24, 30 \nSullivan v. New York State Joint Commn. on Pub. Ethics, \n207 A.D.3d 117 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................12 \nTown of Colonie v. City of New York, \n237 A.D.3d 1398 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................22 \nWayte v. United States, \n470 U.S. 598 (1985) ...................................................................................................................9 \nXiang Fu He v. Troon Mgt., Inc., \n34 N.Y.3d 167 (2019) ..............................................................................................................11 \nConstitutions \nNew York State Constitution \n \nart. IV, \u00a7 3 ..............................................................................................................2, 3, 4, 19, 23 \n \nart. XIII, \u00a7 1 .............................................................................................................................17 \nState Statutes \nCounty Law \n\u00a7 701.........................................................................................................................................32 \n\u00a7 701(6) ........................................................................................................................12, 20, 22 \n\u00a7 701(6)(a) ...............................................................................................................................20 \n\u00a7 701(6)(b) ...............................................................................................................................21 \n\u00a7 930.........................................................................................................................................25 \nCriminal Procedure Law \n\u00a7 20.40......................................................................................................................................22 \nExecutive Law \n\u00a7 63(2) ......................................................................................1-4, 11, 17, 19-20, 23-24, 30, 32 \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n15 of 52\n\n--- Page 16 ---\n1 \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nRespondent Kathy Hochul, Governor of the State of New York (Governor) and Respondent \nLetitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York (AG, and collectively with the Governor, \nRespondents), respectfully submit this memorandum of law in opposition to the Verified Petition, \ndated October 7, 2026, which seeks a writ of prohibition to: (1) void an executive order\u2014\nExecutive Order No. 64, dated October 1, 2026 (EO 64)\u2014that appointed the AG as special \nprosecutor to investigate conduct arising out of allegations made in Jane Doe v. Cornell University, \net al., Index No. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) (the Jane Doe Litigation); and (2) disqualify \nthe AG from serving as special prosecutor in that investigation.   \nThe Verified Petition must be denied. The Court of Appeals is clear that judicial review of \nthe Governor\u2019s exercise of her superseder authority under Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) is \u201cgenerally \nlimited to determining whether the State Constitution or the Legislature has empowered the \nGovernor to act, and does not include the manner in which the Governor chooses to discharge that \nauthority.\u201d  Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 91 N.Y.2d 214, 223 (1997). Thus, Petitioner\u2019s claims \nnecessarily fail.  \nFirst, Petitioner\u2019s claims are not justiciable. Petitioner\u2019s claims raise a political question \nthat is not subject to judicial review and depend on so many levels of supposition and contingency \nabout unknown future events that they are unripe and he lacks standing. Second, even if this matter \nwere justiciable, it is procedurally defective and substantively meritless. Accordingly, for all the \nreasons detailed below and in the accompanying affirmation of Kaitlin Vigars, dated October 22, \n2026 (\u201cVigars Aff.\u201d), the Verified Petition must be denied and this proceeding must be dismissed. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \nOn October 1, 2026, the Governor issued EO 64 appointing the AG as a special prosecutor \nfor an investigation into allegations described in the Jane Doe Litigation. Executive Order No. 64, \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n16 of 52\n\n--- Page 17 ---\n2 \n \nVigars Aff., Exh. A. The Governor issued EO 64 in an exercise of her superseder authority, derived \nfrom the executive powers conferred to the Governor in Article IV, \u00a7 3 of the New York State \nConstitution and the statutory powers granted to the Governor by the Legislature in Executive Law \n\u00a7 63(2). See id. EO 64 authorizes the AG to \u201cinvestigate, and, if warranted, present evidence to a \ngrand jury against and prosecute offenses arising out of the allegations of a sexual assault described \nin the [Jane Doe Litigation.]\u201d Id. Further, EO 64 specifies that the AG \u201cor her designee shall \nconduct a full, reasoned, and independent investigation . . . .\u201d Id.  \nPetitioner is a defendant in the Jane Doe Litigation. Petition, \u00b6\u00b6 2\u20133, 6, 17, 22, 64, Dkt. \nNo. 1. Petitioner anticipates that he will be targeted in the investigation authorized by EO 64 and \nthat the investigation will not be properly conducted because, according to him, the AG allegedly \nunfairly prejudged the allegations made in the Jane Doe Litigation. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 6\u20139, 31\u201334, 56, 64\u201366. \nIn support of this claim, Petitioner points to a single, empathetic remark made by the AG on social \nmedia prior to her appointment as special prosecutor, which Petitioner characterizes as \n\u201ccommunicat[ing] acceptance of Doe\u2019s account\u201d and an \u201capparent credibility judgment . . . \nconcerning the complainant . . . .\u201d Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 44\u201345. According to Petitioner, these remarks indicate \nthat the AG is unable to adequately evaluate the allegations made in the Jane Doe litigation and \nwill not consider or pursue exculpatory evidence, which will taint the investigation and prejudice \nPetitioner in a possible future criminal proceeding. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 46\u201348, 56\u201358.  \nPetitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, seeking a writ of \nprohibition to void EO 64 and disqualify the AG from acting as special prosecutor. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 36\u201351, \n60\u201380. Alternatively, Petitioner requests that the determination by the Governor appointing the \nAG as special prosecutor be annulled because it is arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n17 of 52\n\n--- Page 18 ---\n3 \n \ndiscretion. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 52\u201355, 79.1 By way of relief, Petitioner requests judgment pursuant to CPLR \n7806 voiding EO 64 and requiring the Governor to instead appoint a special prosecutor free from \nactual or perceived conflicts of interest or bias, or, in the alternative, modifying EO 64 to limit the \nAG\u2019s participation in any investigation. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 60\u201363, 80, Wherefore Clause. Respondents now \nanswer in opposition. \nSTANDARD OF REVIEW \n Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) authorizes the AG \u201c[w]henever required by the governor\u201d to \n\u201cmanag[e] and conduct[] in such court or before such [grand] jury criminal actions or proceedings \nas shall be specified in such requirement . . . .\u201d  It states that, when the AG is authorized by the \nGovernor, the AG \u201cshall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties in respect of such \nactions or proceedings, which the district attorney would otherwise be authorized or required to \nexercise or perform . . . .\u201d  Exec. Law \u00a7 63(2)  Contemporaneous with this grant of authority, \nExecutive Law \u00a7 63(2) limits the authority of the district attorney, so that when the AG is appointed \nby the Governor, \u201cthe district attorney shall only exercise such powers and perform such duties as \nare required of him by the attorney-general . . . .\u201d  Id. \nCourts interpreting this statutory grant of authority \u201chave long held that article IV, \u00a7 3 of \nthe Constitution and Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) together provide the Governor with discretionary \nauthority to supersede the District Attorney in a matter.\u201d  Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223; \nsee Matter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Superme Ct. v. Doe, 50 N.Y.2d 14, 16 \n \n1 The single cause of action pled in the Verified Petition is a claim pursuant to CPLR \n7803(2). Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 69\u201381. CPLR 7803(2) permits a petitioner to raise the question of \u201cwhether the \nbody or officer proceeded, is proceeding, or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction \n. . . .\u201d Thus, based on Petitioner\u2019s narrow pleading, any claim that the Governor\u2019s actions are \narbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion is not properly pleaded and not properly before \nthis Court. See Matter of Johnson Elec. Constr. Corp. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Transp., 124 \nA.D.3d 1199, 1200 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (claims not properly before the court because they were not \npleaded in the petition). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n18 of 52\n\n--- Page 19 ---\n4 \n \n(1980) (Governor\u2019s superseder authority derives both from Article IV, \u00a7 3 of the New York State \nConstitution and from the Legislature as granted in in Executive Law \u00a7 63(2)); Matter of Carey \n(Fischer), 68 A.D.2d 220, 224 (4th Dep\u2019t 1979) (same). The Governor\u2019s authority under Executive \nLaw \u00a7 63(2) is broad as \u201c[t]he statute neither limits the Governor\u2019s authority to supersede, nor \nrequires the Governor to explain that choice.\u201d  Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 224; see Matter of \nMulroy v. Carey, 58 A.D.2d 213\u201314 (4th Dep\u2019t 1977) (ruling that the Governor is not required to \nexplain rationale for exercising superseder authority because neither the Constitution, nor the \nstatute include \u201ca standard . . . as a guide for action by the governor\u201d); see also Matter of Rice, 31 \nMisc. 3d 838, 844 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2011) (Governor\u2019s superseder authority is \u201cleft to his \nsound discretion; he is not, for example, required . . . to make any finding that a [d]istrict [a]ttorney \nis disqualified\u201d).  \nThis statutory framework leaves \u201cthe authority to supersede within the Governor\u2019s sound \ndiscretion . . . and judicial review is limited to determining whether the Constitution or the \nLegislature has empowered the Governor to act.\u201d  Abelove v. Cuomo, 57 Misc. 3d 668, 673 (Sup. \nCt. Albany Cnty. 2017); see Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8, 19\u201320 (1976) (considering \nwhether specific prosecution pursued by the AG was within scope of authority tasked by Governor \npursuant to Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) and corresponding executive order); Matter of Alessi v. Pataki, \n21 A.D.3d 1141, 1143 (3d Dep\u2019t 2005) (affirming motion court determination that dismissed \npetition challenging Governor\u2019s exercise of discretionary authority because \u201cpetitioner has not \ndemonstrated that the Governor lacked authority\u201d to effectuate action). \u201cFor abuse of lawful \ndiscretionary authority, the remedy as a rule lies with the people at the polls, or with a \nconstitutional amendment, or with corrective legislation.\u201d  Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223; \nsee Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 51 (1978) (action at issue was beyond scope of judicial review \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n19 of 52\n\n--- Page 20 ---\n5 \n \nbecause it was tasked to the executive and legislative branches of government, such that \u201cthe \nremedy lies not in the courtroom, but in the voting booth\u201d). \nARGUMENT \nI. \nPETITIONER\u2019S CLAIMS ARE NOT JUSTICIABLE. \n\u201cIn order to warrant a determination of the merits of a cause of action, the party requesting \nrelief must state a justiciable claim\u2014one that is capable of review and redress by the courts at the \ntime that it is brought for review.\u201d  Matter of Schulz v. Cuomo, 133 A.D.3d 945, 947 (3d Dep\u2019t \n2015); see Matter of Vasquez v. Fischer, 127 A.D.3d 1441, 1442 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (\u201cgeneralized \ndissatisfaction with [governmental action] . . . does not present a justiciable controversy\u201d). \u201cThe \ngeneral principle of justiciability embraces several concepts . . . that are related by the fundamental \ntenet that, in our tripartite system of government, a court should limit itself to conflicts that are \namenable to traditional judicial resolution and should \u2018not undertake tasks that other governmental \nbranches are better suited to perform.\u2019\u201d  Matter of Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU Sch. of Law v. \nNew York State Bd. of Elections, 159 A.D.3d 1299, 1301 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) (quoting Klostermann \nv. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 535 (1984)). Threshold justiciability concepts that bar a determination \non the merits include, among others, the political question doctrine, ripeness, and standing. See \nMatter of Acevedo v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehs., 29 N.Y.3d 202, 218 (2017) \n(recognizing standing as a threshold justiciability concept); Matter of Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. \nv. Vecchio, 27 N.Y.2d 92, 98 (2016) (recognizing ripeness as a threshold justiciability concept); \nJones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408 (1978) (recognizing political question doctrine as a threshold \njusticiability concept). \nHere, Petitioner\u2019s claims are not justiciable, barring resolution on the merits. See Matter of \nPercinthe v. Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 227 A.D.3d 1347, 1348 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) \n(controversy not justiciable because it involved \u201ca future determination by respondent that is too \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n20 of 52\n\n--- Page 21 ---\n6 \n \nremote and speculative to be justiciable\u201d); Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v. \nNew York State Div. of State Police, 40 A.D.3d 1350, 1352\u201353 (3d Dep\u2019t 2007) (controversy not \njusticiable because petitioner \u201cdoes no more than raise concerns over the potentially broad and \narbitrary manner in which [respondent] could theoretically apply [the challenged action] and such \nconcerns are wholly speculative\u201d). Specifically, Petitioner\u2019s claims impermissibly raise a political \nquestion not suitable for judicial review, seek review of a determination that is not ripe for review, \nand Petitioner lacks standing. See Matter of Morabito v. Martens, 149 A.D.3d 1316, 1317 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2017) (affirming motion court determination that dismissed petition because petitioner \nlacked standing to challenge government action at issue);  Roberts v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 87  \nA.D.3d 311, 321, 324\u201326 (1st Dep\u2019t 2011) (reversing motion court determination that reached \nmerits of claims because petitioner lacked standing and claims raised political question not suitable \nfor judicial review); Montano v. City of Watervliet, 47 A.D.3d 1106, 1111 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) \n(affirming motion court determination that awarded summary judgment dismissing claims that \nwere not ripe for judicial review). Any single one of these justiciability defects mandates denial of \nthe Verified Petition. See American Ins. Assn. v. Chu, 64 N.Y.2d 379, 385 (1985) (reversing \nappellate court decision that resolved claims on the merits because, even if party had standing, \nother justiciability issues required dismissal); see also Matter of Town of Brunswick v. Cnty. of \nRensselaer, 152 A.D.3d 1106, 1107 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) (finding claims not justiciable because \npetitioner lacked standing and lack of standing was dispositive); Matter of New York Blue Line \nCouncil, Inc. v. Adirondack Park Agency, 86 A.D.3d 756, 760 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) (finding claims not \njusticiable because, even if party had standing, claims were not ripe for review).  \nA. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims raise a political question. \n\u201c[I]t is a fundamental principle of the organic law that each department of government \nshould be free from interference, in the lawful discharge of duties expressly conferred, by either \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n21 of 52\n\n--- Page 22 ---\n7 \n \nof the other branches.\u201d Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., \nDist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 233, 239 (1984). \u201cWithin our tripartite \ngovernmental framework, the Governor as chief executive officer, has the responsibility to manage \nthe operation of the divisions of the executive branch . . . .\u201d Id. Thus, \u201clawful acts of executive \nbranch officials, performed in satisfaction of responsibilities conferred by law, involves questions \nof judgment, allocation of resources, and ordering of priorities, which are generally not subject to \njudicial review.\u201d Id.; see also Matter of BLDG 44 Devs. LLC v. State of New York, ___ A.D.3d \n___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 02898 (3d Dep\u2019t May 7, 2026) (\u201cunder the separation of powers doctrine \nno one branch of government is allowed to arrogate unto itself powers residing entirely in another \nbranch\u201d (quotations marks, brackets, and citation omitted)). Likewise, \u201c[t]he courts do not sit in \nreview of the discretion of the legislature or determine the expediency, wisdom, or propriety of its \nactions on matters within its power.\u201d Matter of Gonzalez v. Northeast Parent & Child Soc\u2019y, ___ \nN.Y.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 01443 (Mar. 17, 2026); Matter of Schulz v. State of New York, \n216 A.D.3d 21, 26 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (the court \u201cmay not substitute its judgment for that of the body \nwhich made the decision\u201d and \u201c[j]udges, however much they might disagree with the wisdom of \nthe act under review, are not free to invalidate it on that ground\u201d). \u201cThis judicial deference to a \ncoordinate, coequal branch of government\u201d presents a justiciability consideration that is \u201cgenerally \ndenominated as the political question doctrine . . . .\u201d Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & \nLaw Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 64 N.Y.2d at 239; see Center for \nIndependence of the Disabled v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 184 A.D.3d 197, 208 (1st Dep\u2019t \n2020) (recognizing that justiciability concepts provide an important limitation on judicial power). \nIn contravention of these bedrock principles of judicial restraint, Petitioner asks this Court \nto impermissibly void a discretionary action by the Governor, limit the prosecutorial discretion of \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n22 of 52\n\n--- Page 23 ---\n8 \n \nthe AG, and contravene a statutory framework that reflects explicit policy choices made by the \nLegislature. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 36\u201355; see Matter of Montano v. Cnty. Legislature of Cnty. of Suffolk, 70 \nA.D.3d 203, 211\u201312 (2d Dep\u2019t 2009) (dismissing article 78 petition because petitioner\u2019s claim that \nlegislature should have handled his bill differently raised a political question that was not \njusticiable); Matter of Sgueglia v. Kelly, 45 Misc. 3d 335, 342 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2014) (denying \narticle 78 petition because petitioner\u2019s claim that police department should have handled firearms \nlicense application differently raised a political question that was not justiciable). \n1. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims invade the province of the executive branch. \nThe Governor\u2019s exercise of her superseder authority is an executive function, left entirely \nto her discretion. See Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223\u201324; People v. Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d 510, \n515 (1988). Petitioner concedes\u2014and expressly does not challenge\u2014that the Governor has broad, \ndiscretionary authority to appoint the AG as special prosecutor, but nevertheless questions the \nvalidity of the Governor\u2019s choice. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 37\u201338, 44\u201348. Such claim is beyond the reach of this \nCourt because it impermissibly requires the court to pass upon the soundness of a discretionary \ndetermination made by the Governor in exercise of her constitutional authority as executive and \nthe statutory authority conferred on her by the Legislature. See Matter of New York State \nInspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 64 N.Y.2d at \n239\u201340 (separation of powers barred judicial review of Governor\u2019s decision to close correctional \nfacility because \u201cthe manner by which the State addresses complex societal and governmental \nissues is a subject left to the discretion of the political branches of government\u201d and beyond the \nauthority of the courts to review); People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Extraordinary \nSpecial & Trial Term of Supreme Court, 220 N.Y. 487, 490\u201391 (1917) (discretionary action by \nGovernor done in accordance with statutory authority conferred by the Legislature is not subject \nto judicial review); Matter of Urban Justice Ctr. v. Pataki, 38 A.D.3d 20, 32 (1st Dep\u2019t 2006) \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n23 of 52\n\n--- Page 24 ---\n9 \n \n(separation of powers barred judicial review of Governor\u2019s use of messages of necessity because \nGovernor had authority to utilize messages of necessity and their use was left to the Governor\u2019s \ndiscretion).  \nSimilarly, the AG\u2019s exercise of her special prosecutorial authority is an executive function \ninvolving considerable discretion. See Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d at 515 (\u201cwhen an appointment is made \nunder [Executive Law] section 63(2), the whole dynamic is played out within the executive \nbranch\u201d); Matter of Carey, 68 A.D.2d at 224 (appointment of AG to supersede district attorney is \ndone as exercise of executive action, AG \u201csteps into the shoes of the local [d]istrict [a]ttorney\u201d and \n\u201cis empowered to manage and conduct specified criminal actions and proceedings\u201d); see also \nSoares v. Carter, 25 N.Y.3d 1011, 1013 (2015) (recognizing that the way a prosecution is \nconducted is exclusively an executive function). Exercise of prosecutorial discretion by any \nprosecutor is largely beyond the scope of judicial review because it necessarily implicates \nseparation of powers concerns. See, e.g., Matter of Hassan v. Magistrates\u2019 Ct. of City of N.Y., 20 \nMisc. 2d 509, 511 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1959) (\u201c[a]s a basic incident of our form of government, \nwith hits divided powers and responsibilities lodged in the executive, legislative, and judicial \nbranches, and as a self-imposed rule of judicial restraint, the courts should not interfere with the \ndiscretion lodged in prosecuting officials such as the district attorney or the Attorney General to \ninstitute criminal proceedings\u201d (emphasis in the original)); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 \nU.S. 598, 607 (1985) (\u201c[e]xamining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, \nthreatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosector\u2019s motives and decisionmaking to \noutside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness\u201d).  \nDespite this traditional bar, Petitioner presumes to predict how the AG may exercise her \nprosecutorial discretion and, based on his assumptions, asks this Court to prohibit her from acting. \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n24 of 52\n\n--- Page 25 ---\n10 \n \nPet. \u00b6\u00b6 36\u201355. This type of judicial interference would be inappropriate in any prosecution and \nshould not be countenanced here. See Matter of Staten Is. Branch of the Natl. Assn. for the \nAdvancement of Colored People v. State of N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & \nThirteenth Jud. Dists., 144 A.D.3d 412, 412\u201313 (1st Dep\u2019t 2016) (separation of powers prohibited \njudicial review of actions of \u201cduly elected prosecutor who acted within the discretion of his \noffice\u201d); see also Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 55, 56 (1983) (finding that request \nto disqualify prosecutor was \u201cnot justiciable\u201d and noting that the court\u2019s ability to intervene to \ndisqualify a prosecutor was especially limited when it involved \u201ca constitutional officer chosen by \nthe electorate\u201d because \u201cremoval by a court implicates separation of powers\u201d); People v. Bunge \nCorp., 25 N.Y.2d 91, 98 (1969) (ruling that when Attorney General is authorized by statute to act, \n\u201cthe discretion of the Attorney-General in maintaining or discontinuing an action may not be made \nthe subject of injury by the courts\u201d). \nAccordingly, Petitioner\u2019s claim is barred by the political question doctrine because it would \nrequire this Court to impermissibly invade the province of the executive branch, and the Court\u2019s \nreview would undermine the constitutional and statutory authority of both the Governor and the \nAG, in violation of fundamental principles of the separation of powers. See Matter of Civil Serv. \nEmpls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cnty. of Erie, 43 A.D.3d 1341, 1342 (4th \nDep\u2019t 2007) (challenge to determination by County executive to reduce staffing appropriations \nwas a political question not subject to judicial review because such determination involved the \nexercise of executive\u2019s discretionary authority regarding resource allocation); Antonetty v. Cuomo, \n131 Misc. 2d 1041, 1045 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1986) (challenge to action by Governor regarding \nnaming of certain property was a political question not subject to judicial review because such \ndetermination \u201cwas done in the performance of his executive powers and such acts performed in \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n25 of 52\n\n--- Page 26 ---\n11 \n \nhis official capacity are outside the scope of judicial review\u201d); see also Matter of Lorie C., 49 \nN.Y.2d 161, 171 (1980) (\u201ccourts do not normally have overview of the lawful acts of appointive \nand elective officials involving questions of judgment, discretion, allocation of resources and \npriorities\u201d). \n2. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims invade the province of the legislative branch.  \n\u201cThe Legislature, by enacting Executive Law \u00a7 63(2), statutorily gave the power to the \nGovernor to call upon [the ]AG to conduct investigations.\u201d  People v. Abelove, 179 A.D.3d 39, 44 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2019). \u201cThe statute neither limits the Governor\u2019s authority to supersede, nor requires the \nGovernor to explain that choice.\u201d  Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 224; see Matter of Additional \nJan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct., 50 N.Y.2d at 19 (only requirement of Executive \nLaw \u00a7 63(2) is that the Governor identify the subject matter to be investigated); see also Matter of \nDondi, 40 N.Y.2d at 19\u201320 (only limitation on AG\u2019s authority to act upon supersession of district \nattorney is \u201cthe scope of the order or requirement of the Governor\u201d). Contemporaneous judicial \nreview would contravene that explicit policy choice. See Matter of Mulroy, 58 A.D.2d at 214 \n(\u201cimposition of a standard under which a governor may invoke his powers to supersede a district \nattorney\u201d would contradict \u201ca policy risk which the framers of the Constitution and the Legislature \nassumed in granting this authority to the governor\u201d); see also Xiang Fu He v. Troon Mgt., Inc., 34 \nN.Y.3d 167, 175 (2019) (\u201ccourts do not sit in review of the discretion of the Legislature or \ndetermine the expediency, wisdom, or propriety of its action on matters within its powers\u201d); \nJiggetts v. Grinker, 75 N.Y.2d 411, 415 (1990) (\u201c[i]f the Legislature left the matter to the judgment \nof the [executive branch], then the issue is beyond review for the courts may not substitute judicial \noversight for the discretionary management of the public\u2019s business by public officers\u201d). \nAdditionally, and as discussed further below, the Legislature created a specific process for \naddressing disqualification of the AG when acting as a special prosecutor that requires an \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n26 of 52\n\n--- Page 27 ---\n12 \n \napplication by the AG to the superior criminal court where the criminal matter is triable. See \nCounty Law \u00a7 701(6). Permitting Petitioner to seek disqualification through an entirely different \nprocess not contemplated by this statute is in tension with the legislative policy choice that the \nstatute reflects. See Matter of Tripodi v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 251 \nA.D.3d 1708, 1709 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026) (motion court properly dismissed proceeding because \nproceeding was not authorized by underlying statutory scheme and court \u201cmay not second-guess \nthe legislature\u2019s policy choices or rewrite statutes to reflect their preferred outcomes\u201d); see also \nCampaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 28 (2006) (recognizing that \ncourts must give deference to legislative policy choices because this deference is required by our \nstructure of government). \nAccordingly, Petitioner\u2019s claims are barred by the political question doctrine because \nresolution of such claims would improperly invade the province of the Legislature in violation of \nseparation of powers. See Matter of Schulz v. Silver, 212 A.D.2d 293, 295 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) (claims \nin article 78 petition challenging Legislature\u2019s failure to act were not justiciable because resolution \nof such claims would require review of legislative policy choices that \u201crequire the exercise of \nconsiderable judgment and discretion\u201d); Matter of Mohr v. Greenan, 10 Misc. 3d 610, 614 (Sup. \nCt. Erie Cnty. 2005) (claims in article 78 petition challenging budget appropriation decisions were \nnot justiciable because resolution of such claims would require review of legislative policy \nchoices). \nB. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims are not ripe. \nWhether a governmental action is ripe for review requires consideration of: (1) \u201cwhether \nthe issues tendered are appropriate for judicial resolution and[;]\u201d (2) an assessment of \u201cthe hardship \nto the parties if judicial relief is denied.\u201d Sullivan v. New York State Joint Commn. on Pub. Ethics, \n207 A.D.3d 117, 130 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024); see Grand S. Point, LLC v. Bassett, 230 A.D.3d 49, 60 (3d \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n27 of 52\n\n--- Page 28 ---\n13 \n \nDep\u2019t 2024). Appropriateness considers \u201cwhether the administrative action being reviewed is final \nand whether the controversy may be determined as a purely legal question.\u201d Matter of New York \nBlue Line Council, Inc., 86 A.D.3d at 760 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Matter of \nTown of Riverhead v. Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning & Policy Commn, 71 A.D.3d 679, 680\u2013\n81 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010); Matter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, 164 A.D.2d 518, 525 (3d \nDep\u2019t 1990). Hardship considers \u201cthe certainty and effect of the harm claimed to be caused by the \nadministrative action: whether it is sufficiently direct and immediate and whether the action\u2019s \neffects have been felt in a concrete way.\u201d Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d \n510, 520 (1986); see Federation of Mental Health Ctrs. v. DeBuomo, 275 A.D.2d 557, 562 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2000). Harm that is insignificant, remote, or contingent is not sufficient to establish hardship. \nSee Hollandale Apts. & Health Club v. Bonesteel, 173 A.D.3d 55, 59\u201360 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019); Matter \nof LeGrand v. Goord, 272 A.D.2d 650, 650 (3d Dep\u2019t 2000). \nHere, Petitioner fails the hardship prong because the harms alleged\u2014that the investigation \nwill be improperly conducted and prejudice Petitioner in a possible future criminal proceeding\u2014\nare uncertain. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 56\u201358, 64\u201368; see Matter of New York Blue Line Council, Inc., 86 A.D.3d at \n760 (challenge to revision of Adirondack Park Agency regulations was not ripe for review based \non alleged future harms that may never occur). The investigation authorized by EO 64 is only \nweeks old. See Executive Order No. 64. At this stage, the results of that investigation, whether \nthere will be a presentation to the grand jury, or whether any grand jury will vote to indict Petitioner \nare not known. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir. \n1986) (\u201c[b]efore disqualification can even be contemplated . . . the grand jury must indict; the \ngovernment must go forward with the prosecution of the indictment\u201d); In re Grand Jury \nProceedings, 700 F.Supp. 626, 631 (Dist. P.R. 1988) (\u201cwhether a prosecutor who appears before \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n28 of 52\n\n--- Page 29 ---\n14 \n \na grand jury labors under a conflict of interest or whether his conduct oversteps the bounds of \npropriety should be determined after indictment, not by mere conjecture or speculation\u201d); see also \nIn re Grand Jury Investigation, 696 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1982) (expressing skepticism about \nwhether disqualification of a special prosecutor is appropriate at the pre-indictment, investigatory \nstage and recognizing that early disqualification has been permitted in only a limited number of \nextreme circumstances with \u201cserious abuses\u201d).  \nThe myriad unknowns inherent in Petitioner\u2019s claim render any harm far too remote and \ncontingent to sufficiently establish that he has suffered the requisite hardship for ripeness. See \nMatter of Paychex, Inc. v. Dep\u2019t of Taxation & Fin., 251 A.D.3d 1369, 1372 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) \n(petitioner\u2019s claim was not ripe for review because feared administrative action had not yet been \ninitiated); Matter of Buenos Hill, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Planning Bd., 240 A.D.3d 990, 993 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2025) (petitioner\u2019s claim was not ripe for review because harm alleged was \u201ca future harm \nthat may never come to pass\u201d); Matter of Acevedo v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehs., 132 \nA.D.3d 112, 116\u201317 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016), aff\u2019d 29 N.Y.3d 202 (2017) (petitioner\u2019s claim was not ripe \nfor review because harms alleged were \u201ccontingent upon events which may not come to pass\u201d). \nWhile Petitioner relies on the AG\u2019s remarks in a single social media post as proof that the various \nills he fears will come to pass, such speculative and conclusory claims of harm\u2014premised entirely \non his own mischaracterization of the AG\u2019s statements\u2014are insufficient for hardship. Pet. \u00b6 66; \nsee Allard v. Allard, 145 A.D.3d 1254, 1255\u201356 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (petitioner\u2019s speculative claims \nof future harms were insufficient to establish that matter was ripe for judicial review); Matter of \nWal-Mart Stores v. Campbell, 238 A.D.2d 831, 832\u201333 (3d Dep\u2019t 1997) (same). \nC. \nPetitioner lacks standing. \nIt is axiomatic that \u201ca litigant must establish its standing in order to seek judicial review.\u201d \nSoc\u2019y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 769 (1991); see Matter of 61 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n29 of 52\n\n--- Page 30 ---\n15 \n \nCrown St., LLC v. New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preserv., 207 A.D.3d 837, \n839 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022). \u201cStanding is a threshold determination, resting in part on policy \nconsiderations, that a person should be allowed access to the courts to adjudicate the merits of a \nparticular dispute that satisfied the other justiciability criteria.\u201d Matter of Assoc. for a Better Long \nIsland, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, 23 N.Y.3d 1, 6 (2014); see Soc\u2019y of Plastics \nIndus., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d at 769. The burden to prove standing is on the party seeking review. See \nMatter of Curry v. New York State Educ. Dep\u2019t, 13 A.D.3d 1327, 1329 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018); Citizens \nfor St. Patrick\u2019s v. City of Watervliet City Council, 126 A.D.3d 1159, 1160 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015). To \nestablish standing, \u201c[a] petitioner challenging government agency action pursuant to an article 78 \npetition has the burden of demonstrating an injury in fact and that the alleged injury falls within \nthe zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision \nunder which the government has acted . . . .\u201d Matter of Stevens v. New York State Div. of Criminal \nJustice Servs., 40 N.Y.3d 505, 515 (2003) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted); see \nMatter of Long Is. Pure Water, Ltd. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Health, 209 A.D.3d 1128, 1129 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2022).  \nHere, Petitioner fails to meet the burden to establish either requirement for standing. See \nPet. \u00b6\u00b6 64\u201368; see Matter of Whitfield v. New York State Off. of Professional Med. Conduct, 237 \nA.D.3d 1393, 1394\u201395 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (affirming motion court determination that granted motion \nto dismiss article 78 petition challenging agency action related to its handling of investigation into \npetitioner\u2019s complaints of physician misconduct because petitioner failed to establish that his \nalleged injury was attributable to agency action); Matter of Grigger v. Goord, 27 A.D.3d 803, 803\u2013\n04 (3d Dep\u2019t 2006) (affirming motion court determination that granted motion to dismiss article \n78 petition challenging agency action related to denial of visitation privileges for petitioner\u2019s \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n30 of 52\n\n--- Page 31 ---\n16 \n \nmother because petitioner failed to establish that agency determination would impact his specific \nvisitation privileges); see also Matter of Parkland Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t \nof Health, 261 A.D.2d 770, 772 (3d Dep\u2019t 1999) (reversing motion court determination that denied \nmotion to dismiss article 78 petition challenging agency action related to issuance of ambulance \nservice certificates because petitioner\u2019s conclusory allegations of harm were insufficient to meet \nits burden to establish standing). \n1. \nPetitioner did not suffer any injury-in-fact. \n\u201cThe injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal \nstake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, \nephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial \nintervention.\u201d Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Daniels, 33 N.Y.3d 44, 50 (2019); see \nMatter of Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, 206 A.D.3d. \n1332, 1333\u201334 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (no injury-in-fact for standing because petitioner \u201cfailed to \ndemonstrate how the absence of these exemptions . . . is causing or is reasonably likely to cause \nany harm to petitioner\u201d).  \nPetitioner here alleges that his conduct falls within the scope of the investigation authorized \nby EO 64 (Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 56, 64) and that there is a \u201csubstantial risk\u201d that the investigation will be \n\u201cinfluenced by prejudgment.\u201d Pet. \u00b6 66. However, this is not an injury-in-fact because it is wholly \nspeculative as it presumes presently unknown information about how the investigation will be \nconducted. See Matter of Gronbach v. New York State Educ. Dep\u2019t, 221 A.D.3d 1385, 1388 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2023) (no injury-in-fact from administrative action that transferred certain hearings to a \ndifferent administrative agency because alleged resultant diminution in hearing officer caseload \nassumed that, if hearings were spread to additional hearing officers, caseload of existing hearing \nofficer would be diminished); Matter of Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU Sch. of Law, 159 A.D.3d \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n31 of 52\n\n--- Page 32 ---\n17 \n \nat 1301 (no injury-in-fact from administrative action refusing to rescind agency opinion because \nalleged resultant increase in election contributions away from legislators and candidates for \npolitical office assumed that, if opinion were rescinded, agency would adopt position advanced by \nlegislators and candidates for political office); Argyle Farm & Props., LLC v. Watershed Agric. \nCouncil of the N.Y. City Watersheds, Inc., 135 A.D.3d 1262, 1266 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (no injury-in-\nfact from administrative action adopting rules for siting septic systems in watershed because \nalleged limitation on landowner\u2019s ability to develop property assumed that, if landowner applied \nfor land use approvals, application would be denied).  \nThough Petitioner points to a single post made by the AG on social media as proof of \nalleged harm, such statement does not establish the harms feared by Petitioner absent his own \nconclusory characterization. See Pet. \u00b6 66; see Matter of 292 Bedford, LLC v. New York, 249 \nA.D.3d 874, 876 (2d Dep\u2019t 2026) (petitioner\u2019s conclusory claims of harm were insufficient to \nestablish requisite injury for standing); Matter of Cnty. of Orange v. City of New York, 232 A.D.3d \n785, 786\u201387 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) (same); Matter of Park v. Town of New Windsor Zoning Bd. of \nAppeals, 137 A.D.3d 924, 926 (2d Dep\u2019t 2016) (same). Even if Petitioner\u2019s characterization of the \nAG\u2019s remarks were accurate, which it is not, the alleged harm flowing to Petitioner from such \nremarks\u2014that he will be unfairly implicated in the investigation and prejudiced in a possible future \ncriminal proceeding\u2014rests on assumptions that are too speculative to establish injury-in-fact. \nPetitioner\u2019s alleged harm assumes that, despite all constitutional, statutory, and other guardrails on \nher authority, the AG will not properly discharge the obligations of her office or the task entrusted \nto her by the Governor. See Executive Order No. 64 (requiring a \u201cfull, reasoned, and independent \ninvestigation\u201d). See generally Const. art. 13, \u00a7 1 (oath of office for all public officers requiring \npublic officers to swear to \u201cfaithfully discharge the duties of the office\u201d); Exec. Law \u00a7 63 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n32 of 52\n\n--- Page 33 ---\n18 \n \n(providing general duties of the attorney general); People v. Santorelli, 95 N.Y.2d 412, 421 (2000) \n(acknowledging that prosecutors have \u201cspecial responsibilities\u2014constitutional, statutory, ethical, \npersonal\u2014to safeguard the integrity of criminal process\u201d). And, Petitioner\u2019s alleged injury \nassumes that the results of the investigation will warrant presentation to a grand jury and that the \ngrand jury will vote to indict Petitioner. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 64\u201367.  \nPetitioner cannot rely on these speculative assumptions about the results of the \ninvestigation to establish an injury-in-fact because they are unknown future events that may never \noccur. See Matter of New York State Bd. of Regents v. State Univ. of N.Y., 178 A.D.3d 11, 17 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2019) (parents and teachers did not suffer injury-in-fact from promulgation of new \nregulations for teacher licensure because \u201cwhether teachers licensed under the regulations will \never teach in these petitioners\u2019 schools is a matter of conjecture and speculation\u201d (quotation marks \nomitted)); Matter of Schulz, 133 A.D.3d at 947 (citizens did not suffer injury-in-fact from certain \nelected officials participating in a future constitutional convention because alleged conflict of \ninterest arising from such participation \u201cis predicated upon a series of events that may not come to \npass\u201d); see also New York State Ass\u2019n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, 2 N.Y.3d 207, 211 (2004) \n(\u201cspeculation about the future course [government action] might take cannot, under our precedents, \nsupply the missing ingredient of in-fact injury\u201d).  \nAccordingly, Petitioner lacks standing because he has not suffered any non-speculative \ninjury-in-fact. Compare Matter of Seneca Lake Guardian v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. \nConserv., 229 A.D.3d 987, 989\u201390 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) (finding standing based on non-speculative \nclaims that permitted activity would allow contaminants to enter waterbody since member \nobtained drinking water from waterbody and member\u2019s wells did not filter for contaminant), with \nMatter of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Aubertine, 119 A.D.3d 1202, 1203 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014) \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n33 of 52\n\n--- Page 34 ---\n19 \n \n(finding no standing based on speculative claims of increased health risks from consuming foie \ngras because there was no demonstrable link between feared health effects and consumption of \nfoie gras). \n2. \nAny injury-in-fact is not within the relevant zone of interests. \nThe zone of interests requirement mandates that \u201ca party must show that the in-fact injury \nof which it complains (its aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon it) falls within the zone of \ninterests or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which \nthe agency has acted.\u201d Soc\u2019y of Plastics Indus., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d at 773. This requirement ties the \n\u201cin-fact injury asserted to the governmental act challenged\u201d and \u201ccircumscribes the universe of \npersons who may challenge administrative action.\u201d Id. This requisite connection \u201cassures that \ngroups whose interests are only marginally related to, or even inconsistent with, the purpose of the \nstatute cannot use the courts to further their own purposes at the expense of the statutory purposes.\u201d \nId. at 774; see Matter of Lawyers for Children v. New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., \n___ N.Y.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 03218 (May 21, 2026) (legal services organizations that \nrepresent children in voluntary foster care proceedings had standing to challenge changes to \nvoluntary foster care program because they were \u201cbest situated\u2019 to represent children\u2019s interests \nand children likely could not challenge action without counsel\u2019s involvement). \nHere, the Governor acted to appoint the AG as special prosecutor pursuant to Executive \nLaw \u00a7 63(2). Executive Order No. 64. This statutory subdivision serves a separation of powers \nfunction through which the Legislature delineates various law enforcement functions between the \nGovernor, the AG, and local prosecutors. Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223; see People v. \nViviani, 36 N.Y.3d 564, 577 (2021) (noting that the New York State Constitution \u201cdoes not assign \nprosecutorial authority to any constitutional officer, leaving that allocation as a matter for the \nLegislature\u201d). Given its purpose and function, the zone of interests served by Executive Law \u00a7 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n34 of 52\n\n--- Page 35 ---\n20 \n \n63(2) is to preserve the structure of the executive branch and apportion law enforcement functions \nwithin that branch, which do not encompass the sort of individualized injury to a person that \nbelieves they may someday face criminal prosecution, like the injury alleged by Petitioner here. \nSee People v. Abelove, 179 A.D.3d at 45 (Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) functions as a delegation of \npower from the Legislature to the Governor and how the Governor may utilize that statutory grant \nof authority to authorize the AG to conduct criminal prosecutions); Matter of Donnaruma v. \nCarter, 41 Misc. 3d 195, 214 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013) (Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) functions to \nmake district attorneys accountable to the Governor); see also Mulroy v. Carey, 43 N.Y.2d 819, \n820 (1977) (reserving possibility that, if exercise of Governor\u2019s superseder authority were subject \nto judicial review, it would be in action \u201cbrought or defended by the county or the elected District \nAttorney involved\u201d).  \nIn the absence of any injury within the zone of interests of Executive Law \u00a7 63(2), \nPetitioner fails to establish standing. See Matter of Park Manor Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., \nLLC v. Shah, 129 A.D.3d 1276, 1278\u201379 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (affirming motion court determination \nthat dismissed challenge to Medicaid reimbursement because petitioner failed to establish that \nalleged injury to former owner/operator was within zone of interests); Lancaster Dev., Inc. v. \nMcDonald, 112 A.D.3d 1260, 1262 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) (affirming motion court determination that \ndismissed challenge to bid determination for lack of standing because petitioner failed to establish \nthat alleged injury was within zone of interests of competitive bidding statute). \nII. \nPETITIONER\u2019S CLAIMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT \nA. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims are procedurally improper. \nCounty Law \u00a7 701(6) sets forth a specific process that applies to disqualification of the AG \n\u201cin any circumstance where the attorney general acts in place of a district attorney . . . .\u201d County \nLaw \u00a7 701(6)(a). Specifically, it states: \u201c[w]henever the attorney general . . . is disqualified from \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n35 of 52\n\n--- Page 36 ---\n21 \n \nacting in a particular matter to discharge their duties at a term of any court, a superior criminal \ncourt in the county wherein the action is triable may upon articulable reasons set forth by the \nattorney general\u201d appoint another attorney to act in her place. County Law \u00a7 701(6)(b). This \nprocess applies, \u201c[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary . . . .\u201d  County Law \n\u00a7 701(6)(b). \nBy its plain language, this statutory provision prescribes a specific process for \ndisqualification of the AG that: (1) must be initiated by the AG; (2) done before a superior criminal \ncourt; and (3) in the county where the criminal action is triable. See generally Matter of Town of \nSouthampton v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, 39 N.Y. 3d 201, 209 (2023) \n(\u201c[i]nasmuch as the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in \nany case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning \nthereof\u201d); Matter of Amorosi v. South Colonie Ind. Cent. Sch. Dist., 9 N.Y.3d 367, 372\u201373 (2007) \n(\u201cwhere the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give \neffect to the plain meaning of the words used\u201d). The statute forecloses other statutory processes to \ndisqualify the AG when she is acting in place of a district attorney. See, e.g., Eaton v. New York \nCity Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 56 N.Y.2d 340, 345 (\u201c[w]here as here, the statute describes the \nparticular situations to which it is to apply an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is \nomitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded\u201d (quotation marks and citation \nomitted)); Matter of Lawrence Teachers\u2019 Assn., NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO v. New York State \nPub. Empl. Relations Bd., 152 A.D.3d 171, 174 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) (\u201cnotwithstanding any other \nprovision of law . . . is a verbal formulation frequently employed for legislative directives intended \nto preempt any other potentially conflicting statute, wherever found in the state\u2019s laws\u201d). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n36 of 52\n\n--- Page 37 ---\n22 \n \nIn contravention of this statutorily enumerated process here, this proceeding was not \ninitiated by the AG, but rather was initiated by an individual that presumes he may someday be a \ncriminal defendant. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 33\u201334, 56. Further, it is a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 \ninstead of an application made in the criminal court, if this investigation ever ripens into a \nprosecution. