TO JUSTICE PERRY-BOND: A WARNING IS NOT A GAG ORDER. AND YOUR COURTROOM IS NOT OUR NEWSROOM.

Editorial position — not a court filing

By the Administrators of LucyCraig.blog. On October 23, 2026, Justice Phaedra Perry-Bond signed a decision granting the plaintiff leave to proceed under the pseudonym “Jane Doe.” The order also includes a caution about supposed threats and cyberstalking by unspecified members of the public. We object to any suggestion that lawful investigation, reporting, or harsh criticism should be tarred with those allegations. We condemn threats, stalking, criminal harassment, and retaliation against every participant in this controversy, whether plaintiff, defendant, lawyer, journalist, witness, or judge.

We will not manufacture a contempt dispute where the order has not created one. On its face, the operative disclosure restraint names the parties, their counsel, the parties’ agents, and the county clerk’s office — not all independent journalists, all internet users, or LucyCraig.blog as a named respondent. We therefore refuse the absurd leap from “the court permits a litigant to use a pseudonym” to “the court dictates every word used by every independent publisher.”

I. THE ORDER: WHAT IT REALLY SAYS, RATHER THAN WHAT ANYONE WISHES IT SAID

A. The ruling on the motion

“plaintiff’s motion seeking to proceed in this action under the pseudonym of ‘Jane Doe’ is granted.”

NYSCEF Doc. 86, decision p. 1 (PDF p. 1).

That is a ruling about the manner in which a litigant proceeds in this action. We do not dispute the court’s power to regulate the case caption, pleadings, and filing practice in a proceeding before it. We do dispute any suggestion that this alone gives the court an open-ended, worldwide publishing franchise.

B. The court expressly recognizes that anonymity is not automatic

“Permission to proceed in litigation using a pseudonym is not granted automatically”

Decision p. 1 (PDF p. 1), citing Twersky v. Yeshiva Univ., 201 A.D.3d 559 (1st Dep’t 2022).

The judge then describes the need to weigh privacy against openness and potential prejudice. That is precisely why a pseudonymity ruling cannot logically be treated as an irrebuttable judgment that every public discussion about this controversy is forbidden. The court’s own analysis acknowledges competing rights.

C. The court describes allegations — not criminal findings against this publication

“widespread reports of certain malicious actors’ behavior”

Decision p. 3 (PDF p. 3; repeated in the PDF on p. 4).

The phrase refers to reports described by the court. It does not identify LucyCraig.blog as the actor, supply a finding that this publication threatened anyone, or adjudicate a criminal charge. Editorial disagreement with the plaintiff or the bench must not be lumped into a fog of vague accusations. The judicial adjective “malicious” does not relieve anyone of the duty to prove specific wrongful conduct if specific people are accused.

D. The court’s cyberstalking warning is a caution, not a conviction

“cyberstalking and engaging in or encouraging threats across state lines”

Decision p. 3 (PDF p. 3; duplicated on PDF p. 4).

The order warns that those acts can constitute crimes. We agree that genuine threats and cyberstalking can be prosecuted. We deny that our editorial work constitutes either. A court's warning about genuine crime is not a factual finding about every writer who disputes the plaintiff’s account. Criticism is not a threat. Public-record analysis is not surveillance. Refusing to be impressed by a judicial pronouncement is not stalking.

E. Most importantly, read the actual command and its actual subjects

“the parties, their counsel, the parties’ agents, and the New York County Clerk’s office shall refrain from publicly disclosing plaintiff’s identity”

Decision p. 5 (PDF p. 6), operative ORDERED paragraph.

There are the operative words. They identify the persons and institutional actors whose public disclosures are restricted by that clause. It does not read “all members of the public.” It does not read “all news organizations.” It does not name LucyCraig.blog. Anyone suggesting otherwise should quote the language supposedly doing that work.

We recognize the accompanying directions also govern the documents filed in the action. The court orders that filings use the pseudonym and omit sensitive personal information. That is a real restriction affecting filings and the identified participants; it is not fairly characterized as a universal command to strangers to this lawsuit.

F. The order leaves room for discovery and possible later changes

“the restraints issued today may be considered a ‘placeholder’”

Decision p. 5 (PDF p. 6).

