# 911974_26_Gillio_Lopes_v_Kathleen_M_Hochul_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_I_34

Source: https://lucycraig.blog/media/786
File: 911974_26_Gillio_Lopes_v_Kathleen_M_Hochul_et_al_MEMORANDUM_OF_LAW_I_34.pdf
Format: application/pdf
Description: 
Alt text: 

## OCR / extracted text

--- Page 1 ---
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 
COUNTY OF ALBANY 
 
In the Matter of the Application of 
GILLIO LOPES, 
Petitioner, 
 
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules 
 
-against- 
 
KATHLEEN (“KATHY”) M. HOCHUL, in her official 
capacity as Governor of the State of New York, and 
LETITIA JAMES, in her official capacity as Attorney 
General of the State of New York, 
 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Index No. 911974-26 
 
Farrell, J. 
 
   
 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND 
 
 
LETITIA JAMES 
Attorney General of the State of New York 
Attorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, 
Governor of the State of New York, and 
Letitia James, New York State Attorney 
General 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York  12224 
 
Kaitlin Vigars 
Assistant Attorney General,  
 of Counsel 
Telephone: (518) 776-2036 
Fax: (518) 915-7738 (Not for service of papers) 
 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
1 of 30

--- Page 2 ---
i 
 
Table of Contents 
 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 2 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 3 
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS PALPABLY INSUFFICIENT 
AND PATENTLY DEVOID OF MERIT. ............................................................. 3 
A. 
The proposed amendment does not cure the defects 
identified by this Court. .................................................................. 3 
1. 
The proposed amendment does not resolve any 
nonjoinder defect. ............................................................... 3 
2. 
The proposed amendment does not resolve any 
venue defect. ..................................................................... 10 
B. 
The proposed amendment raises new claims that lack merit. ....... 11 
C. 
The proposed amendment does not cure the procedural and 
substantive defects that mandate dismissal of the Verified 
Petition. ......................................................................................... 17 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 20 
 
 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
2 of 30

--- Page 3 ---
ii 
 
Table of Authorities 
 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Ahmed v. Choudhry, 
___ A.D.3d ___ (1st Dep’t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip. Op. 06518 (Nov. 5, 2026) .........................3 
Amazing Home Care Servs., LLC v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assur. Co., Inc., 
191 A.D.3d 516 (1st Dep’t 2021) ..............................................................................................9 
Backus v. Lyme Adirondack Timberlands II, LLC, 
96 A.D.3d 1248 (3d Dep’t 2012) ...............................................................................................3 
Bailey v. Vill. of Saranac Lake, Inc., 
100 A.D.3d 1089 (3d Dep’t 2012) .............................................................................................9 
Capicotto v. Western N.Y. Med. Mgt., LLC, 
247 A.D.3d 1492 (4th Dep’t 2026) ..........................................................................................17 
Carr v. Haas, 
163 A.D.3d 1212 (3d Dep’t 2018) ...........................................................................................10 
Cisco v. Verizon, N.Y., Inc., 
244 A.D.3d 809 (3d Dep’t 2025) .............................................................................................10 
Comm’r of the N.Y. State Dep’t of Transp. v. Polite, 
236 A.D.3d 82 (2d Dep’t 2024) .................................................................................................4 
Della Pietra v. State of New York, 
71 N.Y.2d 792 (1988) ..............................................................................................................13 
Dever v. DeVito, 
84 A.D.3d 1539 (3d Dep’t 2011) ...............................................................................................3 
Doe v. Roe, 
___ A.D.3d ___ (3d Dep’t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 06502 (Nov. 5, 2026) ..........................6 
Doe v. Tobin & Dempf, LLP, 
247 A.D.3d 1320 (3d Dep’t 2026) .............................................................................................3 
Ferguson v. Hart, 
151 A.D.3d 1242 (3d Dep’t 2017) ...........................................................................................20 
Gansett One, LLC v. Husch Blackwell, LLP, 
168 A.D.3d 579 (3d Dep’t 2019) .............................................................................................10 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
3 of 30

--- Page 4 ---
iii 
 
Gaul v. Cool Insuring Agency, Inc., 
250 A.D.3d 1162 (3d Dep’t 2026) ...........................................................................................12 
Hennessy v. G.S. Mink Steamer & T. Claxton Hose Co. No. 2, Auxiliary Inc., 
182 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dep’t 2020) ...............................................................................................9 
Jane Doe v. Cornell University, et al., 
Index No. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) ..........................................................................1 
JMMJ Dev., LLC v. Woodvale Holdings, LLC, 
207 A.D.3d 830 (3d Dep’t 2022) ...............................................................................................4 
L-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet, Inc., 
45 A.D.3d 1 (1st Dep’t 2007) ....................................................................................................9 
Loch Sheldrake Beach & Tennis, Inc. v. Akulich, 
141 A.D.3d 809 (3d Dep’t 2016) .............................................................................................12 
Matter of Bolofsky v. City of New York, 
205 A.D.3d 515 (1st Dep’t 2022) ............................................................................................20 
Matter of Carey (Fischer), 
68 A.D.2d 220 (4th Dep’t 1978) ..............................................................................................14 
Matter of Citizens Organized to Protect the Envt. v. Planning Bd. of Town of 
Irondequuoit, 
50 A.D.3d 1460 (4th Dep’t 2008) ..............................................................................................8 
Matter of Columbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 (Czajka), 
118 A.D.3d 1081 (3d Dep’t 2014) ...........................................................................................16 
Matter of Connectivity Sys., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Ramapo, 
227 A.D.3d 984 (2d Dep’t 2024) ...............................................................................................8 
Matter of Doe v. Cuomo, 
71 A.D.3d 889 (2d Dep’t 2010) ...............................................................................................16 
Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 
40 N.Y.2d 8 (1976) ..................................................................................................................11 
Matter of Donnaruma v. Carter, 
41 Misc. 3d 195 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013) .......................................................................16 
Matter of Furnia, 
232 A.D.3d 1080 (3d Dep’t 2024) .............................................................................................5 
Matter of Green v. Bellini, 
12 A.D.3d 1148 (4th Dep’t 2004) ..............................................................................................9 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
4 of 30