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 36\u201355, 60\u201363, 69\u201381. Additionally, this proceeding was commenced in \nAlbany County, rather than the county where the criminal proceeding is triable, as is required by \nstatute. Pet. \u00b6 15; see Criminal Procedure Law \u00a7 20.40 (providing rules for where criminal \nproceeding must be tried). Thus, the process Petitioner attempts to utilize here is inconsistent with \nrequirements of County Law \u00a7 701(6). See Nitkewich v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y., 40 \nN.Y.3d 349, 357\u201358 (2023) (rejecting statutory construction that was \u201cinconsistent with its plain \nlanguage\u201d); Matter of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. State Of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Commission, \n242 A.D.3d 33, 38 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (same); Matter of Schwabler v. DiNapoli, 194 A.D.3d 1235, \n1237 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) (same). Accordingly, the Verified Petition must be denied. See Town of \nColonie v. City of New York, 237 A.D.3d 1398, 1401\u201302 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (motion court properly \ndenied request to stay related proceeding because requested stay was for proceeding pending in a \ndifferent court); Matter of Mulhern v. Touro Coll., 226 A.D.3d 788, 789 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) (motion \ncourt properly denied motion because it was not correct procedural vehicle for the relief sought). \nB. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie. \nEven if an article 78 proceeding were the proper procedural vehicle for Petitioner\u2019s claims, \n\u201c[t]he extraordinary remedy of prohibition is available only where a judicial or quasi-judicial body \nacts or threatens to act \u2018without or in excess of its jurisdiction and then only when the clear legal \nright to relief appears and, in the court\u2019s discretion the remedy is warranted.\u2019\u201d Matter of Allen B. \nv. Sproat, 23 N.Y.3d 364, 375\u201376 (2014) (quoting Matter of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 51). Here, \nPetitioner\u2019s request for a writ of prohibition to void EO 64 and disqualify the AG from serving as \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n37 of 52\n\n--- Page 38 ---\n23 \n \nspecial prosecutor must be denied because the writ of prohibition does not lie against these \nexecutive actions. See Matter of Raiser & Kenniff, P.C. v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t, 149 \nA.D.3d 1084, 1085 (2d Dep\u2019t 2017) (writ of prohibition did not lie to prohibit recording of phone \ncalls made by individuals in custody in county jail because petitioners \u201cfailed to demonstrate that \nthe conduct sought to be prohibited pertained solely to quasi-judicial action, as opposed to an \ninvestigative function performed in an executive capacity\u201d); New York State Police Investigators \nAssn., Local 4 IUPA, AFL-CIO v. State of New York, 71 Misc. 3d 1007, 1022 (Sup. Ct. Albany \nCnty. 2021) (writ of prohibition did not lie to prohibit issuance of administrative subpoenas \nbecause issuance of subpoenas was \u201cpurely investigative in nature and are not issued in a judicial \nor quasi-judicial capacity\u201d). Petitioner\u2019s request must also be denied because he has not established \nany clear legal right to relief. See Matter of New York State Health Facilities Assn., Inc. v. Sheehan, \n100 A.D.3d 1086, 1088 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) (writ of prohibition did not lie because petitioner failed \nto establish \u201cclear legal right to relief\u201d); Matter of Figgins v. Hendricks, 28 A.D.3d 1178, 1179 \n(4th Dep\u2019t 2006) (same); Matter of Smith v. Gribetz, 211 A.D.2d 605, 605 (2d Dep\u2019t 1995) (same). \n1. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie against executive action. \nIt is well settled that a writ of prohibition \u201cmay not issue against legislative, executive, or \nministerial action . . . .\u201d Matter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 59 N.Y.2d 143, 147 (1983); see Matter \nof Cnty. of Suffolk v. Kennedy, 211 A.D.3d 937, 938 (2d Dep\u2019t 2022). Here, the Governor\u2019s \nappointment of the AG as special prosecutor is an executive action, undertaken pursuant to the \nsuperseder authority conferred on the Governor by virtue of her constitutional executive powers \nenumerated in article IV, \u00a7 3 of the New York State Constitution, as well the powers conferred on \nher by the Legislature in Executive Law \u00a7 63(2). See Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d at 515 (when Governor \nexercises her superseder authority to appoint a special prosecutor under Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) \nthis process is done \u201cwithin the executive branch\u201d); Matter of Mulroy, 58 A.D.2d at 210 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n38 of 52\n\n--- Page 39 ---\n24 \n \n(Governor\u2019s authority to supersede district attorney pursuant to Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) was a \nfunction of her executive powers); see also Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1978) (\u201cexecutive \npower of the State, vested in the Governor, is broad\u201d). Given the purely executive nature of this \naction, the writ of prohibition does not lie to prohibit the Governor from exercising her superseder \nauthority to appoint the AG as a special prosecutor. See Matter of League of Women Voters of N.Y. \nState v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 206 A.D.3d 1227, 1231 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (\u201cwrit of \nprohibition . . . is unavailable because respondent was not acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial \ncapacity\u201d); see also Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d at 13 (writ of prohibition \u201cmust be \ndirected at some inferior judicial tribunal or officer and lies to prevent or control judicial or quasi-\njudicial action only, as distinguished from . . . executive . . . action\u201d). \nLikewise, the writ of prohibition also does not lie to prohibit the AG from exercising the \nauthority granted to her by the Governor because the AG\u2019s exercise of her authority is similarly \nan executive action. See Matter of McGinley v. Hynes, 51 N.Y.2d 116, 123\u201325 (1980) (writ of \nprohibition did not lie to prohibit special prosecutor from presenting additional evidence to a grand \njury because special prosecutor\u2019s actions were investigative activities done as part of prosecutor\u2019s \nexecutive functions); State of New York v. Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d 47, 58 (2d Dep\u2019t 1983) (writ of \nprohibition did not lie to prohibit investigative actions undertaken by AG pursuant to her authority \nunder the Executive Law). The authority granted to the AG by Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) is executive \nlaw enforcement authority. See Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223, 225; Matter of Additional \nJan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct., 50 N.Y.2d at 18\u201319. Further, the authority granted \nto the AG by EO 64 is to \u201cinvestigate . . . and, if warranted, to prosecute offenses\u201d\u2014which are \nexecutive functions not subject to the writ of prohibition. Executive Order No. 64; see Matter of \nDoe v. Cuomo, 71 A.D.3d 889, 889 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) (writ of prohibition did not lie to prohibit AG \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n39 of 52\n\n--- Page 40 ---\n25 \n \nfrom pursuing investigation into alleged violation of immunity agreement because the AG \u201cis \nperforming a purely investigative function and, therefore, is acting in an executive rather than a \nquasi-judicial capacity\u201d); Abelove v. Cuomo, 57 Misc. 3d at 677 (writ of prohibition did not lie to \nprevent AG from pursuing investigation as authorized by Governor in exercise of superseder \nauthority \u201cbecause the AG is performing a purely investigative function and, therefore, acting in \nan executive rather than a quasi-judicial capacity\u201d).  \nAlthough EO 64 contemplates a potential presentation to the grand jury, a grand jury serves \nan executive investigatory function that does not ripen into a judicial function until a specific \nprosecution is contemplated. See Matter of McGinley, 51 N.Y.2d at 123\u201325 (discussing distinction \nbetween executive, investigative functions of public prosecutor and quasi-judicial functions of \npublic prosecutor); see also Matter of Suffolk Cnty. Legislature v. Mullen, 211 A.D.2d 736, 737 \n(2d Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cfunctions of a public prosecutor . . . are to be regarded as executive in nature \nwhen, as here, a purely investigative function is involved, and consequently, such acts cannot \nlegitimately be the object of a proceeding in the nature of a writ or prohibition\u201d) \nPetitioner\u2019s reliance on Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 55 (1983), as \nestablishing the availability of a writ of prohibition in the instant matter is misplaced. See Pet. \n\u00b6\u00b6 39, 42\u201343. In Matter of Schumer, the court invalidated a special prosecutorial appointment made \nby a district attorney that installed an unelected law school professor as special prosecutor and \ndelegated to him \u201cextensive discretionary power\u201d to investigate and prosecute an elected federal \nofficial. 60 N.Y.2d at 52. The court found that the statute the district attorney acted under\u2014County \nLaw \u00a7 930, which authorizes the district attorney to appoint assistant district attorneys\u2014did not \nauthorize the appointment of special prosecutor because the accompanying delegation of \nresponsibilities was so broad that it effectively and impermissibly \u201ctransferr[ed] the fundamental \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n40 of 52\n\n--- Page 41 ---\n26 \n \nresponsibilities of the office\u201d to an unelected official. Id. at 53. By contrast to Petitioner\u2019s claims \nhere, which challenge the substantive merits of the special prosecutorial appointment and disclaim \nany challenge to the Governor\u2019s appointment authority, the specific issue resolved in Matter of \nSchumer was whether the district attorney had the authority to appoint the special prosecutor. See \nid. Although the court in Matter of Schumer also went on to opine as to whether the district attorney \nshould be disqualified based on public statements she made regarding the identified target of the \nprosecution, the court ruled that the disqualification request was premature because, like here, \ninformation about how the investigation might play out was unknown. See id. at 55\u201356.  \n2. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie because Petitioner has no clear legal \nright to relief.  \n \n \u201cBecause of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where there is a clear \nlegal right . . . .\u201d  Matter of Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 569 (1988). The petitioner bears \nthe burden to make such showing. Pirro v. Angiolillo, 89 N.Y.2d 351, 356 (1996) (in determining \nwhether the writ of prohibition lies, \u201cthe question of whether petitioner has established a clear legal \nright to that relief is critical\u201d); see Matter of Town of Huntington v. New York State Div. of Human \nRights, 82 N.Y.2d 783, 785 (1993) (writ of prohibition did not lie because petitioner \u201cfailed to \nestablish a clear legal right\u201d to prevent state agency from considering individual compliant of racial \ndiscrimination). \u201cTo demonstrate a clear legal right to the extraordinary writ of prohibition, a \npetitioner is required to show that the challenged action was \u2018in reality so serious an excess of \npower incontrovertibly justifying and requiring summary correction.\u2019\u201d  Carter, 25 N.Y.3d at 1013 \n(quoting La Rocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 580 (1975)). Generally, this requires a showing that \nthe prohibition sought and the error complained of \u201cimplicate the legality of the entire proceeding.\u201d  \nDoe v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 484, 490 (1988); see Matter of Hoovler v. Vazquez-Doles, 237 A.D.3d \n936, 937 (2d Dep\u2019t 2025) (writ of prohibition lied to prohibit judge from compelling disclosure of \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n41 of 52\n\n--- Page 42 ---\n27 \n \ngrand jury minutes because judge lacked statutory authority to effectuate release of minutes); \nMatter of Canning v. Revoir, 220 A.D.3d 16, 19\u201320 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (writ of prohibition available \nto prohibit judge from enforcing subpoena requiring journalist to testify at criminal trial because \njournalist\u2019s testimony was privileged under civil rights law). \nHere, Petitioner has no clear legal right to void EO 64 and disqualify the AG from serving \nas special prosecutor. See Rush v. Mordue, 68 N.Y.2d 348, 353 (1986) (\u201cprohibition will not lie as \na means of seeking collateral review of mere trial errors of substantive law or procedure, however \negregious the error may be, and however cleverly the error may be characterized by counsel as an \nexcess of jurisdiction or power\u201d). Though Petitioner seems to allege that he has a clear legal right \nto relief because the AG is biased against him, the AG\u2019s expressions of empathy on social media \ndo not indicate bias or that she prejudged the investigation. See People v. National Rifle Assn. of \nAm., Inc., 223 A.D.3d 84, 90\u201391 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) (affirming dismissal of selective prosecution \ncounterclaim alleging the AG \u201cdisplayed animus\u201d towards defendant organization based on \ncomments made while campaigning); Matter of People v. Trump Org., Inc., 205 A.D.3d 625, 626\u2013\n27 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) (affirming motion court determination denying motion to quash subpoena \nbased on theory of selective prosecution where subject of subpoena challenged subpoena based on \nthe AG\u2019s \u201cpolitical campaign and other public statements\u201d); People v. Walton, 214 A.D.2d 805, \n808 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) (rejecting criminal defendant\u2019s claims that prosecutor\u2019s statements to the \npress amounted to prosecutorial misconduct or selective prosecution). Rather, the role of the \nprosecutor is as \u201cadvocate and public officer, charged with the duty not only to secure indictments \nbut also to see that justice is done . . . .\u201d  People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20, 26 (1986); see People \nv. Miller, 110 A.D.3d 1150, 1151 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013); People v. Tatro, 53 A.D.3d 781, 783\u201384 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2008). The AG\u2019s singular statement expressing empathy for a person who drew national \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n42 of 52\n\n--- Page 43 ---\n28 \n \nattention after reporting that she was the victim of a sexual assault falls squarely within that role. \nSee People v. Rivera, 206 A.D.3d 1356, 1359\u201360 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (defendant not deprived of right \nto fair trial when, during trial, prosecutor referred to rape victim as a \u201cvictim\u201d and a \u201csurvivor\u201d \nand \u201cexpress[ed] his personal opinion of the credibility of witnesses\u201d).  \nThus, Petitioner fails to establish any clear legal right to the relief sought and, therefore, \nthe writ of prohibition does not lie. See Matter of Trump v. Merchan, 230 A.D.3d 413, 414 (1st \nDep\u2019t 2024); Matter of Madison Sq. Garden Ent. Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 221 A.D.3d \n536, 537\u201338 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023); Matter of Henry v. Fandrich, 159 A.D.3d 1409, 1410 (4th Dep\u2019t \n2018). \nC. \nThe writ of prohibition should not be issued as a matter of discretion. \n1. \nIssuance of a writ of prohibition is not warranted. \nWhen the writ of prohibition lies, \u201c[t]he determination of whether to issue a writ of \nprohibition is committed to the sound discretion of the reviewing court.\u201d Matter of Peterec-Tolino \nv. Schick, 236 A.D.3d 1130, 1131 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025); see Matter of HCI Distrib., Inc. v. New York \nState Police, Troop B Commander, 110 A.D.3d 1297, 1298 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) (where writ of \nprohibition lies, \u201cthe court has discretion to deny the issuance of a writ of prohibition\u201d). A court \nexercising such discretion must consider: \u201cthe gravity of the harm caused by the excess of power, \nthe availability or unavailability of an adequate remedy on appeal or at law or in equity and the \nremedial effectiveness of prohibition if such an adequate remedy does not exist.\u201d Matter of Soares \nv. Herrick, 20 N.Y.3d 139, 145 (2012); see La Rocca, 37 N.Y.2d at 579\u201380; Matter of Clegg v. \nRounds, 222 A.D.3d 112, 119 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023). Petitioner fails to meaningfully address any of \nthese factors and, in any event, they are not present here. Pet. \u00b6 51; see Matter of Raheem v. New \nYork State Bd. of Parole, 66 A.D.3d 1270, 1272\u201373 (3d Dep\u2019t 2009) (issuance of writ of \nprohibition was not warranted because respondent had authority to undertake action petitioner \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n43 of 52\n\n--- Page 44 ---\n29 \n \nsought to prohibit and petitioner otherwise had another adequate legal remedy); Matter of Pryor \nv. Greenberg, 247 A.D.2d 711, 712 (3d Dep\u2019t 1998) (same). \nFirst, issuance of a writ of prohibition is not warranted because the gravity of any harm to \nPetitioner from the AG\u2019s statement is negligible. See Matter of Trump v. Engoron, 222 A.D.3d \n505, 506 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) (issuance of writ of prohibition not warranted because, among other \nthings, \u201cthe gravity of potential harm is small\u201d); Matter of Schmitt v. Skovira, 53 A.D.3d 918, 922 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2008) (same). Although Petitioner claims that he will be gravely harmed if the AG does \nnot properly discharge her obligations as special prosecutor, such claim is wholly speculative at \nthis nascent stage of the investigation and implausible in light of the empathetic, but otherwise \ninnocuous nature of the AG\u2019s social media remarks. See Matter of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 56 \n(declining to reach the merits of claim alleging district attorney should be disqualified from \nprosecuting petitioner based on public comments made by district attorney because such claim was \n\u201cpremature\u201d when made in anticipation of investigation and prosecution); see also Matter of \nColumbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 (Czajka), 118 A.D.3d 1081, 1083 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2014) (finding no appearance of impropriety to warrant disqualification of district \nattorney because claims \u201cthat the underlying investigation may have been vindictively provoked\u201d \nwere merely \u201cspeculative suggestions . . . unsupported by record evidence\u201d).  \nSecond, issuance of a writ of prohibition is not warranted because there is an adequate \nremedy available to Petitioner where, if he is ever indicted by a grand jury, he can make pre-trial \nmotions on the benefit of a full record and pursue his claims on direct appeal. See Matter of Snyder \nv. Farrell, 242 A.D.3d 1480, 1481\u201382 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (writ of prohibition would not issue to \nprohibit enforcement of prior court order authorizing prosecutor to re-present charges to a new \ngrand jury because petitioner could raise issues with order on direct appeal); Matter of Rodriguez \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n44 of 52\n\n--- Page 45 ---\n30 \n \nv. Hobbs, 220 A.D.3d 1145, 1146\u201347 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (writ of prohibition would not issue to \nprevent prosecution based on alleged defects in search warrant because motion to suppress \nprovided adequate remedy for petitioner to raise his claims); Matter of Maluf v. Vance, 116 A.D.3d \n542, 542\u201343 (1st Dep\u2019t 2014) (writ of prohibition would not issue to prevent prosecution based on \nalleged conflict with principles of international comity because pre-trial motions and appeal \nprovided adequate alternative remedy).  \nIndeed, under substantially similar circumstances, the court in Abelove v. Cuomo, \ndismissed a writ of prohibition that sought to disqualify the AG from acting as special prosecutor \nin an Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) appointment because there was \u201can alternative remedy by challenging \nthe AG\u2019s qualification to act before the presiding court in the event criminal charges are levied.\u201d \n57 Misc. 3d at 677 (emphasis added); see also Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d at 58 (writ of prohibition did \nnot lie to prevent investigation by attorney general and, even if it did, \u201c[r]espondent\u2019s remedy . . . \nwould be, and is, to simply defend on the merits and, if necessary, by way of appeal\u201d). Resolution \nof Petitioner\u2019s claims in the proper procedural context of an actual criminal proceeding would \nallow for resolution of Petitioner\u2019s claims on a full record that would illuminate whether the \nvarious hypothetical ills he now fears ever actualize. See Matter of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 56 \n(declining to rule on substantive merits of request to disqualify district attorney because request \nmade at outset of investigation was \u201cpremature\u201d and later resolution would allow for review based \non a full record).  \nNotably, Petitioner does not dispute the adequacy or availability of these alternative \nremedies. Pet. \u00b6 51. To the extent that Petitioner seems to take issue with the alternative remedies \nbecause they will delay resolution of his claims, this is insufficient to warrant use of such an \nextraordinary remedy as the writ of prohibition. See Rush, 68 N.Y.2d at 354 (\u201cthe ordeal of a \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n45 of 52\n\n--- Page 46 ---\n31 \n \ncriminal trial and the possibility of conviction, by themselves, are insufficiently harmful to warrant \nuse of the writ\u201d); La Rocca, 37 N.Y.2d at 579 (\u201c[t]he orderly administration of justice requires that \ncorrection of litigation errors merely be left to the ordinary channels of appeal or review\u201d). \n2. \nDisqualification is not warranted. \nWhere writ of prohibition is sought to disqualify a judicial or quasi-judicial appointment \nof a special prosecutor, a reviewing court \u201cshould remove a public prosecutor only to protect a \ndefendant from actual prejudice arising from a demonstrated conflict of interest or a substantial \nrisk of an abuse of confidence.\u201d  Matter of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 55. Under such circumstances, \n\u201cthe appearance of impropriety, standing alone, might not be grounds for disqualification.\u201d  Id. To \nestablish disqualification under this standard, \u201c[t]he objector should demonstrate actual prejudice \nor so substantial a risk thereof as could not be ignored.\u201d  Id.; see People v. Hodgins, 202 A.D.3d \n1377, 1382\u201383 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (disqualification of prosecutor not warranted because there was \nno actual prejudice to defendant based on \u201cprior acquaintance\u201d between prosecutor and defendant); \nPeople v. Sloley, 179 A.D.3d 1308, 1312\u201313 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) (disqualification of prosecutor not \nwarranted because, even if there was a conflict of interest, criminal defendant failed to show any \nactual prejudice). \n Though this standard is relied on heavily by Petitioner, it is inapplicable to disqualify a \nspecial prosecutor appointed by the Governor because it applies when the special prosecutorial \nappointment is a judicial or quasi-judicial appointment, rather than an executive one. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 39\u2013\n41, 59; see, e.g., Matter of Working Families Party v. Fisher, 23 N.Y.3d 539, 546 (2014) (applied \nto judicial appointment of a special prosecutor); People v. Adams, 20 N.Y.3d 608, 612 (2013) \n(applied to judicial appointment of a special prosecutor); People v. Shinkle, 51 N.Y.2d 417, 420 \n(1980) (applied to judicial appointment of a special prosecutor); see also Matter of Schumer, 60 \nN.Y.2d at 55 (articulating standard in the context of quasi-judicial appointment of a special \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n46 of 52\n\n--- Page 47 ---\n32 \n \nprosecutor but declining to consider disqualification at early stage of proceeding). Courts in this \nstate have long recognized a distinction between special prosecutorial appointments that are \nexecutive in nature and those that are judicial or quasi-judicial. See People v. Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d \n564, 579 (2021) (discussing distinctions between statutes that permit for special prosecutorial \nappointments and noting distinctions between those that permit for appointments by the court and \nthose that permit for appointments by the Governor); see also People v. Callara, 44 N.Y.3d 623, \n627 (2025) (recognizing a key difference between special prosecutorial appointments made under \nExecutive Law \u00a7 63(2) and County Law \u00a7 701 is that the former is an appointment by the Governor \nand the latter is an appointment by the court); Matter of Bd. of Supervisors of Montgomery Cnty. \nv. Aulisi, 62 A.D.2d 644, 647\u201348 (3d Dep\u2019t 1978) (same); Matter of Rice, 31 Misc. 3d at 842 \n(same). Such distinction is dispositive here. See Matter of Soares, 20 N.Y.3d at 145 (\u201cwe have \nrecognized that prohibition is an appropriate remedy to void the improper appointment of a special \nprosecutor when made by the court\u201d (emphasis added)). \nEven if the disqualification standard relied on by Petitioner applied, disqualification is not \nwarranted based on a single, empathetic social media post made by the AG prior to her \nappointment. See Matter of Soares, 20 N.Y.3d at 146 (\u201c[u]nder our precedent, the existence of a \nconflict of interest between the district attorney and a defendant, by itself, does not warrant the \nremoval of the district attorney\u201d); see also Matter of Czajka v. Koweek, 188 A.D.3d 1540, 1542 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2020) (disqualification of district attorney not warranted because there was no actual \nprejudice to defendant where judge that presided over prior family court matters involving \ndefendant now served as prosecutor). This is particularly so because the AG is otherwise obligated \nby her constitutional, statutory, professional, and ethical obligations as an attorney, an elected \nofficial, and constitutional officer to properly discharge the duties entrusted to her by the voters \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n47 of 52\n\n--- Page 48 ---\n33 \n \nwhen they elected her and by the Governor when she tasked her with this investigation. See, e.g., \nPeople v. Zakrzewski, 249 A.D.2d 1314, 1323 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (defendant failed to demonstrate \nactual prejudice requiring disqualification of prosecutor based on misinformation included in \nsearch warrant application because, among other things, district attorney was otherwise \u201can \nelected, constitutional officer\u201d tasked to public duties concerning conduct of prosecution); People \nv. Barba, 60 Misc. 3d 1074, 1082 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 2018) (defendant failed to meet \u201chigh \nstandard\u201d to show prejudice requiring disqualification of prosecutor based on perceived conflict \nbetween defendant and district attorney stemming from defendant\u2019s prior negative dealings with \ndistrict attorney and litigation against members of district attorney\u2019s office because district \nattorney was otherwise \u201can elected, constitutional officer\u201d tasked to public duties concerning \nconduct of prosecution).  \nThough Petitioner alleges that disqualification is required because he will suffer prejudice \nfrom the AG\u2019s unfavorable investigatory choices (Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 46\u201348, 57\u201358) this claim is wildly \nspeculative. Morgenthau v. Crane, 113 A.D.2d 20, 21\u201322 (1st Dep\u2019t 1985) (\u201c[c]onjectural \nspeculations, without any factual foundation . . . are not a sufficient predicate from which to \nconclude either the existence of prejudice or the reasonable potential for prejudice\u201d). Such \nspeculation about the different ways that various discretionary variables might turn in this \ninvestigation is simply insufficient to establish prejudice at this early stage. Cf. People v. Mero, \n221 A.D.3d 1242, 1250, 51 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (finding no prejudice by joinder of charges in trial \ncourt because criminal defendant\u2019s claims were \u201cpurely speculative\u201d); People v. Ronk, 159 A.D.3d \n1129, 1130 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) (finding no prejudice from failure to effectuate criminal defendant\u2019s \nappearance before grand jury because his claims were \u201conly speculation\u201d); People v. Pottorff, 145 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n48 of 52\n\n--- Page 49 ---\n34 \n \nA.D.3d 1095, 1097 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (finding no prejudice from counsel\u2019s failure to object when \nportion of voir dire was not transcribed because he \u201conly speculates\u201d how he was prejudiced).  \nEven if Petitioner\u2019s claims were not wholly conjectural, they misconstrue the AG\u2019s \nobligations stepping into the shoes of the district attorney. While a prosecutor has a duty of fair \ndealing to the accused and an obligation to see that justice is done, see People v. Thompson, 22 \nN.Y.3d 803, 809 (2014); People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 105 (1984), she has no obligation to \npresent the evidence in the way \u201cmost favorable to the defense . . . .\u201d Thompson, 22 N.Y.3d at 810; \nPeople v. Mitchell, 82 N.Y.2d 509, 515 (1993) (\u201cthe People maintain broad discretion in presenting \ntheir case to the Grand Jury and need not seek evidence favorable to the defendant or present all \nof their evidence tending to exculpate the accused\u201d). Moreover, the credibility issues and factual \ninconsistencies that Petitioner is concerned with are more properly resolved before a petit jury, \nthan in an investigation or presentation to the grand jury. See People v. Douglas, 226 A.D.3d 1162, \n1163 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) (integrity of grand jury proceeding was not impaired by prosecutors failure \nto present allegedly exculpatory eyewitness identification to grand jury because \u201ca grand jury \nhearing is not intended to be a mini-trial at which competing evidence is weighed and questions \nof fact resolved . . . its purpose is simply to determine whether the evidence proffered by the \nPeople, if fully credited, would support a conviction\u201d); People v. Goldston, 126 A.D.3d 1175, 1177 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (integrity of grand jury proceeding was not impaired by prosecutors failure to \npresent allegedly exculpatory evidence to grand jury and such evidence bearing on victim\u2019s \ncredibility \u201cwas more appropriately reserved for presentation to the petit jury than to the grand \njury\u201d (quotation marks and citation omitted)). \nAccordingly, Petitioner fails to establish any actual prejudice that would require \ndisqualification. See Matter of Flynn v. DiTullio, 228 A.D.3d 1323, 1232\u201324 (4th Dep\u2019t 2024) \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n49 of 52\n\n--- Page 50 ---\n35 \n \n(criminal defendant failed to establish appearance of impropriety and actual prejudice requiring \ndisqualification from the fact that member of prosecutor\u2019s office was a victim in another unrelated \ncase); People v. Drago, 207 A.D.3d 559, 560 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (criminal defendant failed to \nestablish actual prejudice requiring disqualification from the fact of professional relationship \nbetween victim and prosecutor); see also People v. Jenkins, 186 A.D.3d 31, 36\u201337 (1st Dep\u2019t 2020) \n(finding that disqualification \u201cis moored to an attorney-client relationship\u201d and rejecting argument \nthat would \u201cextend the principle to instances where there is no relationship of any kind\u201d). \nD. \nThe Governor\u2019s actions are not subject to judicial review as arbitrary and \ncapricious or an abuse of discretion. \n\u201c[W]hen the Governor acts by Executive Order pursuant to a valid grant of discretionary \nauthority, [her] actions are largely beyond judicial review.\u201d Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223; \nsee, e.g., People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co., 220 N.Y. at 490\u201391; Gaynor v. Rockefeller, \n21 A.D.2d 92, 98 (1st Dep\u2019t 1964), aff\u2019d 15 N.Y.2d 120 (1965) (recognizing that the Governor \u201cis \nimmune from interference by judicial process and free from judicial control in his performance of \nexecutive powers\u201d).  \nHere, it is undisputed that the Governor appointed the AG as special prosecutor pursuant \nto a valid grant of discretionary authority. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 37\u201338; see Executive Order No. 64. Thus, \nPetitioner\u2019s alternative claims for relief\u2014that the Governor\u2019s action was arbitrary and capricious \nand an abuse of discretion\u2014are wholly without merit and must be denied as a matter of law. See \nMaybee v. State of New York, 4 N.Y.3d 415, 418 (2005) (discretionary action by Governor done \nin accordance with valid grant of authority \u201cis not subject to judicial review\u201d); Matter of Brown v. \nNew York State DOCCS Exec. Clemency Bur., 239 A.D.3d 1216, 1217 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (same); \nMatter of Boyd v. Pataki, 52 A.D.3d 1128, 1128\u201329 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) (same).  \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n50 of 52\n\n--- Page 51 ---\n36 \n \nCONCLUSION \nRespondents respectfully request that the Verified Petition be denied and this proceeding \nbe dismissed in its entirety and with prejudice.  \n \n \nDated: Albany, New York \n \nOctober 22, 2026 \n \nLETITIA JAMES \nAttorney General of the State of New York \nAttorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, \nGovernor of the State of New York and \nLetitia James, Attorney General of the \nState of New York \nThe Capitol \nAlbany, New York 12224 \n \n \nBy: ___/s/ Kaitlin Vigars___ \nKaitlin Vigars \nAssistant Attorney General, of Counsel \nTelephone: (518) 776-2036 \nFax: (518) 915-7738 (Not for service of papers) \n \n \nTO: \nAll counsel of record (via NYSCEF) \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n51 of 52\n\n--- Page 52 ---\nPrinted [Reproduced] on Recycled Paper \n37 \n \nSTATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.8-b \n \nI, Kaitlin Vigars, affirm under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106 that the total \nnumber of words in the foregoing Memorandum of Law, inclusive of point headings and footnotes \nand exclusive of pages containing the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, and signature \nblock, is 11,956 words. The foregoing Memorandum of Law does not comply with the word count \nlimit set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. However, this Court granted Respondents\u2019 request to submit \na Memorandum of Law of up to 12,000 words and this Memorandum of Law complies with the \npermission granted by the court. In determining the number of words in the foregoing \nMemorandum of Law, I relied upon the word count of the word-processing system used to prepare \nthe document.  \n \n/s/ Kaitlin Vigars \n                                    \n \n \n Kaitlin Vigars \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n52 of 52","text":"--- Page 1 ---\nSUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK \nCOUNTY OF ALBANY \n \nIn the Matter of the Application of \nGILLIO LOPES, \nPetitioner, \n \nFor a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 \nof the Civil Practice Law and Rules \n \n-against- \n \nKATHLEEN (\u201cKATHY\u201d) M. HOCHUL, in her official \ncapacity as Governor of the State of New York, and \nLETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney \nGeneral of the State of New York, \n \nRespondents. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIndex No. 911974-26 \n \nOctober 29, 2026 \n \nFarrell, J. \n \n  \n \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF \nRESPONDENTS\u2019 ANSWER AND IN \nOPPOSITION TO THE VERIFIED PETITION \n \n \nLETITIA JAMES \nAttorney General of the State of New York \nAttorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, \nGovernor of the State of New York, and \nLetitia James, Attorney General of the \nState of New York \nThe Capitol \nAlbany, New York 12224 \n \nKaitlin Vigars \nAssistant Attorney General,  \n of Counsel \nTelephone: (518) 776-2036 \nFax: (518) 915-7738 (Not for service of papers) \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n1 of 52\n\n--- Page 2 ---\ni \n \nTable of Contents \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 1 \nSTANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 3 \nARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 5 \nI. \nPETITIONER\u2019S CLAIMS ARE NOT JUSTICIABLE. ............................. 5 \nA. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims raise a political question. .................................. 6 \n1. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims invade the province of the \nexecutive branch. ................................................................ 8 \n2. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims invade the province of the \nlegislative branch. ............................................................. 11 \nB. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims are not ripe. .................................................... 12 \nC. \nPetitioner lacks standing. .............................................................. 14 \n1. \nPetitioner did not suffer any injury-in-fact. ...................... 16 \n2. \nAny injury-in-fact is not within the relevant zone of \ninterests. ............................................................................ 19 \nII. \nPETITIONER\u2019S CLAIMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT .............................. 20 \nA. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims are procedurally improper. ............................. 20 \nB. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie. ............................................. 22 \n1. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie against \nexecutive action. ............................................................... 23 \n2. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie because \nPetitioner has no clear legal right to relief. ....................... 26 \nC. \nThe writ of prohibition should not be issued as a matter of \ndiscretion. ...................................................................................... 28 \n1. \nIssuance of a writ of prohibition is not warranted. ........... 28 \n2. \nDisqualification is not warranted. ..................................... 31 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n2 of 52\n\n--- Page 3 ---\nii \n \nD. \nThe Governor\u2019s actions are not subject to judicial review as \narbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. ....................... 35 \nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 36 \n \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n3 of 52\n\n--- Page 4 ---\niii \n \nTable of Authorities \n \nPage(s) \nCases \nAbelove v. Cuomo, \n57 Misc. 3d 668 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2017) ...................................................................4, 25 \nAllard v. Allard, \n145 A.D.3d 1254 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) ...........................................................................................14 \nAmerican Ins. Assn. v. Chu, \n64 N.Y.2d 379 (1985) ................................................................................................................6 \nAntonetty v. Cuomo, \n131 Misc. 2d 1041 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1986) .....................................................................10 \nArgyle Farm & Props., LLC v. Watershed Agric. Council of the N.Y. City Watersheds, \nInc., \n135 A.D.3d 1262 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) ...........................................................................................17 \nCampaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, \n8 N.Y.3d 14 (2006) ..................................................................................................................12 \nCenter for Independence of the Disabled v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., \n184 A.D.3d 197 (1st Dep\u2019t 2020) ..............................................................................................7 \nChurch of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, \n67 N.Y.2d 510 (1986) ..............................................................................................................13 \nCitizens for St. Patrick\u2019s v. City of Watervliet City Council, \n126 A.D.3d 1159 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) ...........................................................................................15 \nDoe v. Axelrod, \n71 N.Y.2d 484 (1988) ..............................................................................................................26 \nEaton v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., \n56 N.Y.2d 340 ..........................................................................................................................21 \nFederation of Mental Health Ctrs. v. DeBuomo, \n275 A.D.2d 557 (3d Dep\u2019t 2000) .............................................................................................13 \nGaynor v. Rockefeller, \n21 A.D.2d 92 (1st Dep\u2019t 1964), aff\u2019d 15 N.Y.2d 120 (1965) ..................................................35 \nGrand S. Point, LLC v. Bassett, \n230 A.D.3d 49 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) ...............................................................................................12 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n4 of 52\n\n--- Page 5 ---\niv \n \nHollandale Apts. & Health Club v. Bonesteel, \n173 A.D.3d 55 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) ...............................................................................................13 \nIn re Grand Jury Investigation, \n696 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1982) ...................................................................................................14 \nIn re Grand Jury Proceedings, \n700 F.Supp. 626 (Dist. P.R. 1988) ...........................................................................................13 \nIn re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, \n781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986).....................................................................................................13 \nJane Doe v. Cornell University, et al., \nIndex No. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) ..........................................................................1 \nJiggetts v. Grinker, \n75 N.Y.2d 411 (1990) ..............................................................................................................11 \nJones v. Beame, \n45 N.Y.2d 402 (1978) ................................................................................................................5 \nLa Rocca v. Lane, \n37 N.Y.2d 575 (1975) ........................................................................................................28, 31 \nLancaster Dev., Inc. v. McDonald, \n112 A.D.3d 1260 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) ...........................................................................................20 \nMatter of 292 Bedford, LLC v. New York, \n249 A.D.3d 874 (2d Dep\u2019t 2026) .............................................................................................17 \nMatter of 61 Crown St., LLC v. New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic \nPreserv., \n207 A.D.3d 837 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) .............................................................................................14 \nMatter of Acevedo v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehs., \n132 A.D.3d 112 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016), aff\u2019d 29 N.Y.3d 202 (2017) ...............................................14 \nMatter of Acevedo v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehs., \n29 N.Y.3d 202 (2017) ................................................................................................................5 \nMatter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Superme Ct. v. Doe, \n50 N.Y.2d 14 (1980) ............................................................................................................3, 11 \nMatter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct., \n50 N.Y.2d at 18\u201319 ..................................................................................................................24 \nMatter of Alessi v. Pataki, \n21 A.D.3d 1141 (3d Dep\u2019t 2005) ...............................................................................................4 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n5 of 52\n\n--- Page 6 ---\nv \n \nMatter of Allen B. v. Sproat, \n23 N.Y.3d 364 (2014) ..............................................................................................................22 \nMatter of Amorosi v. South Colonie Ind. Cent. Sch. Dist., \n9 N.Y.3d 367 (2007) ................................................................................................................21 \nMatter of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Aubertine, \n119 A.D.3d 1202 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014) ...........................................................................................18 \nMatter of Assoc. for a Better Long Island, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, \n23 N.Y.3d 1 (2014) ..................................................................................................................15 \nMatter of Bd. of Supervisors of Montgomery Cnty. v. Aulisi, \n62 A.D.2d 644 (3d Dep\u2019t 1978) ...............................................................................................32 \nMatter of BLDG 44 Devs. LLC v. State of New York, \n___ A.D.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 02898 (3d Dep\u2019t May 7, 2026).......................................7 \nMatter of Boyd v. Pataki, \n52 A.D.3d 1128 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) .............................................................................................35 \nMatter of Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU Sch. of Law v. New York State Bd. of \nElections, \n159 A.D.3d 1299 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) .......................................................................................5, 16 \nMatter of Brown v. New York State DOCCS Exec. Clemency Bur., \n239 A.D.3d 1216 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................35 \nMatter of Buenos Hill, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Planning Bd., \n240 A.D.3d 990 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) .............................................................................................14 \nMatter of Canning v. Revoir, \n220 A.D.3d 16 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...............................................................................................27 \nMatter of Carey (Fischer), \n68 A.D.2d 220 (4th Dep\u2019t 1979) ............................................................................................4, 9 \nMatter of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. State Of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Commission, \n242 A.D.3d 33 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...............................................................................................22 \nMatter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cnty. of Erie, \n43 A.D.3d 1341 (4th Dep\u2019t 2007) ............................................................................................10 \nMatter of Clegg v. Rounds, \n222 A.D.3d 112 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) .............................................................................................28 \nMatter of Cnty. of Orange v. City of New York, \n232 A.D.3d 785 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................17 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n6 of 52\n\n--- Page 7 ---\nvi \n \nMatter of Cnty. of Suffolk v. Kennedy, \n211 A.D.3d 937 (2d Dep\u2019t 2022) .............................................................................................23 \nMatter of Columbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 (Czajka), \n118 A.D.3d 1081 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014) ...........................................................................................29 \nMatter of Curry v. New York State Educ. Dep\u2019t, \n13 A.D.3d 1327 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) .............................................................................................15 \nMatter of Czajka v. Koweek, \n188 A.D.3d 1540 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) ...........................................................................................32 \nMatter of Doe v. Cuomo, \n71 A.D.3d 889 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) ...............................................................................................24 \nMatter of Dondi, \n40 N.Y.2d at 19\u201320 ..................................................................................................................11 \nMatter of Dondi v. Jones, \n40 N.Y.2d 8 (1976) ..............................................................................................................4, 24 \nMatter of Donnaruma v. Carter, \n41 Misc. 3d 195 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013) .......................................................................20 \nMatter of Figgins v. Hendricks, \n28 A.D.3d 1178 (4th Dep\u2019t 2006) ............................................................................................23 \nMatter of Flynn v. DiTullio, \n228 A.D.3d 1323 (4th Dep\u2019t 2024) ..........................................................................................34 \nMatter of Gonzalez v. Northeast Parent & Child Soc\u2019y, \n___ N.Y.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 01443 (Mar. 17, 2026) ...................................................7 \nMatter of Grigger v. Goord, \n27 A.D.3d 803 (3d Dep\u2019t 2006) ...............................................................................................15 \nMatter of Gronbach v. New York State Educ. Dep\u2019t, \n221 A.D.3d 1385 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...........................................................................................16 \nMatter of Hassan v. Magistrates\u2019 Ct. of City of N.Y., \n20 Misc. 2d 509 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1959) .........................................................................9 \nMatter of HCI Distrib., Inc. v. New York State Police, Troop B Commander, \n110 A.D.3d 1297 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) ...........................................................................................28 \nMatter of Henry v. Fandrich, \n159 A.D.3d 1409 (4th Dep\u2019t 2018) ..........................................................................................28 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n7 of 52\n\n--- Page 8 ---\nvii \n \nMatter of Holtzman v. Goldman, \n71 N.Y.2d 564 (1988) ..............................................................................................................26 \nMatter of Hoovler v. Vazquez-Doles, \n237 A.D.3d 936 (2d Dep\u2019t 2025) .............................................................................................26 \nMatter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, \n164 A.D.2d 518 (3d Dep\u2019t 1990) .............................................................................................13 \nMatter of Johnson, \n91 N.Y.2d at 223\u201324 ..................................................................................................................8 \nMatter of Johnson Elec. Constr. Corp. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Transp., \n124 A.D.3d 1199 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) .............................................................................................3 \nMatter of Johnson v. Pataki, \n91 N.Y.2d 214 (1997) ................................................................................ 1, 3-4, 11, 19, 24, 35 \nMatter of Lawrence Teachers\u2019s Assn., NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO v. New York State \nPub. Empl. Relations Bd., \n152 A.D.3d 171 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .............................................................................................21 \nMatter of Lawyers for Children v. New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., \n___ N.Y.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 03218 (May 21, 2026) ..................................................19 \nMatter of League of Women Voters of N.Y. State v. New York State Bd. of Elections, \n206 A.D.3d 1227 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...........................................................................................24 \nMatter of LeGrand v. Goord, \n272 A.D.2d 650 (3d Dep\u2019t 2000) .............................................................................................13 \nMatter of Long Is. Pure Water, Ltd. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Health, \n209 A.D.3d 1128 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...........................................................................................15 \nMatter of Lorie C., \n49 N.Y.2d 161 (1980) ..............................................................................................................11 \nMatter of Madison Sq. Garden Ent. Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth., \n221 A.D.3d 536 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) ............................................................................................28 \nMatter of Maluf v. Vance, \n116 A.D.3d 542 (1st Dep\u2019t 2014) ............................................................................................30 \nMatter of McGinley, \n51 N.Y.2d at 123\u201325 ................................................................................................................25 \nMatter of McGinley v. Hynes, \n51 N.Y.2d 116 (1980) ..............................................................................................................24 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n8 of 52\n\n--- Page 9 ---\nviii \n \nMatter of Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Daniels, \n33 N.Y.3d 44 (2019) ................................................................................................................16 \nMatter of Mohr v. Greenan, \n10 Misc. 3d 610 (Sup. Ct. Erie Cnty. 2005) ............................................................................12 \nMatter of Montano v. Cnty. Legislature of Cnty. of Suffolk, \n70 A.D.3d 203 (2d Dep\u2019t 2009) .................................................................................................8 \nMatter of Morabito v. Martens, \n149 A.D.3d 1316 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .............................................................................................6 \nMatter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, \n59 N.Y.2d 143 (1983) ..............................................................................................................23 \nMatter of Mulhern v. Touro Coll., \n226 A.D.3d 788 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................22 \nMatter of Mulroy, \n58 A.D.2d at 214 ................................................................................................................11, 23 \nMatter of Mulroy v. Carey, \n58 A.D.2d 213\u201314 (4th Dep\u2019t 1977) ..........................................................................................4 \nMatter of New York Blue Line Council, Inc. v. Adirondack Park Agency, \n86 A.D.3d 756 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) ...........................................................................................6, 13 \nMatter of New York State Bd. of Regents v. State Univ. of N.Y., \n178 A.D.3d 11 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) ...............................................................................................18 \nMatter of New York State Health Facilities Assn., Inc. v. Sheehan, \n100 A.D.3d 1086 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) ...........................................................................................23 \nMatter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, \nAFSCME, AFL-CIO, \n64 N.Y.2d at 239\u201340 ..................................................................................................................8 \nMatter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, \nAFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cuomo, \n64 N.Y.2d 233 (1984) ................................................................................................................7 \nMatter of Park Manor Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., LLC v. Shah, \n129 A.D.3d 1276 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) ...........................................................................................20 \nMatter of Park v. Town of New Windsor Zoning Bd. of Appeals, \n137 A.D.3d 924 (2d Dep\u2019t 2016) .............................................................................................17 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n9 of 52\n\n--- Page 10 ---\nix \n \nMatter of Parkland Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Health, \n261 A.D.2d 770 (3d Dep\u2019t 1999) .............................................................................................16 \nMatter of Paychex, Inc. v. Dep\u2019t of Taxation & Fin., \n251 A.D.3d 1369 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) ...........................................................................................14 \nMatter of People v. Trump Org., Inc., \n205 A.D.3d 625 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) ............................................................................................27 \nMatter of Percinthe v. Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, \n227 A.D.3d 1347 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................5 \nMatter of Peterec-Tolino v. Schick, \n236 A.D.3d 1130 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................28 \nMatter of Pryor v. Greenberg, \n247 A.D.2d 711 (3d Dep\u2019t 1998) .............................................................................................29 \nMatter of Raheem v. New York State Bd. of Parole, \n66 A.D.3d 1270 (3d Dep\u2019t 2009) .............................................................................................28 \nMatter of Raiser & Kenniff, P.C. v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t, \n149 A.D.3d 1084 (2d Dep\u2019t 2017) ...........................................................................................23 \nMatter of Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. v. Vecchio, \n27 N.Y.2d 92 (2016) ..................................................................................................................5 \nMatter of Rice, \n31 Misc. 3d 838 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2011)....................................................................4, 32 \nMatter of Rodriguez v. Hobbs, \n220 A.D.3d 1145 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...........................................................................................29 \nMatter of Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, \n206 A.D.3d. 1332 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ..........................................................................................16 \nMatter of Schmitt v. Skovira, \n53 A.D.3d 918 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) ...............................................................................................29 \nMatter of Schulz v. Cuomo, \n133 A.D.3d 945 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) .........................................................................................5, 18 \nMatter of Schulz v. Silver, \n212 A.D.2d 293 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................12 \nMatter of Schulz v. State of New York, \n216 A.D.3d 21 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) .................................................................................................7 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n10 of 52\n\n--- Page 11 ---\nx \n \nMatter of Schumer v. Holtzman, \n60 N.Y.2d 46 (1983) ......................................................................................... 10, 25-26, 29-31 \nMatter of Schwabler v. DiNapoli, \n194 A.D.3d 1235 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) ...........................................................................................22 \nMatter of Seneca Lake Guardian v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conserv., \n229 A.D.3d 987 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................18 \nMatter of Sgueglia v. Kelly, \n45 Misc. 3d 335 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2014) .............................................................................8 \nMatter of Smith v. Gribetz, \n211 A.D.2d 605 (2d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................23 \nMatter of Snyder v. Farrell, \n242 A.D.3d 1480 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................29 \nMatter of Soares v. Herrick, \n20 N.Y.3d 139 (2012) ........................................................................................................28, 32 \nMatter of Staten Is. Branch of the Natl. Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. \nState of N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & Thirteenth Jud. Dists., \n144 A.D.3d 412 (1st Dep\u2019t 2016) ............................................................................................10 \nMatter of Stevens v. New York State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., \n40 N.Y.3d 505 (2003) ..............................................................................................................15 \nMatter of Suffolk Cnty. Legislature v. Mullen, \n211 A.D.2d 736 (2d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................25 \nMatter of Town of Brunswick v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, \n152 A.D.3d 1106 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .............................................................................................6 \nMatter of Town of Huntington v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, \n82 N.Y.2d 783 (1993) ..............................................................................................................26 \nMatter of Town of Riverhead v. Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning & Policy Commn, \n71 A.D.3d 679 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) ...............................................................................................13 \nMatter of Town of Southampton v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, \n39 N.Y. 3d 201 (2023) .............................................................................................................21 \nMatter of Tripodi v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, \n251 A.D.3d 1708 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026) ..........................................................................................12 \nMatter of Trump v. Engoron, \n222 A.D.3d 505 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) ............................................................................................29 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n11 of 52\n\n--- Page 12 ---\nxi \n \nMatter of Trump v. Merchan, \n230 A.D.3d 413 (1st Dep\u2019t 2024) ............................................................................................28 \nMatter of Urban Justice Ctr. v. Pataki, \n38 A.D.3d 20 (1st Dep\u2019t 2006) ..................................................................................................8 \nMatter of Vasquez v. Fischer, \n127 A.D.3d 1441 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) .............................................................................................5 \nMatter of Wal-Mart Stores v. Campbell, \n238 A.D.2d 831 (3d Dep\u2019t 1997) .............................................................................................14 \nMatter of Whitfield v. New York State Off. of Professional Med. Conduct, \n237 A.D.3d 1393 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................15 \nMatter of Working Families Party v. Fisher, \n23 N.Y.3d 539 (2014) ..............................................................................................................31 \nMaybee v. State of New York, \n4 N.Y.3d 415 (2005) ................................................................................................................35 \nMontano v. City of Watervliet, \n47 A.D.3d 1106 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) ...............................................................................................6 \nMorgenthau v. Crane, \n113 A.D.2d 20 (1st Dep\u2019t 1985) ..............................................................................................33 \nMulroy v. Carey, \n43 N.Y.2d 819 (1977) ..............................................................................................................20 \nNew York State Ass\u2019n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, \n2 N.Y.3d 207 (2004) ................................................................................................................18 \nNew York State Police Investigators Assn., Local 4 IUPA, AFL-CIO v. State of New York, \n71 Misc. 3d 1007 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2021) .....................................................................23 \nNitkewich v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y., \n40 N.Y.3d 349 (2023) ..............................................................................................................22 \nPeople ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Extraordinary Special & Trial Term of \nSupreme Court, \n220 N.Y. 487 (1917) ..................................................................................................................8 \nPeople v. Abelove, \n179 A.D.3d 39 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) .........................................................................................11, 20 \nPeople v. Adams, \n20 N.Y.3d 608 (2013) ..............................................................................................................31 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n12 of 52\n\n--- Page 13 ---\nxii \n \nPeople v. Barba, \n60 Misc. 3d 1074 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 2018) .....................................................................33 \nPeople v. Bunge Corp., \n25 N.Y.2d 91 (1969) ................................................................................................................10 \nPeople v. Callara, \n44 N.Y.3d 623 (2025) ..............................................................................................................32 \nPeople v. Douglas, \n226 A.D.3d 1162 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) ...........................................................................................34 \nPeople v. Drago, \n207 A.D.3d 559 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) .............................................................................................35 \nPeople v. Goldston, \n126 A.D.3d 1175 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) ...........................................................................................34 \nPeople v. Hodgins, \n202 A.D.3d 1377 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...........................................................................................31 \nPeople v. Jenkins, \n186 A.D.3d 31 (1st Dep\u2019t 2020) ..............................................................................................35 \nPeople v. Lancaster, \n69 N.Y.2d 20 (1986) ................................................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Leahy, \n72 N.Y.2d 510 (1988) ...................................................................................................... 8-9, 23 \nPeople v. Mero, \n221 A.D.3d 1242 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...........................................................................................33 \nPeople v. Miller, \n110 A.D.3d 1150 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) ...........................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Mitchell, \n82 N.Y.2d 509 (1993) ..............................................................................................................34 \nPeople v. National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc., \n223 A.D.3d 84 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) ..............................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Pelchat, \n62 N.Y.2d 97 (1984) ................................................................................................................34 \nPeople v. Pottorff, \n145 A.D.3d 1095 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) ...........................................................................................33 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n13 of 52\n\n--- Page 14 ---\nxiii \n \nPeople v. Rivera, \n206 A.D.3d 1356 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...........................................................................................28 \nPeople v. Ronk, \n159 A.D.3d 1129 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) ...........................................................................................33 \nPeople v. Santorelli, \n95 N.Y.2d 412 (2000) ..............................................................................................................18 \nPeople v. Shinkle, \n51 N.Y.2d 417 (1980) ..............................................................................................................31 \nPeople v. Sloley, \n179 A.D.3d 1308 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) ...........................................................................................31 \nPeople v. Tatro, \n53 A.D.3d 781 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) ...............................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Thompson, \n22 N.Y.3d 803 (2014) ..............................................................................................................34 \nPeople v. Viviani, \n36 N.Y.3d 564 (2021) ........................................................................................................19, 32 \nPeople v. Walton, \n214 A.D.2d 805 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................27 \nPeople v. Zakrzewski, \n249 A.D.2d 1314 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) ...........................................................................................33 \nPirro v. Angiolillo, \n89 N.Y.2d 351 (1996) ..............................................................................................................26 \nPolice Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v. New York State Div. of State \nPolice, \n40 A.D.3d 1350 (3d Dep\u2019t 2007) ...............................................................................................6 \nRapp v. Carey, \n44 N.Y.2d 157 (1978) ..............................................................................................................24 \nRoberts v. Health & Hosps. Corp., \n87 A.D.3d 311 (1st Dep\u2019t 2011) ................................................................................................6 \nRush v. Mordue, \n68 N.Y.2d 348 (1986) ........................................................................................................27, 30 \nSaranac Land & Timber Co., \n220 N.Y. ...................................................................................................................................35 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n14 of 52\n\n--- Page 15 ---\nxiv \n \nSaxton v. Carey, \n44 N.Y.2d 545 (1978) ................................................................................................................4 \nSoares v. Carter, \n25 N.Y.3d 1011 (2015) ........................................................................................................9, 26 \nSoc\u2019y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, \n77 N.Y.2d 761 (1991) .................................................................................................. 14-15, 19 \nState of New York v. Wolowitz, \n96 A.D.2d 47 (2d Dep\u2019t 1983) ...........................................................................................24, 30 \nSullivan v. New York State Joint Commn. on Pub. Ethics, \n207 A.D.3d 117 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................12 \nTown of Colonie v. City of New York, \n237 A.D.3d 1398 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) ...........................................................................................22 \nWayte v. United States, \n470 U.S. 598 (1985) ...................................................................................................................9 \nXiang Fu He v. Troon Mgt., Inc., \n34 N.Y.3d 167 (2019) ..............................................................................................................11 \nConstitutions \nNew York State Constitution \n \nart. IV, \u00a7 3 ..............................................................................................................2, 3, 4, 19, 23 \n \nart. XIII, \u00a7 1 .............................................................................................................................17 \nState Statutes \nCounty Law \n\u00a7 701.........................................................................................................................................32 \n\u00a7 701(6) ........................................................................................................................12, 20, 22 \n\u00a7 701(6)(a) ...............................................................................................................................20 \n\u00a7 701(6)(b) ...............................................................................................................................21 \n\u00a7 930.........................................................................................................................................25 \nCriminal Procedure Law \n\u00a7 20.40......................................................................................................................................22 \nExecutive Law \n\u00a7 63(2) ......................................................................................1-4, 11, 17, 19-20, 23-24, 30, 32 \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n15 of 52\n\n--- Page 16 ---\n1 \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nRespondent Kathy Hochul, Governor of the State of New York (Governor) and Respondent \nLetitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York (AG, and collectively with the Governor, \nRespondents), respectfully submit this memorandum of law in opposition to the Verified Petition, \ndated October 7, 2026, which seeks a writ of prohibition to: (1) void an executive order\u2014\nExecutive Order No. 64, dated October 1, 2026 (EO 64)\u2014that appointed the AG as special \nprosecutor to investigate conduct arising out of allegations made in Jane Doe v. Cornell University, \net al., Index No. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) (the Jane Doe Litigation); and (2) disqualify \nthe AG from serving as special prosecutor in that investigation.   \nThe Verified Petition must be denied. The Court of Appeals is clear that judicial review of \nthe Governor\u2019s exercise of her superseder authority under Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) is \u201cgenerally \nlimited to determining whether the State Constitution or the Legislature has empowered the \nGovernor to act, and does not include the manner in which the Governor chooses to discharge that \nauthority.\u201d  Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 91 N.Y.2d 214, 223 (1997). Thus, Petitioner\u2019s claims \nnecessarily fail.  \nFirst, Petitioner\u2019s claims are not justiciable. Petitioner\u2019s claims raise a political question \nthat is not subject to judicial review and depend on so many levels of supposition and contingency \nabout unknown future events that they are unripe and he lacks standing. Second, even if this matter \nwere justiciable, it is procedurally defective and substantively meritless. Accordingly, for all the \nreasons detailed below and in the accompanying affirmation of Kaitlin Vigars, dated October 22, \n2026 (\u201cVigars Aff.\u201d), the Verified Petition must be denied and this proceeding must be dismissed. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \nOn October 1, 2026, the Governor issued EO 64 appointing the AG as a special prosecutor \nfor an investigation into allegations described in the Jane Doe Litigation. Executive Order No. 64, \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n16 of 52\n\n--- Page 17 ---\n2 \n \nVigars Aff., Exh. A. The Governor issued EO 64 in an exercise of her superseder authority, derived \nfrom the executive powers conferred to the Governor in Article IV, \u00a7 3 of the New York State \nConstitution and the statutory powers granted to the Governor by the Legislature in Executive Law \n\u00a7 63(2). See id. EO 64 authorizes the AG to \u201cinvestigate, and, if warranted, present evidence to a \ngrand jury against and prosecute offenses arising out of the allegations of a sexual assault described \nin the [Jane Doe Litigation.]\u201d Id. Further, EO 64 specifies that the AG \u201cor her designee shall \nconduct a full, reasoned, and independent investigation . . . .\u201d Id.  \nPetitioner is a defendant in the Jane Doe Litigation. Petition, \u00b6\u00b6 2\u20133, 6, 17, 22, 64, Dkt. \nNo. 1. Petitioner anticipates that he will be targeted in the investigation authorized by EO 64 and \nthat the investigation will not be properly conducted because, according to him, the AG allegedly \nunfairly prejudged the allegations made in the Jane Doe Litigation. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 6\u20139, 31\u201334, 56, 64\u201366. \nIn support of this claim, Petitioner points to a single, empathetic remark made by the AG on social \nmedia prior to her appointment as special prosecutor, which Petitioner characterizes as \n\u201ccommunicat[ing] acceptance of Doe\u2019s account\u201d and an \u201capparent credibility judgment . . . \nconcerning the complainant . . . .\u201d Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 44\u201345. According to Petitioner, these remarks indicate \nthat the AG is unable to adequately evaluate the allegations made in the Jane Doe litigation and \nwill not consider or pursue exculpatory evidence, which will taint the investigation and prejudice \nPetitioner in a possible future criminal proceeding. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 46\u201348, 56\u201358.  \nPetitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, seeking a writ of \nprohibition to void EO 64 and disqualify the AG from acting as special prosecutor. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 36\u201351, \n60\u201380. Alternatively, Petitioner requests that the determination by the Governor appointing the \nAG as special prosecutor be annulled because it is arbitrary and capricious and/or an abuse of \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n17 of 52\n\n--- Page 18 ---\n3 \n \ndiscretion. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 52\u201355, 79.1 By way of relief, Petitioner requests judgment pursuant to CPLR \n7806 voiding EO 64 and requiring the Governor to instead appoint a special prosecutor free from \nactual or perceived conflicts of interest or bias, or, in the alternative, modifying EO 64 to limit the \nAG\u2019s participation in any investigation. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 60\u201363, 80, Wherefore Clause. Respondents now \nanswer in opposition. \nSTANDARD OF REVIEW \n Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) authorizes the AG \u201c[w]henever required by the governor\u201d to \n\u201cmanag[e] and conduct[] in such court or before such [grand] jury criminal actions or proceedings \nas shall be specified in such requirement . . . .\u201d  It states that, when the AG is authorized by the \nGovernor, the AG \u201cshall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties in respect of such \nactions or proceedings, which the district attorney would otherwise be authorized or required to \nexercise or perform . . . .\u201d  Exec. Law \u00a7 63(2)  Contemporaneous with this grant of authority, \nExecutive Law \u00a7 63(2) limits the authority of the district attorney, so that when the AG is appointed \nby the Governor, \u201cthe district attorney shall only exercise such powers and perform such duties as \nare required of him by the attorney-general . . . .