{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"DigitalDocument","altText":"Public administrative PDF \u2014 original entry #90","alternateName":"needs-review-a71eaf88aa-161704_2026_Jane_Doe_v_Cornell_University_Inc_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_90.pdf","caption":"","contentUrl":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/620/raw","datePublished":"2026-10-24T00:11:25+00:00","description":"","encodingFormat":"application/pdf","identifier":"620","isAccessibleForFree":true,"machineReadable":{"json":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/620/index.json","markdown":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/620/index.md"},"name":"Public administrative PDF \u2014 original entry #90","ocrStatus":"ready","ocrText":"--- Page 1 ---\nSUPREME COURT \nSTATE OF NEW YORK                        COUNTY OF NEW YORK  \n \n \nJANE DOE, \n \n \n \n \n \nPetitioner, \n \n-against- \n \nCORNELL UNIVERSITY, INC., CHI PHI CHAPTER \nHOUSE ASSOCIATION, CHI PHI FRATERNITY, INC., \nCHI PHI EDUCATIONAL TRUST, ALPHA BETA HOUSE \nCORPORATION OF DELTA DELTA DELTA, DELTA \nDELTA DELTA SORORITY, ZAREEN ENTERPRISE LLC \nd/b/a MOONIES BAR & NIGHTCLUB, MATTHEW \nINGALLS, JOHNATHAN NEWELL, WINSTON LEE, \nGILLIO LOPES, DIEGO SARABIA, SCOTT NORRIS, \nSCOTT KRETZSCHMAR, JOHN DOE (FACULTY), \nJOHN DOE (ALUMNI), JOHN DOES (EXECUTIVE \nBOARD), and ORAZIO PETITO, \n \n \n \n \n \nDefendants. \n \n \n \n \n \nIndex No. 161704/2026 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW  \n \nIN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS   \nBY DEFENDANT DIEGO SARABIA \n \n \n \nJames C. Knox, Esq. \nAlishah E. Bhimani, Esq. \nHACKER MURPHY LLP \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \n22 Corporate Woods Blvd., Suite 404 \nAlbany, N.Y. 12211 \n(518) 274-5820 \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n1 of 16\n\n--- Page 2 ---\n1 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................2 \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................4 \n \nFACTS .............................................................................................................................................6 \n \nARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................8 \n \nI. \nPlaintiff\u2019s Intentional Tort Claims Against Defendant Are Barred by  \nthe Applicable Statute of Limitations ..................................................................................8 \n \nII. \nPlaintiff Has Failed to Sufficiently Plead Her First, Sixth and Eighth  \nCauses of Action ................................................................................................................11 \n \nA. Defendant Had No Duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s First Cause of  \nAction, Sounding in Negligence, Must Be Dismissed ...........................................11 \n \nB. The Sixth Cause of Action Fails to Plead a Particularized  \nAssault Claim Against Defendant ..........................................................................12 \n \nC. Plaintiff\u2019s Intentional-Infliction Claim Impermissibly Duplicates  \nHer Traditional Tort Claims...................................................................................13 \n \nCONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................14 \n \nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 202.8-B ...................................................................15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n2 of 16\n\n--- Page 3 ---\n2 \n \nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES \n \nCases  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n         Pages(s) \n \nCharkhy v. Altman, \n252 A.D.2d 413 (1st Dep\u2019t 1998) ..................................................................................................13 \n \nCotter v. Summit Sec. Servs., \n14 A.D.3d 475 (2d Dep\u2019t 2005) .....................................................................................................13 \n \nBarrack v. Village of Piermont, \n245 A.D.3d 779 (2026)  .................................................................................................................11 \n \nDemas v. Levitsky, \n291 A.D.2d 653 (3d Dep\u2019t 2002)  ..................................................................................................14 \n \nElmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd., \n110 A.D.3d 192 (1st Dep\u2019t 2013)  .................................................................................................12 \n \nEpstein v. Cantor, \n244 A.D.3d 937 (2d Dep\u2019t 2025)  ..................................................................................................11 \n \nFischer v. Maloney, \n43 N.Y.2d 553 (1978) ....................................................................................................................13 \n \nFleishcer v NYP Holdings, Inc., \n104 AD.3d 536, 538-539 (1st Dep\u2019t 2013) .....................................................................................14 \n \nGodfrey v. Spano, \n13 N.Y.3d 358, 373 (2009) ........................................................................................................8, 11 \n \nGianna T.D. v. 64 W. Chippewa Assoc. LLC, \n251 A.D.3d 1458 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026)  .................................................................................................8 \n \nIntegrateNYC, Inc. v. State of New York, \n45 N.Y.3d 176 (2025)  ...............................................................................................................8, 11 \n \nKefalas v. Pappas, \n226 A.D.3d 757 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024)  ..................................................................................................11 \n \nLauer v. City of New York, \n95 N.Y.2d 95, 100 (2000) ..............................................................................................................12 \n \nLeon v. Martinez, \n84 N.Y.2d 83 (1994)  .....................................................................................................................11 \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n3 of 16\n\n--- Page 4 ---\n3 \n \nRandolph v. Fox, \n230 A.D.3d 1173 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024)  ..................................................................................................8 \n \nRobin BB. v. Kotzen, \n62 A.D.3d 1187 (3d Dep\u2019t 2009)  ....................................................................................................8 \n \nShaw v. City of Rochester, \n200 A.D.3d 1551, 1556 (4th Dep\u2019t 2021) .......................................................................................13 \n \nStatutes \nCPLR 208(b) ...............................................................................................................................5,10 \nCPLR 213-c ............................................................................................................................5, 9,10 \nCPLR 215(3)  ...................................................................................................................................9 \nCPLR 3211(a)(5) .........................................................................................................................4, 8 \nCPLR 3211(a)(7)  ................................................................................................................ 4, 12-14 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.00 .........................................................................................................................9 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.25 .......................................................................................................................10 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.30 .........................................................................................................................9 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.35 .........................................................................................................................9 \nFormer Penal Law \u00a7 130.40  ..........................................................................................................10 \nFormer Penal Law \u00a7 130.45  ..........................................................................................................10 \nFormer Penal Law \u00a7 130.50  ..........................................................................................................10 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.52 .......................................................................................................................11 