{"@context":"https://schema.org","@type":"DigitalDocument","altText":"911974_26_Gillio_Lopes_v_Kathleen_M_Hochul_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_I_34","alternateName":"911974_26_Gillio_Lopes_v_Kathleen_M_Hochul_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_I_34.pdf","caption":"","contentUrl":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/786/raw","datePublished":"2026-11-17T00:53:09+00:00","description":"","encodingFormat":"application/pdf","identifier":"786","isAccessibleForFree":true,"machineReadable":{"json":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/786/index.json","markdown":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/786/index.md"},"name":"911974_26_Gillio_Lopes_v_Kathleen_M_Hochul_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_I_34","ocrStatus":"ready","ocrText":"--- Page 1 ---\nSUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK \nCOUNTY OF ALBANY \n \nIn the Matter of the Application of \nGILLIO LOPES, \nPetitioner, \n \nFor a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 \nof the Civil Practice Law and Rules \n \n-against- \n \nKATHLEEN (\u201cKATHY\u201d) M. HOCHUL, in her official \ncapacity as Governor of the State of New York, and \nLETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney \nGeneral of the State of New York, \n \nRespondents. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIndex No. 911974-26 \n \nFarrell, J. \n \n   \n \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION \nTO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR LEAVE \nTO AMEND \n \n \nLETITIA JAMES \nAttorney General of the State of New York \nAttorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, \nGovernor of the State of New York, and \nLetitia James, New York State Attorney \nGeneral \nThe Capitol \nAlbany, New York  12224 \n \nKaitlin Vigars \nAssistant Attorney General,  \n of Counsel \nTelephone: (518) 776-2036 \nFax: (518) 915-7738 (Not for service of papers) \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n1 of 30\n\n--- Page 2 ---\ni \n \nTable of Contents \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 1 \nSTANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 2 \nARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3 \nTHE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS PALPABLY INSUFFICIENT \nAND PATENTLY DEVOID OF MERIT. ............................................................. 3 \nA. \nThe proposed amendment does not cure the defects \nidentified by this Court. .................................................................. 3 \n1. \nThe proposed amendment does not resolve any \nnonjoinder defect. ............................................................... 3 \n2. \nThe proposed amendment does not resolve any \nvenue defect. ..................................................................... 10 \nB. \nThe proposed amendment raises new claims that lack merit. ....... 11 \nC. \nThe proposed amendment does not cure the procedural and \nsubstantive defects that mandate dismissal of the Verified \nPetition. ......................................................................................... 17 \nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 20 \n \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n2 of 30\n\n--- Page 3 ---\nii \n \nTable of Authorities \n \nPage(s) \nCases \nAhmed v. Choudhry, \n___ A.D.3d ___ (1st Dep\u2019t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip. Op. 06518 (Nov. 5, 2026) .........................3 \nAmazing Home Care Servs., LLC v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assur. Co., Inc., \n191 A.D.3d 516 (1st Dep\u2019t 2021) ..............................................................................................9 \nBackus v. Lyme Adirondack Timberlands II, LLC, \n96 A.D.3d 1248 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) ...............................................................................................3 \nBailey v. Vill. of Saranac Lake, Inc., \n100 A.D.3d 1089 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) .............................................................................................9 \nCapicotto v. Western N.Y. Med. Mgt., LLC, \n247 A.D.3d 1492 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026) ..........................................................................................17 \nCarr v. Haas, \n163 A.D.3d 1212 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) ...........................................................................................10 \nCisco v. Verizon, N.Y., Inc., \n244 A.D.3d 809 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) .............................................................................................10 \nComm\u2019r of the N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Polite, \n236 A.D.3d 82 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) .................................................................................................4 \nDella Pietra v. State of New York, \n71 N.Y.2d 792 (1988) ..............................................................................................................13 \nDever v. DeVito, \n84 A.D.3d 1539 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) ...............................................................................................3 \nDoe v. Roe, \n___ A.D.3d ___ (3d Dep\u2019t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 06502 (Nov. 5, 2026) ..........................6 \nDoe v. Tobin & Dempf, LLP, \n247 A.D.3d 1320 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) .............................................................................................3 \nFerguson v. Hart, \n151 A.D.3d 1242 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) ...........................................................................................20 \nGansett One, LLC v. Husch Blackwell, LLP, \n168 A.D.3d 579 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) .............................................................................................10 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n3 of 30\n\n--- Page 4 ---\niii \n \nGaul v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc., \n250 A.D.3d 1162 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) ...........................................................................................12 \nHennessy v. G.S. Mink Steamer & T. Claxton Hose Co. No. 2, Auxiliary Inc., \n182 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) ...............................................................................................9 \nJane Doe v. Cornell University, et al., \nIndex No. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) ..........................................................................1 \nJMMJ Dev., LLC v. Woodvale Holdings, LLC, \n207 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...............................................................................................4 \nL-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet, Inc., \n45 A.D.3d 1 (1st Dep\u2019t 2007) ....................................................................................................9 \nLoch Sheldrake Beach & Tennis, Inc. v. Akulich, \n141 A.D.3d 809 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) .............................................................................................12 \nMatter of Bolofsky v. City of New York, \n205 A.D.3d 515 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) ............................................................................................20 \nMatter of Carey (Fischer), \n68 A.D.2d 220 (4th Dep\u2019t 1978) ..............................................................................................14 \nMatter of Citizens Organized to Protect the Envt. v. Planning Bd. of Town of \nIrondequuoit, \n50 A.D.3d 1460 (4th Dep\u2019t 2008) ..............................................................................................8 \nMatter of Columbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 (Czajka), \n118 A.D.3d 1081 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014) ...........................................................................................16 \nMatter of Connectivity Sys., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Ramapo, \n227 A.D.3d 984 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) ...............................................................................................8 \nMatter of Doe v. Cuomo, \n71 A.D.3d 889 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) ...............................................................................................16 \nMatter of Dondi v. Jones, \n40 N.Y.2d 8 (1976) ..................................................................................................................11 \nMatter of Donnaruma v. Carter, \n41 Misc. 3d 195 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013) .......................................................................16 \nMatter of Furnia, \n232 A.D.3d 1080 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................5 \nMatter of Green v. Bellini, \n12 A.D.3d 1148 (4th Dep\u2019t 2004) ..............................................................................................9 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n4 of 30\n\n--- Page 5 ---\niv \n \nMatter of Haggerty v. Himelein, \n89 N.Y.2d 431 (1997) ........................................................................................................ 13-14 \nMatter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, \n164 A.D.3d 518 (3d Dep\u2019t 1990) ...............................................................................................8 \nMatter of Iglhaut v. City of New York, \n247 A.D.3d 569 (1st Dep\u2019t 2026) ..............................................................................................5 \nMatter of Johnson v. Pataki, \n91 N.Y.2d 214 (1997) ..............................................................................................................18 \nMatter of McGinley v. Hynes, \n51 N.Y.2d 116 (1980) ..............................................................................................................19 \nMatter of People v. Trump Org., Inc., \n205 A.D.3d 625 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) ............................................................................................20 \nMatter of Perkins v. Town of Dryden Planning Bd., \n172 A.D.3d 1695 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) ...........................................................................................20 \nMatter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & \nAppeals, \n5 N.Y.3d 452 (2005) ..............................................................................................................4, 8 \nMatter of Rice, \n31 Misc.3d 838 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2011).........................................................................14 \nMatter of Schenectady Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Social Servs. v. Noah DD., \n200 A.D.3d 1509 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) .........................................................................................2, 7 \nMatter of Schneider v. Aulisi. \n307 N.Y. 376 (1954) ................................................................................................................11 \nMatter of Schumer, \n60 N.Y.2d at 55\u201356 ..................................................................................................................18 \nMatter of Schumer v. Holtzman, \n60 N.Y.2d 46 (1983) ...................................................................................................... 6, 14-15 \nMatter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Health, \n46 A.D.3d 962 (3d Dep\u2019t 2007) ...............................................................................................18 \nMatter of Shelter Is. Assn. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Shelter Is., \n57 A.D.3d 907 (2d Dep\u2019t 2008) ...............................................................................................18 \nMatter of Soares v. Carter, \n25 N.Y.3d 1013 (2015) ............................................................................................................16 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n5 of 30\n\n--- Page 6 ---\nv \n \nMatter of Soares v. Herrick, \n20 N.Y.3d 139 (2012) ................................................................................................................6 \nMatter of Staten Is. Branch of the Nat\u2019s Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. \nState of N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & Thirteenth Jud. Dists., \n144 A.D.3d 412 (1st Dep\u2019t 2016) ............................................................................................16 \nMatter of Town of Verona v. Cuomo, \n136 A.D.3d 36 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) ...............................................................................................18 \nMatter of Velez v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, \n163 A.D.3d 1210 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) .............................................................................................2 \nMatter of Wechsler v. New York State Adirondack Park Agency, \n85 A.D.3d 1378 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) .............................................................................................19 \nMatter of Westchester Cnty. Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. Cnty. of \nWestchester, \n29 Misc. 3d 1219(A) (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 2008) ..........................................................5 \nMatter of Whitehurst v. Kavanagh, \n218 A.D.2d 366 (3d Dep\u2019t 1996) .............................................................................................17 \nMatter of Working Families Party v. Fisher, \n23 N.Y.3d 539 (2014) ..............................................................................................................15 \nMcGraw v. Shapiro, \n56 A.D.2d 624 (2d Dep\u2019t 1977) ...............................................................................................16 \nMilmar Food Group II, LLC v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., \n61 Misc. 3d 812 (Sup.Ct. Orange Cnty. 2018) ..........................................................................8 \nNYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v. People Care Inc., \n156 A.D.3d 99 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .................................................................................................2 \nOglesby v. Barragan, \n135 A.D.3d 1215 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) ...........................................................................................10 \nPeople ex rel. Wogan v. Rafferty, \n208 N.Y. 451 (1913) .................................................................................................... 12, 14-15 \nPeople v. Callara, \n44 N.Y.3d 623 (2025) ..............................................................................................................16 \nPeople v. Gilmour, \n98 N.Y.2d 126 (2002) ..............................................................................................................12 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n6 of 30\n\n--- Page 7 ---\nvi \n \nPeople v. Leahy, \n72 N.Y.2d 510 (1988) ..............................................................................................................16 \nPeople v. National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc., \n223 A.D.3d 84 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) ..............................................................................................20 \nPeople v. Riccio, \n91 A.D.2d 693 (3d Dep\u2019t 1982) ...............................................................................................17 \nPeople v. Romero, \n91 N.Y.2d 750 (1998) ..............................................................................................................13 \nPeople v. Soddano, \n86 N.Y.2d 727 (1995) ..............................................................................................................15 \nPeople v. Viviani, \n36 N.Y.3d 564 (2021) ........................................................................................................ 11-13 \nPeople v. Walton, \n214 A.D.2d 805 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................19 \nPeople v. Zinkhen, \n89 A.D.3d 1319 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) .............................................................................................19 \nPlace v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., \n190 A.D.3d 1208 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) .............................................................................................9 \nPorcello v. Brackett, \n85 A.D.2d 917 (4th Dep\u2019t 1981) ................................................................................................7 \nSaratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, \n100 N.Y.2d 801 (2003) ..............................................................................................................4 \nSaxon Assoc. v. Barton, \n143 Misc.