\u201d  Id. \nCourts interpreting this statutory grant of authority \u201chave long held that article IV, \u00a7 3 of \nthe Constitution and Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) together provide the Governor with discretionary \nauthority to supersede the District Attorney in a matter.\u201d  Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223; \nsee Matter of Additional Jan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Superme Ct. v. Doe, 50 N.Y.2d 14, 16 \n \n1 The single cause of action pled in the Verified Petition is a claim pursuant to CPLR \n7803(2). Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 69\u201381. CPLR 7803(2) permits a petitioner to raise the question of \u201cwhether the \nbody or officer proceeded, is proceeding, or is about to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction \n. . . .\u201d Thus, based on Petitioner\u2019s narrow pleading, any claim that the Governor\u2019s actions are \narbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion is not properly pleaded and not properly before \nthis Court. See Matter of Johnson Elec. Constr. Corp. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Transp., 124 \nA.D.3d 1199, 1200 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (claims not properly before the court because they were not \npleaded in the petition). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n18 of 52\n\n--- Page 19 ---\n4 \n \n(1980) (Governor\u2019s superseder authority derives both from Article IV, \u00a7 3 of the New York State \nConstitution and from the Legislature as granted in in Executive Law \u00a7 63(2)); Matter of Carey \n(Fischer), 68 A.D.2d 220, 224 (4th Dep\u2019t 1979) (same). The Governor\u2019s authority under Executive \nLaw \u00a7 63(2) is broad as \u201c[t]he statute neither limits the Governor\u2019s authority to supersede, nor \nrequires the Governor to explain that choice.\u201d  Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 224; see Matter of \nMulroy v. Carey, 58 A.D.2d 213\u201314 (4th Dep\u2019t 1977) (ruling that the Governor is not required to \nexplain rationale for exercising superseder authority because neither the Constitution, nor the \nstatute include \u201ca standard . . . as a guide for action by the governor\u201d); see also Matter of Rice, 31 \nMisc. 3d 838, 844 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2011) (Governor\u2019s superseder authority is \u201cleft to his \nsound discretion; he is not, for example, required . . . to make any finding that a [d]istrict [a]ttorney \nis disqualified\u201d).  \nThis statutory framework leaves \u201cthe authority to supersede within the Governor\u2019s sound \ndiscretion . . . and judicial review is limited to determining whether the Constitution or the \nLegislature has empowered the Governor to act.\u201d  Abelove v. Cuomo, 57 Misc. 3d 668, 673 (Sup. \nCt. Albany Cnty. 2017); see Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8, 19\u201320 (1976) (considering \nwhether specific prosecution pursued by the AG was within scope of authority tasked by Governor \npursuant to Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) and corresponding executive order); Matter of Alessi v. Pataki, \n21 A.D.3d 1141, 1143 (3d Dep\u2019t 2005) (affirming motion court determination that dismissed \npetition challenging Governor\u2019s exercise of discretionary authority because \u201cpetitioner has not \ndemonstrated that the Governor lacked authority\u201d to effectuate action). \u201cFor abuse of lawful \ndiscretionary authority, the remedy as a rule lies with the people at the polls, or with a \nconstitutional amendment, or with corrective legislation.\u201d  Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223; \nsee Saxton v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 545, 51 (1978) (action at issue was beyond scope of judicial review \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n19 of 52\n\n--- Page 20 ---\n5 \n \nbecause it was tasked to the executive and legislative branches of government, such that \u201cthe \nremedy lies not in the courtroom, but in the voting booth\u201d). \nARGUMENT \nI. \nPETITIONER\u2019S CLAIMS ARE NOT JUSTICIABLE. \n\u201cIn order to warrant a determination of the merits of a cause of action, the party requesting \nrelief must state a justiciable claim\u2014one that is capable of review and redress by the courts at the \ntime that it is brought for review.\u201d  Matter of Schulz v. Cuomo, 133 A.D.3d 945, 947 (3d Dep\u2019t \n2015); see Matter of Vasquez v. Fischer, 127 A.D.3d 1441, 1442 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (\u201cgeneralized \ndissatisfaction with [governmental action] . . . does not present a justiciable controversy\u201d). \u201cThe \ngeneral principle of justiciability embraces several concepts . . . that are related by the fundamental \ntenet that, in our tripartite system of government, a court should limit itself to conflicts that are \namenable to traditional judicial resolution and should \u2018not undertake tasks that other governmental \nbranches are better suited to perform.\u2019\u201d  Matter of Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU Sch. of Law v. \nNew York State Bd. of Elections, 159 A.D.3d 1299, 1301 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) (quoting Klostermann \nv. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 535 (1984)). Threshold justiciability concepts that bar a determination \non the merits include, among others, the political question doctrine, ripeness, and standing. See \nMatter of Acevedo v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehs., 29 N.Y.3d 202, 218 (2017) \n(recognizing standing as a threshold justiciability concept); Matter of Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. \nv. Vecchio, 27 N.Y.2d 92, 98 (2016) (recognizing ripeness as a threshold justiciability concept); \nJones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408 (1978) (recognizing political question doctrine as a threshold \njusticiability concept). \nHere, Petitioner\u2019s claims are not justiciable, barring resolution on the merits. See Matter of \nPercinthe v. Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 227 A.D.3d 1347, 1348 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) \n(controversy not justiciable because it involved \u201ca future determination by respondent that is too \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n20 of 52\n\n--- Page 21 ---\n6 \n \nremote and speculative to be justiciable\u201d); Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v. \nNew York State Div. of State Police, 40 A.D.3d 1350, 1352\u201353 (3d Dep\u2019t 2007) (controversy not \njusticiable because petitioner \u201cdoes no more than raise concerns over the potentially broad and \narbitrary manner in which [respondent] could theoretically apply [the challenged action] and such \nconcerns are wholly speculative\u201d). Specifically, Petitioner\u2019s claims impermissibly raise a political \nquestion not suitable for judicial review, seek review of a determination that is not ripe for review, \nand Petitioner lacks standing. See Matter of Morabito v. Martens, 149 A.D.3d 1316, 1317 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2017) (affirming motion court determination that dismissed petition because petitioner \nlacked standing to challenge government action at issue);  Roberts v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 87  \nA.D.3d 311, 321, 324\u201326 (1st Dep\u2019t 2011) (reversing motion court determination that reached \nmerits of claims because petitioner lacked standing and claims raised political question not suitable \nfor judicial review); Montano v. City of Watervliet, 47 A.D.3d 1106, 1111 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) \n(affirming motion court determination that awarded summary judgment dismissing claims that \nwere not ripe for judicial review). Any single one of these justiciability defects mandates denial of \nthe Verified Petition. See American Ins. Assn. v. Chu, 64 N.Y.2d 379, 385 (1985) (reversing \nappellate court decision that resolved claims on the merits because, even if party had standing, \nother justiciability issues required dismissal); see also Matter of Town of Brunswick v. Cnty. of \nRensselaer, 152 A.D.3d 1106, 1107 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) (finding claims not justiciable because \npetitioner lacked standing and lack of standing was dispositive); Matter of New York Blue Line \nCouncil, Inc. v. Adirondack Park Agency, 86 A.D.3d 756, 760 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) (finding claims not \njusticiable because, even if party had standing, claims were not ripe for review).  \nA. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims raise a political question. \n\u201c[I]t is a fundamental principle of the organic law that each department of government \nshould be free from interference, in the lawful discharge of duties expressly conferred, by either \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n21 of 52\n\n--- Page 22 ---\n7 \n \nof the other branches.\u201d Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., \nDist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cuomo, 64 N.Y.2d 233, 239 (1984). \u201cWithin our tripartite \ngovernmental framework, the Governor as chief executive officer, has the responsibility to manage \nthe operation of the divisions of the executive branch . . . .\u201d Id. Thus, \u201clawful acts of executive \nbranch officials, performed in satisfaction of responsibilities conferred by law, involves questions \nof judgment, allocation of resources, and ordering of priorities, which are generally not subject to \njudicial review.\u201d Id.; see also Matter of BLDG 44 Devs. LLC v. State of New York, ___ A.D.3d \n___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 02898 (3d Dep\u2019t May 7, 2026) (\u201cunder the separation of powers doctrine \nno one branch of government is allowed to arrogate unto itself powers residing entirely in another \nbranch\u201d (quotations marks, brackets, and citation omitted)). Likewise, \u201c[t]he courts do not sit in \nreview of the discretion of the legislature or determine the expediency, wisdom, or propriety of its \nactions on matters within its power.\u201d Matter of Gonzalez v. Northeast Parent & Child Soc\u2019y, ___ \nN.Y.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 01443 (Mar. 17, 2026); Matter of Schulz v. State of New York, \n216 A.D.3d 21, 26 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (the court \u201cmay not substitute its judgment for that of the body \nwhich made the decision\u201d and \u201c[j]udges, however much they might disagree with the wisdom of \nthe act under review, are not free to invalidate it on that ground\u201d). \u201cThis judicial deference to a \ncoordinate, coequal branch of government\u201d presents a justiciability consideration that is \u201cgenerally \ndenominated as the political question doctrine . . . .\u201d Matter of New York State Inspection, Sec. & \nLaw Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 64 N.Y.2d at 239; see Center for \nIndependence of the Disabled v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 184 A.D.3d 197, 208 (1st Dep\u2019t \n2020) (recognizing that justiciability concepts provide an important limitation on judicial power). \nIn contravention of these bedrock principles of judicial restraint, Petitioner asks this Court \nto impermissibly void a discretionary action by the Governor, limit the prosecutorial discretion of \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n22 of 52\n\n--- Page 23 ---\n8 \n \nthe AG, and contravene a statutory framework that reflects explicit policy choices made by the \nLegislature. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 36\u201355; see Matter of Montano v. Cnty. Legislature of Cnty. of Suffolk, 70 \nA.D.3d 203, 211\u201312 (2d Dep\u2019t 2009) (dismissing article 78 petition because petitioner\u2019s claim that \nlegislature should have handled his bill differently raised a political question that was not \njusticiable); Matter of Sgueglia v. Kelly, 45 Misc. 3d 335, 342 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2014) (denying \narticle 78 petition because petitioner\u2019s claim that police department should have handled firearms \nlicense application differently raised a political question that was not justiciable). \n1. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims invade the province of the executive branch. \nThe Governor\u2019s exercise of her superseder authority is an executive function, left entirely \nto her discretion. See Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223\u201324; People v. Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d 510, \n515 (1988). Petitioner concedes\u2014and expressly does not challenge\u2014that the Governor has broad, \ndiscretionary authority to appoint the AG as special prosecutor, but nevertheless questions the \nvalidity of the Governor\u2019s choice. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 37\u201338, 44\u201348. Such claim is beyond the reach of this \nCourt because it impermissibly requires the court to pass upon the soundness of a discretionary \ndetermination made by the Governor in exercise of her constitutional authority as executive and \nthe statutory authority conferred on her by the Legislature. See Matter of New York State \nInspection, Sec. & Law Enforcement Empls., Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 64 N.Y.2d at \n239\u201340 (separation of powers barred judicial review of Governor\u2019s decision to close correctional \nfacility because \u201cthe manner by which the State addresses complex societal and governmental \nissues is a subject left to the discretion of the political branches of government\u201d and beyond the \nauthority of the courts to review); People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Extraordinary \nSpecial & Trial Term of Supreme Court, 220 N.Y. 487, 490\u201391 (1917) (discretionary action by \nGovernor done in accordance with statutory authority conferred by the Legislature is not subject \nto judicial review); Matter of Urban Justice Ctr. v. Pataki, 38 A.D.3d 20, 32 (1st Dep\u2019t 2006) \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n23 of 52\n\n--- Page 24 ---\n9 \n \n(separation of powers barred judicial review of Governor\u2019s use of messages of necessity because \nGovernor had authority to utilize messages of necessity and their use was left to the Governor\u2019s \ndiscretion).  \nSimilarly, the AG\u2019s exercise of her special prosecutorial authority is an executive function \ninvolving considerable discretion. See Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d at 515 (\u201cwhen an appointment is made \nunder [Executive Law] section 63(2), the whole dynamic is played out within the executive \nbranch\u201d); Matter of Carey, 68 A.D.2d at 224 (appointment of AG to supersede district attorney is \ndone as exercise of executive action, AG \u201csteps into the shoes of the local [d]istrict [a]ttorney\u201d and \n\u201cis empowered to manage and conduct specified criminal actions and proceedings\u201d); see also \nSoares v. Carter, 25 N.Y.3d 1011, 1013 (2015) (recognizing that the way a prosecution is \nconducted is exclusively an executive function). Exercise of prosecutorial discretion by any \nprosecutor is largely beyond the scope of judicial review because it necessarily implicates \nseparation of powers concerns. See, e.g., Matter of Hassan v. Magistrates\u2019 Ct. of City of N.Y., 20 \nMisc. 2d 509, 511 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1959) (\u201c[a]s a basic incident of our form of government, \nwith hits divided powers and responsibilities lodged in the executive, legislative, and judicial \nbranches, and as a self-imposed rule of judicial restraint, the courts should not interfere with the \ndiscretion lodged in prosecuting officials such as the district attorney or the Attorney General to \ninstitute criminal proceedings\u201d (emphasis in the original)); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 \nU.S. 598, 607 (1985) (\u201c[e]xamining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, \nthreatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosector\u2019s motives and decisionmaking to \noutside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness\u201d).  \nDespite this traditional bar, Petitioner presumes to predict how the AG may exercise her \nprosecutorial discretion and, based on his assumptions, asks this Court to prohibit her from acting. \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n24 of 52\n\n--- Page 25 ---\n10 \n \nPet. \u00b6\u00b6 36\u201355. This type of judicial interference would be inappropriate in any prosecution and \nshould not be countenanced here. See Matter of Staten Is. Branch of the Natl. Assn. for the \nAdvancement of Colored People v. State of N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & \nThirteenth Jud. Dists., 144 A.D.3d 412, 412\u201313 (1st Dep\u2019t 2016) (separation of powers prohibited \njudicial review of actions of \u201cduly elected prosecutor who acted within the discretion of his \noffice\u201d); see also Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 55, 56 (1983) (finding that request \nto disqualify prosecutor was \u201cnot justiciable\u201d and noting that the court\u2019s ability to intervene to \ndisqualify a prosecutor was especially limited when it involved \u201ca constitutional officer chosen by \nthe electorate\u201d because \u201cremoval by a court implicates separation of powers\u201d); People v. Bunge \nCorp., 25 N.Y.2d 91, 98 (1969) (ruling that when Attorney General is authorized by statute to act, \n\u201cthe discretion of the Attorney-General in maintaining or discontinuing an action may not be made \nthe subject of injury by the courts\u201d). \nAccordingly, Petitioner\u2019s claim is barred by the political question doctrine because it would \nrequire this Court to impermissibly invade the province of the executive branch, and the Court\u2019s \nreview would undermine the constitutional and statutory authority of both the Governor and the \nAG, in violation of fundamental principles of the separation of powers. See Matter of Civil Serv. \nEmpls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Cnty. of Erie, 43 A.D.3d 1341, 1342 (4th \nDep\u2019t 2007) (challenge to determination by County executive to reduce staffing appropriations \nwas a political question not subject to judicial review because such determination involved the \nexercise of executive\u2019s discretionary authority regarding resource allocation); Antonetty v. Cuomo, \n131 Misc. 2d 1041, 1045 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. 1986) (challenge to action by Governor regarding \nnaming of certain property was a political question not subject to judicial review because such \ndetermination \u201cwas done in the performance of his executive powers and such acts performed in \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n25 of 52\n\n--- Page 26 ---\n11 \n \nhis official capacity are outside the scope of judicial review\u201d); see also Matter of Lorie C., 49 \nN.Y.2d 161, 171 (1980) (\u201ccourts do not normally have overview of the lawful acts of appointive \nand elective officials involving questions of judgment, discretion, allocation of resources and \npriorities\u201d). \n2. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims invade the province of the legislative branch.  \n\u201cThe Legislature, by enacting Executive Law \u00a7 63(2), statutorily gave the power to the \nGovernor to call upon [the ]AG to conduct investigations.\u201d  People v. Abelove, 179 A.D.3d 39, 44 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2019). \u201cThe statute neither limits the Governor\u2019s authority to supersede, nor requires the \nGovernor to explain that choice.\u201d  Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 224; see Matter of Additional \nJan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct., 50 N.Y.2d at 19 (only requirement of Executive \nLaw \u00a7 63(2) is that the Governor identify the subject matter to be investigated); see also Matter of \nDondi, 40 N.Y.2d at 19\u201320 (only limitation on AG\u2019s authority to act upon supersession of district \nattorney is \u201cthe scope of the order or requirement of the Governor\u201d). Contemporaneous judicial \nreview would contravene that explicit policy choice. See Matter of Mulroy, 58 A.D.2d at 214 \n(\u201cimposition of a standard under which a governor may invoke his powers to supersede a district \nattorney\u201d would contradict \u201ca policy risk which the framers of the Constitution and the Legislature \nassumed in granting this authority to the governor\u201d); see also Xiang Fu He v. Troon Mgt., Inc., 34 \nN.Y.3d 167, 175 (2019) (\u201ccourts do not sit in review of the discretion of the Legislature or \ndetermine the expediency, wisdom, or propriety of its action on matters within its powers\u201d); \nJiggetts v. Grinker, 75 N.Y.2d 411, 415 (1990) (\u201c[i]f the Legislature left the matter to the judgment \nof the [executive branch], then the issue is beyond review for the courts may not substitute judicial \noversight for the discretionary management of the public\u2019s business by public officers\u201d). \nAdditionally, and as discussed further below, the Legislature created a specific process for \naddressing disqualification of the AG when acting as a special prosecutor that requires an \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n26 of 52\n\n--- Page 27 ---\n12 \n \napplication by the AG to the superior criminal court where the criminal matter is triable. See \nCounty Law \u00a7 701(6). Permitting Petitioner to seek disqualification through an entirely different \nprocess not contemplated by this statute is in tension with the legislative policy choice that the \nstatute reflects. See Matter of Tripodi v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 251 \nA.D.3d 1708, 1709 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026) (motion court properly dismissed proceeding because \nproceeding was not authorized by underlying statutory scheme and court \u201cmay not second-guess \nthe legislature\u2019s policy choices or rewrite statutes to reflect their preferred outcomes\u201d); see also \nCampaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 28 (2006) (recognizing that \ncourts must give deference to legislative policy choices because this deference is required by our \nstructure of government). \nAccordingly, Petitioner\u2019s claims are barred by the political question doctrine because \nresolution of such claims would improperly invade the province of the Legislature in violation of \nseparation of powers. See Matter of Schulz v. Silver, 212 A.D.2d 293, 295 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) (claims \nin article 78 petition challenging Legislature\u2019s failure to act were not justiciable because resolution \nof such claims would require review of legislative policy choices that \u201crequire the exercise of \nconsiderable judgment and discretion\u201d); Matter of Mohr v. Greenan, 10 Misc. 3d 610, 614 (Sup. \nCt. Erie Cnty. 2005) (claims in article 78 petition challenging budget appropriation decisions were \nnot justiciable because resolution of such claims would require review of legislative policy \nchoices). \nB. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims are not ripe. \nWhether a governmental action is ripe for review requires consideration of: (1) \u201cwhether \nthe issues tendered are appropriate for judicial resolution and[;]\u201d (2) an assessment of \u201cthe hardship \nto the parties if judicial relief is denied.\u201d Sullivan v. New York State Joint Commn. on Pub. Ethics, \n207 A.D.3d 117, 130 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024); see Grand S. Point, LLC v. Bassett, 230 A.D.3d 49, 60 (3d \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n27 of 52\n\n--- Page 28 ---\n13 \n \nDep\u2019t 2024). Appropriateness considers \u201cwhether the administrative action being reviewed is final \nand whether the controversy may be determined as a purely legal question.\u201d Matter of New York \nBlue Line Council, Inc., 86 A.D.3d at 760 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Matter of \nTown of Riverhead v. Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning & Policy Commn, 71 A.D.3d 679, 680\u2013\n81 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010); Matter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, 164 A.D.2d 518, 525 (3d \nDep\u2019t 1990). Hardship considers \u201cthe certainty and effect of the harm claimed to be caused by the \nadministrative action: whether it is sufficiently direct and immediate and whether the action\u2019s \neffects have been felt in a concrete way.\u201d Church of St. Paul & St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d \n510, 520 (1986); see Federation of Mental Health Ctrs. v. DeBuomo, 275 A.D.2d 557, 562 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2000). Harm that is insignificant, remote, or contingent is not sufficient to establish hardship. \nSee Hollandale Apts. & Health Club v. Bonesteel, 173 A.D.3d 55, 59\u201360 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019); Matter \nof LeGrand v. Goord, 272 A.D.2d 650, 650 (3d Dep\u2019t 2000). \nHere, Petitioner fails the hardship prong because the harms alleged\u2014that the investigation \nwill be improperly conducted and prejudice Petitioner in a possible future criminal proceeding\u2014\nare uncertain. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 56\u201358, 64\u201368; see Matter of New York Blue Line Council, Inc., 86 A.D.3d at \n760 (challenge to revision of Adirondack Park Agency regulations was not ripe for review based \non alleged future harms that may never occur). The investigation authorized by EO 64 is only \nweeks old. See Executive Order No. 64. At this stage, the results of that investigation, whether \nthere will be a presentation to the grand jury, or whether any grand jury will vote to indict Petitioner \nare not known. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir. \n1986) (\u201c[b]efore disqualification can even be contemplated . . . the grand jury must indict; the \ngovernment must go forward with the prosecution of the indictment\u201d); In re Grand Jury \nProceedings, 700 F.Supp. 626, 631 (Dist. P.R. 1988) (\u201cwhether a prosecutor who appears before \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n28 of 52\n\n--- Page 29 ---\n14 \n \na grand jury labors under a conflict of interest or whether his conduct oversteps the bounds of \npropriety should be determined after indictment, not by mere conjecture or speculation\u201d); see also \nIn re Grand Jury Investigation, 696 F.2d 449, 451 (6th Cir. 1982) (expressing skepticism about \nwhether disqualification of a special prosecutor is appropriate at the pre-indictment, investigatory \nstage and recognizing that early disqualification has been permitted in only a limited number of \nextreme circumstances with \u201cserious abuses\u201d).  \nThe myriad unknowns inherent in Petitioner\u2019s claim render any harm far too remote and \ncontingent to sufficiently establish that he has suffered the requisite hardship for ripeness. See \nMatter of Paychex, Inc. v. Dep\u2019t of Taxation & Fin., 251 A.D.3d 1369, 1372 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) \n(petitioner\u2019s claim was not ripe for review because feared administrative action had not yet been \ninitiated); Matter of Buenos Hill, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Planning Bd., 240 A.D.3d 990, 993 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2025) (petitioner\u2019s claim was not ripe for review because harm alleged was \u201ca future harm \nthat may never come to pass\u201d); Matter of Acevedo v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Motor Vehs., 132 \nA.D.3d 112, 116\u201317 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016), aff\u2019d 29 N.Y.3d 202 (2017) (petitioner\u2019s claim was not ripe \nfor review because harms alleged were \u201ccontingent upon events which may not come to pass\u201d). \nWhile Petitioner relies on the AG\u2019s remarks in a single social media post as proof that the various \nills he fears will come to pass, such speculative and conclusory claims of harm\u2014premised entirely \non his own mischaracterization of the AG\u2019s statements\u2014are insufficient for hardship. Pet. \u00b6 66; \nsee Allard v. Allard, 145 A.D.3d 1254, 1255\u201356 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (petitioner\u2019s speculative claims \nof future harms were insufficient to establish that matter was ripe for judicial review); Matter of \nWal-Mart Stores v. Campbell, 238 A.D.2d 831, 832\u201333 (3d Dep\u2019t 1997) (same). \nC. \nPetitioner lacks standing. \nIt is axiomatic that \u201ca litigant must establish its standing in order to seek judicial review.\u201d \nSoc\u2019y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 769 (1991); see Matter of 61 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n29 of 52\n\n--- Page 30 ---\n15 \n \nCrown St., LLC v. New York State Off. of Parks, Recreation & Historic Preserv., 207 A.D.3d 837, \n839 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022). \u201cStanding is a threshold determination, resting in part on policy \nconsiderations, that a person should be allowed access to the courts to adjudicate the merits of a \nparticular dispute that satisfied the other justiciability criteria.\u201d Matter of Assoc. for a Better Long \nIsland, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, 23 N.Y.3d 1, 6 (2014); see Soc\u2019y of Plastics \nIndus., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d at 769. The burden to prove standing is on the party seeking review. See \nMatter of Curry v. New York State Educ. Dep\u2019t, 13 A.D.3d 1327, 1329 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018); Citizens \nfor St. Patrick\u2019s v. City of Watervliet City Council, 126 A.D.3d 1159, 1160 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015). To \nestablish standing, \u201c[a] petitioner challenging government agency action pursuant to an article 78 \npetition has the burden of demonstrating an injury in fact and that the alleged injury falls within \nthe zone of interests or concerns sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision \nunder which the government has acted . . . .\u201d Matter of Stevens v. New York State Div. of Criminal \nJustice Servs., 40 N.Y.3d 505, 515 (2003) (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted); see \nMatter of Long Is. Pure Water, Ltd. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Health, 209 A.D.3d 1128, 1129 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2022).  \nHere, Petitioner fails to meet the burden to establish either requirement for standing. See \nPet. \u00b6\u00b6 64\u201368; see Matter of Whitfield v. New York State Off. of Professional Med. Conduct, 237 \nA.D.3d 1393, 1394\u201395 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (affirming motion court determination that granted motion \nto dismiss article 78 petition challenging agency action related to its handling of investigation into \npetitioner\u2019s complaints of physician misconduct because petitioner failed to establish that his \nalleged injury was attributable to agency action); Matter of Grigger v. Goord, 27 A.D.3d 803, 803\u2013\n04 (3d Dep\u2019t 2006) (affirming motion court determination that granted motion to dismiss article \n78 petition challenging agency action related to denial of visitation privileges for petitioner\u2019s \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n30 of 52\n\n--- Page 31 ---\n16 \n \nmother because petitioner failed to establish that agency determination would impact his specific \nvisitation privileges); see also Matter of Parkland Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t \nof Health, 261 A.D.2d 770, 772 (3d Dep\u2019t 1999) (reversing motion court determination that denied \nmotion to dismiss article 78 petition challenging agency action related to issuance of ambulance \nservice certificates because petitioner\u2019s conclusory allegations of harm were insufficient to meet \nits burden to establish standing). \n1. \nPetitioner did not suffer any injury-in-fact. \n\u201cThe injury-in-fact requirement necessitates a showing that the party has an actual legal \nstake in the matter being adjudicated and has suffered a cognizable harm that is not tenuous, \nephemeral, or conjectural but is sufficiently concrete and particularized to warrant judicial \nintervention.\u201d Matter of Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Daniels, 33 N.Y.3d 44, 50 (2019); see \nMatter of Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, 206 A.D.3d. \n1332, 1333\u201334 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (no injury-in-fact for standing because petitioner \u201cfailed to \ndemonstrate how the absence of these exemptions . . . is causing or is reasonably likely to cause \nany harm to petitioner\u201d).  \nPetitioner here alleges that his conduct falls within the scope of the investigation authorized \nby EO 64 (Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 56, 64) and that there is a \u201csubstantial risk\u201d that the investigation will be \n\u201cinfluenced by prejudgment.\u201d Pet. \u00b6 66. However, this is not an injury-in-fact because it is wholly \nspeculative as it presumes presently unknown information about how the investigation will be \nconducted. See Matter of Gronbach v. New York State Educ. Dep\u2019t, 221 A.D.3d 1385, 1388 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2023) (no injury-in-fact from administrative action that transferred certain hearings to a \ndifferent administrative agency because alleged resultant diminution in hearing officer caseload \nassumed that, if hearings were spread to additional hearing officers, caseload of existing hearing \nofficer would be diminished); Matter of Brennan Ctr. for Justice at NYU Sch. of Law, 159 A.D.3d \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n31 of 52\n\n--- Page 32 ---\n17 \n \nat 1301 (no injury-in-fact from administrative action refusing to rescind agency opinion because \nalleged resultant increase in election contributions away from legislators and candidates for \npolitical office assumed that, if opinion were rescinded, agency would adopt position advanced by \nlegislators and candidates for political office); Argyle Farm & Props., LLC v. Watershed Agric. \nCouncil of the N.Y. City Watersheds, Inc., 135 A.D.3d 1262, 1266 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (no injury-in-\nfact from administrative action adopting rules for siting septic systems in watershed because \nalleged limitation on landowner\u2019s ability to develop property assumed that, if landowner applied \nfor land use approvals, application would be denied).  \nThough Petitioner points to a single post made by the AG on social media as proof of \nalleged harm, such statement does not establish the harms feared by Petitioner absent his own \nconclusory characterization. See Pet. \u00b6 66; see Matter of 292 Bedford, LLC v. New York, 249 \nA.D.3d 874, 876 (2d Dep\u2019t 2026) (petitioner\u2019s conclusory claims of harm were insufficient to \nestablish requisite injury for standing); Matter of Cnty. of Orange v. City of New York, 232 A.D.3d \n785, 786\u201387 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) (same); Matter of Park v. Town of New Windsor Zoning Bd. of \nAppeals, 137 A.D.3d 924, 926 (2d Dep\u2019t 2016) (same). Even if Petitioner\u2019s characterization of the \nAG\u2019s remarks were accurate, which it is not, the alleged harm flowing to Petitioner from such \nremarks\u2014that he will be unfairly implicated in the investigation and prejudiced in a possible future \ncriminal proceeding\u2014rests on assumptions that are too speculative to establish injury-in-fact. \nPetitioner\u2019s alleged harm assumes that, despite all constitutional, statutory, and other guardrails on \nher authority, the AG will not properly discharge the obligations of her office or the task entrusted \nto her by the Governor. See Executive Order No. 64 (requiring a \u201cfull, reasoned, and independent \ninvestigation\u201d). See generally Const. art. 13, \u00a7 1 (oath of office for all public officers requiring \npublic officers to swear to \u201cfaithfully discharge the duties of the office\u201d); Exec. Law \u00a7 63 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n32 of 52\n\n--- Page 33 ---\n18 \n \n(providing general duties of the attorney general); People v. Santorelli, 95 N.Y.2d 412, 421 (2000) \n(acknowledging that prosecutors have \u201cspecial responsibilities\u2014constitutional, statutory, ethical, \npersonal\u2014to safeguard the integrity of criminal process\u201d). And, Petitioner\u2019s alleged injury \nassumes that the results of the investigation will warrant presentation to a grand jury and that the \ngrand jury will vote to indict Petitioner. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 64\u201367.  \nPetitioner cannot rely on these speculative assumptions about the results of the \ninvestigation to establish an injury-in-fact because they are unknown future events that may never \noccur. See Matter of New York State Bd. of Regents v. State Univ. of N.Y., 178 A.D.3d 11, 17 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2019) (parents and teachers did not suffer injury-in-fact from promulgation of new \nregulations for teacher licensure because \u201cwhether teachers licensed under the regulations will \never teach in these petitioners\u2019 schools is a matter of conjecture and speculation\u201d (quotation marks \nomitted)); Matter of Schulz, 133 A.D.3d at 947 (citizens did not suffer injury-in-fact from certain \nelected officials participating in a future constitutional convention because alleged conflict of \ninterest arising from such participation \u201cis predicated upon a series of events that may not come to \npass\u201d); see also New York State Ass\u2019n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Novello, 2 N.Y.3d 207, 211 (2004) \n(\u201cspeculation about the future course [government action] might take cannot, under our precedents, \nsupply the missing ingredient of in-fact injury\u201d).  \nAccordingly, Petitioner lacks standing because he has not suffered any non-speculative \ninjury-in-fact. Compare Matter of Seneca Lake Guardian v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. \nConserv., 229 A.D.3d 987, 989\u201390 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) (finding standing based on non-speculative \nclaims that permitted activity would allow contaminants to enter waterbody since member \nobtained drinking water from waterbody and member\u2019s wells did not filter for contaminant), with \nMatter of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Aubertine, 119 A.D.3d 1202, 1203 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014) \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n33 of 52\n\n--- Page 34 ---\n19 \n \n(finding no standing based on speculative claims of increased health risks from consuming foie \ngras because there was no demonstrable link between feared health effects and consumption of \nfoie gras). \n2. \nAny injury-in-fact is not within the relevant zone of interests. \nThe zone of interests requirement mandates that \u201ca party must show that the in-fact injury \nof which it complains (its aggrievement, or the adverse effect upon it) falls within the zone of \ninterests or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which \nthe agency has acted.\u201d Soc\u2019y of Plastics Indus., Inc., 77 N.Y.2d at 773. This requirement ties the \n\u201cin-fact injury asserted to the governmental act challenged\u201d and \u201ccircumscribes the universe of \npersons who may challenge administrative action.\u201d Id. This requisite connection \u201cassures that \ngroups whose interests are only marginally related to, or even inconsistent with, the purpose of the \nstatute cannot use the courts to further their own purposes at the expense of the statutory purposes.\u201d \nId. at 774; see Matter of Lawyers for Children v. New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs., \n___ N.Y.3d ___, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 03218 (May 21, 2026) (legal services organizations that \nrepresent children in voluntary foster care proceedings had standing to challenge changes to \nvoluntary foster care program because they were \u201cbest situated\u2019 to represent children\u2019s interests \nand children likely could not challenge action without counsel\u2019s involvement). \nHere, the Governor acted to appoint the AG as special prosecutor pursuant to Executive \nLaw \u00a7 63(2). Executive Order No. 64. This statutory subdivision serves a separation of powers \nfunction through which the Legislature delineates various law enforcement functions between the \nGovernor, the AG, and local prosecutors. Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223; see People v. \nViviani, 36 N.Y.3d 564, 577 (2021) (noting that the New York State Constitution \u201cdoes not assign \nprosecutorial authority to any constitutional officer, leaving that allocation as a matter for the \nLegislature\u201d). Given its purpose and function, the zone of interests served by Executive Law \u00a7 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n34 of 52\n\n--- Page 35 ---\n20 \n \n63(2) is to preserve the structure of the executive branch and apportion law enforcement functions \nwithin that branch, which do not encompass the sort of individualized injury to a person that \nbelieves they may someday face criminal prosecution, like the injury alleged by Petitioner here. \nSee People v. Abelove, 179 A.D.3d at 45 (Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) functions as a delegation of \npower from the Legislature to the Governor and how the Governor may utilize that statutory grant \nof authority to authorize the AG to conduct criminal prosecutions); Matter of Donnaruma v. \nCarter, 41 Misc. 3d 195, 214 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013) (Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) functions to \nmake district attorneys accountable to the Governor); see also Mulroy v. Carey, 43 N.Y.2d 819, \n820 (1977) (reserving possibility that, if exercise of Governor\u2019s superseder authority were subject \nto judicial review, it would be in action \u201cbrought or defended by the county or the elected District \nAttorney involved\u201d).  \nIn the absence of any injury within the zone of interests of Executive Law \u00a7 63(2), \nPetitioner fails to establish standing. See Matter of Park Manor Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., \nLLC v. Shah, 129 A.D.3d 1276, 1278\u201379 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (affirming motion court determination \nthat dismissed challenge to Medicaid reimbursement because petitioner failed to establish that \nalleged injury to former owner/operator was within zone of interests); Lancaster Dev., Inc. v. \nMcDonald, 112 A.D.3d 1260, 1262 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) (affirming motion court determination that \ndismissed challenge to bid determination for lack of standing because petitioner failed to establish \nthat alleged injury was within zone of interests of competitive bidding statute). \nII. \nPETITIONER\u2019S CLAIMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT \nA. \nPetitioner\u2019s claims are procedurally improper. \nCounty Law \u00a7 701(6) sets forth a specific process that applies to disqualification of the AG \n\u201cin any circumstance where the attorney general acts in place of a district attorney . . . .\u201d County \nLaw \u00a7 701(6)(a). Specifically, it states: \u201c[w]henever the attorney general . . . is disqualified from \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n35 of 52\n\n--- Page 36 ---\n21 \n \nacting in a particular matter to discharge their duties at a term of any court, a superior criminal \ncourt in the county wherein the action is triable may upon articulable reasons set forth by the \nattorney general\u201d appoint another attorney to act in her place. County Law \u00a7 701(6)(b). This \nprocess applies, \u201c[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary . . . .\u201d  County Law \n\u00a7 701(6)(b). \nBy its plain language, this statutory provision prescribes a specific process for \ndisqualification of the AG that: (1) must be initiated by the AG; (2) done before a superior criminal \ncourt; and (3) in the county where the criminal action is triable. See generally Matter of Town of \nSouthampton v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conservation, 39 N.Y. 3d 201, 209 (2023) \n(\u201c[i]nasmuch as the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in \nany case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning \nthereof\u201d); Matter of Amorosi v. South Colonie Ind. Cent. Sch. Dist., 9 N.Y.3d 367, 372\u201373 (2007) \n(\u201cwhere the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court should construe it so as to give \neffect to the plain meaning of the words used\u201d). The statute forecloses other statutory processes to \ndisqualify the AG when she is acting in place of a district attorney. See, e.g., Eaton v. New York \nCity Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 56 N.Y.2d 340, 345 (\u201c[w]here as here, the statute describes the \nparticular situations to which it is to apply an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is \nomitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded\u201d (quotation marks and citation \nomitted)); Matter of Lawrence Teachers\u2019 Assn., NYSUT, AFT, NEA, AFL-CIO v. New York State \nPub. Empl. Relations Bd., 152 A.D.3d 171, 174 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) (\u201cnotwithstanding any other \nprovision of law . . . is a verbal formulation frequently employed for legislative directives intended \nto preempt any other potentially conflicting statute, wherever found in the state\u2019s laws\u201d). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n36 of 52\n\n--- Page 37 ---\n22 \n \nIn contravention of this statutorily enumerated process here, this proceeding was not \ninitiated by the AG, but rather was initiated by an individual that presumes he may someday be a \ncriminal defendant. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 33\u201334, 56. Further, it is a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 \ninstead of an application made in the criminal court, if this investigation ever ripens into a \nprosecution. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 1, 36\u201355, 60\u201363, 69\u201381. Additionally, this proceeding was commenced in \nAlbany County, rather than the county where the criminal proceeding is triable, as is required by \nstatute. Pet. \u00b6 15; see Criminal Procedure Law \u00a7 20.40 (providing rules for where criminal \nproceeding must be tried). Thus, the process Petitioner attempts to utilize here is inconsistent with \nrequirements of County Law \u00a7 701(6). See Nitkewich v. Lincoln Life & Annuity Co. of N.Y., 40 \nN.Y.3d 349, 357\u201358 (2023) (rejecting statutory construction that was \u201cinconsistent with its plain \nlanguage\u201d); Matter of Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. State Of N.Y. Pub. Serv. Commission, \n242 A.D.3d 33, 38 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (same); Matter of Schwabler v. DiNapoli, 194 A.D.3d 1235, \n1237 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) (same). Accordingly, the Verified Petition must be denied. See Town of \nColonie v. City of New York, 237 A.D.3d 1398, 1401\u201302 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (motion court properly \ndenied request to stay related proceeding because requested stay was for proceeding pending in a \ndifferent court); Matter of Mulhern v. Touro Coll., 226 A.D.3d 788, 789 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) (motion \ncourt properly denied motion because it was not correct procedural vehicle for the relief sought). \nB. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie. \nEven if an article 78 proceeding were the proper procedural vehicle for Petitioner\u2019s claims, \n\u201c[t]he extraordinary remedy of prohibition is available only where a judicial or quasi-judicial body \nacts or threatens to act \u2018without or in excess of its jurisdiction and then only when the clear legal \nright to relief appears and, in the court\u2019s discretion the remedy is warranted.\u2019\u201d Matter of Allen B. \nv. Sproat, 23 N.Y.3d 364, 375\u201376 (2014) (quoting Matter of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 51). Here, \nPetitioner\u2019s request for a writ of prohibition to void EO 64 and disqualify the AG from serving as \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n37 of 52\n\n--- Page 38 ---\n23 \n \nspecial prosecutor must be denied because the writ of prohibition does not lie against these \nexecutive actions. See Matter of Raiser & Kenniff, P.C. v. Nassau Cnty. Sheriff\u2019s Dep\u2019t, 149 \nA.D.3d 1084, 1085 (2d Dep\u2019t 2017) (writ of prohibition did not lie to prohibit recording of phone \ncalls made by individuals in custody in county jail because petitioners \u201cfailed to demonstrate that \nthe conduct sought to be prohibited pertained solely to quasi-judicial action, as opposed to an \ninvestigative function performed in an executive capacity\u201d); New York State Police Investigators \nAssn., Local 4 IUPA, AFL-CIO v. State of New York, 71 Misc. 3d 1007, 1022 (Sup. Ct. Albany \nCnty. 2021) (writ of prohibition did not lie to prohibit issuance of administrative subpoenas \nbecause issuance of subpoenas was \u201cpurely investigative in nature and are not issued in a judicial \nor quasi-judicial capacity\u201d). Petitioner\u2019s request must also be denied because he has not established \nany clear legal right to relief. See Matter of New York State Health Facilities Assn., Inc. v. Sheehan, \n100 A.D.3d 1086, 1088 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) (writ of prohibition did not lie because petitioner failed \nto establish \u201cclear legal right to relief\u201d); Matter of Figgins v. Hendricks, 28 A.D.3d 1178, 1179 \n(4th Dep\u2019t 2006) (same); Matter of Smith v. Gribetz, 211 A.D.2d 605, 605 (2d Dep\u2019t 1995) (same). \n1. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie against executive action. \nIt is well settled that a writ of prohibition \u201cmay not issue against legislative, executive, or \nministerial action . . . .\u201d Matter of Morgenthau v. Erlbaum, 59 N.Y.2d 143, 147 (1983); see Matter \nof Cnty. of Suffolk v. Kennedy, 211 A.D.3d 937, 938 (2d Dep\u2019t 2022). Here, the Governor\u2019s \nappointment of the AG as special prosecutor is an executive action, undertaken pursuant to the \nsuperseder authority conferred on the Governor by virtue of her constitutional executive powers \nenumerated in article IV, \u00a7 3 of the New York State Constitution, as well the powers conferred on \nher by the Legislature in Executive Law \u00a7 63(2). See Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d at 515 (when Governor \nexercises her superseder authority to appoint a special prosecutor under Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) \nthis process is done \u201cwithin the executive branch\u201d); Matter of Mulroy, 58 A.D.2d at 210 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n38 of 52\n\n--- Page 39 ---\n24 \n \n(Governor\u2019s authority to supersede district attorney pursuant to Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) was a \nfunction of her executive powers); see also Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1978) (\u201cexecutive \npower of the State, vested in the Governor, is broad\u201d). Given the purely executive nature of this \naction, the writ of prohibition does not lie to prohibit the Governor from exercising her superseder \nauthority to appoint the AG as a special prosecutor. See Matter of League of Women Voters of N.Y. \nState v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 206 A.D.3d 1227, 1231 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (\u201cwrit of \nprohibition . . . is unavailable because respondent was not acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial \ncapacity\u201d); see also Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d at 13 (writ of prohibition \u201cmust be \ndirected at some inferior judicial tribunal or officer and lies to prevent or control judicial or quasi-\njudicial action only, as distinguished from . . . executive . . . action\u201d). \nLikewise, the writ of prohibition also does not lie to prohibit the AG from exercising the \nauthority granted to her by the Governor because the AG\u2019s exercise of her authority is similarly \nan executive action. See Matter of McGinley v. Hynes, 51 N.Y.2d 116, 123\u201325 (1980) (writ of \nprohibition did not lie to prohibit special prosecutor from presenting additional evidence to a grand \njury because special prosecutor\u2019s actions were investigative activities done as part of prosecutor\u2019s \nexecutive functions); State of New York v. Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d 47, 58 (2d Dep\u2019t 1983) (writ of \nprohibition did not lie to prohibit investigative actions undertaken by AG pursuant to her authority \nunder the Executive Law). The authority granted to the AG by Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) is executive \nlaw enforcement authority. See Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223, 225; Matter of Additional \nJan. 1979 Grand Jury of Albany Supreme Ct., 50 N.Y.2d at 18\u201319. Further, the authority granted \nto the AG by EO 64 is to \u201cinvestigate . . . and, if warranted, to prosecute offenses\u201d\u2014which are \nexecutive functions not subject to the writ of prohibition. Executive Order No. 64; see Matter of \nDoe v. Cuomo, 71 A.D.3d 889, 889 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) (writ of prohibition did not lie to prohibit AG \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n39 of 52\n\n--- Page 40 ---\n25 \n \nfrom pursuing investigation into alleged violation of immunity agreement because the AG \u201cis \nperforming a purely investigative function and, therefore, is acting in an executive rather than a \nquasi-judicial capacity\u201d); Abelove v. Cuomo, 57 Misc. 3d at 677 (writ of prohibition did not lie to \nprevent AG from pursuing investigation as authorized by Governor in exercise of superseder \nauthority \u201cbecause the AG is performing a purely investigative function and, therefore, acting in \nan executive rather than a quasi-judicial capacity\u201d).  \nAlthough EO 64 contemplates a potential presentation to the grand jury, a grand jury serves \nan executive investigatory function that does not ripen into a judicial function until a specific \nprosecution is contemplated. See Matter of McGinley, 51 N.Y.2d at 123\u201325 (discussing distinction \nbetween executive, investigative functions of public prosecutor and quasi-judicial functions of \npublic prosecutor); see also Matter of Suffolk Cnty. Legislature v. Mullen, 211 A.D.2d 736, 737 \n(2d Dep\u2019t 1995) (\u201cfunctions of a public prosecutor . . . are to be regarded as executive in nature \nwhen, as here, a purely investigative function is involved, and consequently, such acts cannot \nlegitimately be the object of a proceeding in the nature of a writ or prohibition\u201d) \nPetitioner\u2019s reliance on Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 55 (1983), as \nestablishing the availability of a writ of prohibition in the instant matter is misplaced. See Pet. \n\u00b6\u00b6 39, 42\u201343. In Matter of Schumer, the court invalidated a special prosecutorial appointment made \nby a district attorney that installed an unelected law school professor as special prosecutor and \ndelegated to him \u201cextensive discretionary power\u201d to investigate and prosecute an elected federal \nofficial. 