--- Page 5 ---
iv 
 
Matter of Haggerty v. Himelein, 
89 N.Y.2d 431 (1997) ........................................................................................................ 13-14 
Matter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, 
164 A.D.3d 518 (3d Dep’t 1990) ...............................................................................................8 
Matter of Iglhaut v. City of New York, 
247 A.D.3d 569 (1st Dep’t 2026) ..............................................................................................5 
Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 
91 N.Y.2d 214 (1997) ..............................................................................................................18 
Matter of McGinley v. Hynes, 
51 N.Y.2d 116 (1980) ..............................................................................................................19 
Matter of People v. Trump Org., Inc., 
205 A.D.3d 625 (1st Dep’t 2022) ............................................................................................20 
Matter of Perkins v. Town of Dryden Planning Bd., 
172 A.D.3d 1695 (3d Dep’t 2019) ...........................................................................................20 
Matter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & 
Appeals, 
5 N.Y.3d 452 (2005) ..............................................................................................................4, 8 
Matter of Rice, 
31 Misc.3d 838 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2011).........................................................................14 
Matter of Schenectady Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Noah DD., 
200 A.D.3d 1509 (3d Dep’t 2021) .........................................................................................2, 7 
Matter of Schneider v. Aulisi. 
307 N.Y. 376 (1954) ................................................................................................................11 
Matter of Schumer, 
60 N.Y.2d at 55–56 ..................................................................................................................18 
Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 
60 N.Y.2d 46 (1983) ...................................................................................................... 6, 14-15 
Matter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v. New York State Dep’t of Health, 
46 A.D.3d 962 (3d Dep’t 2007) ...............................................................................................18 
Matter of Shelter Is. Assn. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Shelter Is., 
57 A.D.3d 907 (2d Dep’t 2008) ...............................................................................................18 
Matter of Soares v. Carter, 
25 N.Y.3d 1013 (2015) ............................................................................................................16 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
5 of 30

--- Page 6 ---
v 
 
Matter of Soares v. Herrick, 
20 N.Y.3d 139 (2012) ................................................................................................................6 
Matter of Staten Is. Branch of the Nat’s Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. 
State of N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & Thirteenth Jud. Dists., 
144 A.D.3d 412 (1st Dep’t 2016) ............................................................................................16 
Matter of Town of Verona v. Cuomo, 
136 A.D.3d 36 (3d Dep’t 2015) ...............................................................................................18 
Matter of Velez v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 
163 A.D.3d 1210 (3d Dep’t 2018) .............................................................................................2 
Matter of Wechsler v. New York State Adirondack Park Agency, 
85 A.D.3d 1378 (3d Dep’t 2011) .............................................................................................19 
Matter of Westchester Cnty. Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. Cnty. of 
Westchester, 
29 Misc. 3d 1219(A) (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 2008) ..........................................................5 
Matter of Whitehurst v. Kavanagh, 
218 A.D.2d 366 (3d Dep’t 1996) .............................................................................................17 
Matter of Working Families Party v. Fisher, 
23 N.Y.3d 539 (2014) ..............................................................................................................15 
McGraw v. Shapiro, 
56 A.D.2d 624 (2d Dep’t 1977) ...............................................................................................16 
Milmar Food Group II, LLC v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., 
61 Misc. 3d 812 (Sup.Ct. Orange Cnty. 2018) ..........................................................................8 
NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v. People Care Inc., 
156 A.D.3d 99 (3d Dep’t 2017) .................................................................................................2 
Oglesby v. Barragan, 
135 A.D.3d 1215 (3d Dep’t 2016) ...........................................................................................10 
People ex rel. Wogan v. Rafferty, 
208 N.Y. 451 (1913) .................................................................................................... 12, 14-15 
People v. Callara, 
44 N.Y.3d 623 (2025) ..............................................................................................................16 
People v. Gilmour, 
98 N.Y.2d 126 (2002) ..............................................................................................................12 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
6 of 30

--- Page 7 ---
vi 
 
People v. Leahy, 
72 N.Y.2d 510 (1988) ..............................................................................................................16 
People v. National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc., 
223 A.D.3d 84 (1st Dep’t 2023) ..............................................................................................20 
People v. Riccio, 
91 A.D.2d 693 (3d Dep’t 1982) ...............................................................................................17 
People v. Romero, 
91 N.Y.2d 750 (1998) ..............................................................................................................13 
People v. Soddano, 
86 N.Y.2d 727 (1995) ..............................................................................................................15 
People v. Viviani, 
36 N.Y.3d 564 (2021) ........................................................................................................ 11-13 
People v. Walton, 
214 A.D.2d 805 (3d Dep’t 1995) .............................................................................................19 
People v. Zinkhen, 
89 A.D.3d 1319 (3d Dep’t 2011) .............................................................................................19 
Place v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 
190 A.D.3d 1208 (3d Dep’t 2021) .............................................................................................9 
Porcello v. Brackett, 
85 A.D.2d 917 (4th Dep’t 1981) ................................................................................................7 
Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 
100 N.Y.2d 801 (2003) ..............................................................................................................4 
Saxon Assoc. v. Barton, 
143 Misc.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1989) ............................................................................8 
Singh v. T-Mobile. 
232 A.D.3d 662 (2d Dep’t 2024) .............................................................................................17 
Spada v. Aspen Univ., Inc., 
202 A.D.3d 494 (1st Dep’t 2022) ............................................................................................17 
Stone v. Gordon, 
211 A.D.3d 881 (3d Dep’t 1995) ...............................................................................................3 
Swergold v. Cuomo, 
70 A.D.3d 1290 (3d Dep’t 2010) .............................................................................................18 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
7 of 30

--- Page 8 ---
vii 
 
Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 
19 N.Y.3d 543 (2012) ............................................................................................................4, 7 
Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 
71 N.Y.2d 827 (1988) ................................................................................................................7 
Town of Southhampton v. New York State Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv., 
194 A.D.3d 1310 (3d Dep’t 2021) .............................................................................................8 
Walker v. Glaxosmithkline, LLC, 
161 A.D.3d 1419 (3d Dep’t 2017) .............................................................................................5 
Windy Ridge Farm v. Assessor of Town of Shandaken, 
11 N.Y.3d 725 (2008) ................................................................................................................6 
State Statutes 
County Law 
§ 700.........................................................................................................................................13 
§ 701(6) ........................................................................................................................ 10-11, 15 
Executive Law 
§ 63(2) ............................................................................................................................ 1, 13-14 
Penal Law 
§ 20.25........................................................................................................................................5 
§ 120.20......................................................................................................................................5 
§§ 220.00–220.55.......................................................................................................................5 
§ 260.20(2) .................................................................................................................................5 
Rules 
CPLR 308.......................................................................................................................................10 
CPLR 401.........................................................................................................................................2 
CPLR 1001...........................................................................................................................3–4, 6–8 
CPLR 1003.......................................................................................................................................3 
CPLR 1024.......................................................................................................................................5 
CPLR 3025(b) ..................................................................................................................................2 
CPLR 3211(a)(10) .......................................................................................................................3, 7 
CPLR 7802(d) ..................................................................................................................................8 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
8 of 30