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1989) ............................................................................8 \nSingh v. T-Mobile. \n232 A.D.3d 662 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................17 \nSpada v. Aspen Univ., Inc., \n202 A.D.3d 494 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) ............................................................................................17 \nStone v. Gordon, \n211 A.D.3d 881 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) ...............................................................................................3 \nSwergold v. Cuomo, \n70 A.D.3d 1290 (3d Dep\u2019t 2010) .............................................................................................18 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n7 of 30\n\n--- Page 8 ---\nvii \n \nSwezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., \n19 N.Y.3d 543 (2012) ............................................................................................................4, 7 \nTalbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., \n71 N.Y.2d 827 (1988) ................................................................................................................7 \nTown of Southhampton v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conserv., \n194 A.D.3d 1310 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) .............................................................................................8 \nWalker v. Glaxosmithkline, LLC, \n161 A.D.3d 1419 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .............................................................................................5 \nWindy Ridge Farm v. Assessor of Town of Shandaken, \n11 N.Y.3d 725 (2008) ................................................................................................................6 \nState Statutes \nCounty Law \n\u00a7 700.........................................................................................................................................13 \n\u00a7 701(6) ........................................................................................................................ 10-11, 15 \nExecutive Law \n\u00a7 63(2) ............................................................................................................................ 1, 13-14 \nPenal Law \n\u00a7 20.25........................................................................................................................................5 \n\u00a7 120.20......................................................................................................................................5 \n\u00a7\u00a7 220.00\u2013220.55.......................................................................................................................5 \n\u00a7 260.20(2) .................................................................................................................................5 \nRules \nCPLR 308.......................................................................................................................................10 \nCPLR 401.........................................................................................................................................2 \nCPLR 1001...........................................................................................................................3\u20134, 6\u20138 \nCPLR 1003.......................................................................................................................................3 \nCPLR 1024.......................................................................................................................................5 \nCPLR 3025(b) ..................................................................................................................................2 \nCPLR 3211(a)(10) .......................................................................................................................3, 7 \nCPLR 7802(d) ..................................................................................................................................8 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n8 of 30\n\n--- Page 9 ---\n1 \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nRespondent Kathy Hochul, Governor of the State of New York (Governor) and Respondent \nLetitia James, New York State Attorney General (AG, and collectively with the Governor, \nRespondents), respectfully submit this memorandum of law in opposition to Petitioner\u2019s motion \nfor leave to amend, dated November 5, 2026, which seeks leave to file an amended petition adding \nsix new parties who, like Petitioner, are defendants in Jane Doe v. Cornell University, et al., Index \nNo. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) (the Jane Doe Litigation).  As detailed below, amendment \nis not warranted because the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient and patently devoid of \nmerit.  Accordingly, Petitioner\u2019s motion for leave to amend should be denied, the relief requested \nin the Verified Petition should be denied, and the Verified Petition and this proceeding should be \ndismissed in their entirety and with prejudice. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \nFor a complete Statement of Facts, Respondents respectfully refer this Court to the \nStatement of Facts provided in their prior filing.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 1\u20133. \nAs relevant to this motion, Petitioner commenced this action by order to show cause on \nOctober 7, 2026, seeking to: (1) annul Executive Order No. 64 (EO 64), which was issued by the \nGovernor in exercise of her superseder authority pursuant to Executive Law \u00a7 63(2), requiring the \nAG to investigate the conduct of, and, if warranted, present evidence to a grand jury arising out of \nthe allegations in the Jane Doe Litigation; and (2) disqualify the AG from serving as special \nprosecutor in the investigation and prosecution contemplated by EO 64.  Dkt. Nos. 1\u201312.  \nRespondents answered, asserting objections in point of law and opposing the relief requested.  Dkt. \nNos. 18\u201321.  The Verified Petition was fully submitted on October 27, 2026.  See Dkt. No. 24.  \nThe parties then appeared before this Court for oral argument.  See Dkt. Nos. 13, 27.   \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n9 of 30\n\n--- Page 10 ---\n2 \n \nAt oral argument, this Court raised the issue of joinder, expressing concern about its ability \nto effectuate complete relief in the absence of others who may face prosecution as authorized by \nEO 64.1  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12\u201313.  Additionally, the Court expressed concerns about the potential \nfor inconsistent results amongst courts of coordinate jurisdiction.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12\u201316.  The \nCourt also raised related questions about venue.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12\u201313, 19\u201320.  At the \nconclusion of oral argument, the Court granted Petitioner\u2019s request to provide a further submission.  \nDkt. No. 27 at p. 42.  Petitioner subsequently moved by order to show cause for leave to amend \nthe Verified Petition to add six new parties\u2014four new petitioners and two new respondents, who, \nlike Petitioner, are defendants in the Jane Doe Litigation.  Dkt. Nos. 26\u201331.  Respondents oppose. \nSTANDARD OF REVIEW \nCPLR 401 provides applicable rules for joining new parties in special proceedings, \nincluding proceedings pursuant to CPLR Article 78.  It states that, \u201c[a]fter a proceeding is \ncommenced, no party shall be joined or interpleaded . . . except by leave of court.\u201d  CPLR 401.  \nAs relevant to any application for leave to amend made in this context, CPLR 3025(b) instructs \nthat leave to amend \u201cshall be freely given upon such terms as may be just . . . .\u201d  This is a liberal \nstandard that permits leave \u201cunless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently \ndevoid of merit.\u201d  NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v. People Care Inc., 156 A.D.3d 99, 102 \n \n1 As the Court noted at oral argument, Respondents did not raise any nonjoinder issue in \ntheir answering papers.  Dkt. No. 27 at p. 21.  However, any such defect is only one of many other \ndispositive defects requiring dismissal.  See Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 5\u201336.  Even without an objection \nfrom Respondents, this Court may \u201craise the absence of a necessary party at any stage of the \nproceedings upon its own motion.\u201d  Matter of Schenectady Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Social Servs. v. Noah \nDD., 200 A.D.3d 1509, 1511 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021).  Once raised, this Court may summon any necessary \nparty subject to this Court\u2019s jurisdiction or, if a necessary party cannot be summoned, the court \nmust consider whether to proceed in the absence of that necessary party.  Id.; see Matter of Velez \nv. New York State Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 163 A.D.3d 1210, 1211\u201312 (3d Dep\u2019t \n2018). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n10 of 30\n\n--- Page 11 ---\n3 \n \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2017); see Backus v. Lyme Adirondack Timberlands II, LLC, 96 A.D.3d 1248, 1250 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2012); Dever v. DeVito, 84 A.D.3d 1539, 1541 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011). \nARGUMENT \nTHE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS PALPABLY INSUFFICIENT AND PATENTLY \nDEVOID OF MERIT. \nA. \nThe proposed amendment does not cure the defects identified by this Court. \nInitially, Petitioner\u2019s application for leave to amend should be denied because the proposed \namendment does not resolve the nonjoinder and venue defects identified by this Court.  Dkt No. \n27 at pp. 12\u201316; see Doe v. Tobin & Dempf, LLP, 247 A.D.3d 1320, 1323 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) (motion \ncourt did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because proposed \namendment did not cure pleading deficiency); Stone v. Gordon, 211 A.D.3d 881, 882 (3d Dep\u2019t \n1995) (same); see also Ahmed v. Choudhry, ___ A.D.3d ___ (1st Dep\u2019t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip. Op. \n06518 (Nov. 5, 2026) (denying plaintiff\u2019s request to amend its complaint because \u201camendment \nwould be futile since plaintiff cannot cure the defects\u201d). \n1. \nThe proposed amendment does not resolve any nonjoinder defect. \nCPLR 1001 mandates that \u201c[p]ersons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be \naccorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected \nby a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiff or defendants.\u201d  CPLR 1001(a).  \u201cWhen a \nperson who should be joined . . . has not been made a party and is subject to the jurisdiction of the \ncourt, the court shall order him summoned.\u201d  CPLR 1001(b).  \u201cIf jurisdiction over him can be \nobtained only by his consent or appearance, the court, when justice requires, may allow the action \nto proceed without his being made a party.\u201d  Id.  \u201cNonjoinder of a party who should be joined \nunder [CPLR 1001] is a ground for dismissal of an action without prejudice unless the court allows \nthe action to proceed without that party . . . .\u201d  CPLR 1003; see CPLR 3211(a)(10) (identifying \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n11 of 30\n\n--- Page 12 ---\n4 \n \nfailure to name a necessary party as grounds for dismissal); JMMJ Dev., LLC v. Woodvale \nHoldings, LLC, 207 A.D.3d 830, 831 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (resolving motion to dismiss or, in the \nalternative, for joinder based on absence of necessary party).   \nAs set forth in CPLR 1001(b), the determination as to whether a court may proceed without \na necessary party requires an evaluation of five discretionary factors:  \n(1) whether the plaintiff has another effective remedy in case the \naction is dismissed on account of the nonjoinder; (2) the prejudice \nwhich may accrue from the nonjoinder to the defendant or to the \nperson not joined; (3) whether and by whom prejudice might have \nbeen avoided or may in the future be avoided; (4) the feasibility of \na protective provision by order of the court or in the judgment; and \n(5) whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the absence \nof the person who is not joined. \n  \nCPLR 1001(b). \n \nIn analyzing these five factors, \u201c[n]o single one is determinative; and while the court need \nnot separately set forth its reasoning as to each factor, the statute directs it to consider all five.\u201d  \nMatter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 5 \nN.Y.3d 452, 459 (2005); see Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 19 N.Y.3d \n543, 551 (2012).  \u201cThe overall statutory design is intended to (1) guarantee that absent parties at \nrisk of prejudice will not be embarrassed by judgment purporting to bind their rights or interests \nwhere they have had no opportunity to be heard and (2) protect against multiple lawsuits and \ninconsistent judgments.\u201d  Comm\u2019r of the N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Polite, 236 A.D.3d 82, 109 \n(2d Dep\u2019t 2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce \nv. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 820 (2003). \nHere, in the proposed amendment, Petitioner attempts to obviate the Court\u2019s nonjoinder \nconcerns by adding six new parties, who are some of Petitioner\u2019s co-defendants in the Jane Doe \nLitigation.  Dkt. No. 29 at \u00b6\u00b6 12\u201315, 18\u201319; see Dkt. No. 4.  However, in addition to the six parties \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n12 of 30\n\n--- Page 13 ---\n5 \n \nidentified in the proposed amendment, there are multiple other defendants in the Jane Doe \nLitigation that are alleged to have engaged in various misconduct that could provide a basis for \ncriminal liability.  See Dkt. No. 4; see also Penal Law \u00a7 20.25 (proscribing when an individual \nmay be criminally liable for corporate conduct).  Further, there are potentially innumerable \nunknown others who are not named as defendants in the Jane Doe Litigation, but whose conduct \nfalls within the scope of the investigation authorized by EO 64 and who could be subject to future \nprosecution by the AG.  See, e.g., Penal Law \u00a7 120.20 (making it unlawful to engage in conduct \nwhich creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person); Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 220.00\u2013\n220.55 (controlled substances offenses); Penal Law \u00a7 260.20(2) (making it unlawful to sell any \nalcoholic beverage to a person under twenty-one years old).2   \nThus, if the necessary parties to this proceeding are the individuals whose conduct falls \nwithin the scope of the investigation authorized by EO 64 and may eventually be prosecuted, the \nproposed amendment does not obviate this Court\u2019s nonjoinder concerns because it fails to join all \nsuch parties.  See Matter of Iglhaut v. City of New York, 247 A.D.3d 569, 569 (1st Dep\u2019t 2026) \n(motion court properly dismissed article 78 proceeding for failure to join necessary parties where \npetitioner failed to identify all necessary parties \u201crendering it impossible to bring the parties before \nthe court\u201d); see also Matter of Furnia, 232 A.D.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) (motion court\u2019s \n \n2 Although CPLR 1024 permits a litigant to proceed against unknown parties in certain \ncircumstances, this provision does not permit unknown petitioners in proceedings pursuant to \nCPLR Article 78.  See Matter of Westchester Cnty. Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. \nCnty. of Westchester, 29 Misc. 3d 1219(A) (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 2008) (\u201cCPLR 1024, which \nprovides for the naming of unknown parties as defendants in an action, does not provide for the \nnaming of unidentified Petitioners in an Article 78 proceeding\u201d).  Regardless, Petitioner has not \nnamed any unknown parties in the proposed amendment and otherwise has not met the \nprerequisites for use of this procedural tool.  Dkt No. 29; see Walker v. Glaxosmithkline, LLC, 161 \nA.D.3d 1419, 1420\u201321 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) (\u201c[i]n the absence of evidence that a plaintiff made the \nrequisite timely and diligent efforts to identify an unknown defendant, he or she may not take \nadvantage of the procedural mechanism provided by CPLR 1024\u201d). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n13 of 30\n\n--- Page 14 ---\n6 \n \nfinding that children of beneficiary of estate were necessary party to estate proceeding required \nremittal to motion court to consider whether there were other unknown children that could be \nidentified and joined or, if they could not be joined, whether court could proceed in their absence).  \nAt this stage of investigation, any nonjoinder of necessary parties only highlights that Petitioner\u2019s \nclaim is wildly premature.  Compare Matter of Soares v. Herrick, 20 N.Y.3d 139, 143, 146\u201347 \n(2012) (reaching merits of application to disqualify prosecutor after indictment was dismissed and \nre-presented five times and criminal defendant commenced civil action for malicious prosecution \nagainst prosecutor, but still denying such motion because criminal defendant failed to show any \nactual prejudice), with Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 56 (1983) (refusing to reach \nmerits of application to disqualify prosecutor at outset of investigation because \u201cthe application \nfor disqualification was premature\u201d).   \nMore pointedly, even if the six new parties identified in the proposed amendment were the \nonly other parties that might eventually be prosecuted, two of those parties\u2014Matthew Ingalls \n(Ingalls) and Johnathan Newell (Newell)\u2014cannot be joined because they are beyond the \njurisdiction of the Court.  CPLR 1001(b); see Windy Ridge Farm v. Assessor of Town of \nShandaken, 11 N.Y.3d 725, 727 (2008).  Although the proposed amendment purports to join \nNewell and Ingalls as respondents, Petitioner concedes they are not residents of this state.  Dkt. \nNo. 29 at \u00b6\u00b6 18\u201319.  