60 N.Y.2d at 52. The court found that the statute the district attorney acted under\u2014County \nLaw \u00a7 930, which authorizes the district attorney to appoint assistant district attorneys\u2014did not \nauthorize the appointment of special prosecutor because the accompanying delegation of \nresponsibilities was so broad that it effectively and impermissibly \u201ctransferr[ed] the fundamental \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n40 of 52\n\n--- Page 41 ---\n26 \n \nresponsibilities of the office\u201d to an unelected official. Id. at 53. By contrast to Petitioner\u2019s claims \nhere, which challenge the substantive merits of the special prosecutorial appointment and disclaim \nany challenge to the Governor\u2019s appointment authority, the specific issue resolved in Matter of \nSchumer was whether the district attorney had the authority to appoint the special prosecutor. See \nid. Although the court in Matter of Schumer also went on to opine as to whether the district attorney \nshould be disqualified based on public statements she made regarding the identified target of the \nprosecution, the court ruled that the disqualification request was premature because, like here, \ninformation about how the investigation might play out was unknown. See id. at 55\u201356.  \n2. \nThe writ of prohibition does not lie because Petitioner has no clear legal \nright to relief.  \n \n \u201cBecause of its extraordinary nature, prohibition is available only where there is a clear \nlegal right . . . .\u201d  Matter of Holtzman v. Goldman, 71 N.Y.2d 564, 569 (1988). The petitioner bears \nthe burden to make such showing. Pirro v. Angiolillo, 89 N.Y.2d 351, 356 (1996) (in determining \nwhether the writ of prohibition lies, \u201cthe question of whether petitioner has established a clear legal \nright to that relief is critical\u201d); see Matter of Town of Huntington v. New York State Div. of Human \nRights, 82 N.Y.2d 783, 785 (1993) (writ of prohibition did not lie because petitioner \u201cfailed to \nestablish a clear legal right\u201d to prevent state agency from considering individual compliant of racial \ndiscrimination). \u201cTo demonstrate a clear legal right to the extraordinary writ of prohibition, a \npetitioner is required to show that the challenged action was \u2018in reality so serious an excess of \npower incontrovertibly justifying and requiring summary correction.\u2019\u201d  Carter, 25 N.Y.3d at 1013 \n(quoting La Rocca v. Lane, 37 N.Y.2d 575, 580 (1975)). Generally, this requires a showing that \nthe prohibition sought and the error complained of \u201cimplicate the legality of the entire proceeding.\u201d  \nDoe v. Axelrod, 71 N.Y.2d 484, 490 (1988); see Matter of Hoovler v. Vazquez-Doles, 237 A.D.3d \n936, 937 (2d Dep\u2019t 2025) (writ of prohibition lied to prohibit judge from compelling disclosure of \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n41 of 52\n\n--- Page 42 ---\n27 \n \ngrand jury minutes because judge lacked statutory authority to effectuate release of minutes); \nMatter of Canning v. Revoir, 220 A.D.3d 16, 19\u201320 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (writ of prohibition available \nto prohibit judge from enforcing subpoena requiring journalist to testify at criminal trial because \njournalist\u2019s testimony was privileged under civil rights law). \nHere, Petitioner has no clear legal right to void EO 64 and disqualify the AG from serving \nas special prosecutor. See Rush v. Mordue, 68 N.Y.2d 348, 353 (1986) (\u201cprohibition will not lie as \na means of seeking collateral review of mere trial errors of substantive law or procedure, however \negregious the error may be, and however cleverly the error may be characterized by counsel as an \nexcess of jurisdiction or power\u201d). Though Petitioner seems to allege that he has a clear legal right \nto relief because the AG is biased against him, the AG\u2019s expressions of empathy on social media \ndo not indicate bias or that she prejudged the investigation. See People v. National Rifle Assn. of \nAm., Inc., 223 A.D.3d 84, 90\u201391 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) (affirming dismissal of selective prosecution \ncounterclaim alleging the AG \u201cdisplayed animus\u201d towards defendant organization based on \ncomments made while campaigning); Matter of People v. Trump Org., Inc., 205 A.D.3d 625, 626\u2013\n27 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) (affirming motion court determination denying motion to quash subpoena \nbased on theory of selective prosecution where subject of subpoena challenged subpoena based on \nthe AG\u2019s \u201cpolitical campaign and other public statements\u201d); People v. Walton, 214 A.D.2d 805, \n808 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) (rejecting criminal defendant\u2019s claims that prosecutor\u2019s statements to the \npress amounted to prosecutorial misconduct or selective prosecution). Rather, the role of the \nprosecutor is as \u201cadvocate and public officer, charged with the duty not only to secure indictments \nbut also to see that justice is done . . . .\u201d  People v. Lancaster, 69 N.Y.2d 20, 26 (1986); see People \nv. Miller, 110 A.D.3d 1150, 1151 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013); People v. Tatro, 53 A.D.3d 781, 783\u201384 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2008). The AG\u2019s singular statement expressing empathy for a person who drew national \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n42 of 52\n\n--- Page 43 ---\n28 \n \nattention after reporting that she was the victim of a sexual assault falls squarely within that role. \nSee People v. Rivera, 206 A.D.3d 1356, 1359\u201360 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (defendant not deprived of right \nto fair trial when, during trial, prosecutor referred to rape victim as a \u201cvictim\u201d and a \u201csurvivor\u201d \nand \u201cexpress[ed] his personal opinion of the credibility of witnesses\u201d).  \nThus, Petitioner fails to establish any clear legal right to the relief sought and, therefore, \nthe writ of prohibition does not lie. See Matter of Trump v. Merchan, 230 A.D.3d 413, 414 (1st \nDep\u2019t 2024); Matter of Madison Sq. Garden Ent. Corp. v. New York State Liq. Auth., 221 A.D.3d \n536, 537\u201338 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023); Matter of Henry v. Fandrich, 159 A.D.3d 1409, 1410 (4th Dep\u2019t \n2018). \nC. \nThe writ of prohibition should not be issued as a matter of discretion. \n1. \nIssuance of a writ of prohibition is not warranted. \nWhen the writ of prohibition lies, \u201c[t]he determination of whether to issue a writ of \nprohibition is committed to the sound discretion of the reviewing court.\u201d Matter of Peterec-Tolino \nv. Schick, 236 A.D.3d 1130, 1131 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025); see Matter of HCI Distrib., Inc. v. New York \nState Police, Troop B Commander, 110 A.D.3d 1297, 1298 (3d Dep\u2019t 2013) (where writ of \nprohibition lies, \u201cthe court has discretion to deny the issuance of a writ of prohibition\u201d). A court \nexercising such discretion must consider: \u201cthe gravity of the harm caused by the excess of power, \nthe availability or unavailability of an adequate remedy on appeal or at law or in equity and the \nremedial effectiveness of prohibition if such an adequate remedy does not exist.\u201d Matter of Soares \nv. Herrick, 20 N.Y.3d 139, 145 (2012); see La Rocca, 37 N.Y.2d at 579\u201380; Matter of Clegg v. \nRounds, 222 A.D.3d 112, 119 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023). Petitioner fails to meaningfully address any of \nthese factors and, in any event, they are not present here. Pet. \u00b6 51; see Matter of Raheem v. New \nYork State Bd. of Parole, 66 A.D.3d 1270, 1272\u201373 (3d Dep\u2019t 2009) (issuance of writ of \nprohibition was not warranted because respondent had authority to undertake action petitioner \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n43 of 52\n\n--- Page 44 ---\n29 \n \nsought to prohibit and petitioner otherwise had another adequate legal remedy); Matter of Pryor \nv. Greenberg, 247 A.D.2d 711, 712 (3d Dep\u2019t 1998) (same). \nFirst, issuance of a writ of prohibition is not warranted because the gravity of any harm to \nPetitioner from the AG\u2019s statement is negligible. See Matter of Trump v. Engoron, 222 A.D.3d \n505, 506 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) (issuance of writ of prohibition not warranted because, among other \nthings, \u201cthe gravity of potential harm is small\u201d); Matter of Schmitt v. Skovira, 53 A.D.3d 918, 922 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2008) (same). Although Petitioner claims that he will be gravely harmed if the AG does \nnot properly discharge her obligations as special prosecutor, such claim is wholly speculative at \nthis nascent stage of the investigation and implausible in light of the empathetic, but otherwise \ninnocuous nature of the AG\u2019s social media remarks. See Matter of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 56 \n(declining to reach the merits of claim alleging district attorney should be disqualified from \nprosecuting petitioner based on public comments made by district attorney because such claim was \n\u201cpremature\u201d when made in anticipation of investigation and prosecution); see also Matter of \nColumbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 (Czajka), 118 A.D.3d 1081, 1083 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2014) (finding no appearance of impropriety to warrant disqualification of district \nattorney because claims \u201cthat the underlying investigation may have been vindictively provoked\u201d \nwere merely \u201cspeculative suggestions . . . unsupported by record evidence\u201d).  \nSecond, issuance of a writ of prohibition is not warranted because there is an adequate \nremedy available to Petitioner where, if he is ever indicted by a grand jury, he can make pre-trial \nmotions on the benefit of a full record and pursue his claims on direct appeal. See Matter of Snyder \nv. Farrell, 242 A.D.3d 1480, 1481\u201382 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (writ of prohibition would not issue to \nprohibit enforcement of prior court order authorizing prosecutor to re-present charges to a new \ngrand jury because petitioner could raise issues with order on direct appeal); Matter of Rodriguez \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n44 of 52\n\n--- Page 45 ---\n30 \n \nv. Hobbs, 220 A.D.3d 1145, 1146\u201347 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (writ of prohibition would not issue to \nprevent prosecution based on alleged defects in search warrant because motion to suppress \nprovided adequate remedy for petitioner to raise his claims); Matter of Maluf v. Vance, 116 A.D.3d \n542, 542\u201343 (1st Dep\u2019t 2014) (writ of prohibition would not issue to prevent prosecution based on \nalleged conflict with principles of international comity because pre-trial motions and appeal \nprovided adequate alternative remedy).  \nIndeed, under substantially similar circumstances, the court in Abelove v. Cuomo, \ndismissed a writ of prohibition that sought to disqualify the AG from acting as special prosecutor \nin an Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) appointment because there was \u201can alternative remedy by challenging \nthe AG\u2019s qualification to act before the presiding court in the event criminal charges are levied.\u201d \n57 Misc. 3d at 677 (emphasis added); see also Wolowitz, 96 A.D.2d at 58 (writ of prohibition did \nnot lie to prevent investigation by attorney general and, even if it did, \u201c[r]espondent\u2019s remedy . . . \nwould be, and is, to simply defend on the merits and, if necessary, by way of appeal\u201d). Resolution \nof Petitioner\u2019s claims in the proper procedural context of an actual criminal proceeding would \nallow for resolution of Petitioner\u2019s claims on a full record that would illuminate whether the \nvarious hypothetical ills he now fears ever actualize. See Matter of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 56 \n(declining to rule on substantive merits of request to disqualify district attorney because request \nmade at outset of investigation was \u201cpremature\u201d and later resolution would allow for review based \non a full record).  \nNotably, Petitioner does not dispute the adequacy or availability of these alternative \nremedies. Pet. \u00b6 51. To the extent that Petitioner seems to take issue with the alternative remedies \nbecause they will delay resolution of his claims, this is insufficient to warrant use of such an \nextraordinary remedy as the writ of prohibition. See Rush, 68 N.Y.2d at 354 (\u201cthe ordeal of a \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n45 of 52\n\n--- Page 46 ---\n31 \n \ncriminal trial and the possibility of conviction, by themselves, are insufficiently harmful to warrant \nuse of the writ\u201d); La Rocca, 37 N.Y.2d at 579 (\u201c[t]he orderly administration of justice requires that \ncorrection of litigation errors merely be left to the ordinary channels of appeal or review\u201d). \n2. \nDisqualification is not warranted. \nWhere writ of prohibition is sought to disqualify a judicial or quasi-judicial appointment \nof a special prosecutor, a reviewing court \u201cshould remove a public prosecutor only to protect a \ndefendant from actual prejudice arising from a demonstrated conflict of interest or a substantial \nrisk of an abuse of confidence.\u201d  Matter of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 55. Under such circumstances, \n\u201cthe appearance of impropriety, standing alone, might not be grounds for disqualification.\u201d  Id. To \nestablish disqualification under this standard, \u201c[t]he objector should demonstrate actual prejudice \nor so substantial a risk thereof as could not be ignored.\u201d  Id.; see People v. Hodgins, 202 A.D.3d \n1377, 1382\u201383 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (disqualification of prosecutor not warranted because there was \nno actual prejudice to defendant based on \u201cprior acquaintance\u201d between prosecutor and defendant); \nPeople v. Sloley, 179 A.D.3d 1308, 1312\u201313 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) (disqualification of prosecutor not \nwarranted because, even if there was a conflict of interest, criminal defendant failed to show any \nactual prejudice). \n Though this standard is relied on heavily by Petitioner, it is inapplicable to disqualify a \nspecial prosecutor appointed by the Governor because it applies when the special prosecutorial \nappointment is a judicial or quasi-judicial appointment, rather than an executive one. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 39\u2013\n41, 59; see, e.g., Matter of Working Families Party v. Fisher, 23 N.Y.3d 539, 546 (2014) (applied \nto judicial appointment of a special prosecutor); People v. Adams, 20 N.Y.3d 608, 612 (2013) \n(applied to judicial appointment of a special prosecutor); People v. Shinkle, 51 N.Y.2d 417, 420 \n(1980) (applied to judicial appointment of a special prosecutor); see also Matter of Schumer, 60 \nN.Y.2d at 55 (articulating standard in the context of quasi-judicial appointment of a special \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n46 of 52\n\n--- Page 47 ---\n32 \n \nprosecutor but declining to consider disqualification at early stage of proceeding). Courts in this \nstate have long recognized a distinction between special prosecutorial appointments that are \nexecutive in nature and those that are judicial or quasi-judicial. See People v. Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d \n564, 579 (2021) (discussing distinctions between statutes that permit for special prosecutorial \nappointments and noting distinctions between those that permit for appointments by the court and \nthose that permit for appointments by the Governor); see also People v. Callara, 44 N.Y.3d 623, \n627 (2025) (recognizing a key difference between special prosecutorial appointments made under \nExecutive Law \u00a7 63(2) and County Law \u00a7 701 is that the former is an appointment by the Governor \nand the latter is an appointment by the court); Matter of Bd. of Supervisors of Montgomery Cnty. \nv. Aulisi, 62 A.D.2d 644, 647\u201348 (3d Dep\u2019t 1978) (same); Matter of Rice, 31 Misc. 3d at 842 \n(same). Such distinction is dispositive here. See Matter of Soares, 20 N.Y.3d at 145 (\u201cwe have \nrecognized that prohibition is an appropriate remedy to void the improper appointment of a special \nprosecutor when made by the court\u201d (emphasis added)). \nEven if the disqualification standard relied on by Petitioner applied, disqualification is not \nwarranted based on a single, empathetic social media post made by the AG prior to her \nappointment. See Matter of Soares, 20 N.Y.3d at 146 (\u201c[u]nder our precedent, the existence of a \nconflict of interest between the district attorney and a defendant, by itself, does not warrant the \nremoval of the district attorney\u201d); see also Matter of Czajka v. Koweek, 188 A.D.3d 1540, 1542 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2020) (disqualification of district attorney not warranted because there was no actual \nprejudice to defendant where judge that presided over prior family court matters involving \ndefendant now served as prosecutor). This is particularly so because the AG is otherwise obligated \nby her constitutional, statutory, professional, and ethical obligations as an attorney, an elected \nofficial, and constitutional officer to properly discharge the duties entrusted to her by the voters \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n47 of 52\n\n--- Page 48 ---\n33 \n \nwhen they elected her and by the Governor when she tasked her with this investigation. See, e.g., \nPeople v. Zakrzewski, 249 A.D.2d 1314, 1323 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (defendant failed to demonstrate \nactual prejudice requiring disqualification of prosecutor based on misinformation included in \nsearch warrant application because, among other things, district attorney was otherwise \u201can \nelected, constitutional officer\u201d tasked to public duties concerning conduct of prosecution); People \nv. Barba, 60 Misc. 3d 1074, 1082 (Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 2018) (defendant failed to meet \u201chigh \nstandard\u201d to show prejudice requiring disqualification of prosecutor based on perceived conflict \nbetween defendant and district attorney stemming from defendant\u2019s prior negative dealings with \ndistrict attorney and litigation against members of district attorney\u2019s office because district \nattorney was otherwise \u201can elected, constitutional officer\u201d tasked to public duties concerning \nconduct of prosecution).  \nThough Petitioner alleges that disqualification is required because he will suffer prejudice \nfrom the AG\u2019s unfavorable investigatory choices (Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 46\u201348, 57\u201358) this claim is wildly \nspeculative. Morgenthau v. Crane, 113 A.D.2d 20, 21\u201322 (1st Dep\u2019t 1985) (\u201c[c]onjectural \nspeculations, without any factual foundation . . . are not a sufficient predicate from which to \nconclude either the existence of prejudice or the reasonable potential for prejudice\u201d). Such \nspeculation about the different ways that various discretionary variables might turn in this \ninvestigation is simply insufficient to establish prejudice at this early stage. Cf. People v. Mero, \n221 A.D.3d 1242, 1250, 51 (3d Dep\u2019t 2023) (finding no prejudice by joinder of charges in trial \ncourt because criminal defendant\u2019s claims were \u201cpurely speculative\u201d); People v. Ronk, 159 A.D.3d \n1129, 1130 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) (finding no prejudice from failure to effectuate criminal defendant\u2019s \nappearance before grand jury because his claims were \u201conly speculation\u201d); People v. Pottorff, 145 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n48 of 52\n\n--- Page 49 ---\n34 \n \nA.D.3d 1095, 1097 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (finding no prejudice from counsel\u2019s failure to object when \nportion of voir dire was not transcribed because he \u201conly speculates\u201d how he was prejudiced).  \nEven if Petitioner\u2019s claims were not wholly conjectural, they misconstrue the AG\u2019s \nobligations stepping into the shoes of the district attorney. While a prosecutor has a duty of fair \ndealing to the accused and an obligation to see that justice is done, see People v. Thompson, 22 \nN.Y.3d 803, 809 (2014); People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 105 (1984), she has no obligation to \npresent the evidence in the way \u201cmost favorable to the defense . . . .\u201d Thompson, 22 N.Y.3d at 810; \nPeople v. Mitchell, 82 N.Y.2d 509, 515 (1993) (\u201cthe People maintain broad discretion in presenting \ntheir case to the Grand Jury and need not seek evidence favorable to the defendant or present all \nof their evidence tending to exculpate the accused\u201d). Moreover, the credibility issues and factual \ninconsistencies that Petitioner is concerned with are more properly resolved before a petit jury, \nthan in an investigation or presentation to the grand jury. See People v. Douglas, 226 A.D.3d 1162, \n1163 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) (integrity of grand jury proceeding was not impaired by prosecutors failure \nto present allegedly exculpatory eyewitness identification to grand jury because \u201ca grand jury \nhearing is not intended to be a mini-trial at which competing evidence is weighed and questions \nof fact resolved . . . its purpose is simply to determine whether the evidence proffered by the \nPeople, if fully credited, would support a conviction\u201d); People v. Goldston, 126 A.D.3d 1175, 1177 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (integrity of grand jury proceeding was not impaired by prosecutors failure to \npresent allegedly exculpatory evidence to grand jury and such evidence bearing on victim\u2019s \ncredibility \u201cwas more appropriately reserved for presentation to the petit jury than to the grand \njury\u201d (quotation marks and citation omitted)). \nAccordingly, Petitioner fails to establish any actual prejudice that would require \ndisqualification. See Matter of Flynn v. DiTullio, 228 A.D.3d 1323, 1232\u201324 (4th Dep\u2019t 2024) \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n49 of 52\n\n--- Page 50 ---\n35 \n \n(criminal defendant failed to establish appearance of impropriety and actual prejudice requiring \ndisqualification from the fact that member of prosecutor\u2019s office was a victim in another unrelated \ncase); People v. Drago, 207 A.D.3d 559, 560 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (criminal defendant failed to \nestablish actual prejudice requiring disqualification from the fact of professional relationship \nbetween victim and prosecutor); see also People v. Jenkins, 186 A.D.3d 31, 36\u201337 (1st Dep\u2019t 2020) \n(finding that disqualification \u201cis moored to an attorney-client relationship\u201d and rejecting argument \nthat would \u201cextend the principle to instances where there is no relationship of any kind\u201d). \nD. \nThe Governor\u2019s actions are not subject to judicial review as arbitrary and \ncapricious or an abuse of discretion. \n\u201c[W]hen the Governor acts by Executive Order pursuant to a valid grant of discretionary \nauthority, [her] actions are largely beyond judicial review.\u201d Matter of Johnson, 91 N.Y.2d at 223; \nsee, e.g., People ex rel. Saranac Land & Timber Co., 220 N.Y. at 490\u201391; Gaynor v. Rockefeller, \n21 A.D.2d 92, 98 (1st Dep\u2019t 1964), aff\u2019d 15 N.Y.2d 120 (1965) (recognizing that the Governor \u201cis \nimmune from interference by judicial process and free from judicial control in his performance of \nexecutive powers\u201d).  \nHere, it is undisputed that the Governor appointed the AG as special prosecutor pursuant \nto a valid grant of discretionary authority. Pet. \u00b6\u00b6 37\u201338; see Executive Order No. 64. Thus, \nPetitioner\u2019s alternative claims for relief\u2014that the Governor\u2019s action was arbitrary and capricious \nand an abuse of discretion\u2014are wholly without merit and must be denied as a matter of law. See \nMaybee v. State of New York, 4 N.Y.3d 415, 418 (2005) (discretionary action by Governor done \nin accordance with valid grant of authority \u201cis not subject to judicial review\u201d); Matter of Brown v. \nNew York State DOCCS Exec. Clemency Bur., 239 A.D.3d 1216, 1217 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (same); \nMatter of Boyd v. Pataki, 52 A.D.3d 1128, 1128\u201329 (3d Dep\u2019t 2008) (same).  \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n50 of 52\n\n--- Page 51 ---\n36 \n \nCONCLUSION \nRespondents respectfully request that the Verified Petition be denied and this proceeding \nbe dismissed in its entirety and with prejudice.  \n \n \nDated: Albany, New York \n \nOctober 22, 2026 \n \nLETITIA JAMES \nAttorney General of the State of New York \nAttorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, \nGovernor of the State of New York and \nLetitia James, Attorney General of the \nState of New York \nThe Capitol \nAlbany, New York 12224 \n \n \nBy: ___/s/ Kaitlin Vigars___ \nKaitlin Vigars \nAssistant Attorney General, of Counsel \nTelephone: (518) 776-2036 \nFax: (518) 915-7738 (Not for service of papers) \n \n \nTO: \nAll counsel of record (via NYSCEF) \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n51 of 52\n\n--- Page 52 ---\nPrinted [Reproduced] on Recycled Paper \n37 \n \nSTATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.8-b \n \nI, Kaitlin Vigars, affirm under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106 that the total \nnumber of words in the foregoing Memorandum of Law, inclusive of point headings and footnotes \nand exclusive of pages containing the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, and signature \nblock, is 11,956 words. The foregoing Memorandum of Law does not comply with the word count \nlimit set forth in 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. However, this Court granted Respondents\u2019 request to submit \na Memorandum of Law of up to 12,000 words and this Memorandum of Law complies with the \npermission granted by the court. In determining the number of words in the foregoing \nMemorandum of Law, I relied upon the word count of the word-processing system used to prepare \nthe document.  \n \n/s/ Kaitlin Vigars \n                                    \n \n \n Kaitlin Vigars \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 10/22/2026 05:24 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 21\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/22/2026\n52 of 52","thumbnailUrl":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/595/thumb.webp","transcriptStatus":"not_applicable","transcriptText":"","url":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/595"}