The judge recognizes that disclosure rules could change as litigation proceeds. The order also authorizes specified private disclosures to people involved in discovery and investigation, subject to conditions. Thus, the court itself does not treat anonymity as an absolute barrier to every use of identifying information under every circumstance.

II. THIS PUBLICATION’S EDITORIAL POSITION ON THE PLAINTIFF’S NAME

Let us make the distinction unmistakable: we accept that the plaintiff’s formal litigation designation is “Jane Doe.” We do not accept that the caption automatically controls how a genuinely independent, nonparty publisher describes matters outside the judicial proceeding. The publication has previously identified the plaintiff by the name “Lucy Craig” and asserts that it acquired the identifying information by lawful means. We maintain our position that nonparty reporting is entitled to independent legal analysis, rather than being treated as if it were itself a filing by a party.

We intend to maintain editorial independence over our naming conventions, consistent with applicable law, verifiable information, and the distinction between a public-interest purpose and gratuitous exposure of private details. A lawful source, truthful publication, statutory protections, and any orders actually binding on a publisher must all be considered. We will not pretend that foreign hosting or the invocation of the First Amendment grants a magic exemption from every such consideration.

It is the legal scope of the order that matters. We will not let a party-specific directive be casually inflated into something it never expressly says.

III. THE SUPREME COURT CASES THIS CONTROVERSY CANNOT IGNORE

A. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)

The Supreme Court protected publication of a rape victim’s identity taken from public judicial records. It is a significant precedent for truthful reporting about judicial affairs, though its result depends on the public-record context. It does not authorize theft of sealed materials or every conceivable form of harassment. Read the decision.

B. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)

The Court invalidated damages imposed on a newspaper under the particular circumstances in which it had lawfully obtained a complainant’s identifying information from a publicly released police report. The case is especially pertinent because it takes sexual-offense privacy seriously while also demanding that government burdens on truthful publication pass stringent constitutional examination. This is a contextual holding, not an unlimited license. Read the decision.

C. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)

The Court protected, on the facts presented, disclosure of information concerning a public issue by speakers who had not participated in the unlawful interception. The distinction between acquisition, participation in illegality, and publication matters. Read the decision.

D. Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976)

The Supreme Court subjected judicial restraints on reporting to exacting review. It is a serious warning against the idea that proceedings become easier to manage when press speech can simply be switched off. Read the decision.

E. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)

The former is foundational to vigorous public-official criticism; the latter illustrates constitutional protection for intensely offensive expression on matters of public concern. Nobody owes a public official soothing language, judicial genuflection, or a flattering headline. Read Sullivan. Read Snyder.

IV. THE NEW YORK APPELLATE CASE CITED BY THE JUDGE MAKES THE LAW MORE NUANCED, NOT LESS

The order relies on N.S. v. Frankenhoff, 215 A.D.3d 592 (1st Dep’t 2023). The First Department approved pseudonymity but vacated an overbroad restriction that prevented a defendant from making necessary private disclosures. Significantly, the appellate court acknowledged that a defendant may be restrained from publishing an anonymous plaintiff’s name in appropriate circumstances. That is a real limitation on any simplistic assertion that “the First Amendment always beats pseudonymity.”

But the same decision shows why tailoring and procedural context matter. The appellate court did not declare every person who learns a name to be automatically bound by a lawsuit’s protective order. Nor does that case relieve a proponent of censorship from establishing the actual reach and validity of an injunction against a particular speaker. Read the official First Department opinion.

We are arguing for precision, not impunity. If a legal restraint is asserted against this publication, identify the exact restraint, the party to whom it applies, the jurisdictional basis, and the process by which it was imposed. Otherwise stop pretending that a generalized warning is a substitute for a binding adjudication.

V. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 50-b IS NOT A FREE-FLOATING PRIVATE CENSORSHIP LICENSE

The court quotes New York Civil Rights Law § 50-b, addressing confidentiality of identifying information in the custody of public officers and employees. The provision imposes important duties regarding government records and disclosures; it should be read according to its terms, not converted into an all-purpose assertion that every independent publication is automatically prohibited from mentioning anything the court wishes concealed.