Since neither reside in this state, Ingalls and Newell are not subject to the \njurisdiction of this Court and cannot be joined unless they consent or appear.  See Doe v. Roe, ___ \nA.D.3d ___ (3d Dep\u2019t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 06502 (Nov. 5, 2026) (court lacked general and \nspecific jurisdiction over defendant-undergraduate student at Cornell University because student \nmaintained domicile at her parents\u2019 residence while attending college and her participation in a \nuniversity disciplinary investigation did not provide basis for exercise of long-arm jurisdiction); \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n14 of 30\n\n--- Page 15 ---\n7 \n \nPorcello v. Brackett, 85 A.D.2d 917, 917\u201318 (4th Dep\u2019t 1981) (court lacked general and specific \njurisdiction over defendant-undergraduate student at Cornell University because student \nmaintained domicile at his parents\u2019 residence while attending college and \u201csocial agreement \namong students to share the expenses of a pleasure trip\u201d did not provide basis for exercise of long-\narm jurisdiction); see also Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 827, 829\u201330 (1988) \n(court lacked general and specific jurisdiction over defendant-alumna of St. Lawrence University \nbecause alumna resided in California and previous enrollment and attendance at university in New \nYork did not provide basis for exercise of long-arm jurisdiction).  Petitioner admits that Ingalls \nand Newell will not consent or appear.  Dkt. No. 26 at \u00b6\u00b6 26\u201327.  In the admitted absence of other \njurisdictional bases over these parties, they cannot be joined.  See CPLR 1001(b) (a court can only \norder a party to be joined if that party \u201cis subject to the jurisdiction of the court\u201d); Matter of \nSchenectady Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Social Servs. v. Noah DD., 200 A.D.3d 1509, 1511 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) \n(court \u201cplainly did not have authority to make [person] a named party to this proceeding\u201d because \nthe court had no jurisdiction over person and, in the absence of jurisdiction, \u201cthe court is limited \nto directing that reasonable efforts be made to join him as a party or considering whether this \nmatter should proceed in his absence\u201d). \nIn the absence of any party this Court deems necessary, this Court must consider the CPLR \n1001(b) balancing factors to determine whether it can proceed or whether it must dismiss.  See \nCPLR 3211(a)(10) (failure to name a necessary party as grounds for dismissal); Swezey, 19 N.Y.3d \nat 554\u201355 (dismissing action because balance of CPLR 1001(b) factors led court to \u201cconclude that \nthis case cannot be decided without the presence of the [necessary party]\u201d).  Notably, Petitioner \nmakes no attempt to address the CPLR 1001(b) balancing factors or otherwise request that this \nCourt proceed in the absence of any necessary parties.  See Dkt. Nos. 26\u201329.  Instead, Petitioner \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n15 of 30\n\n--- Page 16 ---\n8 \n \nasks this Court to effectuate joinder by giving notice to \u201cthe remaining individuals\u201d pursuant to \nCPLR 7802(d), so that these parties may intervene.3  Dkt. No. 26 at \u00b6 30.  This request conflicts \nwith Petitioner\u2019s proposed amendment, which purports to add Ingalls and Newell as respondents, \nrather than as proposed intervenors.  See Dkt. No. 29 at \u00b6\u00b6 18\u201319.  Even so, Petitioner\u2019s request \nthat this Court effectuate joinder by inviting intervention is procedurally improper because \n\u201c[w]hen a necessary party can be joined only by consent or appearance, a court must engage in the \nCPLR 1001(b) analysis to determine whether to allow the case to proceed without that party.\u201d  \nMatter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce, 5 N.Y.3d at 459. \nAnalyzing the requisite statutory factors here, the availability of alternative remedies cuts \nstrongly against proceeding in the absence of necessary parties because Petitioner\u2014and any other \nperson who might eventually be indicted and prosecuted\u2014can challenge any indictment in \nnumerous ways and through various procedural vehicles on a complete record that speaks to actual \nand specific, rather than hypothetical and generalized, claims of prejudice.  See Milmar Food \nGroup II, LLC v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., 61 Misc. 3d 812, 833 (Sup.Ct. Orange Cnty. 2018) \n(granting motion to dismiss for failure to name a necessary party because plaintiff had an effective \nremedy available in another state); Saxon Assoc. v. Barton, 143 Misc.2d 602, 603 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. \nCnty. 1989) (denying motion to amend judgment to add necessary party because plaintiff had \nanother effective remedy available in new plenary action or by moving for relief in separate \n \n3 Even if joinder could be accomplished in this unorthodox manner, issuing notice to invite \nintervention would unnecessarily delay this proceeding.  See Matter of Connectivity Sys., LLC v. \nZoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Ramapo, 227 A.D.3d 984, 986 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024); Matter of \nCitizens Organized to Protect the Envt. v. Planning Bd. of Town of Irondequuoit, 50 A.D.3d 1460, \n1461\u201362 (4th Dep\u2019t 2008); Matter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, 164 A.D.3d 518, 527 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 1990).  Further, the claim of any intervenor similarly situated to Petitioner would fail \nfor all the same reasons that Petitioner\u2019s claim fails.  See Town of Southhampton v. New York State \nDep\u2019t of Envtl. Conserv., 194 A.D.3d 1310, 1313 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) (motion to intervene in Article \n78 proceeding properly denied where underlying claim was defective). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n16 of 30\n\n--- Page 17 ---\n9 \n \nbankruptcy proceeding); see also L-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet, Inc., 45 A.D.3d 1, 11 (1st \nDep\u2019t 2007) (\u201cdismissal should be a last resort where plaintiff will be deprived of any remedy\u201d \n(emphasis added)).   \nAlthough the availability of alternative remedies alone is not dispositive, the remaining \nfactors likewise weigh against proceeding because the absence of necessary parties would only \nsow confusion and chaos in this, a related proceeding, and in any potential future criminal \nprosecutions that would prejudice all parties and undermine this Court\u2019s ability to render an \neffective judgment.  See Matter of Green v. Bellini, 12 A.D.3d 1148, 1149 (4th Dep\u2019t 2004) \n(proceeding for writ of prohibition that sought to reinstate criminal prosecution could not continue \nin the absence of party that was subject of the criminal prosecution because of \u201cthe prejudice that \nmight accrue to [the criminal defendant] as a result of petitioner\u2019s failure to join him\u201d); see also \nAmazing Home Care Servs., LLC v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assur. Co., Inc., 191 \nA.D.3d 516, 519 (1st Dep\u2019t 2021) (dismissal of necessary party from action required dismissal of \nentire action because court could not proceed in absence of necessary party where alternative \nremedy was available to plaintiffs, absence of necessary party raised \u201c[t]he possibility of multiple \nconflicting judgments[,]\u201d and no effective judgment could be rendered without necessary party).   \nMoreover, permitting amendment to add new parties without any excuse for nonjoinder \nand at this late stage, after Respondents answered and after the parties were heard at oral argument, \nwould prejudice Respondents by unduly delaying this proceeding.  See Place v. Preferred Mut. \nIns. Co., 190 A.D.3d 1208, 1212 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in \ndenying motion for leave to amend complaint where application for leave to amend was made after \njoinder of issue and plaintiff offered no excuse for delay); Hennessy v. G.S. Mink Steamer & T. \nClaxton Hose Co. No. 2, Auxiliary Inc., 182 A.D.3d 830, 834 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) (same); Bailey v. \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n17 of 30\n\n--- Page 18 ---\n10 \n \nVill. of Saranac Lake, Inc., 100 A.D.3d 1089, 1091 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) (same).  Although delay of a \nfew weeks, like the delay already incurred here, is normally not unduly prejudicial, there is a \nsubstantial risk that this delay will be interminably prolonged by the proposed amendment because \nit contemplates adding new parties to this proceeding who apparently cannot be located.  See Dkt. \nNo. 29 at \u00b6\u00b6 18\u201319, 30.  As a practical matter, adding new respondents whose whereabouts are \nunknown would result in protracted delay while Petitioner continues his efforts to first locate and \nthen serve these new respondents.  See CPLR 308; Oglesby v. Barragan, 135 A.D.3d 1215, 1216 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (evaluating sufficiency of plaintiff\u2019s efforts to locate out-of-state defendants for \npurposes of service). \nAccordingly, the proposed amendment does not, and cannot at this time, resolve the \nnonjoinder issue identified by this Court such that amendment should not be permitted.  See Cisco \nv. Verizon, N.Y., Inc., 244 A.D.3d 809, 812 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (amendment not warranted because \nproposed amendment \u201cdid not cure the defects in the complaint that led to its dismissal\u201d); Carr v. \nHaas, 163 A.D.3d 1212, 1215 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) (amendment not warranted because proposed \namendment did not cure justiciability and pleading defects); see also Gansett One, LLC v. Husch \nBlackwell, LLP, 168 A.D.3d 579, 580 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) (finding that granting leave to amend is \nunnecessary when \u201camendment cannot cure the fundamental deficiencies in these claims\u201d). \n2. \nThe proposed amendment does not resolve any venue defect. \nAlthough not squarely addressed in the proposed amendment, this Court, at oral argument, \nalso questioned whether Albany County is a proper venue for this proceeding.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. \n12\u201313, 19\u201320.  That question necessarily implicates a broader defect previously identified by \nRespondents\u2014i.e., that a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 is not the proper procedural \nvehicle to request disqualification of the AG.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 20\u201322.  As detailed in \nRespondents\u2019 answering papers, County Law \u00a7 701(6) otherwise establishes requirements for \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n18 of 30\n\n--- Page 19 ---\n11 \n \nmaking an application to disqualify the AG that apply any time she is serving as special prosecutor \nand mandate any application for disqualification be made to a superior criminal court in the county \nwhere the criminal matter is triable.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 20\u201322; see County Law \u00a7 701(6); see also \nPeople v. Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d 564, 578\u201379 (2021) (disqualification processes in County Law \u00a7 \nserve separation of powers functions that are implicated when a court is asked to undertake \u201cthe \nexceptional function of displacing an elected constitutional officer\u201d).   \nThe statutory requirements set forth in County Law \u00a7 701(6) serve the important comity \ngoals animating the Court\u2019s questions.  See County Law \u00a7 701(6).  The process proscribed by \nCounty Law \u00a7 701(6) martials the disqualification process before a single court where any criminal \nmatter impacted by the disqualification is triable, limiting the risk of duplicative litigation and \ninconsistent results.  See Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8, 15 (1976) (considering principles \nof comity in connection with application for a writ of prohibition to disqualify the AG from serving \nas special prosecutor and finding that, because petitioner had twice moved to dismiss the \nindictment on the same grounds raised in his application for writ of prohibition to disqualify the \nAG, his failure to make a third application to dismiss the indictment did not bar prohibition since \na court ruling on the third application could not overrule the prior two decisions); see also Matter \nof Schneider v. Aulisi. 307 N.Y. 376, 382 (1954) (proceedings in multiple counties before courts \nof coordinate jurisdiction is disfavored because, even if not technically improper, as a matter of \npractice this \u201cwould tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and would seriously \ninterfere with the orderly administration of judicial work\u201d). \nB. \nThe proposed amendment raises new claims that lack merit. \nTo the extent that Petitioner\u2019s motion for leave to amend can be read as requesting leave \nto assert new factual allegations regarding the recent appointment of outside counsel to assist the \nAG with the investigation authorized by EO 64, any request to so amend must be denied because \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n19 of 30\n\n--- Page 20 ---\n12 \n \nany claims directed at the appointment of outside counsel are wholly without merit.  See Gaul v. \nCool Insuring Agency, Inc., 250 A.D.3d 1162, 1165 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) (motion for leave to amend \nwas \u201cappropriately denied\u201d because proposed amendment failed to state clam with requisite \nparticularity and allegations were otherwise insufficient to state a claim); Loch Sheldrake Beach \n& Tennis, Inc. v. Akulich, 141 A.D.3d 809, 811 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (motion for leave to amend was \nimproperly granted because claims in proposed amendment failed as a matter of law).   \nPetitioner\u2019s new factual allegations and contentions about the appointment of outside \ncounsel reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the constitutional predicate for criminal \ninvestigations and prosecutions.  See Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d at 577\u2013579 (explaining constitutional \ngrant of prosecutorial authority to the AG and district attorney, how they share prosecutorial \npowers, and constitutional basis for those officers to act); People v. Gilmour, 98 N.Y.2d 126, 129\u2013\n31 (2002) (explaining evolution of AG\u2019s prosecutorial authority and basis for same as provided in \nthe New York State Constitutional and Executive Law \u00a7 63).  Contrary to Petitioner\u2019s contentions \nthat the investigation must proceed without the AG\u2019s involvement, in fact, it cannot.  See Viviani, \n36 N.Y.3d at 577 (finding it unconstitutional to create a special prosecutor other than AG or district \nattorney because this would \u201ctake[] an essential function from a constitutional officer and give[] it \nto a different officer chosen in a different manner\u201d); see also People ex rel. Wogan v. Rafferty, 208 \nN.Y. 451, 462 (1913) (finding it unconstitutional to take constitutional authority from \nconstitutional officer and vest that authority outside of the constitutional officer without any \ninvolvement by the constitutional officer because it would deprive the constitutional officer of \npowers vested by the constitution and \u201cinterfere with the free exercise\u201d of the officer\u2019s duties and \nresponsibilities).   \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n20 of 30\n\n--- Page 21 ---\n13 \n \nThe Legislature, apportioning prosecutorial authority between duly-elected constitutional \nlaw enforcement officers, vests: (1) district attorneys with generalized prosecutorial authority in \nthe county where they are elected; and (2) the AG with specific state-wide prosecutorial authority \nthat she may exercise only when authorized by statute.  See County Law \u00a7 700 (statutory delegation \nof general prosecutorial authority to district attorneys); Executive Law \u00a7 63 (statutory delegation \nof specific prosecutorial authority to the AG); see also People v. Romero, 91 N.Y.2d 750, 754 \n(1998) (\u201cDistrict Attorneys have plenary prosecutorial power in the counties where they are \nelected\u201d and \u201cthe Attorney-General has no such general authority . . . except when specifically \nauthorized by statute\u201d); Della Pietra v. State of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 792, 796 (1988) (district \nattorneys have \u201cgeneral prosecutorial authority for all crimes occurring in the county where \nelected\u201d and the AG has \u201cno general prosecutorial authority . . . except when specifically permitted \nby statute\u201d).  Beyond these two officers, no other person holds prosecutorial authority, nor may \nsuch authority be delegated away to an unelected person.  See Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d at 577 (finding \nit unconstitutional to create a special prosecutor other than AG or district attorney because this \nwould \u201ctake[] an essential function from a constitutional officer and give[] it to a different officer \nchosen in a different manner\u201d); Matter of Haggerty v. Himelein, 89 N.Y.2d 431, 436 (1997) (\u201cthe \nconstitutional, statutory, and common-law prosecutorial authority[,]\u201d including \u201cthe discretionary \npower to determine whom, whether and how to prosecute a criminal matter\u201d and \u201cthe responsibility \nand accountability\u201d for those actions is \u201cnot freely transferable to anyone else\u201d). \nExecutive Law \u00a7 63(2) is a statutory delegation of prosecutorial authority that empowers \nthe AG to exercise her prosecutorial authority whenever required by the Governor.  Exec. Law \u00a7 \n63(2).  