--- Page 9 ---
1 
 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent Kathy Hochul, Governor of the State of New York (Governor) and Respondent 
Letitia James, New York State Attorney General (AG, and collectively with the Governor, 
Respondents), respectfully submit this memorandum of law in opposition to Petitioner’s motion 
for leave to amend, dated November 5, 2026, which seeks leave to file an amended petition adding 
six new parties who, like Petitioner, are defendants in Jane Doe v. Cornell University, et al., Index 
No. 161704/2026 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.) (the Jane Doe Litigation).  As detailed below, amendment 
is not warranted because the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient and patently devoid of 
merit.  Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for leave to amend should be denied, the relief requested 
in the Verified Petition should be denied, and the Verified Petition and this proceeding should be 
dismissed in their entirety and with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For a complete Statement of Facts, Respondents respectfully refer this Court to the 
Statement of Facts provided in their prior filing.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 1–3. 
As relevant to this motion, Petitioner commenced this action by order to show cause on 
October 7, 2026, seeking to: (1) annul Executive Order No. 64 (EO 64), which was issued by the 
Governor in exercise of her superseder authority pursuant to Executive Law § 63(2), requiring the 
AG to investigate the conduct of, and, if warranted, present evidence to a grand jury arising out of 
the allegations in the Jane Doe Litigation; and (2) disqualify the AG from serving as special 
prosecutor in the investigation and prosecution contemplated by EO 64.  Dkt. Nos. 1–12.  
Respondents answered, asserting objections in point of law and opposing the relief requested.  Dkt. 
Nos. 18–21.  The Verified Petition was fully submitted on October 27, 2026.  See Dkt. No. 24.  
The parties then appeared before this Court for oral argument.  See Dkt. Nos. 13, 27.   
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
9 of 30

--- Page 10 ---
2 
 
At oral argument, this Court raised the issue of joinder, expressing concern about its ability 
to effectuate complete relief in the absence of others who may face prosecution as authorized by 
EO 64.1  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12–13.  Additionally, the Court expressed concerns about the potential 
for inconsistent results amongst courts of coordinate jurisdiction.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12–16.  The 
Court also raised related questions about venue.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 12–13, 19–20.  At the 
conclusion of oral argument, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to provide a further submission.  
Dkt. No. 27 at p. 42.  Petitioner subsequently moved by order to show cause for leave to amend 
the Verified Petition to add six new parties—four new petitioners and two new respondents, who, 
like Petitioner, are defendants in the Jane Doe Litigation.  Dkt. Nos. 26–31.  Respondents oppose. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
CPLR 401 provides applicable rules for joining new parties in special proceedings, 
including proceedings pursuant to CPLR Article 78.  It states that, “[a]fter a proceeding is 
commenced, no party shall be joined or interpleaded . . . except by leave of court.”  CPLR 401.  
As relevant to any application for leave to amend made in this context, CPLR 3025(b) instructs 
that leave to amend “shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just . . . .”  This is a liberal 
standard that permits leave “unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently 
devoid of merit.”  NYAHSA Servs., Inc., Self-Ins. Trust v. People Care Inc., 156 A.D.3d 99, 102 
 
1 As the Court noted at oral argument, Respondents did not raise any nonjoinder issue in 
their answering papers.  Dkt. No. 27 at p. 21.  However, any such defect is only one of many other 
dispositive defects requiring dismissal.  See Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 5–36.  Even without an objection 
from Respondents, this Court may “raise the absence of a necessary party at any stage of the 
proceedings upon its own motion.”  Matter of Schenectady Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Noah 
DD., 200 A.D.3d 1509, 1511 (3d Dep’t 2021).  Once raised, this Court may summon any necessary 
party subject to this Court’s jurisdiction or, if a necessary party cannot be summoned, the court 
must consider whether to proceed in the absence of that necessary party.  Id.; see Matter of Velez 
v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 163 A.D.3d 1210, 1211–12 (3d Dep’t 
2018). 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
10 of 30

--- Page 11 ---
3 
 
(3d Dep’t 2017); see Backus v. Lyme Adirondack Timberlands II, LLC, 96 A.D.3d 1248, 1250 (3d 
Dep’t 2012); Dever v. DeVito, 84 A.D.3d 1539, 1541 (3d Dep’t 2011). 
ARGUMENT 
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IS PALPABLY INSUFFICIENT AND PATENTLY 
DEVOID OF MERIT. 
A. 
The proposed amendment does not cure the defects identified by this Court. 
Initially, Petitioner’s application for leave to amend should be denied because the proposed 
amendment does not resolve the nonjoinder and venue defects identified by this Court.  Dkt No. 
27 at pp. 12–16; see Doe v. Tobin & Dempf, LLP, 247 A.D.3d 1320, 1323 (3d Dep’t 2026) (motion 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion to amend complaint because proposed 
amendment did not cure pleading deficiency); Stone v. Gordon, 211 A.D.3d 881, 882 (3d Dep’t 
1995) (same); see also Ahmed v. Choudhry, ___ A.D.3d ___ (1st Dep’t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip. Op. 
06518 (Nov. 5, 2026) (denying plaintiff’s request to amend its complaint because “amendment 
would be futile since plaintiff cannot cure the defects”). 
1. 
The proposed amendment does not resolve any nonjoinder defect. 
CPLR 1001 mandates that “[p]ersons who ought to be parties if complete relief is to be 
accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected 
by a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiff or defendants.”  CPLR 1001(a).  “When a 
person who should be joined . . . has not been made a party and is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
court, the court shall order him summoned.”  CPLR 1001(b).  “If jurisdiction over him can be 
obtained only by his consent or appearance, the court, when justice requires, may allow the action 
to proceed without his being made a party.”  Id.  “Nonjoinder of a party who should be joined 
under [CPLR 1001] is a ground for dismissal of an action without prejudice unless the court allows 
the action to proceed without that party . . . .”  CPLR 1003; see CPLR 3211(a)(10) (identifying 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
11 of 30

--- Page 12 ---
4 
 
failure to name a necessary party as grounds for dismissal); JMMJ Dev., LLC v. Woodvale 
Holdings, LLC, 207 A.D.3d 830, 831 (3d Dep’t 2022) (resolving motion to dismiss or, in the 
alternative, for joinder based on absence of necessary party).   
As set forth in CPLR 1001(b), the determination as to whether a court may proceed without 
a necessary party requires an evaluation of five discretionary factors:  
(1) whether the plaintiff has another effective remedy in case the 
action is dismissed on account of the nonjoinder; (2) the prejudice 
which may accrue from the nonjoinder to the defendant or to the 
person not joined; (3) whether and by whom prejudice might have 
been avoided or may in the future be avoided; (4) the feasibility of 
a protective provision by order of the court or in the judgment; and 
(5) whether an effective judgment may be rendered in the absence 
of the person who is not joined. 
  
CPLR 1001(b). 
 