At the same time, we do not dismiss victim privacy. The exact source of material, whether information was publicly and lawfully available, the publication’s relationship to the parties, and applicable court orders may bear heavily on the legal analysis. Read the statute.

VI. ACTUAL STALKING HAS LEGAL ELEMENTS. AN OFFENSIVE OPINION DOES NOT SATISFY THEM.

Federal stalking law, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A, addresses specified intentional courses of conduct using interstate or foreign-commerce facilities and causing or reasonably expected to cause the harms described in the statute. It is not a general “your criticism annoys me” statute. The statutory language matters; intentions, conduct, consequences, and the evidentiary record matter. Read the federal statute.

If an individual makes a true threat or stalks someone, law enforcement should investigate. If someone is criticized over a judicial ruling, that is not automatically a criminal offense. Conflating the two is legally sloppy and institutionally dangerous. We will not apologize for forceful reporting merely because somebody dresses up indignation as criminal-law theater.

VII. THE DELETEME EPISODE: SHOW THE AUTHORIZATION, SHOW THE LEGAL BASIS, OR STOP THE BLUSTER

Our October 22 article concerning an apparent DeleteMe removal demand describes a request for removal of material relating to Justice Perry-Bond and criticizes its asserted legal justification. That prior story is our published account, not a judicial finding about who authorized the communication, who paid for it, or whether any public funds were involved.

We want the chain of authority documented. Was the communication sent with the judge’s knowledge? Who retained or directed its sender? What specific allegedly unlawful content was identified? On what basis was removal demanded? These are legitimate questions, not findings of wrongdoing. We will not convert suspicion into fact simply to make a nastier headline.

But the principle is not remotely negotiable: if a government official uses official power to suppress constitutionally protected criticism, serious First Amendment questions arise. A private legal notice, standing alone, does not automatically prove state censorship. The facts determine that issue. And if the point of a notice is to frighten a publisher into surrendering lawful criticism without a sound legal basis, the proper response is pointed scrutiny, public documentation, and, where warranted, lawful challenge.

Put less delicately: a threatening-looking letter is not a fucking substitute for a valid legal argument. Public officials are not entitled to buy themselves a reputation scrubber at the expense of public debate.

VIII. FOREIGN HOSTING DOES NOT CREATE IMMUNITY — AND NEW YORK DOES NOT OWN THE PLANET

Our site’s foreign hosting is relevant to jurisdiction, enforcement, and conflicts of law. It is not an absolute shield. Certain U.S. statutes explicitly address cross-border conduct, and courts can have jurisdiction over persons or entities with sufficient contacts even when infrastructure is abroad. Any contrary claim would be foolish.

Equally foolish is pretending that a state-court order in one civil dispute instantly becomes a global publishing code applicable to every foreign-based journalist. A party seeking relief against an independent publisher must establish a legal basis for binding that publisher and comply with the relevant procedural and constitutional requirements. The internet does not end at the Hudson River. Nor does an injunction acquire planetary reach through a judge’s frustration.

IX. WE REQUEST LEGAL PRECISION, NOT YOUR APPROVAL

X. CONCLUSION — THE FOUNDERS DID NOT CREATE AN EXCEPTION FOR OFFENDED JUDGES

Your Honor, you can enforce lawful rulings over the parties and proceedings properly before you. You can protect legitimate confidentiality interests within the boundaries of law. You can criticize journalism you dislike. But no judge acquires ownership of public debate by putting the word “ORDERED” at the top of a page.

We reject stalking. We reject threats. We reject intimidation. We reject the equally corrosive notion that protected political and legal commentary may be made to disappear simply by invoking criminal-law vocabulary in the vicinity of a controversial website.

We will continue examining the complaint, defenses, evidence, reported developments, attorney conduct, judicial rulings, and matters of public significance. We will distinguish allegations from findings and confront attempts to suppress lawful coverage with argument, sources, and more reporting.

A judge is a public official, not a constitutional monarch. When criticism is rude, pointed, or embarrassing, the judicial response still must remain within the law. If that is an unwelcome arrangement, take it up with the First Amendment — not with the people exercising it.

— The Administrators of LucyCraig.blog

This is a public editorial response, not a motion, appearance, objection filed on the docket, or legal determination of any party’s rights. References to what the publication asserts are not independent judicial findings.