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.55 .......................................................................................................................11 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.60 .......................................................................................................................11 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.65 .......................................................................................................................11 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.70 .......................................................................................................................10 \nRules \n22 NYCRR 202.8-b  ......................................................................................................................15 \n \n \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n4 of 16\n\n--- Page 5 ---\n4 \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n \nDefendant Diego Sarabia (hereinafter \u201cdefendant\u201d) brings this motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s \ncomplaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7). Plaintiff alleges defendant committed the \ncommon law torts of negligence, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress \n(Dkt. 71). Defendant categorically denies those allegations. However, even accepting the \ncomplaint\u2019s factual allegations as true for purposes of this motion, plaintiff\u2019s claims against \ndefendant are either time-barred, fail to state a legitimate cause of action, or both.  \nAs far as defendant goes, this is essentially a lawsuit about an allegedly forced kiss. \nThroughout a sprawling complaint approaching 600 paragraphs, plaintiff repeatedly, collectively \nand without differentiation accuses seven student defendants of \u201csexual assault and rape.\u201d  Those \nlegally conclusory statements do not substitute for pleaded facts. Actually, plaintiff alleges only \ntwo specific actions by defendant:  \n1. That he \u201cgrabbed her face and started kissing her\u201d (Dkt. 71 \nat \u00b6 165); and   \n \n2. That, with others, he \u201cbegan pouring lines of Ketamine all \nover her body and snorting them.\u201d (Dkt. 71, at \u00b6 169). \n \nPlaintiff does not allege that defendant penetrated her in any manner, touched her vagina, \nbreasts, or anus, supplied her with drugs or alcohol, participated in any of the alleged sexual \nencounters described elsewhere in the complaint, or was even present for most of the conduct that \nforms the basis of plaintiff\u2019s broader allegations. Thus, plaintiff\u2019s repeated allegation that the seven \nstudent defendants \u201csexually assaulted and raped\u201d her are nothing more than baldly asserted legal \nconclusions, directly contradicted by her own detailed factual pleadings, which make plain that \ndefendant did not rape plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s conclusory characterizations must yield to the specific \nfacts she has alleged.  \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n5 of 16\n\n--- Page 6 ---\n5 \n \nIn actuality, plaintiff\u2019s claims that defendant kissed her without her consent and snorted \nketamine off her body are straightforward.  Any intentional tort arising out of that alleged conduct \nis foreclosed by a strict one-year statute of limitations because plaintiff commenced this action \nnearly two years after the alleged events. Faced with that obvious timeliness problem, plaintiff \ninvokes CPLR 213-c (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 6) and CPLR 208(b) (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 516 and 522), but neither statute \napplies.  \nCPLR 213-c extends the statute of limitations only where the alleged conduct constitutes \none of a list of specified, serious sexual offenses.  An unconsented-to kiss does not constitute any \nof the listed offenses, and plaintiff cannot simply circumvent the statute of limitations by relying \non generalized, collective accusations of \u201crape and sexual assault\u201d that are otherwise unsupported \nby, and inconsistent with, her own factual allegations. CPLR 208(b) is simply inapplicable.  It \nexpressly applies only to alleged conduct committed against a person under eighteen years of age, \nand plaintiff alleges she was twenty years old at all relevant times.  \nThe complaint suffers from numerous additional fatal defects. Plaintiff attempts to recast \nintentional conduct as negligence in the absence of any duty owed by defendant to supervise, \nprotect, or control either plaintiff or other adult students. She also fails to plead the necessary \nelements of assault against defendant and improperly repackages her already deficient tort claims \nas a duplicative cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  \nIn short, plaintiff has filed a sensational complaint that repeatedly concludes defendant is \na rapist, but her alleged facts, even if accepted as true, describe something entirely different. \nBecause plaintiff\u2019s actual claims against defendant are time-barred, inadequately pleaded, or both, \nthe complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.  \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n6 of 16\n\n--- Page 7 ---\n6 \n \nFACTS \nPlaintiff commenced this action on September 16, 2026, and alleges that she was a twenty-\nyear-old Cornell University undergraduate at the time of the alleged incident (Dkt. 71 at \u00b6 8). On \nthe night of October 19, 2024, plaintiff had \u201cbinged\u201d vodka at her sorority house (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 227), \nattended an event at Moonies Bar & Nightclub, and been served alcohol, despite markings \nindicating that she was under twenty-one (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 135-39).  \n \nPlaintiff later walked alone to the Chi Phi fraternity house, where she met defendant \nMatthew Ingalls (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 143, 146). Defendant Ingalls then propositioned plaintiff to engage in \na threesome with himself and one other fraternity member (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 148). Thereafter, defendant \nIngalls led plaintiff to a room where only defendant Jonathan Newell waited inside (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 151). \nDefendants Ingalls and Newell then \u201cplied\u201d plaintiff with ketamine, marijuana, and Jamacian \nliquor (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 152-154). Defendants Ingalls and Newell engaged in a threesome with plaintiff \nuntil defendant Ingalls stopped participating, went to a different bed located in the same room, and \nfell asleep (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 155-156, 158). Defendant Newell began reaching for plaintiff\u2019s vagina with \nhis hands, and plaintiff pushed his hand away at every attempt (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 159). Soon after end of \nthe plaintiff-Newell-Ingalls threesome, defendant Gillio Lopes entered the room (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 160). \nDefendant Lopes then grabbed plaintiff from defendant Newell and began kissing her, while \ndefendant Newell groped her from behind, specifically reaching for her vagina (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 160). \nDefendants Lopes and Newell then placed plaintiff on the bed and began engaging in a second \nthreesome (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 161). Defendant is not alleged to have been present for, to have knowledge \nof, or to have been a witness to, any of these activities.   \n \nPlaintiff offers a screenshot of a Snapchat group chat labeled \u201cChi Phi Actives\u201d with a time \nstamp of 1:42 am on October 20, 2024, wherein defendant Newell wrote \u201cfree pussy in alum pu\u201d \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n7 of 16\n\n--- Page 8 ---\n7 \n \n(Dkt. 71 \u00b6 162). At some point thereafter, defendant entered the room along with other fraternity \nmembers (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 165). Plaintiff does not allege that, at the time defendant entered the room, \nshe was engaged in any sexual activity or had consumed any drugs or alcohol in defendant\u2019s \npresence. Rather, plaintiff alleges that she was under the covers when defendant \u201capproached [her], \ngrabbed her face, and started kissing her\u201d (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 164-65).  \nThereafter, defendant Newell poured a line of ketamine onto his penis, and plaintiff snorted \nit off of his penis (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 167). Defendant is not alleged to have provided the ketamine or \ninstructed plaintiff to snort it. Rather, defendant\u2019s conduct is limited to thereafter snorting ketamine \noff an unspecified area of plaintiff\u2019s body, along with defendants Winston Lee, Scott Norris, Scott \nKretzschmar, Newell, and Lopes, before exiting the room (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 169-170). Plaintiff does not \nexplicitly allege that she did not consent to defendants snorting ketamine off unspecified areas of \nher body. Defendant is not alleged to have attempted to engage in any type of sexual activity with \nplaintiff after the allegedly forced kiss. \n \nPlaintiff was then removed by defendants Ingalls and Lee to another, smaller room (Dkt. \n71 \u00b6 170). In this smaller room, defendants Ingalls and Lee consumed more ketamine and \ninstructed plaintiff to snort another line of ketamine, which she did (Dkt. 71\u00b6 171). Plaintiff then \nengaged in a third threesome with defendant Ingalls and Lee (Dkt. 71 \u00b6173). Plaintiff alleges she \nlost consciousness once, after the end of the third and final threesome (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 174). Defendant \nis not accused of having been present for, or to have had contemporaneous knowledge of, this third \nthreesome.  \n \nIn sum, the specific factual allegations concerning defendant are set forth in paragraphs \n133-174 of the complaint, wherein plaintiff states only two specific facts: that he \u201cgrabbed her face \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n8 of 16\n\n--- Page 9 ---\n8 \n \nand started kissing her\u201d (Dkt. 71 at \u00b6 165), and that, with others, he \u201cbegan pouring lines of \nKetamine all over her body and snorting them.\u201d (Dkt. 71, at \u00b6 169).  \nPlaintiff does not allege that defendant penetrated her at any point or was even present for \nany of the alleged penetrative acts that occurred. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant made any \ncontact whatsoever with her vagina, breasts, or anus. Notwithstanding, the complaint is riddled \nwith generalized claims that, together with six other student defendants, defendant \u201craped\u201d \nplaintiff (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 6, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 199, 200, 202).  \nARGUMENT  \nI. \nPlaintiff\u2019s Intentional Tort Claims Against Defendant Are Barred by the \nApplicable Statute of Limitations.  \n \nOn a motion brought pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), a defendant initially must establish that \nthe time to sue has expired. Once such showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise \na factual question concerning a toll or other reason the limitations period does not apply, or to \ndemonstrate timely commencement. See Randolph v. Fox, 230 A.D.3d 1173, 1174 (2d Dep\u2019t \n2024). So that the Court may properly analyze whether a claim is timely, plaintiff\u2019s complaint \nmust provide sufficient detail to give the Court and the parties notice of the transactions or \noccurrences to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action. See Robin BB. v. \nKotzen, 62 A.D.3d 1187, 1188 (3d Dep\u2019t 2009). Even on a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, \nconclusory allegations of collective wrongdoing need not be accepted, especially where the \ncomplaint supplies no supporting facts connecting a particular defendant to the asserted legal \nobligation or wrong. See IntegrateNYC, Inc., v. State of New York, 45 N.Y.3d 176, 184 (2025) \nquoting Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358, 373 (2009) (\u201cAlthough on a motion to dismiss \nplaintiffs\u2019 allegations are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference, conclusory \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n9 of 16\n\n--- Page 10 ---\n9 \n \nallegations \u2013 claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity \u2013 are \ninsufficient to survive a motion to dismiss\u201d). \nPlaintiff alleges that defendant committed the following intentional torts: Sexual Assault \n(Sixth Cause of Action)1, Sexual Battery (Seventh Cause of Action), and Intentional Infliction of \nEmotional Distress (\u201cIIED\u201d) (Eighth Cause of Action). Each of these intentional torts is subject to \na one-year statute of limitations. See CPLR 215 (3). Plaintiff alleges that the relevant events \nforming the basis of her claims occurred over the night of October 19, 2024, through the following \nmorning. Plaintiff did not file her action on or before October 20, 2025, and instead waited to file \nher complaint until September 16, 2026.  Thus, all three said causes of action are untimely and \nmust be dismissed. \nIn anticipation of plaintiff\u2019s potential argument that CPLR 213-c extends the limitations \nperiod of these intentional torts to twenty years (see Dkt. 71 \u00b6 6), that extension applies only when \nthe conduct alleged constitutes one of the sex crimes specified in that statute. See Gianna T.D. v. \n64 W. Chippewa Assoc. LLC, 251 A.D.3d 1458, 1461 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026). As relevant here, the \nspecific enumerated sex crimes are as follows:  \n(1) Rape in the First Degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.35 (requiring vaginal, \noral2, or anal sexual contact);  \n \n(2) Rape in the Second Degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.30(4), (5), or (6) \n(requiring vaginal, oral, or anal sexual contact); \n \n(3) Rape in the Second Degree as defined in former Penal Law \u00a7 130.30(2) \n(requiring vaginal penetration, oral, or anal sexual contact);  \n \n1  \nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint proceeds directly from a \u201cFourth\u201d cause of action to a \u201cSixth\u201d cause \nof action. Despite the absence of a \u201cFifth\u201d cause of action in plaintiff\u2019s complaint, for \nconsistency purposes, defendant will refer to the specific causes of action by the number \ndenominated in the complaint.  \n2  \n\u201cOral sexual contact\u201d is defined as conduct between persons consisting of contact \nbetween mouth and the penis, the mouth and the anus, or the mouth and the vulva or vagina. See \nNY Penal Law \u00a7 130.00(2)(a).  \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n10 of 16\n\n--- Page 11 ---\n10 \n \n(4) Rape in the Third Degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.25(1), (2), (3), (7), (8), \nor (9);  \n \n(5) A crime formerly defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.50 (relating to oral sexual conduct \nor anal sexual conduct);  \n \n(6) A crime formerly defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.45 (2) (relating to oral sexual \nconduct or anal sexual conduct);  \n \n(7) A crime formerly defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.40 (1) or (3) (relating to oral \nsexual conduct or anal sexual conduct); and \n \n(8) Aggravated Sexual Abuse in the First Degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.70 \n(requiring insertion of a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum, or \nanus of another person). See CPLR 213-c. \n \n \nAs concerns defendant, plaintiff alleges only that defendant grabbed plaintiff\u2019s face and \nkissed her, and snorted ketamine off of her body (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 165, 169). These specific actions \u2013 \neven if unconsented to \u2013 do not constitute any of the serious sex offenses enumerated in CPLR \n213-c. Plaintiff cannot solve her timeliness problem simply by peppering her complaint with \ngeneralized, collective, conclusory allegations that defendant, together with defendants Ingalls, \nNewell, Lee, Lopes, Norris, and Kretzschmar, \u201csexually abused and raped\u201d plaintiff (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 6, \n190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 199, 200, 202). While it is axiomatic that the Court must assume the truth \nof the complaint\u2019s allegations at this juncture, such assumption should not include conclusory and \nundifferentiated group-pleadings of sexual abuse and rape, expressly refuted by the specific acts \npleaded. The twenty-year extension afforded by CPLR 213-c is thus inapplicable to plaintiff\u2019s \nallegation of an unconsented-to kiss, rendering her assault and battery claims untimely by nearly \none year.  \n \nIt must also be noted that plaintiff expressly endeavors to rely on CPLR 208(b), in an \napparent alternative, but misguided, attempt to preemptively foreclose a statute of limitations \nattack on her Sexual Assault and Battery claims. See Dkt. 71 at \u00b6\u00b6 516 and 522 (\u201cThe alleged \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n11 of 16\n\n--- Page 12 ---\n11 \n \nconduct constituted a violation of N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7130.52[,] \u00a7130.55, \u00a7130.60 and \u00a7130.65, and \nthis action to recover damages from such conduct is protected under CPLR \u00a7208[b].