In analyzing these five factors, “[n]o single one is determinative; and while the court need 
not separately set forth its reasoning as to each factor, the statute directs it to consider all five.”  
Matter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, 5 
N.Y.3d 452, 459 (2005); see Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 19 N.Y.3d 
543, 551 (2012).  “The overall statutory design is intended to (1) guarantee that absent parties at 
risk of prejudice will not be embarrassed by judgment purporting to bind their rights or interests 
where they have had no opportunity to be heard and (2) protect against multiple lawsuits and 
inconsistent judgments.”  Comm’r of the N.Y. State Dep’t of Transp. v. Polite, 236 A.D.3d 82, 109 
(2d Dep’t 2024) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Saratoga Cnty. Chamber of Commerce 
v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 820 (2003). 
Here, in the proposed amendment, Petitioner attempts to obviate the Court’s nonjoinder 
concerns by adding six new parties, who are some of Petitioner’s co-defendants in the Jane Doe 
Litigation.  Dkt. No. 29 at ¶¶ 12–15, 18–19; see Dkt. No. 4.  However, in addition to the six parties 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
12 of 30

--- Page 13 ---
5 
 
identified in the proposed amendment, there are multiple other defendants in the Jane Doe 
Litigation that are alleged to have engaged in various misconduct that could provide a basis for 
criminal liability.  See Dkt. No. 4; see also Penal Law § 20.25 (proscribing when an individual 
may be criminally liable for corporate conduct).  Further, there are potentially innumerable 
unknown others who are not named as defendants in the Jane Doe Litigation, but whose conduct 
falls within the scope of the investigation authorized by EO 64 and who could be subject to future 
prosecution by the AG.  See, e.g., Penal Law § 120.20 (making it unlawful to engage in conduct 
which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person); Penal Law §§ 220.00–
220.55 (controlled substances offenses); Penal Law § 260.20(2) (making it unlawful to sell any 
alcoholic beverage to a person under twenty-one years old).2   
Thus, if the necessary parties to this proceeding are the individuals whose conduct falls 
within the scope of the investigation authorized by EO 64 and may eventually be prosecuted, the 
proposed amendment does not obviate this Court’s nonjoinder concerns because it fails to join all 
such parties.  See Matter of Iglhaut v. City of New York, 247 A.D.3d 569, 569 (1st Dep’t 2026) 
(motion court properly dismissed article 78 proceeding for failure to join necessary parties where 
petitioner failed to identify all necessary parties “rendering it impossible to bring the parties before 
the court”); see also Matter of Furnia, 232 A.D.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Dep’t 2024) (motion court’s 
 
2 Although CPLR 1024 permits a litigant to proceed against unknown parties in certain 
circumstances, this provision does not permit unknown petitioners in proceedings pursuant to 
CPLR Article 78.  See Matter of Westchester Cnty. Correction Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v. 
Cnty. of Westchester, 29 Misc. 3d 1219(A) (Sup. Ct. Westchester Cnty. 2008) (“CPLR 1024, which 
provides for the naming of unknown parties as defendants in an action, does not provide for the 
naming of unidentified Petitioners in an Article 78 proceeding”).  Regardless, Petitioner has not 
named any unknown parties in the proposed amendment and otherwise has not met the 
prerequisites for use of this procedural tool.  Dkt No. 29; see Walker v. Glaxosmithkline, LLC, 161 
A.D.3d 1419, 1420–21 (3d Dep’t 2017) (“[i]n the absence of evidence that a plaintiff made the 
requisite timely and diligent efforts to identify an unknown defendant, he or she may not take 
advantage of the procedural mechanism provided by CPLR 1024”). 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
13 of 30

--- Page 14 ---
6 
 
finding that children of beneficiary of estate were necessary party to estate proceeding required 
remittal to motion court to consider whether there were other unknown children that could be 
identified and joined or, if they could not be joined, whether court could proceed in their absence).  
At this stage of investigation, any nonjoinder of necessary parties only highlights that Petitioner’s 
claim is wildly premature.  Compare Matter of Soares v. Herrick, 20 N.Y.3d 139, 143, 146–47 
(2012) (reaching merits of application to disqualify prosecutor after indictment was dismissed and 
re-presented five times and criminal defendant commenced civil action for malicious prosecution 
against prosecutor, but still denying such motion because criminal defendant failed to show any 
actual prejudice), with Matter of Schumer v. Holtzman, 60 N.Y.2d 46, 56 (1983) (refusing to reach 
merits of application to disqualify prosecutor at outset of investigation because “the application 
for disqualification was premature”).   
More pointedly, even if the six new parties identified in the proposed amendment were the 
only other parties that might eventually be prosecuted, two of those parties—Matthew Ingalls 
(Ingalls) and Johnathan Newell (Newell)—cannot be joined because they are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Court.  CPLR 1001(b); see Windy Ridge Farm v. Assessor of Town of 
Shandaken, 11 N.Y.3d 725, 727 (2008).  Although the proposed amendment purports to join 
Newell and Ingalls as respondents, Petitioner concedes they are not residents of this state.  Dkt. 
No. 29 at ¶¶ 18–19.  Since neither reside in this state, Ingalls and Newell are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of this Court and cannot be joined unless they consent or appear.  See Doe v. Roe, ___ 
A.D.3d ___ (3d Dep’t 2026), 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 06502 (Nov. 5, 2026) (court lacked general and 
specific jurisdiction over defendant-undergraduate student at Cornell University because student 
maintained domicile at her parents’ residence while attending college and her participation in a 
university disciplinary investigation did not provide basis for exercise of long-arm jurisdiction); 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
14 of 30

--- Page 15 ---
7 
 
Porcello v. Brackett, 85 A.D.2d 917, 917–18 (4th Dep’t 1981) (court lacked general and specific 
jurisdiction over defendant-undergraduate student at Cornell University because student 
maintained domicile at his parents’ residence while attending college and “social agreement 
among students to share the expenses of a pleasure trip” did not provide basis for exercise of long-
arm jurisdiction); see also Talbot v. Johnson Newspaper Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 827, 829–30 (1988) 
(court lacked general and specific jurisdiction over defendant-alumna of St. Lawrence University 
because alumna resided in California and previous enrollment and attendance at university in New 
York did not provide basis for exercise of long-arm jurisdiction).  Petitioner admits that Ingalls 
and Newell will not consent or appear.  Dkt. No. 26 at ¶¶ 26–27.  In the admitted absence of other 
jurisdictional bases over these parties, they cannot be joined.  See CPLR 1001(b) (a court can only 
order a party to be joined if that party “is subject to the jurisdiction of the court”); Matter of 
Schenectady Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Noah DD., 200 A.D.3d 1509, 1511 (3d Dep’t 2021) 
(court “plainly did not have authority to make [person] a named party to this proceeding” because 
the court had no jurisdiction over person and, in the absence of jurisdiction, “the court is limited 
to directing that reasonable efforts be made to join him as a party or considering whether this 
matter should proceed in his absence”). 
In the absence of any party this Court deems necessary, this Court must consider the CPLR 
1001(b) balancing factors to determine whether it can proceed or whether it must dismiss.  See 
CPLR 3211(a)(10) (failure to name a necessary party as grounds for dismissal); Swezey, 19 N.Y.3d 
at 554–55 (dismissing action because balance of CPLR 1001(b) factors led court to “conclude that 
this case cannot be decided without the presence of the [necessary party]”).  Notably, Petitioner 
makes no attempt to address the CPLR 1001(b) balancing factors or otherwise request that this 
Court proceed in the absence of any necessary parties.  See Dkt. Nos. 26–29.  Instead, Petitioner 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
15 of 30