The Governor exercising her superseder authority under Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) has a single \nprosecutorial alternative to the district attorney\u2014the AG.  Exec. Law \u00a7 63(2); see Viviani, 36 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n21 of 30\n\n--- Page 22 ---\n14 \n \nN.Y.3d at 579; see also Wogan, 208 N.Y. at 462 (finding it unconstitutional to take constitutional \nauthority from constitutional officer and vest that authority outside of the constitutional officer \nwithout any involvement by the constitutional officer because it would deprive the constitutional \nofficer of powers vested by the constitution and \u201cinterfere with the free exercise\u201d of the officer\u2019s \nduties and responsibilities).  The AG acting in a superseder capacity wholly displaces the district \nattorney and strips all prosecutorial authority from the district attorney.  See Matter of Haggerty, \n89 N.Y.2d at 436 (when the Governor requires the AG to act, the AG supersedes the local district \nattorney \u201cto assume the prosecutorial function\u201d and \u201cacquires all the powers and performs all the \nduties in respect of such actions or proceedings before a court or Grand Jury, which the district \nattorney would otherwise be authorized or required to exercise or perform.\u201d); Matter of Carey \n(Fischer), 68 A.D.2d 220, 224\u201325 (4th Dep\u2019t 1978) (\u201c[a]n Attorney-General who supersedes a \nlocal [d]istrict [a]ttorney exercises all powers and performs all duties with respect thereto that the \nlocal [d]istrict [a]ttorney would otherwise perform\u201d); Matter of Rice, 31 Misc.3d 838, 842 (Sup. \nCt. Nassau Cnty. 2011) (recognizing that when Governor exercises her superseder authority under \nExecutive Law \u00a7 63(2), she is removing power from the district attorney). \nThus here, where the Governor has exercised her superseder authority to task the AG with \nthe investigation authorized by EO 64, the district attorney is divested of any prosecutorial \nauthority over that investigation and the only person with any prosecutorial authority to investigate \nthis matter is the AG.  See Matter of Carey, 68 A.D.2d at 225; see also Matter of Haggerty, 89 \nN.Y.2d at 436 (recognizing distinction between when AG is acting under superseder authority \nunder Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) and fully displacing district attorney versus when AG and district \nattorney are working cooperatively together).  That ultimate prosecutorial authority cannot be \nfurther divested from the AG and installed in an unelected person.  See Matter of Schumer, 60 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n22 of 30\n\n--- Page 23 ---\n15 \n \nN.Y.2d at 52 (prosecutor cannot delegate away ultimate prosecutorial responsibility and authority); \nsee also Wogan, 36 N.Y.3d at 455\u201356 (constitutional authority cannot be taken away from a \nconstitutional officer and given to a non-elected, non-constitutional officer); see also Matter of \nWorking Families Party v. Fisher, 23 N.Y.3d 539, 546 (2014) (recognizing a strong \u201cpublic \ninterest in having prosecutorial duties preformed, where possible, by the constitutional officer \nchosen by the electorate\u201d).  Rather, the AG, as the sole constitutional officer currently vested with \nthe constitutional and statutory prosecutorial powers and responsibilities, must retain ultimate \nauthority and control.  See People v. Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d 727, 728 (1995) (prosecutor \u201cmay allow \nappearances by public officers or private attorneys so long as they are kept aware\u201d because \nprosecutors \u201cretain the ultimate, nondelegable responsibility for prosecuting\u201d).   \nThough the AG may be assisted by an unelected person, as she will be here by the outside \ncounsel, ultimate responsibility and accountability for the prosecution must remain with the AG \nand her complete exclusion from the investigation is constitutionally impermissible.  See Matter \nof Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 52 (district attorney could not transfer fundamental responsibilities of \nher office to unelected official); see also People v. Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d 727, 728 (1995) \n(prosecutor \u201cmay allow appearances by public officers or private attorneys so long as they are kept \naware\u201d because prosecutors \u201cretain the ultimate, nondelegable responsibility for prosecuting\u201d); \nWogan, 208 N.Y. at 462 (constitutional authority vested in constitutional officer could not be \nvested outside of that constitutional officer).  In certain limited circumstances, County Law \u00a7 \n701(6) permits further divestiture of the AG\u2019s prosecutorial authority, but this further divestiture \ncan only be done on application of the AG and in a superior criminal court in the county where the \ncriminal matter is triable and permits transfer only to very specific alternatives.  County Law \u00a7 \n701(6).  These statutory limitations are strictly construed because \u201ca very important purpose is \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n23 of 30\n\n--- Page 24 ---\n16 \n \nserved by adhering to the plain language of the statute and to its exceptional function of displacing \nan elected constitutional officer.\u201d  People v. Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d 510, 514 (1988); see People v. \nCallara, 44 N.Y.3d 623, 626 (2025) (requiring strict adherence to statutory process for transferring \npower from a prosecutor because of \u201cthe separation of powers concerns at play\u201d). \nFurthermore, the writ of prohibition does not lie to compel this relief because the AG\u2019s \ndecision to appoint outside counsel, staffing decisions about who will work with the outside \ncounsel, and ultimately how the investigation is conducted through outside counsel are all \nexecutive or administrative actions against which the writ of prohibition does not lie.  See Matter \nof Doe v. Cuomo, 71 A.D.3d 889, 889 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) (writ of prohibition did not lie against \ninvestigation into alleged violation of immunity agreement because such action is executive in \nnature); McGraw v. Shapiro, 56 A.D.2d 624 (2d Dep\u2019t 1977) (writ of prohibition did not lie against \nemployment decisions because such actions are administrative in nature); see also Matter of Soares \nv. Carter, 25 N.Y.3d 1013 (2015) (recognizing the \u201cbroad authority and discretion . . . to conduct \nall phases of criminal prosecution\u201d as an \u201cexecutive power\u201d).  Further, Petitioner has no clear legal \nright to any relief because neither he, nor this Court, may dictate how any prosecutor, including \nthe AG or any designee, perform their job responsibilities or exercise their prosecutorial discretion.  \nSee Matter of Staten Is. Branch of the Nat\u2019s Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. State \nof N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & Thirteenth Jud. Dists., 144 A.D.3d 412, 413 \n(1st Dep\u2019t 2016); Matter of Columbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 \n(Czajka), 118 A.D.3d 1081, 1083 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014); Matter of Donnaruma v. Carter, 41 Misc. 3d \n195, 210\u201311 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013).   \nLikewise, a writ of prohibition should not issue as a matter of discretion given the \navailability of other adequate remedies available to Petitioner if he is eventually indicted and \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n24 of 30\n\n--- Page 25 ---\n17 \n \nprosecuted.  See Matter of Whitehurst v. Kavanagh, 218 A.D.2d 366, 368\u201369 (3d Dep\u2019t 1996) \n(affirming denial of writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit district attorney from proceeding with \nprosecution of indictment because petitioner could raise his claims \u201cby moving against the \nindictment\u201d and \u201cthe ordeal of a criminal trial with the possibility of conviction, standing along is \nnot sufficiently harmful to warrant the use of prohibition even if the harm sought to be redressed \nimplicates a constitutional right\u201d); see also People v. Riccio, 91 A.D.2d 693, 694 (3d Dep\u2019t 1982) \n(direct appeal from criminal conviction considering criminal defendant\u2019s claim that prosecution \nby AG acting pursuant to Executive Order made in exercise of Governor\u2019s superseder authority \nwas improper or beyond scope of AG\u2019s authority).   \nAccordingly, Petitioner\u2019s request for leave to amend to add new factual allegations \nregarding the appointment of outside counsel should be denied because these new factual \nallegations are wholly without merit.  See Capicotto v. Western N.Y. Med. Mgt., LLC, 247 A.D.3d \n1492, 1494 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026) (motion court properly denied motion for leave to amend because \nproposed amendment was patently devoid of merit \u201cwhere it fails to cure any of the defects that \nwarranted dismissal\u201d); Singh v. T-Mobile. 232 A.D.3d 662, 667 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) (motion court \nproperly denied motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment \u201cwas palpably \ninsufficient and patently devoid of merit, as it failed to cure any of the defects that warranted \ndismissal\u201d); Spada v. Aspen Univ., Inc., 202 A.D.3d 494, 495 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) (motion court \nproperly denied motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment \u201cwould not cure the \ndeficiency\u201d in the original pleading). \nC. \nThe proposed amendment does not cure the procedural and substantive \ndefects that mandate dismissal of the Verified Petition. \nFinally, leave to amend must also be denied because the proposed amendment does not \ncure the numerous other procedural and substantive defects that require dismissal of the Verified \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n25 of 30\n\n--- Page 26 ---\n18 \n \nPetition and preclude this Court from granting relief.  See Matter of Town of Verona v. Cuomo, \n136 A.D.3d 36, 45 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying cross-\nmotion to amend because proposed amendment was \u201cplainly lacking in merit\u201d where petitioners \nlacked standing and court lacked jurisdiction over dispute); Swergold v. Cuomo, 70 A.D.3d 1290, \n1294 (3d Dep\u2019t 2010) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for leave to \namend because proposed amendment \u201csuffer[ed] from the same jurisdictional deficiencies\u201d and \n\u201calso would have been dismissed in its entirety\u201d); Matter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v. New York \nState Dep\u2019t of Health, 46 A.D.3d 962, 964 (3d Dep\u2019t 2007) (affirming motion court determination \nthat denied motion for leave to amend because claims in proposed amendment were substantively \nmeritless). \nAs detailed in Respondents\u2019 answering papers, Petitioner\u2019s claim fails three important \njusticiability criteria\u2014ripeness, standing, and presentation of a political question.  Dkt. No. 21 at \npp. 5\u201320.  These threshold considerations are dispositive and not cured by the proposed \namendment.  See Matter of Shelter Is. Assn. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Shelter Is., 57 \nA.D.3d 907, 908\u201310 (2d Dep\u2019t 2008) (finding \u201cSupreme Court did not err in denying . . . \npetitioner\u2019s cross motion which was for leave to amend the petition . . . as none of the petitioners, \nincluding the four additional petitioners that the original petitioners sought to add had standing\u201d); \nsee also Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 91 N.Y.2d 214, 223 (1997) (judicial review of the Governor\u2019s \nexercise of her superseder authority \u201cis generally limited to determining whether the State \nConstitution or the Legislature has empowered the Governor to act and does not include the \nmanner in which the Governor chooses to discharge that authority\u201d); Matter of Schumer, 60 \nN.Y.2d at 55\u201356 (request to disqualify prosecutor raised separation of powers concerns and \u201cwas \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n26 of 30\n\n--- Page 27 ---\n19 \n \npremature and not justiciable\u201d because it was made before information about how prosecution \nmight play out was known).   \nSimilarly, as also discussed in Respondents\u2019 answering papers, Petitioner\u2019s claim is \nprocedurally improper because the writ of prohibition does not lie against executive action or in \nthe absence of a clear legal right to relief.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 22\u201328.  Neither defect is remedied \nby the proposed amendment as the claim in the proposed amendment is identical to the claim \nalleged in the original petition, both of which impermissibly seek a writ of prohibition against \nexecutive action and do not identify any clear entitlement to relief.  See Matter of Wechsler v. New \nYork State Adirondack Park Agency, 85 A.D.3d 1378, 1379 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011); see also Matter of \nMcGinley v. Hynes, 51 N.Y.2d 116, 123\u201325 (1980) (writ of prohibition did not lie against \ninvestigative activities of special prosecutor because investigation \u201chad not yet progressed to a \nstage where individual wrongdoers had been identified or discrete charges of criminality raised\u201d).   \nThese procedural defects notwithstanding, and as also discussed in Respondents\u2019 \nanswering papers, issuance of the writ of prohibition is also not warranted as a matter of this \nCourt\u2019s discretion.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 28\u201331.  Further, Petitioner fails to establish any actual \nprejudice that would require disqualification of the AG.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 31\u201335.  Nothing in the \nproposed amendment addresses these defects.  See People v. Zinkhen, 89 A.D.3d 1319, 1320 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2011) (criminal court did not err in denying motion to dismiss indictment that alleged the \nprosecutor should be disqualified because did not provide proof of any actual prejudice and only \nasserted \u201can inference of impropriety, which is not enough on its own to require [the c]ourt to \ndismiss the indictment or disqualify the District Attorney\u2019s office\u201d); People v. Walton, 214 A.D.2d \n805, 808\u201309 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) (denying CPL 440 motion \u201c[a]lleging that statements made by the \nprosecutor to the press constituted prosecutorial misconduct and that he was the victim of selective \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n27 of 30\n\n--- Page 28 ---\n20 \n \nprosecution\u201d because defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced or that this resulted in \nselective application of the law and defendant otherwise had ability to protect his rights through \nother means at trial and in pre-trial motions); see also People v. National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc., \n223 A.D.3d 84, 90\u201391 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) (AG\u2019s public statements that \u201cdisplayed animus\u201d towards \ndefendant organization did not amount to selective prosecution); Matter of People v. Trump Org., \nInc., 205 A.D.3d 625, 626\u201327 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) (AG\u2019s public statements about subject of subpoenas \ndid not did not amount to selective prosecution).   \nAccordingly, the proposed amendment is devoid of merit such that Petitioner\u2019s motion for \nleave to amend must be denied.  See Matter of Bolofsky v. City of New York, 205 A.D.3d 515, 515-\n16 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) (finding \u201cSupreme Court providently exercised its discretion to deny leave to \namend to add additional parties after respondents challenged the standing of petitioner\u201d because \n\u201cpetitioners cannot show that they will actually be harmed by the challenged administrative action \nas the harm is entirely conjectural\u201d); Matter of Perkins v. Town of Dryden Planning Bd., 172 \nA.D.3d 1695, 1697\u201398 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) (finding \u201cno abuse of discretion by Supreme Court in \ndenying the motion for leave to amend the petition\u201d because the proposed amendment \u201cis devoid \nof merit\u201d); Ferguson v. Hart, 151 A.D.3d 1242, 1243\u201345 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) (reversing motion court \ndetermination that granted motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment was \u201cpalpably \ninsufficient on its face\u201d since claims were inconsistent with applicable law).    \nCONCLUSION \nRespondents respectfully request that Petitioner\u2019s motion for leave to amend be denied in \nits entirety and with prejudice. \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n28 of 30\n\n--- Page 29 ---\n21 \n \n \nDated: Albany, New York \n \nNovember 16, 2026 \n \nLETITIA JAMES \nAttorney General of the State of New York \nAttorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, \nGovernor of the State of New York, and \nLetitia James, New York State Attorney \nGeneral \nThe Capitol \nAlbany, New York  12224 \n \n \nBy: _/s/ Kaitlin Vigars___________ \nKaitlin Vigars \nAssistant Attorney General, of Counsel \nTelephone:  (518) 776-2036 \nFax: (518) 915-7738  (Not for service of papers) \n \n \nTO: \nAll counsel of record (via NYSCEF) \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n29 of 30\n\n--- Page 30 ---\nPrinted [Reproduced] on Recycled Paper \n22 \n \nSTATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.8-b \n \nI, Kaitlin Vigars, affirm under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106 that the total \nnumber of words in the foregoing Memorandum of Law, inclusive of point headings and footnotes \nand exclusive of pages containing the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, and signature \nblock, is 6,776 words. The foregoing Memorandum of Law complies with the word count limit set \nforth in 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. In determining the number of words in the foregoing Memorandum \nof Law, I relied upon the word count of the word-processing system used to prepare the document.  \n \n/s/ Kaitlin Vigars \n                                     \n \n \nKaitlin Vigars \n \n \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n30 of 30","text":"--- Page 1 ---\nSUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK \nCOUNTY OF ALBANY \n \nIn the Matter of the Application of \nGILLIO LOPES, \nPetitioner, \n \nFor a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 \nof the Civil Practice Law and Rules \n \n-against- \n \nKATHLEEN (\u201cKATHY\u201d) M. HOCHUL, in her official \ncapacity as Governor of the State of New York, and \nLETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney \nGeneral of the State of New York, \n \nRespondents. \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \nIndex No. 911974-26 \n \nFarrell, J. \n \n   \n \nMEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION \nTO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR LEAVE \nTO AMEND \n \n \nLETITIA JAMES \nAttorney General of the State of New York \nAttorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, \nGovernor of the State of New York, and \nLetitia James, New York State Attorney \nGeneral \nThe Capitol \nAlbany, New York  12224 \n \nKaitlin Vigars \nAssistant Attorney General,  \n of Counsel \nTelephone: (518) 776-2036 \nFax: (518) 915-7738 (Not for service of papers) \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n1 of 30\n\n--- Page 2 ---\ni \n \nTable of Contents \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 1 \nSTANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 2 \nARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3 \nTHE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS PALPABLY INSUFFICIENT \nAND PATENTLY DEVOID OF MERIT. ............................................................. 3 \nA. \nThe proposed amendment does not cure the defects \nidentified by this Court. .................................................................. 3 \n1. \nThe proposed amendment does not resolve any \nnonjoinder defect. ............................................................... 3 \n2. \nThe proposed amendment does not resolve any \nvenue defect. ..................................................................... 10 \nB. \nThe proposed amendment raises new claims that lack merit. ....... 11 \nC. \nThe proposed amendment does not cure the procedural and \nsubstantive defects that mandate dismissal of the Verified \nPetition. ......................................................................................... 17 \nCONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 20 \n \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n2 of 30\n\n--- Page 3 ---\nii \n \nTable of Authorities \n \nPage(s) \nCases \nAhmed v. Choudhry, \n___ A.D.3d ___ (1st Dep\u2019t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip. Op. 06518 (Nov. 5, 2026) .........................3 \nAmazing Home Care Servs., LLC v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assur. Co., Inc., \n191 A.D.3d 516 (1st Dep\u2019t 2021) ..............................................................................................9 \nBackus v. Lyme Adirondack Timberlands II, LLC, \n96 A.D.3d 1248 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) ...............................................................................................3 \nBailey v. Vill. of Saranac Lake, Inc., \n100 A.D.3d 1089 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) .............................................................................................9 \nCapicotto v. Western N.Y. Med. Mgt., LLC, \n247 A.D.3d 1492 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026) ..........................................................................................17 \nCarr v. Haas, \n163 A.D.3d 1212 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) ...........................................................................................10 \nCisco v. Verizon, N.Y., Inc., \n244 A.D.3d 809 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) .............................................................................................10 \nComm\u2019r of the N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Polite, \n236 A.D.3d 82 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) .................................................................................................4 \nDella Pietra v. State of New York, \n71 N.Y.2d 792 (1988) ..............................................................................................................13 \nDever v. DeVito, \n84 A.D.3d 1539 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) ...............................................................................................3 \nDoe v. Roe, \n___ A.D.3d ___ (3d Dep\u2019t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 06502 (Nov. 5, 2026) ..........................6 \nDoe v. Tobin & Dempf, LLP, \n247 A.D.3d 1320 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) .............................................................................................3 \nFerguson v. Hart, \n151 A.D.3d 1242 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) ...........................................................................................20 \nGansett One, LLC v. Husch Blackwell, LLP, \n168 A.D.3d 579 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) .............................................................................................10 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n3 of 30\n\n--- Page 4 ---\niii \n \nGaul v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc., \n250 A.D.3d 1162 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) ...........................................................................................12 \nHennessy v. G.S. Mink Steamer & T. Claxton Hose Co. No. 2, Auxiliary Inc., \n182 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) ...............................................................................................9 \nJane Doe v. Cornell University, et al., \nIndex No. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) ..........................................................................1 \nJMMJ Dev., LLC v. Woodvale Holdings, LLC, \n207 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) ...............................................................................................4 \nL-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet, Inc., \n45 A.D.3d 1 (1st Dep\u2019t 2007) ....................................................................................................9 \nLoch Sheldrake Beach & Tennis, Inc. v. Akulich, \n141 A.D.3d 809 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) .............................................................................................12 \nMatter of Bolofsky v. City of New York, \n205 A.D.3d 515 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) ............................................................................................20 \nMatter of Carey (Fischer), \n68 A.D.2d 220 (4th Dep\u2019t 1978) ..............................................................................................14 \nMatter of Citizens Organized to Protect the Envt. v. Planning Bd. of Town of \nIrondequuoit, \n50 A.D.3d 1460 (4th Dep\u2019t 2008) ..............................................................................................8 \nMatter of Columbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 (Czajka), \n118 A.D.3d 1081 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014) ...........................................................................................16 \nMatter of Connectivity Sys., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Ramapo, \n227 A.D.3d 984 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) ...............................................................................................8 \nMatter of Doe v. Cuomo, \n71 A.D.3d 889 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) ...............................................................................................16 \nMatter of Dondi v. Jones, \n40 N.Y.2d 8 (1976) ..................................................................................................................11 \nMatter of Donnaruma v. Carter, \n41 Misc. 3d 195 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013) .......................................................................16 \nMatter of Furnia, \n232 A.D.3d 1080 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................5 \nMatter of Green v. Bellini, \n12 A.D.3d 1148 (4th Dep\u2019t 2004) ..............................................................................................9 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n4 of 30\n\n--- Page 5 ---\niv \n \nMatter of Haggerty v. Himelein, \n89 N.Y.2d 431 (1997) ........................................................................................................ 13-14 \nMatter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, \n164 A.D.3d 518 (3d Dep\u2019t 1990) ...............................................................................................8 \nMatter of Iglhaut v. City of New York, \n247 A.D.3d 569 (1st Dep\u2019t 2026) ..............................................................................................5 \nMatter of Johnson v. Pataki, \n91 N.Y.2d 214 (1997) ..............................................................................................................18 \nMatter of McGinley v. Hynes, \n51 N.Y.2d 116 (1980) ..............................................................................................................19 \nMatter of People v. Trump Org., Inc., \n205 A.D.3d 625 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) ............................................................................................20 \nMatter of Perkins v. Town of Dryden Planning Bd., \n172 A.D.3d 1695 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) ...........................................................................................20 \nMatter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & \nAppeals, \n5 N.Y.3d 452 (2005) ..............................................................................................................4, 8 \nMatter of Rice, \n31 Misc.3d 838 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2011).........................................................................14 \nMatter of Schenectady Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Social Servs. v. Noah DD., \n200 A.D.3d 1509 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) .........................................................................................2, 7 \nMatter of Schneider v. Aulisi. \n307 N.Y. 376 (1954) ................................................................................................................11 \nMatter of Schumer, \n60 N.Y.2d at 55\u201356 ..................................................................................................................18 \nMatter of Schumer v. Holtzman, \n60 N.Y.2d 46 (1983) ...................................................................................................... 6, 14-15 \nMatter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Health, \n46 A.D.3d 962 (3d Dep\u2019t 2007) ...............................................................................................18 \nMatter of Shelter Is. Assn. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Shelter Is., \n57 A.D.3d 907 (2d Dep\u2019t 2008) ...............................................................................................18 \nMatter of Soares v. Carter, \n25 N.Y.3d 1013 (2015) ............................................................................................................16 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n5 of 30\n\n--- Page 6 ---\nv \n \nMatter of Soares v. Herrick, \n20 N.Y.3d 139 (2012) ................................................................................................................6 \nMatter of Staten Is. Branch of the Nat\u2019s Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. \nState of N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & Thirteenth Jud. Dists., \n144 A.D.3d 412 (1st Dep\u2019t 2016) ............................................................................................16 \nMatter of Town of Verona v. Cuomo, \n136 A.D.3d 36 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) ...............................................................................................18 \nMatter of Velez v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, \n163 A.D.3d 1210 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) .............................................................................................2 \nMatter of Wechsler v. New York State Adirondack Park Agency, \n85 A.D.3d 1378 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) .............................................................................................19 \nMatter of Westchester Cnty. Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. Cnty. of \nWestchester, \n29 Misc. 3d 1219(A) (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 2008) ..........................................................5 \nMatter of Whitehurst v. Kavanagh, \n218 A.D.2d 366 (3d Dep\u2019t 1996) .............................................................................................17 \nMatter of Working Families Party v. Fisher, \n23 N.Y.3d 539 (2014) ..............................................................................................................15 \nMcGraw v. Shapiro, \n56 A.D.2d 624 (2d Dep\u2019t 1977) ...............................................................................................16 \nMilmar Food Group II, LLC v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., \n61 Misc. 3d 812 (Sup.Ct. Orange Cnty. 2018) ..........................................................................8 \nNYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v. People Care Inc., \n156 A.D.3d 99 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .................................................................................................2 \nOglesby v. Barragan, \n135 A.D.3d 1215 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) ...........................................................................................10 \nPeople ex rel. Wogan v. Rafferty, \n208 N.Y. 451 (1913) .................................................................................................... 12, 14-15 \nPeople v. Callara, \n44 N.Y.3d 623 (2025) ..............................................................................................................16 \nPeople v. Gilmour, \n98 N.Y.2d 126 (2002) ..............................................................................................................12 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n6 of 30\n\n--- Page 7 ---\nvi \n \nPeople v. Leahy, \n72 N.Y.2d 510 (1988) ..............................................................................................................16 \nPeople v. National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc., \n223 A.D.3d 84 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) ..............................................................................................20 \nPeople v. Riccio, \n91 A.D.2d 693 (3d Dep\u2019t 1982) ...............................................................................................17 \nPeople v. Romero, \n91 N.Y.2d 750 (1998) ..............................................................................................................13 \nPeople v. Soddano, \n86 N.Y.2d 727 (1995) ..............................................................................................................15 \nPeople v. Viviani, \n36 N.Y.3d 564 (2021) ........................................................................................................ 11-13 \nPeople v. Walton, \n214 A.D.2d 805 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) .............................................................................................19 \nPeople v. Zinkhen, \n89 A.D.3d 1319 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011) .............................................................................................19 \nPlace v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., \n190 A.D.3d 1208 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) .............................................................................................9 \nPorcello v. Brackett, \n85 A.D.2d 917 (4th Dep\u2019t 1981) ................................................................................................7 \nSaratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, \n100 N.Y.2d 801 (2003) ..............................................................................................................4 \nSaxon Assoc. v. Barton, \n143 Misc.