\u201d) That statute \nis inapplicable here, as plaintiff alleges she was a 20-year-old student at the relevant time (Dkt. 71 \nat \u00b6 8) and, by its own terms, the statute of limitations extension provided in CPLR 208 applies \nonly when certain enumerated offenses were \u201ccommitted against [a] person who was less than \neighteen years of age.\u201d CPLR 208 (b). \nAccordingly, plaintiff\u2019s Sixth Cause of Action for assault, Seventh Cause of Action for \nbattery, and Eighth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are time-barred \nas asserted against defendant, and they must be dismissed.    \nII. \nPlaintiff Has Failed to Sufficiently Plead Her First, Sixth and Eighth Causes of \nAction. \n \nOn a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the Court must accept properly pleaded facts as true \nand, giving the plaintiff every favorable inference, determine whether those facts fit within a \ncognizable legal theory. See Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 (1994); Barrack v. Village of \nPiermont, 245 A.D.3d 779, 779 (2d Dep\u2019t 2026). That favorable treatment does not extend to bare \nlegal conclusions or allegations lacking factual specificity. See Epstein v. Cantor, 244 A.D.3d 937, \n940 (2d Dep\u2019t 2025). Conclusory factual allegations are insufficient even under the liberal pleading \nstandard accorded on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211. See IntegrateNYC, Inc., v. State \nof New York, 45 N.Y.3d at 184, quoting Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d at 373. Dismissal is \nwarranted when, after discounting conclusory allegations, a plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting \nan element of the claim or when the alleged facts and reasonable inferences do not permit an \nenforceable right of recovery. See Kefalas v. Pappas, 226 A.D.3d 757, 759 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024). \na. Defendant Had No Duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s First Cause of Action, Sounding in \nNegligence, Must Be Dismissed. \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n12 of 16\n\n--- Page 13 ---\n12 \n \nA negligence claim requires a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, \na breach, and an injury proximately caused by that breach. Elmaliach v Bank of China Ltd., 110 \nA.D.3d 192, 200 (1st Dep\u2019t 2013). The existence of a duty running directly to the injured person is \nthe threshold question, and \u201cthe injured party must show not only that the defendant owed a duty \nto society but a specific duty to the plaintiff; without a duty running to the injured person there is \nno liability in damages, however foreseeable the harm.\u201d Elmaliach v Bank of China Ltd., 110 \nA.D.3d at 200, citing Lauer v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 95, 100 (2000).  \nHere, plaintiff alleges only that defendant was an adult undergraduate student and a \nfraternity member. She does not allege that he owned, operated, or controlled the fraternity house, \nemployed or supervised any other defendant, held an institutional office, or possessed authority to \ncontrol another student\u2019s conduct. Nevertheless, the First Cause of Action alleges that defendant \nhad duties to protect plaintiff, prevent other defendants from harming her, investigate concerns \nabout those defendants, supervise their activities, and warn plaintiff about them.  \nThose supposed legal duties are, in fact, legal conclusions asserted by plaintiff, unsupported \nby any facts showing that defendant had custody of plaintiff, control over the other adult students, \nor any relationship giving rise to the asserted obligations. Plaintiff cannot create a legal duty merely \nby repeatedly alleging one existed. Because she has failed to plead facts showing a duty running \nfrom defendant to her to supervise or control the conduct of other students, the negligence claim \nagainst him must be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7). \nb. The Sixth Cause of Action Fails to Plead a Particularized Assault Claim Against \nDefendant. \n \nThe Sixth Cause of Action alleges collectively that all seven student defendants possessed \nthe ability to cause harmful or offensive contact, committed an unspecified \u201cmenacing act,\u201d and \ncaused plaintiff apprehension of contact. It does not identify any threat, gesture, or other menacing \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n13 of 16\n\n--- Page 14 ---\n13 \n \nact by defendant individually. The only particularized physical-contact allegation against \ndefendant is that he grabbed Plaintiff\u2019s face and kissed her without consent (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 165). That \nallegation concerns completed contact, not a separately pleaded threat that caused apprehension of \nimminent contact. The Sixth Cause of Action instead relies on undifferentiated conclusions \ndirected at all seven student defendants.  As noted above, conclusory allegations lacking factual \nspecificity do not survive a motion to dismiss.  \nHere, the complaint does not allege that defendant threatened plaintiff, raised a hand, made \na threatening gesture, moved toward her in a menacing manner, or engaged in any other conduct \nthat caused plaintiff to anticipate any imminent harmful or offensive contact.  A properly pleaded \nassault claim requires physical conduct placing plaintiff in imminent apprehension of harmful \ncontact, and an intent to either inflict physical injury or to arouse apprehension of harmful bodily \ncontact.  See Cotter v. Summit Sec. Servs., 14 A.D.3d 475 (2d Dep\u2019t 2005); Charkhy v. Altman, \n252 A.D.2d 413 (1st Dep\u2019t 1998). Because the complaint does not allege facts identifying a \nthreatening act by defendant or plaintiff\u2019s resulting apprehension before contact, the Sixth Cause \nof Action should also be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7).  See Shaw v. City of Rochester, 200 \nA.D.3d 1551, 1556 (4th Dep\u2019t 2021). \nc. Plaintiff\u2019s Intentional-Infliction Claim Impermissibly Duplicates Her Traditional \nTort Claims. \n \nLiability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous \nconduct intentionally or recklessly causing severe emotional distress. See Fischer v. Maloney, 43 \nN.Y.2d 553, 558 (1978). The claim should not be applied where the complained-of conduct falls \nwithin the scope of another traditional tort. See Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d at 558. Plaintiff\u2019s \nEighth Cause of Action rests on the same alleged sexual contact underlying her assault and battery \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n14 of 16\n\n--- Page 15 ---\n14 \n \nclaims. It is purely duplicative of them, and alleges no distinct conduct by defendant and no \nseparate injury attributable to conduct outside those traditional tort theories. \nNew York courts dismiss intentional-infliction claims when the conduct alleged falls \nsquarely within another traditional tort claim.  See Fleishcer v NYP Holdings, Inc., 104 AD.3d \n536, 538-539 (1st Dep\u2019t 2013); Demas v. Levitsky, 291 A.D.2d 653, 660 (3d Dep\u2019t 2002). Because \nplaintiff\u2019s intentional-infliction claim merely repackages the same alleged contact underlying the \nassault and battery claims, it should be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7). \nCONCLUSION \nFor the above stated reasons, defendant Diego Sarabia respectfully requests that this Court \nDISMISS the complaint against him, with prejudice, along with such other and further relief as \nthe Court deems just and proper.  \nDATED: \nOctober 23, 2026 \n \nHACKER MURPHY, LLP \n \n \n_____________________________________  \nBy: James C. Knox \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \njknox@hackermurphy.com  \n \n \n \n \n______________________________________  \nBy: Alishah Bhimani  \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \nabhimani@hackermurphy.com  \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n15 of 16\n\n--- Page 16 ---\n15 \n \nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 202.8-B \n \n \nI, James C. Knox, hereby certify pursuant to Rule 202.8-b of the Uniform Rules of the \nSupreme Courts, that the length of this Memorandum of Law, exclusive of the cover page, the \ntables of contents and authorities, the signature block, and exclusive of this certification itself, is \n3,349 words. In making this certification, I have relied on the word count tool in the word \nprocessing program that I used to compose this document, Microsoft Word. \n \nDated: Albany, New York \n \nOctober 23, 2026 \nRespectfully submitted, \n \nHACKER MURPHY LLP \n \n \n \nBy:_______________________________________  \nJames C. Knox \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \nOffice & P.O. Address \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \njknox@hackermurphy.com  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n16 of 16","text":"--- Page 1 ---\nSUPREME COURT \nSTATE OF NEW YORK                        COUNTY OF NEW YORK  \n \n \nJANE DOE, \n \n \n \n \n \nPetitioner, \n \n-against- \n \nCORNELL UNIVERSITY, INC., CHI PHI CHAPTER \nHOUSE ASSOCIATION, CHI PHI FRATERNITY, INC., \nCHI PHI EDUCATIONAL TRUST, ALPHA BETA HOUSE \nCORPORATION OF DELTA DELTA DELTA, DELTA \nDELTA DELTA SORORITY, ZAREEN ENTERPRISE LLC \nd/b/a MOONIES BAR & NIGHTCLUB, MATTHEW \nINGALLS, JOHNATHAN NEWELL, WINSTON LEE, \nGILLIO LOPES, DIEGO SARABIA, SCOTT NORRIS, \nSCOTT KRETZSCHMAR, JOHN DOE (FACULTY), \nJOHN DOE (ALUMNI), JOHN DOES (EXECUTIVE \nBOARD), and ORAZIO PETITO, \n \n \n \n \n \nDefendants. \n \n \n \n \n \nIndex No. 161704/2026 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW  \n \nIN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS   \nBY DEFENDANT DIEGO SARABIA \n \n \n \nJames C. Knox, Esq. \nAlishah E. Bhimani, Esq. \nHACKER MURPHY LLP \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \n22 Corporate Woods Blvd., Suite 404 \nAlbany, N.Y. 12211 \n(518) 274-5820 \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n1 of 16\n\n--- Page 2 ---\n1 \n \nTABLE OF CONTENTS \n \nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................2 \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................4 \n \nFACTS .............................................................................................................................................6 \n \nARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................8 \n \nI. \nPlaintiff\u2019s Intentional Tort Claims Against Defendant Are Barred by  \nthe Applicable Statute of Limitations ..................................................................................8 \n \nII. \nPlaintiff Has Failed to Sufficiently Plead Her First, Sixth and Eighth  \nCauses of Action ................................................................................................................11 \n \nA. Defendant Had No Duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s First Cause of  \nAction, Sounding in Negligence, Must Be Dismissed ...........................................11 \n \nB. The Sixth Cause of Action Fails to Plead a Particularized  \nAssault Claim Against Defendant ..........................................................................12 \n \nC. Plaintiff\u2019s Intentional-Infliction Claim Impermissibly Duplicates  \nHer Traditional Tort Claims...................................................................................13 \n \nCONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................14 \n \nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 202.8-B ...................................................................15 \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n2 of 16\n\n--- Page 3 ---\n2 \n \nTABLE OF AUTHORITIES \n \nCases  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n         Pages(s) \n \nCharkhy v. Altman, \n252 A.D.2d 413 (1st Dep\u2019t 1998) ..................................................................................................13 \n \nCotter v. Summit Sec. Servs., \n14 A.D.3d 475 (2d Dep\u2019t 2005) .....................................................................................................13 \n \nBarrack v. Village of Piermont, \n245 A.D.3d 779 (2026)  .................................................................................................................11 \n \nDemas v. Levitsky, \n291 A.D.2d 653 (3d Dep\u2019t 2002)  ..................................................................................................14 \n \nElmaliach v. Bank of China Ltd., \n110 A.D.3d 192 (1st Dep\u2019t 2013)  .................................................................................................12 \n \nEpstein v. Cantor, \n244 A.D.3d 937 (2d Dep\u2019t 2025)  ..................................................................................................11 \n \nFischer v. Maloney, \n43 N.Y.2d 553 (1978) ....................................................................................................................13 \n \nFleishcer v NYP Holdings, Inc., \n104 AD.3d 536, 538-539 (1st Dep\u2019t 2013) .....................................................................................14 \n \nGodfrey v. Spano, \n13 N.Y.3d 358, 373 (2009) ........................................................................................................8, 11 \n \nGianna T.D. v. 64 W. Chippewa Assoc. LLC, \n251 A.D.3d 1458 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026)  .................................................................................................8 \n \nIntegrateNYC, Inc. v. State of New York, \n45 N.Y.3d 176 (2025)  ...............................................................................................................8, 11 \n \nKefalas v. Pappas, \n226 A.D.3d 757 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024)  ..................................................................................................11 \n \nLauer v. City of New York, \n95 N.Y.2d 95, 100 (2000) ..............................................................................................................12 \n \nLeon v. Martinez, \n84 N.Y.2d 83 (1994)  .....................................................................................................................11 \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n3 of 16\n\n--- Page 4 ---\n3 \n \nRandolph v. Fox, \n230 A.D.3d 1173 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024)  ..................................................................................................8 \n \nRobin BB. v. Kotzen, \n62 A.D.3d 1187 (3d Dep\u2019t 2009)  ....................................................................................................8 \n \nShaw v. City of Rochester, \n200 A.D.3d 1551, 1556 (4th Dep\u2019t 2021) .......................................................................................13 \n \nStatutes \nCPLR 208(b) ...............................................................................................................................5,10 \nCPLR 213-c ............................................................................................................................5, 9,10 \nCPLR 215(3)  ...................................................................................................................................9 \nCPLR 3211(a)(5) .........................................................................................................................4, 8 \nCPLR 3211(a)(7)  ................................................................................................................ 4, 12-14 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.00 .........................................................................................................................9 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.25 .......................................................................................................................10 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.30 .........................................................................................................................9 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.35 .........................................................................................................................9 \nFormer Penal Law \u00a7 130.40  ..........................................................................................................10 \nFormer Penal Law \u00a7 130.45  ..........................................................................................................10 \nFormer Penal Law \u00a7 130.50  ..........................................................................................................10 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.52 .......................................................................................................................11 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.55 .......................................................................................................................11 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.60 .......................................................................................................................11 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.65 .......................................................................................................................11 \nPenal Law \u00a7 130.70 .......................................................................................................................10 \nRules \n22 NYCRR 202.8-b  ......................................................................................................................15 \n \n \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n4 of 16\n\n--- Page 5 ---\n4 \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \n \nDefendant Diego Sarabia (hereinafter \u201cdefendant\u201d) brings this motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s \ncomplaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) and (a)(7). Plaintiff alleges defendant committed the \ncommon law torts of negligence, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress \n(Dkt. 71). Defendant categorically denies those allegations. However, even accepting the \ncomplaint\u2019s factual allegations as true for purposes of this motion, plaintiff\u2019s claims against \ndefendant are either time-barred, fail to state a legitimate cause of action, or both.  \nAs far as defendant goes, this is essentially a lawsuit about an allegedly forced kiss. \nThroughout a sprawling complaint approaching 600 paragraphs, plaintiff repeatedly, collectively \nand without differentiation accuses seven student defendants of \u201csexual assault and rape.\u201d  Those \nlegally conclusory statements do not substitute for pleaded facts. Actually, plaintiff alleges only \ntwo specific actions by defendant:  \n1. That he \u201cgrabbed her face and started kissing her\u201d (Dkt. 71 \nat \u00b6 165); and   \n \n2. That, with others, he \u201cbegan pouring lines of Ketamine all \nover her body and snorting them.\u201d (Dkt. 71, at \u00b6 169). \n \nPlaintiff does not allege that defendant penetrated her in any manner, touched her vagina, \nbreasts, or anus, supplied her with drugs or alcohol, participated in any of the alleged sexual \nencounters described elsewhere in the complaint, or was even present for most of the conduct that \nforms the basis of plaintiff\u2019s broader allegations. Thus, plaintiff\u2019s repeated allegation that the seven \nstudent defendants \u201csexually assaulted and raped\u201d her are nothing more than baldly asserted legal \nconclusions, directly contradicted by her own detailed factual pleadings, which make plain that \ndefendant did not rape plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s conclusory characterizations must yield to the specific \nfacts she has alleged.  \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n5 of 16\n\n--- Page 6 ---\n5 \n \nIn actuality, plaintiff\u2019s claims that defendant kissed her without her consent and snorted \nketamine off her body are straightforward.  Any intentional tort arising out of that alleged conduct \nis foreclosed by a strict one-year statute of limitations because plaintiff commenced this action \nnearly two years after the alleged events. Faced with that obvious timeliness problem, plaintiff \ninvokes CPLR 213-c (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 6) and CPLR 208(b) (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 516 and 522), but neither statute \napplies.  \nCPLR 213-c extends the statute of limitations only where the alleged conduct constitutes \none of a list of specified, serious sexual offenses.  An unconsented-to kiss does not constitute any \nof the listed offenses, and plaintiff cannot simply circumvent the statute of limitations by relying \non generalized, collective accusations of \u201crape and sexual assault\u201d that are otherwise unsupported \nby, and inconsistent with, her own factual allegations. CPLR 208(b) is simply inapplicable.  It \nexpressly applies only to alleged conduct committed against a person under eighteen years of age, \nand plaintiff alleges she was twenty years old at all relevant times.  \nThe complaint suffers from numerous additional fatal defects. Plaintiff attempts to recast \nintentional conduct as negligence in the absence of any duty owed by defendant to supervise, \nprotect, or control either plaintiff or other adult students. She also fails to plead the necessary \nelements of assault against defendant and improperly repackages her already deficient tort claims \nas a duplicative cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  \nIn short, plaintiff has filed a sensational complaint that repeatedly concludes defendant is \na rapist, but her alleged facts, even if accepted as true, describe something entirely different. \nBecause plaintiff\u2019s actual claims against defendant are time-barred, inadequately pleaded, or both, \nthe complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.  \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n6 of 16\n\n--- Page 7 ---\n6 \n \nFACTS \nPlaintiff commenced this action on September 16, 2026, and alleges that she was a twenty-\nyear-old Cornell University undergraduate at the time of the alleged incident (Dkt. 71 at \u00b6 8). On \nthe night of October 19, 2024, plaintiff had \u201cbinged\u201d vodka at her sorority house (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 227), \nattended an event at Moonies Bar & Nightclub, and been served alcohol, despite markings \nindicating that she was under twenty-one (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 135-39).  \n \nPlaintiff later walked alone to the Chi Phi fraternity house, where she met defendant \nMatthew Ingalls (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 143, 146). Defendant Ingalls then propositioned plaintiff to engage in \na threesome with himself and one other fraternity member (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 148). Thereafter, defendant \nIngalls led plaintiff to a room where only defendant Jonathan Newell waited inside (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 151). \nDefendants Ingalls and Newell then \u201cplied\u201d plaintiff with ketamine, marijuana, and Jamacian \nliquor (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 152-154). Defendants Ingalls and Newell engaged in a threesome with plaintiff \nuntil defendant Ingalls stopped participating, went to a different bed located in the same room, and \nfell asleep (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 155-156, 158). Defendant Newell began reaching for plaintiff\u2019s vagina with \nhis hands, and plaintiff pushed his hand away at every attempt (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 159). Soon after end of \nthe plaintiff-Newell-Ingalls threesome, defendant Gillio Lopes entered the room (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 160). \nDefendant Lopes then grabbed plaintiff from defendant Newell and began kissing her, while \ndefendant Newell groped her from behind, specifically reaching for her vagina (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 160). \nDefendants Lopes and Newell then placed plaintiff on the bed and began engaging in a second \nthreesome (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 161). Defendant is not alleged to have been present for, to have knowledge \nof, or to have been a witness to, any of these activities.   \n \nPlaintiff offers a screenshot of a Snapchat group chat labeled \u201cChi Phi Actives\u201d with a time \nstamp of 1:42 am on October 20, 2024, wherein defendant Newell wrote \u201cfree pussy in alum pu\u201d \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n7 of 16\n\n--- Page 8 ---\n7 \n \n(Dkt. 71 \u00b6 162). At some point thereafter, defendant entered the room along with other fraternity \nmembers (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 165). Plaintiff does not allege that, at the time defendant entered the room, \nshe was engaged in any sexual activity or had consumed any drugs or alcohol in defendant\u2019s \npresence. Rather, plaintiff alleges that she was under the covers when defendant \u201capproached [her], \ngrabbed her face, and started kissing her\u201d (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 164-65).  \nThereafter, defendant Newell poured a line of ketamine onto his penis, and plaintiff snorted \nit off of his penis (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 167). Defendant is not alleged to have provided the ketamine or \ninstructed plaintiff to snort it. Rather, defendant\u2019s conduct is limited to thereafter snorting ketamine \noff an unspecified area of plaintiff\u2019s body, along with defendants Winston Lee, Scott Norris, Scott \nKretzschmar, Newell, and Lopes, before exiting the room (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 169-170). Plaintiff does not \nexplicitly allege that she did not consent to defendants snorting ketamine off unspecified areas of \nher body. Defendant is not alleged to have attempted to engage in any type of sexual activity with \nplaintiff after the allegedly forced kiss. \n \nPlaintiff was then removed by defendants Ingalls and Lee to another, smaller room (Dkt. \n71 \u00b6 170). In this smaller room, defendants Ingalls and Lee consumed more ketamine and \ninstructed plaintiff to snort another line of ketamine, which she did (Dkt. 71\u00b6 171). Plaintiff then \nengaged in a third threesome with defendant Ingalls and Lee (Dkt. 71 \u00b6173). Plaintiff alleges she \nlost consciousness once, after the end of the third and final threesome (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 174). Defendant \nis not accused of having been present for, or to have had contemporaneous knowledge of, this third \nthreesome.  \n \nIn sum, the specific factual allegations concerning defendant are set forth in paragraphs \n133-174 of the complaint, wherein plaintiff states only two specific facts: that he \u201cgrabbed her face \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n8 of 16\n\n--- Page 9 ---\n8 \n \nand started kissing her\u201d (Dkt. 71 at \u00b6 165), and that, with others, he \u201cbegan pouring lines of \nKetamine all over her body and snorting them.\u201d (Dkt. 71, at \u00b6 169).  \nPlaintiff does not allege that defendant penetrated her at any point or was even present for \nany of the alleged penetrative acts that occurred. Plaintiff does not allege that defendant made any \ncontact whatsoever with her vagina, breasts, or anus. Notwithstanding, the complaint is riddled \nwith generalized claims that, together with six other student defendants, defendant \u201craped\u201d \nplaintiff (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 6, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 199, 200, 202).  \nARGUMENT  \nI. \nPlaintiff\u2019s Intentional Tort Claims Against Defendant Are Barred by the \nApplicable Statute of Limitations.  \n \nOn a motion brought pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), a defendant initially must establish that \nthe time to sue has expired. Once such showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to raise \na factual question concerning a toll or other reason the limitations period does not apply, or to \ndemonstrate timely commencement. See Randolph v. Fox, 230 A.D.3d 1173, 1174 (2d Dep\u2019t \n2024). So that the Court may properly analyze whether a claim is timely, plaintiff\u2019s complaint \nmust provide sufficient detail to give the Court and the parties notice of the transactions or \noccurrences to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action. See Robin BB. v. \nKotzen, 62 A.D.3d 1187, 1188 (3d Dep\u2019t 2009). Even on a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss, \nconclusory allegations of collective wrongdoing need not be accepted, especially where the \ncomplaint supplies no supporting facts connecting a particular defendant to the asserted legal \nobligation or wrong. See IntegrateNYC, Inc., v. State of New York, 45 N.Y.3d 176, 184 (2025) \nquoting Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d 358, 373 (2009) (\u201cAlthough on a motion to dismiss \nplaintiffs\u2019 allegations are presumed to be true and accorded every favorable inference, conclusory \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n9 of 16\n\n--- Page 10 ---\n9 \n \nallegations \u2013 claims consisting of bare legal conclusions with no factual specificity \u2013 are \ninsufficient to survive a motion to dismiss\u201d). \nPlaintiff alleges that defendant committed the following intentional torts: Sexual Assault \n(Sixth Cause of Action)1, Sexual Battery (Seventh Cause of Action), and Intentional Infliction of \nEmotional Distress (\u201cIIED\u201d) (Eighth Cause of Action). Each of these intentional torts is subject to \na one-year statute of limitations. See CPLR 215 (3). Plaintiff alleges that the relevant events \nforming the basis of her claims occurred over the night of October 19, 2024, through the following \nmorning. Plaintiff did not file her action on or before October 20, 2025, and instead waited to file \nher complaint until September 16, 2026.  Thus, all three said causes of action are untimely and \nmust be dismissed. \nIn anticipation of plaintiff\u2019s potential argument that CPLR 213-c extends the limitations \nperiod of these intentional torts to twenty years (see Dkt. 71 \u00b6 6), that extension applies only when \nthe conduct alleged constitutes one of the sex crimes specified in that statute. See Gianna T.D. v. \n64 W. Chippewa Assoc. LLC, 251 A.D.3d 1458, 1461 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026). As relevant here, the \nspecific enumerated sex crimes are as follows:  \n(1) Rape in the First Degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.35 (requiring vaginal, \noral2, or anal sexual contact);  \n \n(2) Rape in the Second Degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.30(4), (5), or (6) \n(requiring vaginal, oral, or anal sexual contact); \n \n(3) Rape in the Second Degree as defined in former Penal Law \u00a7 130.30(2) \n(requiring vaginal penetration, oral, or anal sexual contact);  \n \n1  \nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint proceeds directly from a \u201cFourth\u201d cause of action to a \u201cSixth\u201d cause \nof action. Despite the absence of a \u201cFifth\u201d cause of action in plaintiff\u2019s complaint, for \nconsistency purposes, defendant will refer to the specific causes of action by the number \ndenominated in the complaint.  \n2  \n\u201cOral sexual contact\u201d is defined as conduct between persons consisting of contact \nbetween mouth and the penis, the mouth and the anus, or the mouth and the vulva or vagina. See \nNY Penal Law \u00a7 130.00(2)(a).  \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n10 of 16\n\n--- Page 11 ---\n10 \n \n(4) Rape in the Third Degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.25(1), (2), (3), (7), (8), \nor (9);  \n \n(5) A crime formerly defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.50 (relating to oral sexual conduct \nor anal sexual conduct);  \n \n(6) A crime formerly defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.45 (2) (relating to oral sexual \nconduct or anal sexual conduct);  \n \n(7) A crime formerly defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.40 (1) or (3) (relating to oral \nsexual conduct or anal sexual conduct); and \n \n(8) Aggravated Sexual Abuse in the First Degree as defined in Penal Law \u00a7 130.70 \n(requiring insertion of a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum, or \nanus of another person). See CPLR 213-c. \n \n \nAs concerns defendant, plaintiff alleges only that defendant grabbed plaintiff\u2019s face and \nkissed her, and snorted ketamine off of her body (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 165, 169). These specific actions \u2013 \neven if unconsented to \u2013 do not constitute any of the serious sex offenses enumerated in CPLR \n213-c. Plaintiff cannot solve her timeliness problem simply by peppering her complaint with \ngeneralized, collective, conclusory allegations that defendant, together with defendants Ingalls, \nNewell, Lee, Lopes, Norris, and Kretzschmar, \u201csexually abused and raped\u201d plaintiff (Dkt. 71 \u00b6\u00b6 6, \n190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 199, 200, 202). While it is axiomatic that the Court must assume the truth \nof the complaint\u2019s allegations at this juncture, such assumption should not include conclusory and \nundifferentiated group-pleadings of sexual abuse and rape, expressly refuted by the specific acts \npleaded. The twenty-year extension afforded by CPLR 213-c is thus inapplicable to plaintiff\u2019s \nallegation of an unconsented-to kiss, rendering her assault and battery claims untimely by nearly \none year.  \n \nIt must also be noted that plaintiff expressly endeavors to rely on CPLR 208(b), in an \napparent alternative, but misguided, attempt to preemptively foreclose a statute of limitations \nattack on her Sexual Assault and Battery claims. See Dkt. 71 at \u00b6\u00b6 516 and 522 (\u201cThe alleged \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n11 of 16\n\n--- Page 12 ---\n11 \n \nconduct constituted a violation of N.Y. Penal Law \u00a7130.52[,] \u00a7130.55, \u00a7130.60 and \u00a7130.65, and \nthis action to recover damages from such conduct is protected under CPLR \u00a7208[b].\u201d) That statute \nis inapplicable here, as plaintiff alleges she was a 20-year-old student at the relevant time (Dkt. 71 \nat \u00b6 8) and, by its own terms, the statute of limitations extension provided in CPLR 208 applies \nonly when certain enumerated offenses were \u201ccommitted against [a] person who was less than \neighteen years of age.\u201d CPLR 208 (b). \nAccordingly, plaintiff\u2019s Sixth Cause of Action for assault, Seventh Cause of Action for \nbattery, and Eighth Cause of Action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are time-barred \nas asserted against defendant, and they must be dismissed.    \nII. \nPlaintiff Has Failed to Sufficiently Plead Her First, Sixth and Eighth Causes of \nAction. \n \nOn a motion under CPLR 3211(a)(7), the Court must accept properly pleaded facts as true \nand, giving the plaintiff every favorable inference, determine whether those facts fit within a \ncognizable legal theory. See Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 (1994); Barrack v. Village of \nPiermont, 245 A.D.3d 779, 779 (2d Dep\u2019t 2026). That favorable treatment does not extend to bare \nlegal conclusions or allegations lacking factual specificity. See Epstein v. Cantor, 244 A.D.3d 937, \n940 (2d Dep\u2019t 2025). Conclusory factual allegations are insufficient even under the liberal pleading \nstandard accorded on a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211. See IntegrateNYC, Inc., v. State \nof New York, 45 N.Y.3d at 184, quoting Godfrey v. Spano, 13 N.Y.3d at 373. Dismissal is \nwarranted when, after discounting conclusory allegations, a plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting \nan element of the claim or when the alleged facts and reasonable inferences do not permit an \nenforceable right of recovery. See Kefalas v. Pappas, 226 A.D.3d 757, 759 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024). \na. Defendant Had No Duty to Plaintiff. Plaintiff\u2019s First Cause of Action, Sounding in \nNegligence, Must Be Dismissed. \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n12 of 16\n\n--- Page 13 ---\n12 \n \nA negligence claim requires a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, \na breach, and an injury proximately caused by that breach. Elmaliach v Bank of China Ltd., 110 \nA.D.3d 192, 200 (1st Dep\u2019t 2013). The existence of a duty running directly to the injured person is \nthe threshold question, and \u201cthe injured party must show not only that the defendant owed a duty \nto society but a specific duty to the plaintiff; without a duty running to the injured person there is \nno liability in damages, however foreseeable the harm.\u201d Elmaliach v Bank of China Ltd., 110 \nA.D.3d at 200, citing Lauer v. City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 95, 100 (2000).  \nHere, plaintiff alleges only that defendant was an adult undergraduate student and a \nfraternity member. She does not allege that he owned, operated, or controlled the fraternity house, \nemployed or supervised any other defendant, held an institutional office, or possessed authority to \ncontrol another student\u2019s conduct. Nevertheless, the First Cause of Action alleges that defendant \nhad duties to protect plaintiff, prevent other defendants from harming her, investigate concerns \nabout those defendants, supervise their activities, and warn plaintiff about them.  \nThose supposed legal duties are, in fact, legal conclusions asserted by plaintiff, unsupported \nby any facts showing that defendant had custody of plaintiff, control over the other adult students, \nor any relationship giving rise to the asserted obligations. Plaintiff cannot create a legal duty merely \nby repeatedly alleging one existed. Because she has failed to plead facts showing a duty running \nfrom defendant to her to supervise or control the conduct of other students, the negligence claim \nagainst him must be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7). \nb. The Sixth Cause of Action Fails to Plead a Particularized Assault Claim Against \nDefendant. \n \nThe Sixth Cause of Action alleges collectively that all seven student defendants possessed \nthe ability to cause harmful or offensive contact, committed an unspecified \u201cmenacing act,\u201d and \ncaused plaintiff apprehension of contact. It does not identify any threat, gesture, or other menacing \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n13 of 16\n\n--- Page 14 ---\n13 \n \nact by defendant individually. The only particularized physical-contact allegation against \ndefendant is that he grabbed Plaintiff\u2019s face and kissed her without consent (Dkt. 71 \u00b6 165). That \nallegation concerns completed contact, not a separately pleaded threat that caused apprehension of \nimminent contact. The Sixth Cause of Action instead relies on undifferentiated conclusions \ndirected at all seven student defendants.  As noted above, conclusory allegations lacking factual \nspecificity do not survive a motion to dismiss.  \nHere, the complaint does not allege that defendant threatened plaintiff, raised a hand, made \na threatening gesture, moved toward her in a menacing manner, or engaged in any other conduct \nthat caused plaintiff to anticipate any imminent harmful or offensive contact.  A properly pleaded \nassault claim requires physical conduct placing plaintiff in imminent apprehension of harmful \ncontact, and an intent to either inflict physical injury or to arouse apprehension of harmful bodily \ncontact.  See Cotter v. Summit Sec. Servs., 14 A.D.3d 475 (2d Dep\u2019t 2005); Charkhy v. Altman, \n252 A.D.2d 413 (1st Dep\u2019t 1998). Because the complaint does not allege facts identifying a \nthreatening act by defendant or plaintiff\u2019s resulting apprehension before contact, the Sixth Cause \nof Action should also be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7).  See Shaw v. City of Rochester, 200 \nA.D.3d 1551, 1556 (4th Dep\u2019t 2021). \nc. Plaintiff\u2019s Intentional-Infliction Claim Impermissibly Duplicates Her Traditional \nTort Claims. \n \nLiability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires extreme and outrageous \nconduct intentionally or recklessly causing severe emotional distress. See Fischer v. Maloney, 43 \nN.Y.2d 553, 558 (1978). The claim should not be applied where the complained-of conduct falls \nwithin the scope of another traditional tort. See Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d at 558. Plaintiff\u2019s \nEighth Cause of Action rests on the same alleged sexual contact underlying her assault and battery \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n14 of 16\n\n--- Page 15 ---\n14 \n \nclaims. It is purely duplicative of them, and alleges no distinct conduct by defendant and no \nseparate injury attributable to conduct outside those traditional tort theories. \nNew York courts dismiss intentional-infliction claims when the conduct alleged falls \nsquarely within another traditional tort claim.  See Fleishcer v NYP Holdings, Inc., 104 AD.3d \n536, 538-539 (1st Dep\u2019t 2013); Demas v. Levitsky, 291 A.D.2d 653, 660 (3d Dep\u2019t 2002). Because \nplaintiff\u2019s intentional-infliction claim merely repackages the same alleged contact underlying the \nassault and battery claims, it should be dismissed under CPLR 3211(a)(7). \nCONCLUSION \nFor the above stated reasons, defendant Diego Sarabia respectfully requests that this Court \nDISMISS the complaint against him, with prejudice, along with such other and further relief as \nthe Court deems just and proper.  \nDATED: \nOctober 23, 2026 \n \nHACKER MURPHY, LLP \n \n \n_____________________________________  \nBy: James C. Knox \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \njknox@hackermurphy.com  \n \n \n \n \n______________________________________  \nBy: Alishah Bhimani  \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \nabhimani@hackermurphy.com  \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n15 of 16\n\n--- Page 16 ---\n15 \n \nCERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO RULE 202.8-B \n \n \nI, James C. Knox, hereby certify pursuant to Rule 202.8-b of the Uniform Rules of the \nSupreme Courts, that the length of this Memorandum of Law, exclusive of the cover page, the \ntables of contents and authorities, the signature block, and exclusive of this certification itself, is \n3,349 words. In making this certification, I have relied on the word count tool in the word \nprocessing program that I used to compose this document, Microsoft Word. \n \nDated: Albany, New York \n \nOctober 23, 2026 \nRespectfully submitted, \n \nHACKER MURPHY LLP \n \n \n \nBy:_______________________________________  \nJames C. Knox \nAttorneys for Defendant Diego Sarabia \nOffice & P.O. Address \n22 Corporate Woods Boulevard, Suite 404 \nAlbany, NY  12211 \nTelephone:  518-274-5820 \njknox@hackermurphy.com  \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nFILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 10/23/2026 07:51 PM\nINDEX NO. 161704/2026\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 90\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 10/23/2026\n16 of 16","thumbnailUrl":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/620/thumb.webp","transcriptStatus":"not_applicable","transcriptText":"","url":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/620"}