--- Page 16 ---
8 
 
asks this Court to effectuate joinder by giving notice to “the remaining individuals” pursuant to 
CPLR 7802(d), so that these parties may intervene.3  Dkt. No. 26 at ¶ 30.  This request conflicts 
with Petitioner’s proposed amendment, which purports to add Ingalls and Newell as respondents, 
rather than as proposed intervenors.  See Dkt. No. 29 at ¶¶ 18–19.  Even so, Petitioner’s request 
that this Court effectuate joinder by inviting intervention is procedurally improper because 
“[w]hen a necessary party can be joined only by consent or appearance, a court must engage in the 
CPLR 1001(b) analysis to determine whether to allow the case to proceed without that party.”  
Matter of Red Hook/Gowanus Chamber of Commerce, 5 N.Y.3d at 459. 
Analyzing the requisite statutory factors here, the availability of alternative remedies cuts 
strongly against proceeding in the absence of necessary parties because Petitioner—and any other 
person who might eventually be indicted and prosecuted—can challenge any indictment in 
numerous ways and through various procedural vehicles on a complete record that speaks to actual 
and specific, rather than hypothetical and generalized, claims of prejudice.  See Milmar Food 
Group II, LLC v. Applied Underwriters, Inc., 61 Misc. 3d 812, 833 (Sup.Ct. Orange Cnty. 2018) 
(granting motion to dismiss for failure to name a necessary party because plaintiff had an effective 
remedy available in another state); Saxon Assoc. v. Barton, 143 Misc.2d 602, 603 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cnty. 1989) (denying motion to amend judgment to add necessary party because plaintiff had 
another effective remedy available in new plenary action or by moving for relief in separate 
 
3 Even if joinder could be accomplished in this unorthodox manner, issuing notice to invite 
intervention would unnecessarily delay this proceeding.  See Matter of Connectivity Sys., LLC v. 
Zoning Bd. of Appeals of the Town of Ramapo, 227 A.D.3d 984, 986 (2d Dep’t 2024); Matter of 
Citizens Organized to Protect the Envt. v. Planning Bd. of Town of Irondequuoit, 50 A.D.3d 1460, 
1461–62 (4th Dep’t 2008); Matter of Hospital Assn. of N.Y. State v. Axelrod, 164 A.D.3d 518, 527 
(3d Dep’t 1990).  Further, the claim of any intervenor similarly situated to Petitioner would fail 
for all the same reasons that Petitioner’s claim fails.  See Town of Southhampton v. New York State 
Dep’t of Envtl. Conserv., 194 A.D.3d 1310, 1313 (3d Dep’t 2021) (motion to intervene in Article 
78 proceeding properly denied where underlying claim was defective). 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
16 of 30

--- Page 17 ---
9 
 
bankruptcy proceeding); see also L-3 Communications Corp. v. SafeNet, Inc., 45 A.D.3d 1, 11 (1st 
Dep’t 2007) (“dismissal should be a last resort where plaintiff will be deprived of any remedy” 
(emphasis added)).   
Although the availability of alternative remedies alone is not dispositive, the remaining 
factors likewise weigh against proceeding because the absence of necessary parties would only 
sow confusion and chaos in this, a related proceeding, and in any potential future criminal 
prosecutions that would prejudice all parties and undermine this Court’s ability to render an 
effective judgment.  See Matter of Green v. Bellini, 12 A.D.3d 1148, 1149 (4th Dep’t 2004) 
(proceeding for writ of prohibition that sought to reinstate criminal prosecution could not continue 
in the absence of party that was subject of the criminal prosecution because of “the prejudice that 
might accrue to [the criminal defendant] as a result of petitioner’s failure to join him”); see also 
Amazing Home Care Servs., LLC v. Applied Underwriters Captive Risk Assur. Co., Inc., 191 
A.D.3d 516, 519 (1st Dep’t 2021) (dismissal of necessary party from action required dismissal of 
entire action because court could not proceed in absence of necessary party where alternative 
remedy was available to plaintiffs, absence of necessary party raised “[t]he possibility of multiple 
conflicting judgments[,]” and no effective judgment could be rendered without necessary party).   
Moreover, permitting amendment to add new parties without any excuse for nonjoinder 
and at this late stage, after Respondents answered and after the parties were heard at oral argument, 
would prejudice Respondents by unduly delaying this proceeding.  See Place v. Preferred Mut. 
Ins. Co., 190 A.D.3d 1208, 1212 (3d Dep’t 2021) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying motion for leave to amend complaint where application for leave to amend was made after 
joinder of issue and plaintiff offered no excuse for delay); Hennessy v. G.S. Mink Steamer & T. 
Claxton Hose Co. No. 2, Auxiliary Inc., 182 A.D.3d 830, 834 (3d Dep’t 2020) (same); Bailey v. 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
17 of 30

--- Page 18 ---
10 
 
Vill. of Saranac Lake, Inc., 100 A.D.3d 1089, 1091 (3d Dep’t 2012) (same).  Although delay of a 
few weeks, like the delay already incurred here, is normally not unduly prejudicial, there is a 
substantial risk that this delay will be interminably prolonged by the proposed amendment because 
it contemplates adding new parties to this proceeding who apparently cannot be located.  See Dkt. 
No. 29 at ¶¶ 18–19, 30.  As a practical matter, adding new respondents whose whereabouts are 
unknown would result in protracted delay while Petitioner continues his efforts to first locate and 
then serve these new respondents.  See CPLR 308; Oglesby v. Barragan, 135 A.D.3d 1215, 1216 
(3d Dep’t 2016) (evaluating sufficiency of plaintiff’s efforts to locate out-of-state defendants for 
purposes of service). 
Accordingly, the proposed amendment does not, and cannot at this time, resolve the 
nonjoinder issue identified by this Court such that amendment should not be permitted.  See Cisco 
v. Verizon, N.Y., Inc., 244 A.D.3d 809, 812 (3d Dep’t 2025) (amendment not warranted because 
proposed amendment “did not cure the defects in the complaint that led to its dismissal”); Carr v. 
Haas, 163 A.D.3d 1212, 1215 (3d Dep’t 2018) (amendment not warranted because proposed 
amendment did not cure justiciability and pleading defects); see also Gansett One, LLC v. Husch 
Blackwell, LLP, 168 A.D.3d 579, 580 (3d Dep’t 2019) (finding that granting leave to amend is 
unnecessary when “amendment cannot cure the fundamental deficiencies in these claims”). 
2. 
The proposed amendment does not resolve any venue defect. 
Although not squarely addressed in the proposed amendment, this Court, at oral argument, 
also questioned whether Albany County is a proper venue for this proceeding.  Dkt. No. 27 at pp. 
12–13, 19–20.  That question necessarily implicates a broader defect previously identified by 
Respondents—i.e., that a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 is not the proper procedural 
vehicle to request disqualification of the AG.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 20–22.  As detailed in 
Respondents’ answering papers, County Law § 701(6) otherwise establishes requirements for 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
18 of 30