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1989) ............................................................................8 \nSingh v. T-Mobile. \n232 A.D.3d 662 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) .............................................................................................17 \nSpada v. Aspen Univ., Inc., \n202 A.D.3d 494 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) ............................................................................................17 \nStone v. Gordon, \n211 A.D.3d 881 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) ...............................................................................................3 \nSwergold v. Cuomo, \n70 A.D.3d 1290 (3d Dep\u2019t 2010) .............................................................................................18 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n7 of 30\n\n--- Page 8 ---\nvii \n \nSwezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., \n19 N.Y.3d 543 (2012) ............................................................................................................4, 7 \nTalbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., \n71 N.Y.2d 827 (1988) ................................................................................................................7 \nTown of Southhampton v. New York State Dep\u2019t of Envtl. Conserv., \n194 A.D.3d 1310 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) .............................................................................................8 \nWalker v. Glaxosmithkline, LLC, \n161 A.D.3d 1419 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) .............................................................................................5 \nWindy Ridge Farm v. Assessor of Town of Shandaken, \n11 N.Y.3d 725 (2008) ................................................................................................................6 \nState Statutes \nCounty Law \n\u00a7 700.........................................................................................................................................13 \n\u00a7 701(6) ........................................................................................................................ 10-11, 15 \nExecutive Law \n\u00a7 63(2) ............................................................................................................................ 1, 13-14 \nPenal Law \n\u00a7 20.25........................................................................................................................................5 \n\u00a7 120.20......................................................................................................................................5 \n\u00a7\u00a7 220.00\u2013220.55.......................................................................................................................5 \n\u00a7 260.20(2) .................................................................................................................................5 \nRules \nCPLR 308.......................................................................................................................................10 \nCPLR 401.........................................................................................................................................2 \nCPLR 1001...........................................................................................................................3\u20134, 6\u20138 \nCPLR 1003.......................................................................................................................................3 \nCPLR 1024.......................................................................................................................................5 \nCPLR 3025(b) ..................................................................................................................................2 \nCPLR 3211(a)(10) .......................................................................................................................3, 7 \nCPLR 7802(d) ..................................................................................................................................8 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n8 of 30\n\n--- Page 9 ---\n1 \n \nPRELIMINARY STATEMENT \nRespondent Kathy Hochul, Governor of the State of New York (Governor) and Respondent \nLetitia James, New York State Attorney General (AG, and collectively with the Governor, \nRespondents), respectfully submit this memorandum of law in opposition to Petitioner\u2019s motion \nfor leave to amend, dated November 5, 2026, which seeks leave to file an amended petition adding \nsix new parties who, like Petitioner, are defendants in Jane Doe v. Cornell University, et al., Index \nNo. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) (the Jane Doe Litigation).  As detailed below, amendment \nis not warranted because the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient and patently devoid of \nmerit.  Accordingly, Petitioner\u2019s motion for leave to amend should be denied, the relief requested \nin the Verified Petition should be denied, and the Verified Petition and this proceeding should be \ndismissed in their entirety and with prejudice. \nSTATEMENT OF FACTS \nFor a complete Statement of Facts, Respondents respectfully refer this Court to the \nStatement of Facts provided in their prior filing.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 1\u20133. \nAs relevant to this motion, Petitioner commenced this action by order to show cause on \nOctober 7, 2026, seeking to: (1) annul Executive Order No. 64 (EO 64), which was issued by the \nGovernor in exercise of her superseder authority pursuant to Executive Law \u00a7 63(2), requiring the \nAG to investigate the conduct of, and, if warranted, present evidence to a grand jury arising out of \nthe allegations in the Jane Doe Litigation; and (2) disqualify the AG from serving as special \nprosecutor in the investigation and prosecution contemplated by EO 64.  Dkt. Nos. 1\u201312.  \nRespondents answered, asserting objections in point of law and opposing the relief requested.  Dkt. \nNos. 18\u201321.  The Verified Petition was fully submitted on October 27, 2026.  See Dkt. No. 24.  \nThe parties then appeared before this Court for oral argument.  See Dkt. Nos. 13, 27.   \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n9 of 30\n\n--- Page 10 ---\n2 \n \nAt oral argument, this Court raised the issue of joinder, expressing concern about its ability \nto effectuate complete relief in the absence of others who may face prosecution as authorized by \nEO 64.1  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12\u201313.  Additionally, the Court expressed concerns about the potential \nfor inconsistent results amongst courts of coordinate jurisdiction.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12\u201316.  The \nCourt also raised related questions about venue.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12\u201313, 19\u201320.  At the \nconclusion of oral argument, the Court granted Petitioner\u2019s request to provide a further submission.  \nDkt. No. 27 at p. 42.  Petitioner subsequently moved by order to show cause for leave to amend \nthe Verified Petition to add six new parties\u2014four new petitioners and two new respondents, who, \nlike Petitioner, are defendants in the Jane Doe Litigation.  Dkt. Nos. 26\u201331.  Respondents oppose. \nSTANDARD OF REVIEW \nCPLR 401 provides applicable rules for joining new parties in special proceedings, \nincluding proceedings pursuant to CPLR Article 78.  It states that, \u201c[a]fter a proceeding is \ncommenced, no party shall be joined or interpleaded . . . except by leave of court.\u201d  CPLR 401.  \nAs relevant to any application for leave to amend made in this context, CPLR 3025(b) instructs \nthat leave to amend \u201cshall be freely given upon such terms as may be just . . . .\u201d  This is a liberal \nstandard that permits leave \u201cunless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently \ndevoid of merit.\u201d  NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v. People Care Inc., 156 A.D.3d 99, 102 \n \n1 As the Court noted at oral argument, Respondents did not raise any nonjoinder issue in \ntheir answering papers.  Dkt. No. 27 at p. 21.  However, any such defect is only one of many other \ndispositive defects requiring dismissal.  See Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 5\u201336.  Even without an objection \nfrom Respondents, this Court may \u201craise the absence of a necessary party at any stage of the \nproceedings upon its own motion.\u201d  Matter of Schenectady Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Social Servs. v. Noah \nDD., 200 A.D.3d 1509, 1511 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021).  Once raised, this Court may summon any necessary \nparty subject to this Court\u2019s jurisdiction or, if a necessary party cannot be summoned, the court \nmust consider whether to proceed in the absence of that necessary party.  Id.; see Matter of Velez \nv. New York State Dep\u2019t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 163 A.D.3d 1210, 1211\u201312 (3d Dep\u2019t \n2018). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n10 of 30\n\n--- Page 11 ---\n3 \n \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2017); see Backus v. Lyme Adirondack Timberlands II, LLC, 96 A.D.3d 1248, 1250 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2012); Dever v. DeVito, 84 A.D.3d 1539, 1541 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011). \nARGUMENT \nTHE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS PALPABLY INSUFFICIENT AND PATENTLY \nDEVOID OF MERIT. \nA. \nThe proposed amendment does not cure the defects identified by this Court. \nInitially, Petitioner\u2019s application for leave to amend should be denied because the proposed \namendment does not resolve the nonjoinder and venue defects identified by this Court.  Dkt No. \n27 at pp. 12\u201316; see Doe v. Tobin & Dempf, LLP, 247 A.D.3d 1320, 1323 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) (motion \ncourt did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because proposed \namendment did not cure pleading deficiency); Stone v. Gordon, 211 A.D.3d 881, 882 (3d Dep\u2019t \n1995) (same); see also Ahmed v. Choudhry, ___ A.D.3d ___ (1st Dep\u2019t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip. Op. \n06518 (Nov. 5, 2026) (denying plaintiff\u2019s request to amend its complaint because \u201camendment \nwould be futile since plaintiff cannot cure the defects\u201d). \n1. \nThe proposed amendment does not resolve any nonjoinder defect. \nCPLR 1001 mandates that \u201c[p]ersons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be \naccorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected \nby a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiff or defendants.\u201d  CPLR 1001(a).  \u201cWhen a \nperson who should be joined . . . has not been made a party and is subject to the jurisdiction of the \ncourt, the court shall order him summoned.\u201d  CPLR 1001(b).  \u201cIf jurisdiction over him can be \nobtained only by his consent or appearance, the court, when justice requires, may allow the action \nto proceed without his being made a party.\u201d  Id.  \u201cNonjoinder of a party who should be joined \nunder [CPLR 1001] is a ground for dismissal of an action without prejudice unless the court allows \nthe action to proceed without that party . . . .\u201d  CPLR 1003; see CPLR 3211(a)(10) (identifying \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n11 of 30\n\n--- Page 12 ---\n4 \n \nfailure to name a necessary party as grounds for dismissal); JMMJ Dev., LLC v. Woodvale \nHoldings, LLC, 207 A.D.3d 830, 831 (3d Dep\u2019t 2022) (resolving motion to dismiss or, in the \nalternative, for joinder based on absence of necessary party).   \nAs set forth in CPLR 1001(b), the determination as to whether a court may proceed without \na necessary party requires an evaluation of five discretionary factors:  \n(1) whether the plaintiff has another effective remedy in case the \naction is dismissed on account of the nonjoinder; (2) the prejudice \nwhich may accrue from the nonjoinder to the defendant or to the \nperson not joined; (3) whether and by whom prejudice might have \nbeen avoided or may in the future be avoided; (4) the feasibility of \na protective provision by order of the court or in the judgment; and \n(5) whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the absence \nof the person who is not joined. \n  \nCPLR 1001(b). \n \nIn analyzing these five factors, \u201c[n]o single one is determinative; and while the court need \nnot separately set forth its reasoning as to each factor, the statute directs it to consider all five.\u201d  \nMatter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 5 \nN.Y.3d 452, 459 (2005); see Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 19 N.Y.3d \n543, 551 (2012).  \u201cThe overall statutory design is intended to (1) guarantee that absent parties at \nrisk of prejudice will not be embarrassed by judgment purporting to bind their rights or interests \nwhere they have had no opportunity to be heard and (2) protect against multiple lawsuits and \ninconsistent judgments.\u201d  Comm\u2019r of the N.Y. State Dep\u2019t of Transp. v. Polite, 236 A.D.3d 82, 109 \n(2d Dep\u2019t 2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce \nv. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 820 (2003). \nHere, in the proposed amendment, Petitioner attempts to obviate the Court\u2019s nonjoinder \nconcerns by adding six new parties, who are some of Petitioner\u2019s co-defendants in the Jane Doe \nLitigation.  Dkt. No. 29 at \u00b6\u00b6 12\u201315, 18\u201319; see Dkt. No. 4.  However, in addition to the six parties \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n12 of 30\n\n--- Page 13 ---\n5 \n \nidentified in the proposed amendment, there are multiple other defendants in the Jane Doe \nLitigation that are alleged to have engaged in various misconduct that could provide a basis for \ncriminal liability.  See Dkt. No. 4; see also Penal Law \u00a7 20.25 (proscribing when an individual \nmay be criminally liable for corporate conduct).  Further, there are potentially innumerable \nunknown others who are not named as defendants in the Jane Doe Litigation, but whose conduct \nfalls within the scope of the investigation authorized by EO 64 and who could be subject to future \nprosecution by the AG.  See, e.g., Penal Law \u00a7 120.20 (making it unlawful to engage in conduct \nwhich creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person); Penal Law \u00a7\u00a7 220.00\u2013\n220.55 (controlled substances offenses); Penal Law \u00a7 260.20(2) (making it unlawful to sell any \nalcoholic beverage to a person under twenty-one years old).2   \nThus, if the necessary parties to this proceeding are the individuals whose conduct falls \nwithin the scope of the investigation authorized by EO 64 and may eventually be prosecuted, the \nproposed amendment does not obviate this Court\u2019s nonjoinder concerns because it fails to join all \nsuch parties.  See Matter of Iglhaut v. City of New York, 247 A.D.3d 569, 569 (1st Dep\u2019t 2026) \n(motion court properly dismissed article 78 proceeding for failure to join necessary parties where \npetitioner failed to identify all necessary parties \u201crendering it impossible to bring the parties before \nthe court\u201d); see also Matter of Furnia, 232 A.D.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Dep\u2019t 2024) (motion court\u2019s \n \n2 Although CPLR 1024 permits a litigant to proceed against unknown parties in certain \ncircumstances, this provision does not permit unknown petitioners in proceedings pursuant to \nCPLR Article 78.  See Matter of Westchester Cnty. Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. \nCnty. of Westchester, 29 Misc. 3d 1219(A) (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 2008) (\u201cCPLR 1024, which \nprovides for the naming of unknown parties as defendants in an action, does not provide for the \nnaming of unidentified Petitioners in an Article 78 proceeding\u201d).  Regardless, Petitioner has not \nnamed any unknown parties in the proposed amendment and otherwise has not met the \nprerequisites for use of this procedural tool.  Dkt No. 29; see Walker v. Glaxosmithkline, LLC, 161 \nA.D.3d 1419, 1420\u201321 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) (\u201c[i]n the absence of evidence that a plaintiff made the \nrequisite timely and diligent efforts to identify an unknown defendant, he or she may not take \nadvantage of the procedural mechanism provided by CPLR 1024\u201d). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n13 of 30\n\n--- Page 14 ---\n6 \n \nfinding that children of beneficiary of estate were necessary party to estate proceeding required \nremittal to motion court to consider whether there were other unknown children that could be \nidentified and joined or, if they could not be joined, whether court could proceed in their absence).  \nAt this stage of investigation, any nonjoinder of necessary parties only highlights that Petitioner\u2019s \nclaim is wildly premature.  Compare Matter of Soares v. Herrick, 20 N.Y.3d 139, 143, 146\u201347 \n(2012) (reaching merits of application to disqualify prosecutor after indictment was dismissed and \nre-presented five times and criminal defendant commenced civil action for malicious prosecution \nagainst prosecutor, but still denying such motion because criminal defendant failed to show any \nactual prejudice), with Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 56 (1983) (refusing to reach \nmerits of application to disqualify prosecutor at outset of investigation because \u201cthe application \nfor disqualification was premature\u201d).   \nMore pointedly, even if the six new parties identified in the proposed amendment were the \nonly other parties that might eventually be prosecuted, two of those parties\u2014Matthew Ingalls \n(Ingalls) and Johnathan Newell (Newell)\u2014cannot be joined because they are beyond the \njurisdiction of the Court.  CPLR 1001(b); see Windy Ridge Farm v. Assessor of Town of \nShandaken, 11 N.Y.3d 725, 727 (2008).  Although the proposed amendment purports to join \nNewell and Ingalls as respondents, Petitioner concedes they are not residents of this state.  Dkt. \nNo. 29 at \u00b6\u00b6 18\u201319.  Since neither reside in this state, Ingalls and Newell are not subject to the \njurisdiction of this Court and cannot be joined unless they consent or appear.  