--- Page 19 ---
11 
 
making an application to disqualify the AG that apply any time she is serving as special prosecutor 
and mandate any application for disqualification be made to a superior criminal court in the county 
where the criminal matter is triable.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 20–22; see County Law § 701(6); see also 
People v. Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d 564, 578–79 (2021) (disqualification processes in County Law § 
serve separation of powers functions that are implicated when a court is asked to undertake “the 
exceptional function of displacing an elected constitutional officer”).   
The statutory requirements set forth in County Law § 701(6) serve the important comity 
goals animating the Court’s questions.  See County Law § 701(6).  The process proscribed by 
County Law § 701(6) martials the disqualification process before a single court where any criminal 
matter impacted by the disqualification is triable, limiting the risk of duplicative litigation and 
inconsistent results.  See Matter of Dondi v. Jones, 40 N.Y.2d 8, 15 (1976) (considering principles 
of comity in connection with application for a writ of prohibition to disqualify the AG from serving 
as special prosecutor and finding that, because petitioner had twice moved to dismiss the 
indictment on the same grounds raised in his application for writ of prohibition to disqualify the 
AG, his failure to make a third application to dismiss the indictment did not bar prohibition since 
a court ruling on the third application could not overrule the prior two decisions); see also Matter 
of Schneider v. Aulisi. 307 N.Y. 376, 382 (1954) (proceedings in multiple counties before courts 
of coordinate jurisdiction is disfavored because, even if not technically improper, as a matter of 
practice this “would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and would seriously 
interfere with the orderly administration of judicial work”). 
B. 
The proposed amendment raises new claims that lack merit. 
To the extent that Petitioner’s motion for leave to amend can be read as requesting leave 
to assert new factual allegations regarding the recent appointment of outside counsel to assist the 
AG with the investigation authorized by EO 64, any request to so amend must be denied because 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
19 of 30

--- Page 20 ---
12 
 
any claims directed at the appointment of outside counsel are wholly without merit.  See Gaul v. 
Cool Insuring Agency, Inc., 250 A.D.3d 1162, 1165 (3d Dep’t 2026) (motion for leave to amend 
was “appropriately denied” because proposed amendment failed to state clam with requisite 
particularity and allegations were otherwise insufficient to state a claim); Loch Sheldrake Beach 
& Tennis, Inc. v. Akulich, 141 A.D.3d 809, 811 (3d Dep’t 2016) (motion for leave to amend was 
improperly granted because claims in proposed amendment failed as a matter of law).   
Petitioner’s new factual allegations and contentions about the appointment of outside 
counsel reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of the constitutional predicate for criminal 
investigations and prosecutions.  See Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d at 577–579 (explaining constitutional 
grant of prosecutorial authority to the AG and district attorney, how they share prosecutorial 
powers, and constitutional basis for those officers to act); People v. Gilmour, 98 N.Y.2d 126, 129–
31 (2002) (explaining evolution of AG’s prosecutorial authority and basis for same as provided in 
the New York State Constitutional and Executive Law § 63).  Contrary to Petitioner’s contentions 
that the investigation must proceed without the AG’s involvement, in fact, it cannot.  See Viviani, 
36 N.Y.3d at 577 (finding it unconstitutional to create a special prosecutor other than AG or district 
attorney because this would “take[] an essential function from a constitutional officer and give[] it 
to a different officer chosen in a different manner”); see also People ex rel. Wogan v. Rafferty, 208 
N.Y. 451, 462 (1913) (finding it unconstitutional to take constitutional authority from 
constitutional officer and vest that authority outside of the constitutional officer without any 
involvement by the constitutional officer because it would deprive the constitutional officer of 
powers vested by the constitution and “interfere with the free exercise” of the officer’s duties and 
responsibilities).   
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
20 of 30

--- Page 21 ---
13 
 
The Legislature, apportioning prosecutorial authority between duly-elected constitutional 
law enforcement officers, vests: (1) district attorneys with generalized prosecutorial authority in 
the county where they are elected; and (2) the AG with specific state-wide prosecutorial authority 
that she may exercise only when authorized by statute.  See County Law § 700 (statutory delegation 
of general prosecutorial authority to district attorneys); Executive Law § 63 (statutory delegation 
of specific prosecutorial authority to the AG); see also People v. Romero, 91 N.Y.2d 750, 754 
(1998) (“District Attorneys have plenary prosecutorial power in the counties where they are 
elected” and “the Attorney-General has no such general authority . . . except when specifically 
authorized by statute”); Della Pietra v. State of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 792, 796 (1988) (district 
attorneys have “general prosecutorial authority for all crimes occurring in the county where 
elected” and the AG has “no general prosecutorial authority . . . except when specifically permitted 
by statute”).  Beyond these two officers, no other person holds prosecutorial authority, nor may 
such authority be delegated away to an unelected person.  See Viviani, 36 N.Y.3d at 577 (finding 
it unconstitutional to create a special prosecutor other than AG or district attorney because this 
would “take[] an essential function from a constitutional officer and give[] it to a different officer 
chosen in a different manner”); Matter of Haggerty v. Himelein, 89 N.Y.2d 431, 436 (1997) (“the 
constitutional, statutory, and common-law prosecutorial authority[,]” including “the discretionary 
power to determine whom, whether and how to prosecute a criminal matter” and “the responsibility 
and accountability” for those actions is “not freely transferable to anyone else”). 
Executive Law § 63(2) is a statutory delegation of prosecutorial authority that empowers 
the AG to exercise her prosecutorial authority whenever required by the Governor.  Exec. Law § 
63(2).  The Governor exercising her superseder authority under Executive Law § 63(2) has a single 
prosecutorial alternative to the district attorney—the AG.  Exec. Law § 63(2); see Viviani, 36 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
21 of 30

--- Page 22 ---
14 
 
N.Y.3d at 579; see also Wogan, 208 N.Y. at 462 (finding it unconstitutional to take constitutional 
authority from constitutional officer and vest that authority outside of the constitutional officer 
without any involvement by the constitutional officer because it would deprive the constitutional 
officer of powers vested by the constitution and “interfere with the free exercise” of the officer’s 
duties and responsibilities).  The AG acting in a superseder capacity wholly displaces the district 
attorney and strips all prosecutorial authority from the district attorney.  See Matter of Haggerty, 
89 N.Y.2d at 436 (when the Governor requires the AG to act, the AG supersedes the local district 
attorney “to assume the prosecutorial function” and “acquires all the powers and performs all the 
duties in respect of such actions or proceedings before a court or Grand Jury, which the district 
attorney would otherwise be authorized or required to exercise or perform.”); Matter of Carey 
(Fischer), 68 A.D.2d 220, 224–25 (4th Dep’t 1978) (“[a]n Attorney-General who supersedes a 
local [d]istrict [a]ttorney exercises all powers and performs all duties with respect thereto that the 
local [d]istrict [a]ttorney would otherwise perform”); Matter of Rice, 31 Misc.3d 838, 842 (Sup. 
Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2011) (recognizing that when Governor exercises her superseder authority under 
Executive Law § 63(2), she is removing power from the district attorney). 
Thus here, where the Governor has exercised her superseder authority to task the AG with 
the investigation authorized by EO 64, the district attorney is divested of any prosecutorial 
authority over that investigation and the only person with any prosecutorial authority to investigate 
this matter is the AG.  See Matter of Carey, 68 A.D.2d at 225; see also Matter of Haggerty, 89 
N.Y.2d at 436 (recognizing distinction between when AG is acting under superseder authority 
under Executive Law § 63(2) and fully displacing district attorney versus when AG and district 
attorney are working cooperatively together).  That ultimate prosecutorial authority cannot be 
further divested from the AG and installed in an unelected person.  See Matter of Schumer, 60 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
22 of 30

--- Page 23 ---
15 
 
N.Y.2d at 52 (prosecutor cannot delegate away ultimate prosecutorial responsibility and authority); 
see also Wogan, 36 N.Y.3d at 455–56 (constitutional authority cannot be taken away from a 
constitutional officer and given to a non-elected, non-constitutional officer); see also Matter of 
Working Families Party v. Fisher, 23 N.Y.3d 539, 546 (2014) (recognizing a strong “public 
interest in having prosecutorial duties preformed, where possible, by the constitutional officer 
chosen by the electorate”).  Rather, the AG, as the sole constitutional officer currently vested with 
the constitutional and statutory prosecutorial powers and responsibilities, must retain ultimate 
authority and control.  See People v. Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d 727, 728 (1995) (prosecutor “may allow 
appearances by public officers or private attorneys so long as they are kept aware” because 
prosecutors “retain the ultimate, nondelegable responsibility for prosecuting”).   
Though the AG may be assisted by an unelected person, as she will be here by the outside 
counsel, ultimate responsibility and accountability for the prosecution must remain with the AG 
and her complete exclusion from the investigation is constitutionally impermissible.  See Matter 
of Schumer, 60 N.Y.2d at 52 (district attorney could not transfer fundamental responsibilities of 
her office to unelected official); see also People v. Soddano, 86 N.Y.2d 727, 728 (1995) 
(prosecutor “may allow appearances by public officers or private attorneys so long as they are kept 
aware” because prosecutors “retain the ultimate, nondelegable responsibility for prosecuting”); 
Wogan, 208 N.Y. at 462 (constitutional authority vested in constitutional officer could not be 
vested outside of that constitutional officer).  In certain limited circumstances, County Law § 
701(6) permits further divestiture of the AG’s prosecutorial authority, but this further divestiture 
can only be done on application of the AG and in a superior criminal court in the county where the 
criminal matter is triable and permits transfer only to very specific alternatives.  County Law § 
701(6).  These statutory limitations are strictly construed because “a very important purpose is 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
23 of 30

--- Page 24 ---
16 
 
served by adhering to the plain language of the statute and to its exceptional function of displacing 
an elected constitutional officer.”  People v. Leahy, 72 N.Y.2d 510, 514 (1988); see People v. 
Callara, 44 N.Y.3d 623, 626 (2025) (requiring strict adherence to statutory process for transferring 
power from a prosecutor because of “the separation of powers concerns at play”). 
Furthermore, the writ of prohibition does not lie to compel this relief because the AG’s 
decision to appoint outside counsel, staffing decisions about who will work with the outside 
counsel, and ultimately how the investigation is conducted through outside counsel are all 
executive or administrative actions against which the writ of prohibition does not lie.  See Matter 
of Doe v. Cuomo, 71 A.D.3d 889, 889 (2d Dep’t 2010) (writ of prohibition did not lie against 
investigation into alleged violation of immunity agreement because such action is executive in 
nature); McGraw v. Shapiro, 56 A.D.2d 624 (2d Dep’t 1977) (writ of prohibition did not lie against 
employment decisions because such actions are administrative in nature); see also Matter of Soares 
v. Carter, 25 N.Y.3d 1013 (2015) (recognizing the “broad authority and discretion . . . to conduct 
all phases of criminal prosecution” as an “executive power”).  Further, Petitioner has no clear legal 
right to any relief because neither he, nor this Court, may dictate how any prosecutor, including 
the AG or any designee, perform their job responsibilities or exercise their prosecutorial discretion.  
See Matter of Staten Is. Branch of the Nat’s Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People v. State 
of N.Y. Grievance Comm. for the Second, Eleventh & Thirteenth Jud. Dists., 144 A.D.3d 412, 413 
(1st Dep’t 2016); Matter of Columbia Cnty. Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Mar. 20, 2013 
(Czajka), 118 A.D.3d 1081, 1083 (3d Dep’t 2014); Matter of Donnaruma v. Carter, 41 Misc. 3d 
195, 210–11 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cnty. 2013).   
Likewise, a writ of prohibition should not issue as a matter of discretion given the 
availability of other adequate remedies available to Petitioner if he is eventually indicted and 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
24 of 30

--- Page 25 ---
17 
 
prosecuted.  See Matter of Whitehurst v. Kavanagh, 218 A.D.2d 366, 368–69 (3d Dep’t 1996) 
(affirming denial of writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit district attorney from proceeding with 
prosecution of indictment because petitioner could raise his claims “by moving against the 
indictment” and “the ordeal of a criminal trial with the possibility of conviction, standing along is 
not sufficiently harmful to warrant the use of prohibition even if the harm sought to be redressed 
implicates a constitutional right”); see also People v. Riccio, 91 A.D.2d 693, 694 (3d Dep’t 1982) 
(direct appeal from criminal conviction considering criminal defendant’s claim that prosecution 
by AG acting pursuant to Executive Order made in exercise of Governor’s superseder authority 
was improper or beyond scope of AG’s authority).   
Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for leave to amend to add new factual allegations 
regarding the appointment of outside counsel should be denied because these new factual 
allegations are wholly without merit.  See Capicotto v. Western N.Y. Med. Mgt., LLC, 247 A.D.3d 
1492, 1494 (4th Dep’t 2026) (motion court properly denied motion for leave to amend because 
proposed amendment was patently devoid of merit “where it fails to cure any of the defects that 
warranted dismissal”); Singh v. T-Mobile. 232 A.D.3d 662, 667 (2d Dep’t 2024) (motion court 
properly denied motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment “was palpably 
insufficient and patently devoid of merit, as it failed to cure any of the defects that warranted 
dismissal”); Spada v. Aspen Univ., Inc., 202 A.D.3d 494, 495 (1st Dep’t 2022) (motion court 
properly denied motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment “would not cure the 
deficiency” in the original pleading). 
C. 
The proposed amendment does not cure the procedural and substantive 
defects that mandate dismissal of the Verified Petition. 
Finally, leave to amend must also be denied because the proposed amendment does not 
cure the numerous other procedural and substantive defects that require dismissal of the Verified 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
25 of 30