See Doe v. Roe, ___ \nA.D.3d ___ (3d Dep\u2019t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 06502 (Nov. 5, 2026) (court lacked general and \nspecific jurisdiction over defendant-undergraduate student at Cornell University because student \nmaintained domicile at her parents\u2019 residence while attending college and her participation in a \nuniversity disciplinary investigation did not provide basis for exercise of long-arm jurisdiction); \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n14 of 30\n\n--- Page 15 ---\n7 \n \nPorcello v. Brackett, 85 A.D.2d 917, 917\u201318 (4th Dep\u2019t 1981) (court lacked general and specific \njurisdiction over defendant-undergraduate student at Cornell University because student \nmaintained domicile at his parents\u2019 residence while attending college and \u201csocial agreement \namong students to share the expenses of a pleasure trip\u201d did not provide basis for exercise of long-\narm jurisdiction); see also Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 827, 829\u201330 (1988) \n(court lacked general and specific jurisdiction over defendant-alumna of St. Lawrence University \nbecause alumna resided in California and previous enrollment and attendance at university in New \nYork did not provide basis for exercise of long-arm jurisdiction).  Petitioner admits that Ingalls \nand Newell will not consent or appear.  Dkt. No. 26 at \u00b6\u00b6 26\u201327.  In the admitted absence of other \njurisdictional bases over these parties, they cannot be joined.  See CPLR 1001(b) (a court can only \norder a party to be joined if that party \u201cis subject to the jurisdiction of the court\u201d); Matter of \nSchenectady Cnty. Dep\u2019t of Social Servs. v. Noah DD., 200 A.D.3d 1509, 1511 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) \n(court \u201cplainly did not have authority to make [person] a named party to this proceeding\u201d because \nthe court had no jurisdiction over person and, in the absence of jurisdiction, \u201cthe court is limited \nto directing that reasonable efforts be made to join him as a party or considering whether this \nmatter should proceed in his absence\u201d). \nIn the absence of any party this Court deems necessary, this Court must consider the CPLR \n1001(b) balancing factors to determine whether it can proceed or whether it must dismiss.  See \nCPLR 3211(a)(10) (failure to name a necessary party as grounds for dismissal); Swezey, 19 N.Y.3d \nat 554\u201355 (dismissing action because balance of CPLR 1001(b) factors led court to \u201cconclude that \nthis case cannot be decided without the presence of the [necessary party]\u201d).  Notably, Petitioner \nmakes no attempt to address the CPLR 1001(b) balancing factors or otherwise request that this \nCourt proceed in the absence of any necessary parties.  See Dkt. Nos. 26\u201329.  Instead, Petitioner \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n15 of 30\n\n--- Page 16 ---\n8 \n \nasks this Court to effectuate joinder by giving notice to \u201cthe remaining individuals\u201d pursuant to \nCPLR 7802(d), so that these parties may intervene.3  Dkt. No. 26 at \u00b6 30.  This request conflicts \nwith Petitioner\u2019s proposed amendment, which purports to add Ingalls and Newell as respondents, \nrather than as proposed intervenors.  See Dkt. No. 29 at \u00b6\u00b6 18\u201319.  Even so, Petitioner\u2019s request \nthat this Court effectuate joinder by inviting intervention is procedurally improper because \n\u201c[w]hen a necessary party can be joined only by consent or appearance, a court must engage in the \nCPLR 1001(b) analysis to determine whether to allow the case to proceed without that party.\u201d  \nMatter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce, 5 N.Y.3d at 459. \nAnalyzing the requisite statutory factors here, the availability of alternative remedies cuts \nstrongly against proceeding in the absence of necessary parties because Petitioner\u2014and any other \nperson who might eventually be indicted and prosecuted\u2014can challenge any indictment in \nnumerous ways and through various procedural vehicles on a complete record that speaks to actual \nand specific, rather than hypothetical and generalized, claims of prejudice.  See Milmar Food \nGroup II, LLC v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., 61 Misc. 3d 812, 833 (Sup.Ct. Orange Cnty. 2018) \n(granting motion to dismiss for failure to name a necessary party because plaintiff had an effective \nremedy available in another state); Saxon Assoc. v. Barton, 143 Misc.2d 602, 603 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. \nCnty. 1989) (denying motion to amend judgment to add necessary party because plaintiff had \nanother effective remedy available in new plenary action or by moving for relief in separate \n \n3 Even if joinder could be accomplished in this unorthodox manner, issuing notice to invite \nintervention would unnecessarily delay this proceeding.  See Matter of Connectivity Sys., LLC v. \nZoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Ramapo, 227 A.D.3d 984, 986 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024); Matter of \nCitizens Organized to Protect the Envt. v. Planning Bd. of Town of Irondequuoit, 50 A.D.3d 1460, \n1461\u201362 (4th Dep\u2019t 2008); Matter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, 164 A.D.3d 518, 527 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 1990).  Further, the claim of any intervenor similarly situated to Petitioner would fail \nfor all the same reasons that Petitioner\u2019s claim fails.  See Town of Southhampton v. New York State \nDep\u2019t of Envtl. Conserv., 194 A.D.3d 1310, 1313 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) (motion to intervene in Article \n78 proceeding properly denied where underlying claim was defective). \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n16 of 30\n\n--- Page 17 ---\n9 \n \nbankruptcy proceeding); see also L-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet, Inc., 45 A.D.3d 1, 11 (1st \nDep\u2019t 2007) (\u201cdismissal should be a last resort where plaintiff will be deprived of any remedy\u201d \n(emphasis added)).   \nAlthough the availability of alternative remedies alone is not dispositive, the remaining \nfactors likewise weigh against proceeding because the absence of necessary parties would only \nsow confusion and chaos in this, a related proceeding, and in any potential future criminal \nprosecutions that would prejudice all parties and undermine this Court\u2019s ability to render an \neffective judgment.  See Matter of Green v. Bellini, 12 A.D.3d 1148, 1149 (4th Dep\u2019t 2004) \n(proceeding for writ of prohibition that sought to reinstate criminal prosecution could not continue \nin the absence of party that was subject of the criminal prosecution because of \u201cthe prejudice that \nmight accrue to [the criminal defendant] as a result of petitioner\u2019s failure to join him\u201d); see also \nAmazing Home Care Servs., LLC v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assur. Co., Inc., 191 \nA.D.3d 516, 519 (1st Dep\u2019t 2021) (dismissal of necessary party from action required dismissal of \nentire action because court could not proceed in absence of necessary party where alternative \nremedy was available to plaintiffs, absence of necessary party raised \u201c[t]he possibility of multiple \nconflicting judgments[,]\u201d and no effective judgment could be rendered without necessary party).   \nMoreover, permitting amendment to add new parties without any excuse for nonjoinder \nand at this late stage, after Respondents answered and after the parties were heard at oral argument, \nwould prejudice Respondents by unduly delaying this proceeding.  See Place v. Preferred Mut. \nIns. Co., 190 A.D.3d 1208, 1212 (3d Dep\u2019t 2021) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in \ndenying motion for leave to amend complaint where application for leave to amend was made after \njoinder of issue and plaintiff offered no excuse for delay); Hennessy v. G.S. Mink Steamer & T. \nClaxton Hose Co. No. 2, Auxiliary Inc., 182 A.D.3d 830, 834 (3d Dep\u2019t 2020) (same); Bailey v. \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n17 of 30\n\n--- Page 18 ---\n10 \n \nVill. of Saranac Lake, Inc., 100 A.D.3d 1089, 1091 (3d Dep\u2019t 2012) (same).  Although delay of a \nfew weeks, like the delay already incurred here, is normally not unduly prejudicial, there is a \nsubstantial risk that this delay will be interminably prolonged by the proposed amendment because \nit contemplates adding new parties to this proceeding who apparently cannot be located.  See Dkt. \nNo. 29 at \u00b6\u00b6 18\u201319, 30.  As a practical matter, adding new respondents whose whereabouts are \nunknown would result in protracted delay while Petitioner continues his efforts to first locate and \nthen serve these new respondents.  See CPLR 308; Oglesby v. Barragan, 135 A.D.3d 1215, 1216 \n(3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (evaluating sufficiency of plaintiff\u2019s efforts to locate out-of-state defendants for \npurposes of service). \nAccordingly, the proposed amendment does not, and cannot at this time, resolve the \nnonjoinder issue identified by this Court such that amendment should not be permitted.  See Cisco \nv. Verizon, N.Y., Inc., 244 A.D.3d 809, 812 (3d Dep\u2019t 2025) (amendment not warranted because \nproposed amendment \u201cdid not cure the defects in the complaint that led to its dismissal\u201d); Carr v. \nHaas, 163 A.D.3d 1212, 1215 (3d Dep\u2019t 2018) (amendment not warranted because proposed \namendment did not cure justiciability and pleading defects); see also Gansett One, LLC v. Husch \nBlackwell, LLP, 168 A.D.3d 579, 580 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) (finding that granting leave to amend is \nunnecessary when \u201camendment cannot cure the fundamental deficiencies in these claims\u201d). \n2. \nThe proposed amendment does not resolve any venue defect. \nAlthough not squarely addressed in the proposed amendment, this Court, at oral argument, \nalso questioned whether Albany County is a proper venue for this proceeding.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. \n12\u201313, 19\u201320.  That question necessarily implicates a broader defect previously identified by \nRespondents\u2014i.e., that a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 is not the proper procedural \nvehicle to request disqualification of the AG.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 20\u201322.  As detailed in \nRespondents\u2019 answering papers, County Law \u00a7 701(6) otherwise establishes requirements for \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n18 of 30\n\n--- Page 19 ---\n11 \n \nmaking an application to disqualify the AG that apply any time she is serving as special prosecutor \nand mandate any application for disqualification be made to a superior criminal court in the county \nwhere the criminal matter is triable.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 20\u201322; see County Law \u00a7 701(6); see also \nPeople v. Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d 564, 578\u201379 (2021) (disqualification processes in County Law \u00a7 \nserve separation of powers functions that are implicated when a court is asked to undertake \u201cthe \nexceptional function of displacing an elected constitutional officer\u201d).   \nThe statutory requirements set forth in County Law \u00a7 701(6) serve the important comity \ngoals animating the Court\u2019s questions.  See County Law \u00a7 701(6).  The process proscribed by \nCounty Law \u00a7 701(6) martials the disqualification process before a single court where any criminal \nmatter impacted by the disqualification is triable, limiting the risk of duplicative litigation and \ninconsistent results.  See Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8, 15 (1976) (considering principles \nof comity in connection with application for a writ of prohibition to disqualify the AG from serving \nas special prosecutor and finding that, because petitioner had twice moved to dismiss the \nindictment on the same grounds raised in his application for writ of prohibition to disqualify the \nAG, his failure to make a third application to dismiss the indictment did not bar prohibition since \na court ruling on the third application could not overrule the prior two decisions); see also Matter \nof Schneider v. Aulisi. 307 N.Y. 376, 382 (1954) (proceedings in multiple counties before courts \nof coordinate jurisdiction is disfavored because, even if not technically improper, as a matter of \npractice this \u201cwould tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and would seriously \ninterfere with the orderly administration of judicial work\u201d). \nB. \nThe proposed amendment raises new claims that lack merit. \nTo the extent that Petitioner\u2019s motion for leave to amend can be read as requesting leave \nto assert new factual allegations regarding the recent appointment of outside counsel to assist the \nAG with the investigation authorized by EO 64, any request to so amend must be denied because \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n19 of 30\n\n--- Page 20 ---\n12 \n \nany claims directed at the appointment of outside counsel are wholly without merit.  See Gaul v. \nCool Insuring Agency, Inc., 250 A.D.3d 1162, 1165 (3d Dep\u2019t 2026) (motion for leave to amend \nwas \u201cappropriately denied\u201d because proposed amendment failed to state clam with requisite \nparticularity and allegations were otherwise insufficient to state a claim); Loch Sheldrake Beach \n& Tennis, Inc. v. Akulich, 141 A.D.3d 809, 811 (3d Dep\u2019t 2016) (motion for leave to amend was \nimproperly granted because claims in proposed amendment failed as a matter of law).   \nPetitioner\u2019s new factual allegations and contentions about the appointment of outside \ncounsel reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the constitutional predicate for criminal \ninvestigations and prosecutions.  See Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d at 577\u2013579 (explaining constitutional \ngrant of prosecutorial authority to the AG and district attorney, how they share prosecutorial \npowers, and constitutional basis for those officers to act); People v. Gilmour, 98 N.Y.2d 126, 129\u2013\n31 (2002) (explaining evolution of AG\u2019s prosecutorial authority and basis for same as provided in \nthe New York State Constitutional and Executive Law \u00a7 63).  Contrary to Petitioner\u2019s contentions \nthat the investigation must proceed without the AG\u2019s involvement, in fact, it cannot.  See Viviani, \n36 N.Y.3d at 577 (finding it unconstitutional to create a special prosecutor other than AG or district \nattorney because this would \u201ctake[] an essential function from a constitutional officer and give[] it \nto a different officer chosen in a different manner\u201d); see also People ex rel. Wogan v. Rafferty, 208 \nN.Y. 451, 462 (1913) (finding it unconstitutional to take constitutional authority from \nconstitutional officer and vest that authority outside of the constitutional officer without any \ninvolvement by the constitutional officer because it would deprive the constitutional officer of \npowers vested by the constitution and \u201cinterfere with the free exercise\u201d of the officer\u2019s duties and \nresponsibilities).   \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n20 of 30\n\n--- Page 21 ---\n13 \n \nThe Legislature, apportioning prosecutorial authority between duly-elected constitutional \nlaw enforcement officers, vests: (1) district attorneys with generalized prosecutorial authority in \nthe county where they are elected; and (2) the AG with specific state-wide prosecutorial authority \nthat she may exercise only when authorized by statute.  See County Law \u00a7 700 (statutory delegation \nof general prosecutorial authority to district attorneys); Executive Law \u00a7 63 (statutory delegation \nof specific prosecutorial authority to the AG); see also People v. Romero, 91 N.Y.2d 750, 754 \n(1998) (\u201cDistrict Attorneys have plenary prosecutorial power in the counties where they are \nelected\u201d and \u201cthe Attorney-General has no such general authority . . . except when specifically \nauthorized by statute\u201d); Della Pietra v. State of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 792, 796 (1988) (district \nattorneys have \u201cgeneral prosecutorial authority for all crimes occurring in the county where \nelected\u201d and the AG has \u201cno general prosecutorial authority . . . except when specifically permitted \nby statute\u201d).  Beyond these two officers, no other person holds prosecutorial authority, nor may \nsuch authority be delegated away to an unelected person.  See Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d at 577 (finding \nit unconstitutional to create a special prosecutor other than AG or district attorney because this \nwould \u201ctake[] an essential function from a constitutional officer and give[] it to a different officer \nchosen in a different manner\u201d); Matter of Haggerty v. Himelein, 89 N.Y.2d 431, 436 (1997) (\u201cthe \nconstitutional, statutory, and common-law prosecutorial authority[,]\u201d including \u201cthe discretionary \npower to determine whom, whether and how to prosecute a criminal matter\u201d and \u201cthe responsibility \nand accountability\u201d for those actions is \u201cnot freely transferable to anyone else\u201d). \nExecutive Law \u00a7 63(2) is a statutory delegation of prosecutorial authority that empowers \nthe AG to exercise her prosecutorial authority whenever required by the Governor.  Exec. Law \u00a7 \n63(2).  The Governor exercising her superseder authority under Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) has a single \nprosecutorial alternative to the district attorney\u2014the AG.  Exec. Law \u00a7 63(2); see Viviani, 36 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n21 of 30\n\n--- Page 22 ---\n14 \n \nN.Y.3d at 579; see also Wogan, 208 N.Y. at 462 (finding it unconstitutional to take constitutional \nauthority from constitutional officer and vest that authority outside of the constitutional officer \nwithout any involvement by the constitutional officer because it would deprive the constitutional \nofficer of powers vested by the constitution and \u201cinterfere with the free exercise\u201d of the officer\u2019s \nduties and responsibilities).  