--- Page 26 ---
18 
 
Petition and preclude this Court from granting relief.  See Matter of Town of Verona v. Cuomo, 
136 A.D.3d 36, 45 (3d Dep’t 2015) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying cross-
motion to amend because proposed amendment was “plainly lacking in merit” where petitioners 
lacked standing and court lacked jurisdiction over dispute); Swergold v. Cuomo, 70 A.D.3d 1290, 
1294 (3d Dep’t 2010) (motion court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for leave to 
amend because proposed amendment “suffer[ed] from the same jurisdictional deficiencies” and 
“also would have been dismissed in its entirety”); Matter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v. New York 
State Dep’t of Health, 46 A.D.3d 962, 964 (3d Dep’t 2007) (affirming motion court determination 
that denied motion for leave to amend because claims in proposed amendment were substantively 
meritless). 
As detailed in Respondents’ answering papers, Petitioner’s claim fails three important 
justiciability criteria—ripeness, standing, and presentation of a political question.  Dkt. No. 21 at 
pp. 5–20.  These threshold considerations are dispositive and not cured by the proposed 
amendment.  See Matter of Shelter Is. Assn. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Shelter Is., 57 
A.D.3d 907, 908–10 (2d Dep’t 2008) (finding “Supreme Court did not err in denying . . . 
petitioner’s cross motion which was for leave to amend the petition . . . as none of the petitioners, 
including the four additional petitioners that the original petitioners sought to add had standing”); 
see also Matter of Johnson v. Pataki, 91 N.Y.2d 214, 223 (1997) (judicial review of the Governor’s 
exercise of her superseder authority “is generally limited to determining whether the State 
Constitution or the Legislature has empowered the Governor to act and does not include the 
manner in which the Governor chooses to discharge that authority”); Matter of Schumer, 60 
N.Y.2d at 55–56 (request to disqualify prosecutor raised separation of powers concerns and “was 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
26 of 30

--- Page 27 ---
19 
 
premature and not justiciable” because it was made before information about how prosecution 
might play out was known).   
Similarly, as also discussed in Respondents’ answering papers, Petitioner’s claim is 
procedurally improper because the writ of prohibition does not lie against executive action or in 
the absence of a clear legal right to relief.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 22–28.  Neither defect is remedied 
by the proposed amendment as the claim in the proposed amendment is identical to the claim 
alleged in the original petition, both of which impermissibly seek a writ of prohibition against 
executive action and do not identify any clear entitlement to relief.  See Matter of Wechsler v. New 
York State Adirondack Park Agency, 85 A.D.3d 1378, 1379 (3d Dep’t 2011); see also Matter of 
McGinley v. Hynes, 51 N.Y.2d 116, 123–25 (1980) (writ of prohibition did not lie against 
investigative activities of special prosecutor because investigation “had not yet progressed to a 
stage where individual wrongdoers had been identified or discrete charges of criminality raised”).   
These procedural defects notwithstanding, and as also discussed in Respondents’ 
answering papers, issuance of the writ of prohibition is also not warranted as a matter of this 
Court’s discretion.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 28–31.  Further, Petitioner fails to establish any actual 
prejudice that would require disqualification of the AG.  Dkt. No. 21 at pp. 31–35.  Nothing in the 
proposed amendment addresses these defects.  See People v. Zinkhen, 89 A.D.3d 1319, 1320 (3d 
Dep’t 2011) (criminal court did not err in denying motion to dismiss indictment that alleged the 
prosecutor should be disqualified because did not provide proof of any actual prejudice and only 
asserted “an inference of impropriety, which is not enough on its own to require [the c]ourt to 
dismiss the indictment or disqualify the District Attorney’s office”); People v. Walton, 214 A.D.2d 
805, 808–09 (3d Dep’t 1995) (denying CPL 440 motion “[a]lleging that statements made by the 
prosecutor to the press constituted prosecutorial misconduct and that he was the victim of selective 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
27 of 30

--- Page 28 ---
20 
 
prosecution” because defendant failed to show that he was prejudiced or that this resulted in 
selective application of the law and defendant otherwise had ability to protect his rights through 
other means at trial and in pre-trial motions); see also People v. National Rifle Assn. of Am., Inc., 
223 A.D.3d 84, 90–91 (1st Dep’t 2023) (AG’s public statements that “displayed animus” towards 
defendant organization did not amount to selective prosecution); Matter of People v. Trump Org., 
Inc., 205 A.D.3d 625, 626–27 (1st Dep’t 2022) (AG’s public statements about subject of subpoenas 
did not did not amount to selective prosecution).   
Accordingly, the proposed amendment is devoid of merit such that Petitioner’s motion for 
leave to amend must be denied.  See Matter of Bolofsky v. City of New York, 205 A.D.3d 515, 515-
16 (1st Dep’t 2022) (finding “Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion to deny leave to 
amend to add additional parties after respondents challenged the standing of petitioner” because 
“petitioners cannot show that they will actually be harmed by the challenged administrative action 
as the harm is entirely conjectural”); Matter of Perkins v. Town of Dryden Planning Bd., 172 
A.D.3d 1695, 1697–98 (3d Dep’t 2019) (finding “no abuse of discretion by Supreme Court in 
denying the motion for leave to amend the petition” because the proposed amendment “is devoid 
of merit”); Ferguson v. Hart, 151 A.D.3d 1242, 1243–45 (3d Dep’t 2017) (reversing motion court 
determination that granted motion for leave to amend because proposed amendment was “palpably 
insufficient on its face” since claims were inconsistent with applicable law).    
CONCLUSION 
Respondents respectfully request that Petitioner’s motion for leave to amend be denied in 
its entirety and with prejudice. 
 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
28 of 30

--- Page 29 ---
21 
 
 
Dated: Albany, New York 
 
November 16, 2026 
 
LETITIA JAMES 
Attorney General of the State of New York 
Attorney for Respondents Kathy Hochul, 
Governor of the State of New York, and 
Letitia James, New York State Attorney 
General 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York  12224 
 
 
By: _/s/ Kaitlin Vigars___________ 
Kaitlin Vigars 
Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel 
Telephone:  (518) 776-2036 
Fax: (518) 915-7738  (Not for service of papers) 
 
 
TO: 
All counsel of record (via NYSCEF) 
 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
29 of 30

--- Page 30 ---
Printed [Reproduced] on Recycled Paper 
22 
 
STATEMENT PURSUANT TO 22 NYCRR 202.8-b 
 
I, Kaitlin Vigars, affirm under penalty of perjury pursuant to CPLR 2106 that the total 
number of words in the foregoing Memorandum of Law, inclusive of point headings and footnotes 
and exclusive of pages containing the caption, table of contents, table of authorities, and signature 
block, is 6,776 words. The foregoing Memorandum of Law complies with the word count limit set 
forth in 22 NYCRR 202.8-b. In determining the number of words in the foregoing Memorandum 
of Law, I relied upon the word count of the word-processing system used to prepare the document.  
 
/s/ Kaitlin Vigars 
                                     
 
 
Kaitlin Vigars 
 
 
 
FILED: ALBANY COUNTY CLERK 11/16/2026 05:45 PM
INDEX NO. 911974-26
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 34
RECEIVED NYSCEF: 11/16/2026
30 of 30

## Transcript



## Machine-readable JSON

https://lucycraig.blog/media/786/index.json