The AG acting in a superseder capacity wholly displaces the district \nattorney and strips all prosecutorial authority from the district attorney.  See Matter of Haggerty, \n89 N.Y.2d at 436 (when the Governor requires the AG to act, the AG supersedes the local district \nattorney \u201cto assume the prosecutorial function\u201d and \u201cacquires all the powers and performs all the \nduties in respect of such actions or proceedings before a court or Grand Jury, which the district \nattorney would otherwise be authorized or required to exercise or perform.\u201d); Matter of Carey \n(Fischer), 68 A.D.2d 220, 224\u201325 (4th Dep\u2019t 1978) (\u201c[a]n Attorney-General who supersedes a \nlocal [d]istrict [a]ttorney exercises all powers and performs all duties with respect thereto that the \nlocal [d]istrict [a]ttorney would otherwise perform\u201d); Matter of Rice, 31 Misc.3d 838, 842 (Sup. \nCt. Nassau Cnty. 2011) (recognizing that when Governor exercises her superseder authority under \nExecutive Law \u00a7 63(2), she is removing power from the district attorney). \nThus here, where the Governor has exercised her superseder authority to task the AG with \nthe investigation authorized by EO 64, the district attorney is divested of any prosecutorial \nauthority over that investigation and the only person with any prosecutorial authority to investigate \nthis matter is the AG.  See Matter of Carey, 68 A.D.2d at 225; see also Matter of Haggerty, 89 \nN.Y.2d at 436 (recognizing distinction between when AG is acting under superseder authority \nunder Executive Law \u00a7 63(2) and fully displacing district attorney versus when AG and district \nattorney are working cooperatively together).  That ultimate prosecutorial authority cannot be \nfurther divested from the AG and installed in an unelected person.  See Matter of Schumer, 60 \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n22 of 30\n\n--- Page 23 ---\n15 \n \nN.Y.2d at 52 (prosecutor cannot delegate away ultimate prosecutorial responsibility and authority); \nsee also Wogan, 36 N.Y.3d at 455\u201356 (constitutional authority cannot be taken away from a \nconstitutional officer and given to a non-elected, non-constitutional officer); see also Matter of \nWorking Families Party v. Fisher, 23 N.Y.3d 539, 546 (2014) (recognizing a strong \u201cpublic \ninterest in having prosecutorial duties preformed, where possible, by the constitutional officer \nchosen by the electorate\u201d).  Rather, the AG, as the sole constitutional officer currently vested with \nthe constitutional and statutory prosecutorial powers and responsibilities, must retain ultimate \nauthority and control.  See People v. Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d 727, 728 (1995) (prosecutor \u201cmay allow \nappearances by public officers or private attorneys so long as they are kept aware\u201d because \nprosecutors \u201cretain the ultimate, nondelegable responsibility for prosecuting\u201d).   \nThough the AG may be assisted by an unelected person, as she will be here by the outside \ncounsel, ultimate responsibility and accountability for the prosecution must remain with the AG \nand her complete exclusion from the investigation is constitutionally impermissible.  See Matter \nof Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 52 (district attorney could not transfer fundamental responsibilities of \nher office to unelected official); see also People v. Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d 727, 728 (1995) \n(prosecutor \u201cmay allow appearances by public officers or private attorneys so long as they are kept \naware\u201d because prosecutors \u201cretain the ultimate, nondelegable responsibility for prosecuting\u201d); \nWogan, 208 N.Y. at 462 (constitutional authority vested in constitutional officer could not be \nvested outside of that constitutional officer).  In certain limited circumstances, County Law \u00a7 \n701(6) permits further divestiture of the AG\u2019s prosecutorial authority, but this further divestiture \ncan only be done on application of the AG and in a superior criminal court in the county where the \ncriminal matter is triable and permits transfer only to very specific alternatives.  County Law \u00a7 \n701(6).  These statutory limitations are strictly construed because \u201ca very important purpose is \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n23 of 30\n\n--- Page 24 ---\n16 \n \nserved by adhering to the plain language of the statute and to its exceptional function of displacing \nan elected constitutional officer.\u201d  People v. Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d 510, 514 (1988); see People v. \nCallara, 44 N.Y.3d 623, 626 (2025) (requiring strict adherence to statutory process for transferring \npower from a prosecutor because of \u201cthe separation of powers concerns at play\u201d). \nFurthermore, the writ of prohibition does not lie to compel this relief because the AG\u2019s \ndecision to appoint outside counsel, staffing decisions about who will work with the outside \ncounsel, and ultimately how the investigation is conducted through outside counsel are all \nexecutive or administrative actions against which the writ of prohibition does not lie.  See Matter \nof Doe v. Cuomo, 71 A.D.3d 889, 889 (2d Dep\u2019t 2010) (writ of prohibition did not lie against \ninvestigation into alleged violation of immunity agreement because such action is executive in \nnature); McGraw v. Shapiro, 56 A.D.2d 624 (2d Dep\u2019t 1977) (writ of prohibition did not lie against \nemployment decisions because such actions are administrative in nature); see also Matter of Soares \nv. Carter, 25 N.Y.3d 1013 (2015) (recognizing the \u201cbroad authority and discretion . . . to conduct \nall phases of criminal prosecution\u201d as an \u201cexecutive power\u201d).  Further, Petitioner has no clear legal \nright to any relief because neither he, nor this Court, may dictate how any prosecutor, including \nthe AG or any designee, perform their job responsibilities or exercise their prosecutorial discretion.  \nSee Matter of Staten Is. Branch of the Nat\u2019s Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. State \nof N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & Thirteenth Jud. Dists., 144 A.D.3d 412, 413 \n(1st Dep\u2019t 2016); Matter of Columbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 \n(Czajka), 118 A.D.3d 1081, 1083 (3d Dep\u2019t 2014); Matter of Donnaruma v. Carter, 41 Misc. 3d \n195, 210\u201311 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013).   \nLikewise, a writ of prohibition should not issue as a matter of discretion given the \navailability of other adequate remedies available to Petitioner if he is eventually indicted and \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n24 of 30\n\n--- Page 25 ---\n17 \n \nprosecuted.  See Matter of Whitehurst v. Kavanagh, 218 A.D.2d 366, 368\u201369 (3d Dep\u2019t 1996) \n(affirming denial of writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit district attorney from proceeding with \nprosecution of indictment because petitioner could raise his claims \u201cby moving against the \nindictment\u201d and \u201cthe ordeal of a criminal trial with the possibility of conviction, standing along is \nnot sufficiently harmful to warrant the use of prohibition even if the harm sought to be redressed \nimplicates a constitutional right\u201d); see also People v. Riccio, 91 A.D.2d 693, 694 (3d Dep\u2019t 1982) \n(direct appeal from criminal conviction considering criminal defendant\u2019s claim that prosecution \nby AG acting pursuant to Executive Order made in exercise of Governor\u2019s superseder authority \nwas improper or beyond scope of AG\u2019s authority).   \nAccordingly, Petitioner\u2019s request for leave to amend to add new factual allegations \nregarding the appointment of outside counsel should be denied because these new factual \nallegations are wholly without merit.  See Capicotto v. Western N.Y. Med. Mgt., LLC, 247 A.D.3d \n1492, 1494 (4th Dep\u2019t 2026) (motion court properly denied motion for leave to amend because \nproposed amendment was patently devoid of merit \u201cwhere it fails to cure any of the defects that \nwarranted dismissal\u201d); Singh v. T-Mobile. 232 A.D.3d 662, 667 (2d Dep\u2019t 2024) (motion court \nproperly denied motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment \u201cwas palpably \ninsufficient and patently devoid of merit, as it failed to cure any of the defects that warranted \ndismissal\u201d); Spada v. Aspen Univ., Inc., 202 A.D.3d 494, 495 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) (motion court \nproperly denied motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment \u201cwould not cure the \ndeficiency\u201d in the original pleading). \nC. \nThe proposed amendment does not cure the procedural and substantive \ndefects that mandate dismissal of the Verified Petition. \nFinally, leave to amend must also be denied because the proposed amendment does not \ncure the numerous other procedural and substantive defects that require dismissal of the Verified \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n25 of 30\n\n--- Page 26 ---\n18 \n \nPetition and preclude this Court from granting relief.  See Matter of Town of Verona v. Cuomo, \n136 A.D.3d 36, 45 (3d Dep\u2019t 2015) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying cross-\nmotion to amend because proposed amendment was \u201cplainly lacking in merit\u201d where petitioners \nlacked standing and court lacked jurisdiction over dispute); Swergold v. Cuomo, 70 A.D.3d 1290, \n1294 (3d Dep\u2019t 2010) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for leave to \namend because proposed amendment \u201csuffer[ed] from the same jurisdictional deficiencies\u201d and \n\u201calso would have been dismissed in its entirety\u201d); Matter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v. New York \nState Dep\u2019t of Health, 46 A.D.3d 962, 964 (3d Dep\u2019t 2007) (affirming motion court determination \nthat denied motion for leave to amend because claims in proposed amendment were substantively \nmeritless). \nAs detailed in Respondents\u2019 answering papers, Petitioner\u2019s claim fails three important \njusticiability criteria\u2014ripeness, standing, and presentation of a political question.  Dkt. No. 21 at \npp. 5\u201320.  These threshold considerations are dispositive and not cured by the proposed \namendment.  See Matter of Shelter Is. Assn. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Shelter Is., 57 \nA.D.3d 907, 908\u201310 (2d Dep\u2019t 2008) (finding \u201cSupreme Court did not err in denying . . . \npetitioner\u2019s cross motion which was for leave to amend the petition . . . as none of the petitioners, \nincluding the four additional petitioners that the original petitioners sought to add had standing\u201d); \nsee also Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 91 N.Y.2d 214, 223 (1997) (judicial review of the Governor\u2019s \nexercise of her superseder authority \u201cis generally limited to determining whether the State \nConstitution or the Legislature has empowered the Governor to act and does not include the \nmanner in which the Governor chooses to discharge that authority\u201d); Matter of Schumer, 60 \nN.Y.2d at 55\u201356 (request to disqualify prosecutor raised separation of powers concerns and \u201cwas \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n26 of 30\n\n--- Page 27 ---\n19 \n \npremature and not justiciable\u201d because it was made before information about how prosecution \nmight play out was known).   \nSimilarly, as also discussed in Respondents\u2019 answering papers, Petitioner\u2019s claim is \nprocedurally improper because the writ of prohibition does not lie against executive action or in \nthe absence of a clear legal right to relief.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 22\u201328.  Neither defect is remedied \nby the proposed amendment as the claim in the proposed amendment is identical to the claim \nalleged in the original petition, both of which impermissibly seek a writ of prohibition against \nexecutive action and do not identify any clear entitlement to relief.  See Matter of Wechsler v. New \nYork State Adirondack Park Agency, 85 A.D.3d 1378, 1379 (3d Dep\u2019t 2011); see also Matter of \nMcGinley v. Hynes, 51 N.Y.2d 116, 123\u201325 (1980) (writ of prohibition did not lie against \ninvestigative activities of special prosecutor because investigation \u201chad not yet progressed to a \nstage where individual wrongdoers had been identified or discrete charges of criminality raised\u201d).   \nThese procedural defects notwithstanding, and as also discussed in Respondents\u2019 \nanswering papers, issuance of the writ of prohibition is also not warranted as a matter of this \nCourt\u2019s discretion.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 28\u201331.  Further, Petitioner fails to establish any actual \nprejudice that would require disqualification of the AG.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 31\u201335.  Nothing in the \nproposed amendment addresses these defects.  See People v. Zinkhen, 89 A.D.3d 1319, 1320 (3d \nDep\u2019t 2011) (criminal court did not err in denying motion to dismiss indictment that alleged the \nprosecutor should be disqualified because did not provide proof of any actual prejudice and only \nasserted \u201can inference of impropriety, which is not enough on its own to require [the c]ourt to \ndismiss the indictment or disqualify the District Attorney\u2019s office\u201d); People v. Walton, 214 A.D.2d \n805, 808\u201309 (3d Dep\u2019t 1995) (denying CPL 440 motion \u201c[a]lleging that statements made by the \nprosecutor to the press constituted prosecutorial misconduct and that he was the victim of selective \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n27 of 30\n\n--- Page 28 ---\n20 \n \nprosecution\u201d because defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced or that this resulted in \nselective application of the law and defendant otherwise had ability to protect his rights through \nother means at trial and in pre-trial motions); see also People v. National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc., \n223 A.D.3d 84, 90\u201391 (1st Dep\u2019t 2023) (AG\u2019s public statements that \u201cdisplayed animus\u201d towards \ndefendant organization did not amount to selective prosecution); Matter of People v. Trump Org., \nInc., 205 A.D.3d 625, 626\u201327 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) (AG\u2019s public statements about subject of subpoenas \ndid not did not amount to selective prosecution).   \nAccordingly, the proposed amendment is devoid of merit such that Petitioner\u2019s motion for \nleave to amend must be denied.  See Matter of Bolofsky v. City of New York, 205 A.D.3d 515, 515-\n16 (1st Dep\u2019t 2022) (finding \u201cSupreme Court providently exercised its discretion to deny leave to \namend to add additional parties after respondents challenged the standing of petitioner\u201d because \n\u201cpetitioners cannot show that they will actually be harmed by the challenged administrative action \nas the harm is entirely conjectural\u201d); Matter of Perkins v. Town of Dryden Planning Bd., 172 \nA.D.3d 1695, 1697\u201398 (3d Dep\u2019t 2019) (finding \u201cno abuse of discretion by Supreme Court in \ndenying the motion for leave to amend the petition\u201d because the proposed amendment \u201cis devoid \nof merit\u201d); Ferguson v. Hart, 151 A.D.3d 1242, 1243\u201345 (3d Dep\u2019t 2017) (reversing motion court \ndetermination that granted motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment was \u201cpalpably \ninsufficient on its face\u201d since claims were inconsistent with applicable law).    \nCONCLUSION \nRespondents respectfully request that Petitioner\u2019s motion for leave to amend be denied in \nits entirety and with prejudice. \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n28 of 30\n\n--- Page 29 ---\n21 \n \n \nDated: Albany, New York \n \nNovember 16, 2026 \n \nLETITIA JAMES \nAttorney General of the State of New York \nAttorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, \nGovernor of the State of New York, and \nLetitia James, New York State Attorney \nGeneral \nThe Capitol \nAlbany, New York  12224 \n \n \nBy: _/s/ Kaitlin Vigars___________ \nKaitlin Vigars \nAssistant Attorney General, of Counsel \nTelephone:  (518) 776-2036 \nFax: (518) 915-7738  (Not for service of papers) \n \n \nTO: \nAll counsel of record (via NYSCEF) \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n29 of 30\n\n--- Page 30 ---\nPrinted [Reproduced] on Recycled Paper \n22 \n \nSTATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.8-b \n \nI, Kaitlin Vigars, affirm under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106 that the total \nnumber of words in the foregoing Memorandum of Law, inclusive of point headings and footnotes \nand exclusive of pages containing the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, and signature \nblock, is 6,776 words. The foregoing Memorandum of Law complies with the word count limit set \nforth in 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. In determining the number of words in the foregoing Memorandum \nof Law, I relied upon the word count of the word-processing system used to prepare the document.  \n \n/s/ Kaitlin Vigars \n                                     \n \n \nKaitlin Vigars \n \n \n \nFILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM\nINDEX NO. 911974-26\nNYSCEF DOC. NO. 34\nRECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026\n30 of 30","thumbnailUrl":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/786/thumb.webp","transcriptStatus":"not_applicable","transcriptText":"","url":"https://lucycraig.blog/media/786"}
